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Globalisation, Education and Development: Ideas, Actors and Dynamics

Susan L. Robertson, Mario Novelli, Roger Dale, Leon Tikly, Hillary Dachi and Ndibelema Alphonce

Centre for Globalisation, Education and Societies
University of Bristol, UK

Globalisation, Education and Development: Ideas, Actors and Dynamics is the outcome of a State of the Art Synthetic Review of the literature on Globalisation, Education and Development. This volume reports the findings of a 14 month-long project commissioned by the Department for International Development (DfID) where we reviewed the literature on key global actors, their policies and programmes on development as is mediated through education. The purpose of this review is to provide a base for informed policymaking and programme implementation. The focus of this particular project was on the policies and programmes of the multilateral and supranational organisations, such as those tied to the system of global governance, that have implications for countries in alleviating poverty and in meeting the Millennium Development Goals. It was led by a team from the Centre for Globalisation, Education and Societies - Susan Robertson, Mario Novelli, Roger Dale and Leon Tikly at the University of Bristol, and Hillary Dachi and Ndibelema Alphonse at the University of Dar es Salaam.

The dissemination of the research is taking a number of different forms. Three research seminars were conducted over 2005: one in Arusha, Tanzania in September, 2005 organised by our colleagues, Hillary Dachi and Alphonse Ndibela; one with the Chongqing Technology and Business University Chongqing, China in September, 2005, and one organised by Sangeeta Kamat at the India International Center, New Delhi in October, 2005. Papers were presented at all of these seminars from our ongoing work, and received excellent comment and feedback. A CD-ROM is available of the New Delhi and Chongqing conferences. Members of the Bristol team have had the opportunity to present the preliminary findings of the study to a range of seminar and conference audiences in the UK, Spain, Turkey and the United States of America. A database from the Bristol DfID project will be located at the University of Dar es Salaam to enable further capacity building. Short policy briefing papers on aspects of the project of direct interest to policymakers and programme directors are available on the Centre for Globalisation, Education and Societies website: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/education/research/centres/ges/globeddev

This project has depended on a number of collaborative efforts. We particularly want to thank Jim Keery and Hazel Bines at DfID for their enthusiasm and support for our efforts, Hazel Bines for her brilliant job of editing, and our anonymous reviewers for their insightful and incisive comments. We also appreciated the opportunity to develop our work in collaboration with the other teams; this enabled us to share knowledge and add considerably more value to our work than is otherwise the case with single-track projects. We’d like to thank the members of the ODI and Institute of Education London teams for their contributions to the meetings that we held to progress our work, for their openness in talking about their own work and commenting on ours, and for being willing to share in the opportunity to disseminate our work together.

Within the Bristol team, the Bristol-located personnel valued very much our collaboration with old friends from the University of Dar es Salaam; Hillary Dachi and Ndibelema Alphonse. This made our collective work much richer, grounding it in developments within the African region.

Within the Graduate School of Education, Nikki Hicks and Valerie Aspin provided us with excellent administrative and financial support.

Finally, in the headache stage, of the preparation of the manuscript for final publication, Nick Souček’s meticulous matching of references to text, his filling in the gaps, and means for making our joint efforts appear as seamless as possible, together with Bianca Souček’s management of the visual images, made our task so much easier. We would like to extend a big thank you for their efforts.
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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAU</td>
<td>Association of African Universities</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADEA</td>
<td>Association for the Development of African Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGLI</td>
<td>African Great Lakes Initiative, also referred to as GLI</td>
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<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AVU</td>
<td>African Virtual University</td>
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<td>BBG</td>
<td>Broadcasting Board of Governors</td>
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<td>BPA</td>
<td>Beijing Platform for Action</td>
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<td>BWI</td>
<td>Bretton Woods Institutions</td>
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<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Common Market</td>
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<td>CATIA</td>
<td>Catalysing Access to ICT in Africa</td>
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<td>CBFIL</td>
<td>Computer-Based Functional Literacy</td>
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<td>CDF</td>
<td>Comprehensive Development Framework</td>
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<td>CFA</td>
<td>Commission for Africa</td>
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<td>CICE</td>
<td>Centre for International Development (at Harvard University)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoSCAR</td>
<td>Comprehensive, Systematic, Critical and Accessible Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSGR</td>
<td>Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSI</td>
<td>Coalition of Service Industries</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>DiID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DRUID</td>
<td>Danish Research Unit for Industrial Dynamics</td>
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<td>EACM</td>
<td>East African Common Market</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>ECLAC</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
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<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>(UN) Economic and Social Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFA</td>
<td>Education for All</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFA-FTI</td>
<td>Education for All - Fast Track Initiative</td>
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<td>ELD</td>
<td>Export Led Development</td>
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<td>ESRC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Research Council</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUA</td>
<td>European Universities Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAWE</td>
<td>Forum for African Women Educationalists</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>FEMSA</td>
<td>Female Education in Mathematics and Science In Africa</td>
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<td>GAO</td>
<td>(US) Government Accountability Office</td>
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<td>GATS</td>
<td>General Agreement on Trade in Services</td>
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<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GLI</td>
<td>Great Lakes Initiative (also referred to as AGLI)</td>
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<td>HE</td>
<td>Higher Education</td>
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<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Heavily Indebted Poor Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>HMSO</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Stationery Office</td>
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<td>ICESCR</td>
<td>International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>ICTA</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technology</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IDS</td>
<td>Institute of Development Studies</td>
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<td>IDT</td>
<td>International Development Targets</td>
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<td>IFF</td>
<td>International Finance Facility</td>
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<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institution</td>
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<td>IIEP</td>
<td>International Institution for Education Planning</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>INEE</td>
<td>Interagency Network for Education in Emergencies</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organisations</td>
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<td>IP</td>
<td>Intellectual Property</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>Import Substitution Industrialisation</td>
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<td>ISPAD</td>
<td>Information Society Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>IUCEA</td>
<td>Inter-University Council for East Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>IZA</td>
<td>Institute for the Study of Labour</td>
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<td>KAM</td>
<td>Knowledge Assessment Methodology</td>
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<td>LaRRI</td>
<td>Labour Resource and Research Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>Less Developed Countries</td>
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<td>LLGKE</td>
<td>Lifelong Learning for the Global Knowledge Economy</td>
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<td>MCA</td>
<td>Millennium Challenge Account</td>
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<td>MCC</td>
<td>Millennium Challenge Corporation</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MERCOSUR</td>
<td>Mercado Común del Sur (Southern Common Market)</td>
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<td>MFN</td>
<td>Most Favoured-Nation status</td>
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<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>NCE</td>
<td>Neoclassical Economic Theory</td>
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<td>NED</td>
<td>National Endowment for Democracy</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for African Development</td>
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<td>National Grid for Learning</td>
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<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NIC</td>
<td>Newly Industrialised Countries</td>
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<td>NIE</td>
<td>New Institutional Economics</td>
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<td>NIEO</td>
<td>New International Economic Order</td>
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<td>NORRAG</td>
<td>Network for Policy Review Research and Advice on Education and Training</td>
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<td>NPM</td>
<td>New Public Management</td>
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<td>NSI</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation for African Unity</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development</td>
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<td>OVC</td>
<td>Orphans and Vulnerable Children</td>
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<td>PEPFAR</td>
<td>President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief</td>
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<td>Political Economy Research Centre</td>
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<td>PPPs</td>
<td>Public Private Partnerships</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers</td>
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<td>PwC</td>
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<td>R&amp;D</td>
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<td>RBM</td>
<td>Results Based Management</td>
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<td>RoR</td>
<td>Rates-of-Return</td>
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<td>SACHE</td>
<td>South African Council on Higher Education</td>
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<td>Southern and Eastern African Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNCTAD</td>
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<td>UPE</td>
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<td>US/USA</td>
<td>United States (of America)</td>
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Executive Summary

Since the mid 1980s there has been an explosion of interest in the idea of globalisation. Throughout this period there has also been an unprecedented rise in prominence and influence of a range of multilateral and supranational organisations, such as those tied into the system of global governance. There is now a thickening web of multilateral agreements, global and regional institutions and regimes as well as trans-governmental policy networks and summits that characterise the global economy and polity. Correspondingly, there have also been shifts in the nature of global production networks and the increasing penetration of multinational corporations and International Financial Institutions across the planet. The period has also produced new social inequalities across the world, particularly as a result of economic globalisation.

Education is implicated in these transformations. It is seen as having an important role to play in these processes, with investment in people, skills and knowledge becoming essential for countries wishing to participate in the global economy.

In this volume we examine the relationship between globalisation, education and development based upon a review of policies and programmes developed at a supranational level (global and regional) that have implications for countries in meeting the Millennium Development Goals. We also review the literature on current policies intended to alleviate deepening poverty and inequality of access to infrastructures and public services. Our focus is particularly on sub-Saharan Africa, where these trends are most acute, and where there have been renewed calls for development policies that address the challenges of globalisation that are currently shaping Africa.

This volume is made up of three parts: in Part I, we locate educational policy and internal debates on education (education politics) within a broader historical and international political economy framework. Specifically, we explore education as a sector embedded within a complex system of local, national, regional and global actors, institutions and practices (politics of education). In Part II, we examine a series of broad themes that relate multilateral and bi-lateral educational policy initiatives in low-income countries in order to understand whether and how processes of globalisation, particularly though not exclusively economic, have altered the terrain upon which education policies and programmes are now constructed. In Part III, we draw together a series of conclusions that arise from the first two parts of book.

Our methodology, CoSCAR is introduced in Chapter 1: Introduction. CoSCAR is a comprehensive, systematic, critical and accessible review of literature on globalisation, education and development. More than two thousand pieces of text were considered and entered into a database: papers, books, reports, web-based material, and so on. We mainly reviewed material published in English. We also reviewed relevant literature in Spanish and a small amount of literature in French.

Chapter 2: Key Concepts and Debates is reported in two halves. In the first half, we introduce key terms used throughout the review. We argue how we think about processes such as ‘globalisation’, ‘development’ and ‘education’, are dependent upon how we define and understand them. In the second half we review the literature assessing the affect of contemporary economic (neo-liberal) globalisation on social development.

Globalisation is a relatively new term and there are considerable differences amongst writers as to how best to interpret this phenomenon. In reviewing the literature, we are convinced that globalisation involves ‘new’ phenomena as well as involving continuities with the past. It is a discourse that is anchored in the material world, it has real material effects, and involves shifts in how we see and explain the world.

A key element of globalisation is the thickening of multilateral interactions and interconnections in the global governance landscape. The traditional International Organisations (IOs), such as the UN institutions (World Bank, UNESCO and ECLAC) and the OECD, are now joined by an expanding array of non-governmental international organisations and transnational firms. We show that, though the multilateral institutions have had a long-standing interest in education, the nature and form of this interest has changed over time. The World Bank, for instance, while initially reluctant to involve itself in education, has become a major—albeit controversial—investor in education. The controversy surrounding the World Bank’s education programmes lies largely in its conception of education and development as human capital for economic growth and its ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach.

The growth of globalisation has been paralleled by a resurgence of regionalism – leading to the emergence of major regional blocs: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European Union (EU) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) agreement. These have been added to by a proliferation of other regional agreements, including MERCOSUR (Latin America), CARICOM (Caribbean countries) and ASEAN (Asian economies not including the USA), among others. However, within this literature, education is usually conceptualised narrowly in relation to trade and economic development.

In comparison with globalisation, the term ‘development’ has an older history that can be traced to the post Second World War period. Much of the writing during this period was underpinned by modernisation theory. Most famously enunciated over a decade later in Rostow’s (1960) The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, modernisation theory was the dominant explanation of how low-income countries could improve the living conditions of their populations by following a set of prescriptive policies to ensure economic ‘take off’. Within modernisation theory, education was to unlock the door to modernisation (through the development of
countries undergoing SAPs, the outcomes varied. However, the literature suggests that while educational pol...adjusted for the centre’s survival and the periphery’s stagnation.

For both modernisation and dependency theorists, the state was the key catalyst for national economic development. Yet, by the 1980s, a radical neo-classical economic critique emerged that had a strong preference for markets as the mechanism through which production, distribution and consumption within an international economy should be efficiently managed. From then on, neo-liberalism has dominated development policy and programmes. It has also given economic globalisation its central characteristics.

An important question then is whether neo-liberal policies have delivered the promised levels of growth for all. Reviewing the evidence, there is good reason to feel less confident about neo-liberal models of economic and social development. We examine three key reports; the ILO (2004), the UN (2005a) and the UNDP (2005), around five themes: integration, inadequacy of growth, informalisation, inequality and poverty and inadequate human resources. All three reports are deeply concerned with the nature of global economic integration that has taken place over the last two decades. Asia and the Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean have seen marked increases in FDI, while Africa and Central and Eastern Europe have seen little growth. Africa has been left out of the process of FDI, leading some commentators to talk of a ‘Fourth World’ excluded from capitalist development.

Despite more than 20 years of restructuring, global economic growth rates have remained relatively low when taken as a mean average compared with earlier periods. Africa has entered into freefall. The two countries that show most economic growth are China and India. Ironically, China and India demonstrate strong levels of state intervention in the economy and a highly selective and strategic engagement with free trade while producing high levels of economic growth. This offers a direct challenge to the dominant economic model—neo-liberalism. Advocates of neo-liberal policies continue to argue that minimal state intervention and market mechanisms will be sufficient to promote economic growth.

The effects of neo-liberal restructuring are most evident in the rising unemployment and informalisation of labour. Youth unemployment rates are particularly high across all regions. Neo-liberal globalisation has also affected poverty and inequality. While the number of people worldwide living in absolute poverty declined significantly, from 1,237 million in 1990 to 1,100 million in 2000, most of this is accounted for by changes in China and India (38 % of the world’s population). If China and India are removed from these calculations, then we see a rise in poverty and inequality.

There is evidence of rising inequalities, including in China and India. The UNDP notes that the world’s richest 500 individuals have a combined income greater than that of the poorest 416 million. The 2.5 billion people living on less than $2 a day (40% of the world’s population) account for 5% of global income, while the richest 10% (almost all living in high-income countries) account for 54%. The UNDP argue that if a pro-poor redistributive model of growth was applied, poverty could be halved in Brazil 19 years earlier, and in Kenya within 17 years.

Spending on education as % of GDP over the 1990s has seen a downward spiral in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, fairly stagnant in the Middle East and North Africa (around 5%) (ILO 2004: 47), and has moved downwards in sub-Saharan Africa, from 4.5% down to just over 4%. Only Latin America has seen a steady rise in educational spending from 3% to 4.5%. However, there is a continued concern with the gender dimension of educational access. For example, the data for 2001 indicates that females are less likely to be enrolled in secondary school, except in Latin America and the Caribbean and in North America and Western Europe. However, between 1998 and 2001, net secondary enrolment among young women improved markedly in Latin America and the Caribbean.

While education is seen as the medium through which inequalities can be tackled, it is also the medium through which “the worst forms of social stratification and segmentation are created”. Inequalities in educational attainment translate into differentials in employment, occupation, income, residence and social class.

In Chapter 3: The Washington Consensus 1980-90 we examine the transformations that occurred in the global economy and polity towards the end of the 1970s. We chart the emergence of a set of policy prescriptions commonly known as the ‘Washington Consensus’ and demonstrate how these policy prescriptions became globalised under World Bank/IMF-led Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). We examine the relationship between these reforms and education in low-income countries.

There is evidence to suggest that the two continents most affected by the debt crisis, and who subsequently adopted SAPs, also suffered the most during the 1980s and 1990s. Developmental state policies were pursued by the Tiger economies. Whilst not rejecting the market, the Tiger economies nonetheless adopted a more strategic approach to development, with a strong role for the state.

Education systems in low-income countries during the 1980s were not spared the adverse effects of SAPs. However, the literature suggests that while educational policy measures were broadly similar in content in countries undergoing SAPs, the outcomes varied.
World Bank policy during this period involved a curtailed role for government in educational provision; the rationalisation of its role in educational finance and system oversight; a commitment to decentralisation; cost-recovery and privatisation in higher education; increased attention to productive inputs like textbooks; and the movement out of more technically-oriented vocational education. At the end of the 1980s, other policies were added, including national assessment and testing to hold schools and teachers more accountable. Central to all these policies was the prioritisation of basic and general vocational education as the building blocks for national educational development.

Since the 1980s, the World Bank has relied heavily on Rates-of-Return (RoR) analyses in education, as the main rationale for educational investment. These studies assess the public versus private cost of education and the public versus private gains to society as opposed to the recipient. RoR analyses have led to the growing acceptance of Universal Primary Education (UPE) and user-charges for Higher Education (HE).

Studies reveal that SAPs resulted in increased poverty, increased school drop-out rates, reduced expenditure on materials and capital infrastructures, and a decline in quality and levels of achievement. Though access was broadly maintained, in some regions it declined for the poor and for women. Studies highlight downward fiscal pressure on education systems, particularly during the 1980s. Taken together, studies suggest the failure of SAPs to generate economic growth in turn led to a reduction in educational budgets. Decentralisation policies were introduced during the 1980s to improve the efficiency of education systems. There is evidence that decentralisation increased regional and class inequalities.

There was also a growing preference for private schooling. The evidence points to an increasing role of private capital in education, whether through increased user-charges in state schools, or private provision of education. Studies note an increase in the power and influence of external agencies during the period of the Washington Consensus.

Chapter 4: Post-Washington Consensus 1990-2005 reviews the literature on the World Bank/IMF Washington Consensus reforms and the call for ‘adjustment with a human face’. Within this context the ‘good governance’ agenda emerged, as an explanation of and solution to the deficiencies of the Washington Consensus development model. By the end of the 1990s, a broader and more sustained development model emerged known as the Post Washington Consensus. This model extended and consolidated the Good Governance agenda.

The World Bank initially blamed the failure of SAPs on poor governments, corruption, secrecy, inefficient policymaking, lack of accountability, and disregard for the law, while western governments and bilateral aid agencies began to talk explicitly about democracy as an essential condition for development and economic growth. The World Bank and IMF, however, were criticised for creating uneven development and social inequalities. Non-economic actors and factors and their role in successful market economies began to be seen as crucial. The ‘good governance’ agenda, it was suggested, would assist in the process of creating a more predictable, stable environment for economic development.

While the new agenda acknowledged the relevance of non-economic factors to economic success, it did not represent a complete break from the Washington Consensus. The overall logic of SAPs remained largely unchanged within this agenda, with macroeconomic policies (such as market liberalisation, export-oriented free markets, the removal of trade barriers and tariffs), all paramount. However, social capital and the production of trust were increasingly seen as one of the key, non-market, externalities that could promote growth through social cohesion. This new approach to policy was welcomed as a step in the right direction. Yet those critics of the Washington Consensus were also sceptical about whether the Post Washington paradigm could address the problems of a highly unequal global economy.

In the area of education policy, primary education continued to be prioritised. The literature suggests from the 1990s, UPE was presented as an international issue and a universal human right to be achieved by the year 2000. During this period a Sector Support approach emerged as a response to the failures of project-based aid. This meant looking at the whole educational sector in a country and deciding where assistance could be best used. This required co-ordination between governments and donors, and entailed asking what constituted ‘good’ policy and practice and who defined it. ‘Good’ in education seemed to be defined by the World Bank.

During this period the ideological differences between the major groups of multilateral agencies decreased to the point where they came closer together. This made it possible to target one priority area: in this case, poverty reduction. By the end of the Millennium, poverty reduction was the central policy objective of the major development agencies. Until the late 1990s, poverty had been seen as a ‘second order problem’, connected less with country-specific imbalances, policy errors or political difficulties. Within this new framework selective measures could be targeted at specific countries and populations to help the poor adjust to a changing international economic order.

In Chapter 5: Development Aid After September 11 we examine the changes in education development aid since September 11. These events have radically altered the geo-political and geo-strategic activities of the dominant Western powers and pose a challenge to the shift towards a post-Washington Consensus outlined in the previous chapter. This shift is of great importance, yet the literature on this issue is thin.

There is growing concern amongst powerful states, particularly the USA, to be seen ‘individually’ and ‘visibly’ acting in the humanitarian and development field. There is also the danger of a reduced willingness to pool funds
in multilateral institutions. This is exemplified in the creation, by the US, of new high profile initiatives—such as the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA)—bypassing other multilateral organisations working on the same issues.

The most notable change has been the definition of what constitutes official development assistance (ODA). This definition is controlled and regulated by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC). For the first time in its history, the DAC has recently allowed certain military and security funding to be directed via the aid budget.

The literature reveals diverse responses to the threat of terrorism and conflict as a result of the different views on the underlying rationale for what causes security problems and conflict and what type of interventions might be appropriate. We review three broad theoretical approaches to the relationship between development and security: (i) a ‘clash of civilisations’; (ii) structural inequalities within the global economy and politi and violence; and, (iii) intra-state conflict where violent acts are regarded as generated by individual motives of ‘greed’.

In relation to the ‘civilisations’ approach, educational aid is directed particularly toward translation and broadcasting programmes, such as an Arabic version of Sesame Street and US-funded media broadcasting, aimed at winning ‘hearts and minds’ and promoting more positive attitudes towards the West. A structural inequality approach addresses the issue of ‘human security’ and ‘insecurity’ which in turn produces violence. This kind of conceptualisation is evident in all of the programmes of the major donors, including DfID and AusAID. For example, UK foreign policy and aid budgets have both shifted towards Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The third approach reflects mainstream neo-liberal ideas, where humans are viewed as engaged in conflict, as ‘economic agents’ seeking out profit. The route to peace and security is not through addressing inequality and structural exclusion but through cutting off access to the resources of violent actors. This approach has sympathy in the US and the World Bank.

In Part II – Dynamics and Directions we take up and interrogate the literature around five key themes which we have identified in the literature on globalisation, education and development.

Chapter 6: Poverty, MDGs and Education examines the issue of education and poverty through the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs were first foreshadowed in an OECD report as an attempt to put together a set of specified international development goals presented in the form of targets. The outcome was a set of six ‘International Development Targets’ (IDT’s) that were said to have been synthesized from the recommendations of a series of world conferences over the first half of the 1990s. These contained the core of what emerged a few years later as the MDGs. The shift from EFA to MDGs can be seen as a shift from a ‘multilateral’ agency approach to a ‘global agency’ approach. The constitution of the EFA might be seen as creating a common project from which all countries might benefit, while the MDGs represented a more collective and common agenda from which all may benefit through the collective subscription to that agenda and its pursuit.

The Millennium Declaration (MD) was signed by 147 heads of state and passed unanimously by the members of the UN General Assembly in 2000. The resulting eight MDGs – which range from halving extreme poverty to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS to providing universal primary education, by the target date of 2015 – grew out of the MD and subsequent agreements and resolutions during the 1990s. They form the framework through which the efforts of the world community might be channelled and implemented to achieve significant and measurable improvements in people's lives by the year 2015.

The World Forum on Education (Dakar, 2000) was given the task of coming up with a new Framework for Action to continue the project, following the failure to achieve EFA in the decade that had been devoted to it. It might be inferred that by the time of the Dakar meeting, a few months before that of the Millennium Declaration, while the agenda for MDG2 differed in important ways from that of EFA and Dakar, the tools for reaching it differed little in their fundamental assumptions from those that had informed the EFA campaign. The Millennium Development Goals were developed through the Millennium Project, an agency especially set up for this purpose. Task forces were created for each of the goals, and they issued background papers, interim reports and most recently a summary report for the MDG + 5 UN summit.

While earlier attempts to bring about universal education rested on the ‘strong and comprehensive legal basis’ of international covenants and conventions, the MDGs (like the EFA project before them) are the results of international conference Declarations. This potentially makes it less easy for national policy messages to ignore the human rights provisions to which legal commitments have already been made by national governments. The MDGs are novel in that education is not a separate target but one of a wide range of goals; it is associated with gender parity on MDG3, they have as a common target the reduction of global poverty; a particular level of schooling, primary education, is nominated, with enrolment the criterion.

Universal primary education is engaged as a key weapon in the fight against world poverty, and what counts as ‘significant and measurable improvements’ are defined in and took on concrete form through the Target(s) associated with the Goals.

The literature identifies the lack of progress in attaining the MDGs. Solutions proposed suggest either more private sector involvement, on the one hand, or government involvement on the other. Given that nearly all of the African countries will miss the targets because of the unrealistic nature of the goals this would suggest that the goals themselves were not feasible.
A new architecture of aid has emerged to deliver change. These include Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs); Medium Term Expenditure Forecasts (MTEFs); Sector Wide Approaches (SWAPs); Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSCs); results–based management (RBM); Education Fast Track Initiative (EFTI).

Chapter 7: Knowledge-Based Economy and Lifelong Learning begins by examining the idea that the new economy can be called ‘knowledge-based’, and that learning for workplace flexibility over the course of a lifetime is a powerful discourse informing policy and programmes in the education sector. Current knowledge economy arguments borrow heavily from work developed by Daniel Bell and Manuel Castell’s network society thesis. A core argument of this body of work is that knowledge is a new factor of production and that value can be extracted from knowledge in the form of Intellectual Property (IP) and thus has commercial value. Similarly, Castells argues that information now drives the new economy, and while he pays attention to technology, he also insists that ‘minds’ are the most important asset.

In order to facilitate countries making the transition to a knowledge-based economy, the World Bank has developed a ‘Knowledge Assessment Methodology’ (KAM) which is centred on four main pillars: (i) information and infrastructures; (ii) economic incentive and institutional regime; (iii) innovation systems; and, (iv) education and training for lifelong learning.

In terms of the first pillar - information technologies and infrastructures - governments around the world have been promoting Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in education. However, there are huge differences between the developed and low-income countries in their capacity to implement such changes. While most developed nations have connected nearly all primary and secondary schools to the Internet, in Africa the figure is less than 1%. Digital technologies are unevenly distributed geographically. Data reveals that: 11% of the world’s population have access to the Internet; 2 billion people are not linked to an electricity grid; the cost of technology is very high for low-income countries; and the digital content reflects the language and cultural priorities of the English speaking developed economies. Bridging the digital divide is a major priority for the international community.

The second pillar—the economic and institutional regime—includes openness to international trade and freedom from protectionist policies. In education this means opening up the governance of education to a new range of providers of learning (such as public private partnerships), including for profit firms such as Cisco Learning Systems, Microsoft, Phoenix International, as well as using the regulatory tools and service agreements of the World Trade Organization, and specifically TRIPS and GATS, to promote a more competitive and responsive education sector.

The third pillar refers to the kind of knowledge and innovation systems in place. National Systems of Innovation (NSI) approaches provide some idea as to how these might work. NSI theory, whose focus is the idea of a learning economy, questions how and why some countries are more productive and innovative than others. Relative success is explained, not in ‘technical’ terms or levels of investment in R&D, but in combinations and interactions of institutional and cultural factors that are nationally-specific and include national histories, traditions and language. Crucial to the conception of innovation systems is the idea of the learning economy.

Three trends in development thinking are discussed which might fruitfully be integrated in the NSI approach. These are (i) the ‘capability’ approach, (ii) the World Bank’s focus on knowledge, and (iii) the tendency to see institutions as the root causes of development. The NSI approach has also been applied to Africa where a major theme is the value to be gained from organising them at a regional level. There is also a literature that explores how low-income countries might use knowledge to ‘catch up’. Two crucial conditions of catch-up are ‘institutional instruments’ and ‘organisational innovation’. The literature suggests that there is no unique way to successful catch-up. This places even more importance on the need to develop systematic and context specific strategies for the management of knowledge for low-income countries if they are to change their situation in the world economy.

The fourth pillar is the need to have a well-educated and skilled population to create, acquire, disseminate and utilise relevant knowledge for productive economic growth. Both the World Bank and the OECD argue that a country’s human capital is an essential ingredient for achieving growth, and that school enrolment rates can be shown to have statistically significant effects on the growth of per capita real GDP, while average years of schooling is statistically significant in being positively correlated with effects of education on economic growth. However, new approaches to learning are required which take into account the rapid changes in knowledge as well as needing to quickly produce new knowledge. This poses new challenges for contemporary education systems which it is argued focus on traditional learning rather than learning that would be valuable in a lifelong learning environment. A pressing learning issue for low-income countries is not lifelong learning as much as opportunities for learning. To achieve universal primary education by 2015 would require a 7-fold increase in SSA countries. A 60 percent gross enrolment in secondary schooling would absorb 4 per cent of GDP, while 100 percent would require spending that far exceeds the levels of economic growth in these regions.

A second pressing issue for low-income countries is the problem in retaining highly skilled workers – or ‘brain drain’. Since the 1980s’s there has been a huge increase in the mobility of labour (including students who study abroad and do not return). Countries, regions and cities are now developing strategies for attracting the best talent, or seeking to lure talent back, however this is an increasingly pressing issue for low-income countries.

Chapter 8: Trade in Education Services explores why the services sectors have been targeted by high income countries. It also explores the implications of trade in education services for low-income countries. Trade in
services is estimated to be one of the most dynamic growth sectors. Based upon current WTO trade figures, trade in services accounts for 1/5th of global trade and 60-70% of GDP in the advanced OECD countries. Industry analysts estimate that public and private expenditures on education are huge (upward of US$2 trillion), whilst expenditure on public education specifically is estimated at US$1386.8 billion. For a select number of countries and education institutions, the foreign fee-paying market is a highly lucrative one.

Negotiating access to education sectors across national boundaries in now included under the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). GATS consist of three components: (i) a framework of rules that lays out the general obligations governing trade in services, which it does in much the same way as the GATT does for trade in goods. It provides: disciplines on transparency, most favoured nation treatment, market access, and national treatment; (ii) annexes on specific services sectors; and (iii) schedules detailing the liberalisation commitments of each WTO member. These are combined in a set of top-down rules where all measures and sectors are covered unless they are explicitly excluded (MFN, Transparency, Domestic Regulation, government procurement, subsidies) and bottom-up rules where measures and sectors that are specifically identified are included (market access, national treatment). Four modes of trade are identified: Mode 1, cross border supply – for instance, services through international mail, Internet, teleconference facilities; Mode 2, consumption abroad – for instance, students studying abroad; Mode 3, commercial presence – for instance, foreign direct investment in the form of setting up branches in the territory of another Member State; and Mode 4, presence of natural persons – “temporary” (with temporary yet to be defined) entry of workers in the territory of another Member State.

One of the main issues for those concerned with education is whether Member State’s education sectors are exempt. GATS Article 1.3 excludes services “supplied in the exercise of governmental authority”. However, there is a strong view that education sectors cannot now argue that there is no market-like activity in the sector and that it could be included. A second major issue concerns the difficulty or costliness of reversing decisions. Once a sector and mode is committed, if a Member State wants to withdraw they will have to wait for a period of three years, exchange the commitment for another, and pay potential firms future lost earnings. A third issue is the relationship between GATS and education as a human right and the exaggeration of social inequalities in education.

Chapter 9: Education, Social Cohesion and Conflict is a review of the literature on education and social capital, education and conflict, and education for citizenship, peace and human rights. The causes of increased conflict and violence, and the effects on development are discussed. Conflict has also escalated since September 11. The following points are of note: there is an increase in both crime and interpersonal violence, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean; there is a clear causal relationship between poverty and inequality and violence, crime and armed conflict; and conflict and civil war undermine the possibility of achieving the MDGs.

Social capital has also taken on particular significance in the global era as a way of understanding the contribution of social factors to processes of successful globalisation. The literature suggests that there is a close relationship between education, social capital and human capital and between income inequality and inequality in access to education. Inequality is the most important causal factor in relation to social cohesion. The literature points to the way education systems contribute to gender, ethnic and class inequalities. Through social exclusion, violence and indoctrination, schools can serve as powerful weapons to produce rather than reduce violence.

The vast majority of conflicts now take place in low-income countries, and there is a strong relationship between poverty, inequality and violence and failing education systems. Countries in conflict are likely to spend less on education, and parents are less likely to send girls to school for fear of violence. Similarly, poor children are far more likely to be deprived of education and affected by conflict than wealthier children. War diverts resources away from social sectors such as education.

There is an increasing consensus in the literature that if countries are serious about reaching the MDGs, then we need to address conflict as an integral part of any comprehensive poverty reduction strategy and ensure that education systems are enabled to promote non-violent solutions. However, there is a gap between the rhetoric of many states and the practical and financial measures necessary for implementing a systematic programme of education for citizenship and human rights.

In Chapter 10, Globalisation, Regionalism and Africa, we consider regional responses to globalisation in Africa and the implications of these for education and training policy and practice. Selected statistics provide an insight into the problems facing Africa.

The literature on African regionalism notes that it is not a new phenomenon. Formal efforts to create greater cooperation between African states were instigated in the post-colonial era such as the East African Common Market (EACM) (subsequently collapsed) and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) (which transformed itself into the Southern African Development Community (SADC)).

Both old and new regionalisms in Africa prioritise economic over socio-political and cultural goals. However, critics ask whether the new regionalism in Africa reflects the hegemony of neo-liberal economic models. A consistent criticism of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the Commission For Africa (CFA) is their tendency to promote market-led developments that are regarded as against the interests of the poor. Authors argue that neo-liberal policies have increased rather than decreased poverty and Africa’s marginalisation. Nevertheless, regionalism is viewed as a useful mechanism and regional initiatives in education a viable platform for development.
A range of regional initiatives are reviewed: NEPAD (a high profile initiative involving education in agricultural extension, health, management of population growth, the digital divide and science and technology development); the Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE) (increase access, retention and quality of education for girls) and The African Virtual University (AVU); the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) focuses on education’s role in supporting regional economic integration; the Great Lakes Initiative focuses on civil strife, political instability and health calamities; The Association of African Universities (AAU) and the Inter-University Council for East Africa (IUCEA) are regional bodies representing higher education interests on the continent whilst the Southern and East African Consortium for Monitoring Education Quality (SACMEQ) developed out of a programme of research collaboration between the International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) and a number of Ministries of Education in the Southern Africa Sub-region.

Many of the regional initiatives call for a more relevant curriculum to meet Africa’s changing needs in the global world. It is argued that access to basic education by children and adults can have an impact on poverty reduction because it can contribute to lower child mortality and female fertility rates, protect against HIV/AIDS, and promote environmental awareness.

The literature calls for new skills to meet the demands of a global economy. This is reflected in calls for greater investment in secondary and higher education, research and development and for improvements in the quality of education. However, there is no standardised way for African countries to successfully catch up. An important component of knowledge societies is a skills development strategy that links education and training and research, design and development to broader developmental goals. This requires relevant inter-governmental structures to facilitate communication between stakeholders and the development of a supportive regulatory and legal framework.

The concept of lifelong learning is considered integral to that of knowledge societies. Initiatives, such as NEPAD, the CFA and the SADC protocol, all refer to the idea, although they do not develop a clear picture of what it might look like in practice.

There is a growing consensus about the potential benefits of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), however this should not replace older technologies. An exclusive focus on newer ICTs is likely to disproportionately benefit elites who have access to them and exacerbate the digital divide.

There is a tension in the regional initiatives between support for the privatisation and marketisation of education on the one hand and support for state provided and state-led education systems. The CFA is supportive of public/private partnerships, particularly in relation to secondary and tertiary education provision. However, the literature points to the negative aspects of privatisation; user fees had disastrous consequences for primary and secondary school enrolment and private education is associated with growing educational inequality in countries such as Tanzania. The proposed marketisation of higher education through GATS has proved controversial in many low-income countries. Analyses suggest that African governments should exercise caution on further GATS commitments in higher education until a more informed position is arrived at on how tradeable transnational education can best serve national and regional development priorities.

The issue of language is relatively under-developed in the literature on Africa and regionalism. The problem of identifying and implementing a suitable medium of instruction policy is intimately tied up with the way that colonial boundaries were drawn in the past. A key tension is whether African led development is best served by using indigenous or European languages as the medium of instruction.

Many of the regional initiatives provide support for the MDGs relating to gender parity. However, there is a tension between the emphasis on access in the MDGs and the need to address wider, related issues of quality and relevance. Although this complexity is acknowledged by some initiatives such as FAWE and the CFA, it has yet to be translated at the level of education policy into coherent strategies for tackling multiple disadvantages. The advent of sector wide approaches to donor funding in education and training, Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes (PRSPs) and the more recent Fast Track Initiative (FTI) to achieve the MDGs are intended to support the goals of African-led development. However, some question whether these simply represent more subtle forms of control by donors over national policy agendas whilst others point out the limited success of these initiatives in meeting their objectives.

Chapter 11: Synthetic Review draws the historical and thematic review together. We note the nature of the shifts that have taken place and list 10 important ways in which education and development in the current globalisation phase is both similar to, and different from, earlier phases of development. We then reflect upon four key new aspects which affect education and thus development; the actors and their ideas; mobility and migration; security; and the rise of education sectors as areas of trade. We conclude by suggesting that to date the development paradigm in education has not produced adequate growth with equity and peace (see also Green et al, 2007), and that it will be important that the underlying assumptions are addressed if new frameworks are to emerge and progress is to be made.
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

The purpose of this Review is to provide a state of the art synthetic review of studies relating to globalisation, education and development. Special emphasis in this Review is given to those policies and programmes developed at a supranational level (global and regional) that have implications for the formal and informal education and training sectors in enabling these countries to meet the Millennium Development Goals and to alleviate the trend across the globe of deepening poverty and inequality of access to infrastructures and public services (ILO, 2004; United Nations, 2005; World Bank, 2006a: 6).

These trends are particularly acute in sub-Saharan Africa, and there have been renewed calls for development policy that addresses the challenges of globalisation that are shaping Africa (ESRC 2006). Scholte, in the recently released ESRC report *Africa after 2005*, calls for more ambitious and practical measures – all of which he argues are technically and technologically feasible, but dependent upon a review of current policy directions and the generation of political will.

This review of current ‘global’ policy and practice is intended to provide policy makers in national governments, development agencies, international financial institutions and organisations, regional organisations and civil society actors across a range of transition and low-income countries with relevant, accessible and contextualised information and understandings about the implications of globalisation specifically for the areas of education and training. It should be read in conjunction with Green et al (2007) whose work complements this review.

Our broad approach to this review is to accept the notion that education both shapes and is shaped by broader social, political and economic dynamics and relationships within and across societies. For this reason we will be reviewing the wider literature on globalisation and development as it relates to education in order to identify, on the one hand, the dominant way in which globalisation, as a particular set of discourses and practices, is articulated and mobilised, and on the other, the effects of these on access to quality education and the implications for development. At its simplest, we see the relationship between globalisation and education in low-income countries as mediated by conceptions of ‘development’.

Throughout our review we concentrate on the different roles, agendas, policies and programmes of the multilateral agencies, national governments and civil society rather than on country studies (which is the main but not the only focus of Green et al, 2007). It is worth reminding ourselves, nonetheless, that globalisation is always grounded in places and real events rather than being regarded as a phenomenon that exists ‘out there’ and for this reason we try and provide examples that illustrate this very point. Particularly, we focus on the policies, programmes and practices that either target directly or have consequences for low-income countries and transition economies; Education for All and the Millennium Development Goals, lifelong learning and the knowledge economy, trade in education services, issues of citizenship and conflict and current developments in aid and global security, and processes of regional development with a specific focus on Africa.

1.2 Starting points

1.2.1 Making globalisation work for the poor

A broad starting point for this project is the understanding of globalisation outlined in DFID’s White Paper *Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor* (2000). Globalisation is conceptualised as having the potential to ‘lift millions of the World’s people out of their poverty’. However, there is also recognition that these same processes have the potential to lead to their ‘further marginalisation and impoverishment’ (2000a: 15 - see also UN 2005a; World Bank 2006a). These negative outcomes threaten not only poor people and weak governments, but also the stability of the entire global system itself and the future of ‘the growing interdependence and interconnectedness’ (DFID 2000a: 15) that has so far been achieved. Different ‘policy choices adopted by governments, international institutions, the private sector and civil society’ (paragraph 19, ibid.: 15) are seen as key variables in determining positive outcomes, while with ‘political will’ (ibid.: 7), appropriate strategies will be crucial in ensuring that globalisation works for the poor.

There appear to be clear lessons to be learnt from understanding different levels and types of engagement with the global economy, and the levels of success of that engagement for low-income populations (comparisons are often drawn between the relative success of East Asia and the decline of several of the Latin American and African economies) (also see Green et al, 2007, especially Chapter 6). Strategic policy making would appear to be an important variable in the ability of national and sub-national agencies and other development institutions to optimise the possibilities for positive engagement with the global economy and to minimise potential negative consequences (Rodrick, 2001; Scholte, 2006). At the same time, it is increasingly recognized that policymaking needs to be grounded both in an understanding of the ‘local’ (Bevan et al, 2006), and in more innovative global strategies, such as those concerned with the problem of brain drain, human rights and redistributive global taxes (Scholte, 2006).
In DfID’s *White Paper*, education is seen as having an important role to play in these processes, with investments in people, skills and knowledge becoming essential for countries who wish to participate in the global economy: ‘Globalisation…is both increasing the rewards for education and raising the costs of exclusion from it, particularly for women. If globalisation is to work for poor people, increased investment in education, lifelong learning and skills is essential’ (paragraph 104, DfID, 2000a: 36). Central to this are the key developmental targets of *Universal Primary Education* by 2015, and *Gender Equality in Primary and Secondary Education* by 2005, but there is also a recognition that the Asian experience points to the importance of investment at all the levels of the formal education and training sector if the personnel within countries are to be able to ‘research, analyse, train and manage’ (paragraph 111, DfID, 2000a: 37) effective industries and programmes. Education is considered a ‘good’ in itself and a human right; this view is fundamental to the idea and programme of Education for All as well as to the objectives of UNESCO.

### 1.2.2 The rise of the globalisation paradigm

Since the mid 1980s there has been an explosion of interest in the idea of globalisation. In part this has been shaped by the profound geopolitical shifts that have characterized the world since the early 1970s, by the significant advances in technological and communication processes, and an outcome of the decades of restructuring throughout the 1980s and 90s that put into place neo-liberal policies and programmes. Together, these developments undermined the idea of a cohesive and sequestered national economy and society and radically altered the nature of the relationship between state, economy and society, and nations and their international relationships (Amin and Thrift, 1994; Castells, 1996; Dicken, 1998; Held et al, 1999; Held and McGrew, 2002).

Throughout this period there has also been an unprecedented rise in prominence and influence of a range of multilateral and supranational organisations, such as those tied into the system of global governance—the World Bank, IMF, WTO, OECD as well as international non-governmental agencies (Alexander, 1998; Jenson and Santos, 2000; Sinclair, 2000; Letter, 2001; Kwa, 2002; Ougaard and Higgott, 2002; Wade, 2002a; Cammack, 2003; Jawara and Kwa, 2003). There is now a thickening web of multilateral agreements, global and regional institutions and regimes as well as trans-governmental policy networks and summits (Held and McGrew, 2002: xi) that characterise the global economy and polity.

Correspondingly, there have also been shifts in the nature of global production networks and the increasing penetration of multinational corporations and International Financial Institutions across the planet (Palpacuer and Parisotto, 1998; Dicken and Henderson, 2003; Sinclair, 2003; Yusuf et al, 2004). This has led many to debate whether we have moved (or are moving) from an international capitalist economy to a global capitalist economy (cf. Ohmae, 1990; Castells, 1996; Hirst and Thompson, 1999; Radice, 1999; Ohmae, 2005).

The period has also produced a concerning set of social consequences for many countries and peoples across the world, particularly as a result of economic globalisation (Frobel, Heinrichs et al, 1980; Amin, 1997; Chossudovsky, 1997; Hoogvelt, 1997; Dicken, 1998; Wade, 2002b; Amin,2003; Harvey, 2003). While the negative effects of these processes have been challenged (more recently by a range of robust defences, see Collier and Dollar, 2002; Dollar, 2004; Ravallion, 2004), many critics reject these findings and argue that, at the very least, poverty and inequality have shown little or no improvement during the period, particularly when China and India are removed from the equation (Robinson, 2004; Sutcliffe, 2004; Wade, 2004; ILO, 2004).

Finally, and despite protestations of a New World Order by George Bush senior in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, a new range of local, national and international conflicts have emerged, not least the current US-led War on Terror and the invasion and occupation of both Afghanistan and Iraq (Huntington, 1993; Duffield, 1995; Duffield, 2001a; Harvey, 2003). Conflict has also centred on global institutions such as the WTO and the World Economic Forum and their perceived democratic deficiencies, with new oppositional spaces and experiments emerging—such as the World Social Forum—as a means for developing alternative views and visions of how a different global economy can be advanced (Santos, 2004).

Education is implicated in all of these shifts and transformations, yet its relationship is often either ignored – or reduced to a simple conception of human capital and posited unquestionably as the obvious solution to all of the World’s problems while neglecting other contributions of education to societies and individuals. Further, in much of the writing on globalisation and development, ‘education’ appears as a kind of ‘etc clause’, usually alongside ‘health’, as in phrases like ‘this affects/?’is affected by’ social areas, such as health and education. In this report we explore the broad patterns of national, multi-lateral and bi-lateral educational policy initiatives in low-income countries in order to understand whether and how processes of globalisation, particularly though not exclusively economic, have altered the terrain upon which education policy is constructed.

In this review we will locate these educational policy and internal debates on education (education politics) within a broader historical and international political economy framework. Specifically, we will explore education as a sector embedded within a complex system of local, national, regional and global actors, institutions and practices (a politics of education). Central to this approach is a belief that education policy cannot be understood internally to itself but needs to be explored within a broader local, national, international and now global political economy that shapes its development (Dale, 1999; 2000; 2005).
1.3 Methodology

In this Review we deployed a methodology we have called CoSCAR - that is, a comprehensive, systematic, critical and accessible review of existing research to examine the relationship between globalisation, education and development.

The review is Comprehensive in that it:

• is a review of literatures in English as well as Spanish. This provided not only broader coverage but also enable access to different cultural and theoretical understandings of, and associated policy responses to, the relationships in question;
• is comprehensive in scale, focusing not only on the national and the global levels, but also the regional, sub-national and local levels, and their interrelationships, and the opportunities and threats they hold for new modalities of development cooperation;
• is comprehensive in theoretical approaches covered. Between them the members of the research team have excellent knowledge of the main approaches to globalisation and education and this helped to generate a genuinely multi-theoretical and multi-disciplinary review. The key disciplines from which the literature is drawn include education, economics, sociology and development studies, an approach that is supported by the inter-disciplinary backgrounds of the research team;
• examines literature that did not explicitly ‘declare its interest’ in or relevance to the core issues, through its title or abstract. There are, for example, significant literatures in disciplines other than education that have considerable value for understanding the relationship between globalisation and education from which little benefit has so far been derived;
• includes ‘grey literature’ (in the form particularly of government and international organisation documents) as well as refereed publications;
• addresses, where appropriate, the literatures on topics relating to many aspects of globalisation that impact on education including economic, political and cultural globalisation, the impact of new technologies and the mass media, environmental and health dimensions and the impact of mass mobility and migration of people and skills.

The review is Systematic in that it:

• intends to be truly synthetic, by bringing together studies that have been carried out at different times and places and for different reasons;
• goes beyond the ad hoc and fragmented nature of the existing body of literature in the area;
• distinguishes between literature that provided a clearer understanding of the relationships between globalisation, gender equity and poverty; of the relationships between formal and informal education and training in contributing to successful globalisation in low income countries; of relationships between formal and informal education and training in helping to reduce poverty and achieve gender equity;
• identifies a range of impacts of globalisation on education, pertaining, for instance, to decision making, patterns of resource distribution, curricular and pedagogic processes institutional design and structural arrangements;

The review is Critical in that it:

• critiques rather than either accept unproblematically or criticise the material reviewed;
• locates the literatures reviewed in terms of authorship, the context in which they were produced, their stated purpose and target audience;
• sees the diverse literatures as reflecting differing political and cultural outlooks and perspectives rather than merely academic or ‘neutral’ texts.

The review is Accessible in that it:

• is presented in a variety of different formats for different audiences. This published version is complemented by a series of short briefing papers directed at planners and programme managers.

Together these systematic ‘transversal’ approaches to the existing literature enabled both the ‘locating’ of existing studies in new and productive combinations and the ‘squeezing out’ from them of meanings and value that had not previously been appreciated. A series of dissemination workshops were conducted to ‘test’ the preliminary findings, and to seek feedback on these findings for incorporation into the final report.
1.4 Outline of the Book

The book is organized into three parts. *Part I - Locating Globalisation* - is made up of four broad chapters that identify and examine the broad theories, concepts, trajectories and outcomes of education and development. Chapter 2 introduces the key concepts and debates – particularly around issues of neo-liberal policies and their impacts on economic growth and prosperity across the globe. Chapter 3 examines the effects on education as a result of the implementation of the Washington Consensus (1980-89), while Chapter 4 charts the changes as a result of the post Washington Consensus (1990-2005). Chapter 6 addresses problems of cohesion, conflict and security particularly since September 1, 2001.

In *Part II - Dynamics and Directions* - each chapter develops a specific theme: Chapter 6 addresses the implementation of ‘Education for All’ and the Millennium Development Goals; Chapter 7 reviews the emergence of the ‘knowledge economy’ debates and policies and lifelong learning; Chapter 8 concerns itself with the commoditisation of education and the rise of global agreements, such as the GATS, that is intended to regulate trade in education services; in Chapter 9 we look at the relationship education, social cohesion and conflict, and the way in which these are mediated by international aid. Chapter 10 examines the literature on regionalism focusing particularly on these processes in the African context.

*Part III – Conclusions* - carries our synthesis of the literature. In Chapter 11 we draw together the key findings of the literature review which might in turn inform policymaking.

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Part I - Locating Globalisation
Chapter 2: Key Concepts and Debates

2.1 Introduction

How we think about processes such as ‘globalisation’ and ‘development’, and in this case the relationships between these ideas and ‘education’, are dependent upon how we define and understand them. It is important to make these understandings and their associated processes explicit, in order to reveal the different ways in which these ideas are mobilised or used, and how they change over time. The first half of this chapter engages with this task. In the second half of this chapter we consider the evidence that is now being assembled on the consequences of more than two decades of neo-liberal reform across the world, with a particular focus on what this might mean for opportunities for learning. This is an important debate, particularly given the view that this model of economic development promises to lift the world’s population out of poverty, and that education in the form of skill development is to play a crucial role in that process. It is clear that expanding access to education in low-income countries will be dependent upon economic growth and a higher level of prosperity for families and the country as a whole.

2.2 Globalisation

2.2.1 Questions of definition

It is difficult to avoid the question of definition – that is, what is meant by the term ‘globalisation’. As Jan Aart Scholte (2002: 2) notes, our knowledge of globalisation is substantially a function of how this concept is defined; “A muddled or misguided core concept compromises our overall comprehension of the problem. In contrast, a sharp and revealing definition promotes insightful, interesting and empowering knowledge, an understanding that helps us to shape our destiny in positive directions’. Not only do we expect to find different definitions at play, but we will show that there are also different views on both the logic behind and what might constitute the real phenomena associated with globalisation.

As we have noted above, globalisation is a relatively new term. Scholte (2002: 4) reports that the terms ‘globalize/globalise’ and ‘globalism’ first appeared in the 1940s, and that globalisation first entered the dictionary of American English in 1961. It became a key analytical tool within the academy from the early 1980s onwards following Roland Robertson’s essay Interpreting Globality which was published in 1983. Since then, equivalent terms have emerged in a range of countries and in almost all of the major languages (except Swahili), while globalisation has been debated across disciplines and generated a huge amount of published work.

Much of the academic as opposed to policy literature on globalisation is concerned with the added-value that might accrue from a search for a more coherent understanding of the forces that are shaping socio-political realities today. Writers generally agree that globalisation takes different forms and operates on and through different spheres of social life: political, economic, cultural and technological (cf. Amin and Thrift, 1994; Waters, 1995; Giddens, 2002; Held et al, 1999).

2.2.2 Key ideas on globalisation

Given the centrality of the concept – globalisation – to this review, we will trace out a brief genealogy of the key writers and texts that have been influential in shaping conceptual understanding of globalisation today. This is not to suggest that these ways of understanding globalisation are those that inform all of the policy and other literature we examine. Nor are they exhaustive. However, they do represent some of the important starting points in the conceptual literature.

Much of the early writing on globalisation is an attempt to make sense of major changes taking place in the world following the 1970s economic crisis, and how it might differ from internationalisation (cf. Hobsbawm, 1994). There is general agreement with Harvey’s point that something akin to globalisation has a long presence in the history of capitalism (2000: 54) and that from the year 1500 onwards, the internationalisation of trade and commerce was well underway.

In 1986, Peter Dicken published Global Shift - an interdisciplinary study of global economic change. Woven around the themes of turbulence and volatility, Dicken argues that not only is economic activity becoming more internationalised but it is more globalised. For Dicken, internationalisation refers to “the increasing spread of economic activities across national boundaries; as such it is not a new phenomenon” (1986: 1). On the other hand, “Globalisation of economic activity is qualitatively different. It is a more advanced and complex form of internationalisation which implies a degree of functional integration between internationally dispersed economic activities” (ibid.). Dicken argues that globalisation signals a shift in the centre of gravity in key aspects of the system of economic (i) production - goods; (ii) regulation - the way the production system is controlled and
regulated; (iii) circulation - the intermediary services that connect the parts of the system; distribution - activities that make goods and service available to the consumer; and consumption - demand (Dicken 1992: 300).

It is interesting that the term globalisation does not appear in David Harvey’s very influential The Condition of Postmodernity (1989) where he traces out the transformations taking place in the political economy of late 20th century capitalism. Harvey instead uses the idea of post-modernity to signal a loss of confidence in the Enlightenment project—in other words the ‘condition’ of modernity as a result of the idea of progress—and the collapse of the post-war Fordist settlement (ibid.: 171). Harvey’s significant contribution in this and later work (2000, 2001) was his theorising on space and time—in particular the idea of ‘time-space compression’ to capture the capital’s strategic use of space as well along with the way new technologies enable the rapid and flexible production and distribution of goods globally.

Harvey’s later work engages explicitly with globalisation – however his approach is firmly rooted in an analysis of capital accumulation and class struggle. As he notes, “Capitalism cannot do without what he calls spatial fixes. Time and again it has turned to geographical reorganisation as a partial solution to its impasses” (2000: 54). The term globalisation here signals a profound geographical reorganisation of capitalism, in turn causing changes in the territorial organisation of state power and the ways in which states regulate the conditions for production and accumulation.

Held et al’s highly influential book Global Transformations was published in 1999. Their important contribution at the time was a distillation of the burgeoning literature on globalisation and its dynamics. They identified key three positions that could be detected in the literature – ‘hyper-globalism’ (intensification of long-run global processes), ‘skeptics’ (globalisation is a myth, or that regionalism rather than globalisation is a more evident phenomenon) and ‘transformationalists’ (that there are both qualitative and quantitative shifts that have occurred fundamentally changing social relations). Like others, Held et al agree that “…globalisation is a central driving force behind the rapid social, political and economic changes that are reshaping societies” (Held et al 1999: 7) and that globalisation is “…a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organisation of social relations and transactions—assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact – generating transcontinental or inter-regional flows and networks of activity, interaction and the exercise of power. Thus, historical forms of globalisation refer to “the spatio-temporal and organisational attributes of global interconnectedness in discrete historical periods” (ibid.: 17). This definition leads them to focus on four spatio-temporal dimensions:

- the extensity of global networks;
- the intensity of global interconnectedness;
- the velocity of global flows;
- the impact propensity of global interconnectedness (ibid.: 17) measured through decisional, institutional, distributive, and structural impacts.

This framework provides the basis for both a quantitative and qualitative assessment of historical patterns of globalisation, in turn providing insights into the changing historical forms of globalisation. This approach avoids the argument that suggests globalisation is something completely new, or that it is nothing novel.

Since the publication of Held et al’s work, writers have sought to negate, clarify or amplify various aspects of their approach. Writers like the Portuguese legal sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2002) insist that there are multiple rather than one form of globalisation (including those who oppose contemporary forms of economic globalisation), while Mittelman (2000: 4) sees globalisation as “a syndrome of processes or activities” signalled in the different adjectives that precede globalisation, such as neo-liberal, cultural, economic, and so on.

These processes or logics of globalisation can be summed up as: (i) financial deregulation and the development of international financial markets (Cerny 1995); (ii) profound technological changes, technology transfer and product innovation and the emergence of a new production paradigm (Castells, 1996; Harvey, 2000); (iii) the development of ‘free’ markets shaped by classical economic theory; (iv) the information revolution and its impact on the media and communications systems (Poster, 1990; Castells, 1996); and (v) the diminution of costs and time in moving commodities and people from one place to another (Harvey, 1989; 2000). Taken together (it is difficult to separate) these have had a major impact on the economy, society and polity.

Globalisation is not only about ‘real’ phenomena (Castells, 1996; Held et al, 1999), or discourses that have real effects (Hay, 1999), but there is an emerging view that it is also a way of interpreting the world (Mittelman, 2004; Cox, 2002; Brenner, 2004). Disciplines such as politics and sociology, to the extent that they had been built around the idea of the nation state, have found the idea of globalisation particularly challenging because it decentralises the national scale (denationalisation) as the dominant or primary scale in the organisation of the world polity and economy. It also decentralises the state (de-statisation) as the dominant actor, largely because of the way in which neo-liberalism emphasises moving governing and power away from the state to an array of other actors, but most particularly those involved in the economy. Mittelman (2004: 28) summarises these as:

- Many problems cannot be explained as interactions among nation states, that is as international studies, but must be construed as global problems, e.g. organised crime, trans-border supply of education, infectious diseases;
• globalisation constitutes a structural transformation in the world order - it requires both a temporal and a spatial analytic;
• as a transformation, it involves a series of continuities and discontinuities with the past. In other words, it is not a total break, and nor are things the same as in the past;
• new ontological priorities are warranted because of the emergence of supra-state and sub-state forces. It involves the global economy in its own right;
• states are adjusting and reinventing themselves in relation to the evolving global structures differently; and
• as a result of differences emerging in the global economy there are new tensions emerging around movements across borders and the governing of spaces (Mittelman, 2004: 28-29).

We find the view that globalisation involves real ‘new’ phenomena as well as continuities with the past, that it is a discourse anchored in the material world as well as producing material effects, and that it involves shifts in how we see and explain the world, a useful way forward.

2.2.3 Multilateralism

While the idea of multilateralism (defined as the institutional form which coordinates relations amongst 3 or more states on the basis of generalised principles of conduct – Ruggie, 1992: 568) is not new to globalisation, since the 1990s there has been a thickening of multilateral interactions and interconnections in the global governance landscape. Today there is now a highly complex set of patterns, with many actors linked to transnational and trans-governmental networks, while multilateral negotiations have become management tools in international politics (Ravenhill, 2003). In this section we reflect upon the central structures of post-war multilateralism; those institutions which were the centre-piece of global governance, namely the United Nations and Bretton Woods institutions, the IMF and World Bank.

The OECD stands outside the UN structure, though it is an increasingly powerful organisation in setting global agendas for national economies. Its membership is primarily the industrialised countries, and is often referred to as ‘the rich man’s club’ (Henry et al, 2001). This is not to suggest that the OECD has no concern with developing countries and questions of development. As we will see in Chapter 6, the DAC, or Development Advisory Committee, plays a key role in policy determination for low-income countries, despite the fact these countries are not represented in the governance and workings of the OECD.

The World Trade Organization is a recent addition to the scene; it was created in 1995 out of the post-war General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and currently has 149 Member States signed up to negotiations to pursue a policy of progressive liberalisation of world trade in goods and services, together with the protection of intellectual property rights (Trade Related Intellectual Property - TRIPS).

The formal origins of the United Nations can be found in the 1941 Atlantic Charter where there was an agreement to create a new organisation to replace the League of Nations (Ruggie, 1992; Karns and Mingst, 2004; Ravenhill, 2005). The UN Charter embraced two key ideas in its mandate: first, the sovereignty equality of countries (each country has the same representation); and, second, the possibility of a better world. The main function of the UN was to create international laws as well as develop norms and principles for the purposes of international security, order and development. It is a large, complex and contradictory agency that deals with a range of governance issues, from migration to drug administration, security and education.

The two main institutional components of the UN, the General Assembly and the Security Council, are governed differently, creating a major tension within the organisation. The General Assembly is composed of all UN members each with one vote that meets for three months each year. Decisions are made through majority vote. However, by contrast, the Security Council is small. It has 5 permanent members (US, GB, France, Russia, and China reflecting the balance of power in 1945 and with each having the power of veto) and ten non-permanent members (that are unable to serve successive terms).

Power within the two key financial organisations of the UN - The World Bank and IMF – is also weighted according to economic power and financial input. This difference in governance has been a constant source of tension - between those institutions whose rules operated on a one-country one-vote procedure, and those, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), who reflected dominant national economic power. In essence the key UN institutions - the Security Council, the IMF and the World Bank - were often perceived as representing the interests of the most powerful industrial nations and the financial sector.

One organisation that eventually came to play a key role in the process of providing a coherent voice for low-income countries was the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) which held its first meeting in Yugoslavia in 1961 (see NAM, 2003). Another organisation, the G77, initially representing 77 newly independent nations, was formed in 1964 at the end of the first UNCTAD meeting and had an almost identical membership (see website http://www.g77.org/main/main.htm).

Formed in the heat of the Cold War, the G77 and the NAM aimed to provide a voice for those countries that sought to keep a distance from both the US and the Soviet Union during some of the darkest years of the Cold War. Central figures of this movement were Ghana’s Nkrumah, Tanzania’s Nyerere, Egypt’s Nasser, Cuba’s Castro, India’s Nehru and Yugoslavia’s Tito. Of prime concern was the call for a new international economic order
UNESCO and the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC), alongside UNCTAD, all with ‘one nation-one state’ voting structures, also became engaged in the process of advocacy for a NIEO (UNESCO, 1976; Hart, 1983; Rothstein, 1979) This momentum led to the landmark Brandt Report published in 1980 (Independent Commission on International Development Issues) which articulated a vision of a new more egalitarian world political economy. Yet, even as the report was still in press, a shift was in process that radically altered the balance of power between north and south. We return to these issues in Chapter 2.

**Multilateralism and education**

Despite reluctance on the part of the US, UNESCO was set up in 1947 as the central educational institution, albeit with a very restricted resource base. In its early years, the educational focus of UNESCO were on ‘fundamental education’ (UNESCO, 1947), following in the footsteps of earlier colonial education programmes of adult literacy and basic skills training for adults and young people. ‘Fundamental Education’ was seen as a way of investing in education in countries where the ability to provide universal education was some decades away (Jones with Coleman, 2005). The dominance of fundamental education was short-lived, as more and more newly independent ex-colonial countries saw a mass education system as the means with which to build national identity and pursue economic progress.

The construction of a national education system was seen by many newly independent states as a central symbol of ‘progress’ and national pride (Fägerlind and Saha, 1989). The type of nation that was being constructed was also of key interest to the competing Soviet and Western blocs vying for influence. Education became one tool for both East and West to utilise to assist in their broader geo-political and geo-strategic interests. Aid to education, educational exchanges and educational scholarships became a key conduit of East/West attempts to influence policy and shape the nature of national development (King, 1991; King and Buchert, 1999).

The IMF and the World Bank, though specialised agencies of the UN (but with negotiated distance and functional autonomy from the UN), are better understood as ‘banks’. This has shaped in important ways their relationship to education. These two Bretton Woods institutions were a US initiative aimed at addressing the need for an intergovernmental monetary stabilisation as well as a post-war reconstruction fund (Jones with Coleman, 2005). While in the early post war period the IMF provided temporary relief to a government’s balance of payments, the World Bank focused almost exclusively on lending to governments for reconstruction and long-term development. However, as Jones and Coleman note, nowhere is there evidence of the Bank “grappling with such issues as the nature of development, the factors conducive to economic growth, or the root causes of poverty” (ibid.: 97).

Throughout the 1950s, the Bank was the object of frequent criticism for failing to make explicit its views on economic development and for failing to take an intellectual lead in developing ideas about poverty and growth (Jones with Coleman, 2005: 99). Nonetheless there was an emerging view of the Bank “ Educators” (rather than a political and geo-educational institution) in its role as a conduit of East/West attempts to influence policy and shape the nature of national development (King, 1991; King and Buchert, 1999).

A request from UNESCO in 1957 to finance schools and universities through loans was rejected by the Bank. This did not sit well with the UN specialised agencies, bilateral donors and developing countries, who called for greater assistance from the Bank and the broadening of development assistance. Through the establishment of the International Development Association located within the World Bank (formed largely to head off a rival provider of funding through the UN’s Special Fund for Economic Development – a precursor to UNDP), the World Bank then set its sights on a new set of borrowers - the newly independent African nations.

Mundy argues that emphasis on the development of national education systems and plans was enhanced by the sudden availability of large-scale funding for ‘redistributive multilateralism’ – largely driven by “the US government’s view that the Third World held the key to both the expansion of a liberal world economy and the containment of communism” (Mundy, 1998: 457). European nations quickly followed. By the early 1960s, virtually all of the OECD countries had opened bilateral development assistance programmes.

By the end of the 1960s, the World Bank was lending to a more diverse range of countries with more diverse social and economic goals. Early on, human capital theory was not prominent (Jones with Coleman, 2005: 105). However, Jones with Coleman show that the Bank sought to characterise education as an investment (rather than a budget consumption item). Within this framework, the question to be answered for any ‘education project’ – as with any project – was what effect it would have on economic growth and development. The Bank President at the time also determined that the Bank’s lending in education would be vocationally-oriented. By the late 1960s, more than 23 countries had been lent funds to build up technical education (in secondary schools and technical colleges). Its stance was to discourage support for a general secondary curriculum, a position that was at odds with UNESCO’s insistence on the individual person and a balanced education (Jones with Coleman, 2005: 106; Mundy, 1998).

While initially the Bank depended on UNESCO for direction on education projects, in the early 1970s it was more determined to provide its own direction, initially with a focus on poverty. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the
Bank continued to focus on five key themes: (i) basic education; (ii) the promotion of productivity and social equity; (iii) the maximization of efficiencies in education; (iv) the links between education to economic development; and (v) building institutional capacity.

New lines of thinking were also introduced at this time, including rates of return analysis. Jones and Coleman (2005: 114) argue that this policy framework remained intact, despite the widening economic gap between the low-income countries and others. Mundy terms this approach by the Bank as ‘redistribution with growth’; that is, it was focused entirely on the productive capacities of the poor (that is human capital), and paid little attention to the transfer of income, consumption, or assets of the poor. Nor did it pay attention to the structure of production or the role of government (Mundy, 1998: 465).

The education programme of the Bank was profoundly influenced by the shift toward neo-liberalism, or what was also called the Washington Consensus. This consensus – an attempt to provide a coherent and comprehensive framework for social and economic policy - also provided an ideological framework for the IMF, the OECD and the US Treasury. Within the World Bank, this framework, of privatisation, liberalisation and stabilisation, was also applied to the developing countries, all of who faced a major debt crisis. As we will show in Chapter 3, the Washington Consensus had a profound effect both on development more generally in low-income countries, and on the nature and form of education.

The OECD’s DAC might be seen as one of the most powerful though least known development agencies. Unlike the World Bank, bi-lateral aid agencies and NGOs, the OECD is not a major aid donor. Neither can it claim to be universally representative. The OECD operates through seeking to influence the terms of debate and to provide infra-structural means through which these debates may be embedded and advanced. An example of this is its 1996 report *Shaping the 21st century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation* (OECD, 1996a) which laid out an ‘integrated set’ of international development goals, building on the separate UN conferences of the 1990s on environment, population, social development and women, as well as on the Jomtien *Education For All (EFA)* conference. It sums up its approach and contribution as follows:

> Policy design, analysis and coordination and sharing the lessons of well-tested member country institutional and policy approaches are the OECD’s *leitmotif*. Its unique approach to building capacity relies on networks of member country practitioners who make and implement policy in their own capitals everyday. The ‘how to’ approach takes place through a variety of ‘soft law’ instruments, policy principles and guidelines, best practice, model provisions and treaties, checklists, tools, training materials and consultative mechanisms. By putting these human resources, knowledge experience and supporting tools at the service of partner countries—and by exploring with partners how they can best use and adapt them to their own needs—the OECD is contributing to the international development partnership (OECD, 2005a, 12)

Taken together, the international multilateral agencies define what is to count as development and education, they construct the programmes, finance them, set the conditions under which they are to be financed, lay down the terms of partnership with other agencies and evaluate the activities. We will be looking in detail at the important agencies both directly and indirectly concerned with education.

### 2.2.4 Non-governmental organisations

While non-governmental organisations were a feature of the development landscape during the post-war period (for instance working in areas like human rights and legal justice), since the 1980s and there has been widespread recognition of the rapid growth of non-governmental organisations. Paul (2000: 1) estimates some 25,000 organisations qualify as international NGOs. Their growth has also been a major result of greater involvement in governance at all levels, from global to the local (Karns and Mingst, 2004: 17).

An expanding number of NGOs also mediate the relationship between globalisation and education (see, for example, a special issue of *Current Issues in Comparative Education* (CICE) 1998, especially articles by Ginsburg, Steiner-Khamsi and Armove and responses by Edwards and Stromquist), particularly as the state has moved out of key areas of social responsibility. This development has been seen as a response to the failure of states (Oyugi, 2004); the failure of New Social Movements (Hirsch, 2003); the increasing reliance on NGOs by UN agencies (Martens, 2001); and global trends that create new spaces for civil action (Edwards et al 1999). However, NGOs are seen as being in danger of incorporation into the development agendas of International Organisations (see Edwards and Hulme, 1996) and as auxiliaries in the privatisation of world politics (Martens, 2001: 387-404).

### 2.2.5 Regionalism

Regionalism (the formal process of intergovernmental collaboration between two or more states) was a tendency during the post war period (for instance the establishment of the various UN Commissions, such as ECLAC; the European Economic Community in 1957; the Organisation for African Unity, 1961). Usually it involves an arrangement between three or more geographically contingent states. These agreements have tended to follow the independence of former African and Latin American colonies (Ravenshill, 2005: 126). However, competitive pressures in the global economy have hastened this process. The dramatic revival of European integration has
produced a new wave of thinking on regions, with the 'new regionalism' emerging in the mid 1980s (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000). Ravenshill (2005) has termed this new phase second wave regionalism. The new regionalism is viewed as a complex process of change simultaneously involving state as well as non-state actors, and occurring as a result of global, regional, national and local forces.

Hettne and Söderbaum (2000) argues that the second wave of regionalism must be understood in its historical context: (i) the new division of power in the world; (ii) the relative decline in US hegemony; (iii) the erosion the Westphalian nation-state system and the growth of interdependence and ‘globalisation’; and (iv) the changed attitudes toward (neo-liberal) economic development and political systems in low-income countries as well as the post-communist countries.

The dominant regions that emerged in the 1990s have tended to form around three major regional blocs; the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European Union (EU) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) agreement. These have been added to by a proliferation of other regional agreements, including MERCOSUR (Latin America), CARICOM (Caribbean countries) and ASEAN (Asian economies not including the USA), among others.

A major reason advanced for the reinvigoration of regionalism has been the growth in global interdependence, and in particular the integration of markets for goods, services and finance. There has been some work on the consequences for education of the rise of regionalism as a response to these developments (see Dale and Robertson, 2002) and as a possible alternative to globalisation. A central axis of work in this area concerns whether regionalism is to be seen as largely an economic response to globalisation—in which case it is the economic aspects of education that are stressed—or as an attempt to redress a perceived global imbalance at a cultural level; in this case, developing a regional focus is seen as a means of sustaining a distinct regional identity, particularly in the case of East Asia.

In all cases, however, the social dimension plays second fiddle to the trade dimension of the regional organisation. That is also the case in the region that is most developed in all respects, Europe, and a great deal has been written on the relationship between globalisation, Europeanisation and education. While this may be seen in some cases as a model (and indeed, promoted as such; see the EU’s development of the ‘Tuning America Latina’ programme) it is clear from the literature that (a) different regional organisations operate in different ways, with different aims, and with different perceived roles for education, and (b) these policies or approaches are differently received by different countries. It may also be inferred from these policies and accounts that the relationship between regionalism and globalisation is one of, at best, parts and wholes, rather than a hierarchical one, where ‘globalisation’ is somehow a ‘higher’ level within which regions operate. These ideas will be developed further in Chapter 10 when we focus specifically on the various mechanisms, discourses and institutions that constitute African regionalism.

2.3 Development

By contrast with ‘globalisation’, the idea of ‘development’ has an older history and one that we will plot out here and take up in greater depth in Chapter 3, 4 and 6. The idea of development can be traced back to the post Second World War period. In his ‘Inaugural Speech’ in 1947, President Truman set out a vision of the future for the world’s low-income countries and coined the term ‘development’ to refer to processes of economic and social progress in colonial and post-colonial states:

We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of the underdeveloped areas...I believe that we should make available to peace loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realise their aspirations for a better life...The old imperialism - exploitation for foreign profit - has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair dealing (Truman, 1949: Point Four).

In Truman’s speech three central themes should be noted. First, a distinction is made between the old colonial/imperial way of doing things and the new US way. The phrase ‘development’ also replaced that of Modernisation theory

Throughout the early post-war period, writing on development was underpinned by modernisation theory. Most famously enunciated over a decade later in Rostow’s (1960) The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, modernisation theory became the dominant explanation of how low-income countries could improve the living conditions of their populations by following a set of prescriptive policies to encourage economic ‘take off’.

2.3.1 Modernisation theory
Rostow’s theory embraced a very linear view of history with the West, and particularly the US, at the helm. Other countries were encouraged to follow a set of stages that promised the possibility of ‘catching up’ with the West. In that sense, it was both a theory and a prescription and had important implications for educational policy (Dale, 1982). While it was a strongly technical phenomenon, a body of modernisation theory did focus on culture and politics and the need for the inculcation of ‘Western’ values (Harbison and Myers, 1964; Coleman and Azrael, 1965). This conceptualisation of culture was, as Escobar (1995: 44) notes, more broadly the product of a deep ethnocentric understanding of history that saw non-Western culture as “a residual variable, to disappear with the advance of modernization”. Many recent theories of globalisation, produced in the north and anchored in understandings of industrialisation, continue to reproduce this view of history.

Within modernisation theories, education was regarded as playing a central role. Inkeles and Smith (1974), for example, emphasised the role of education in creating ‘modern’ individuals, while Harbison and Myers (1964: 3) suggest that “…education is the key that unlocks the door to modernisation”. Education here is seen as fundamental in the development of the ‘necessary’ technical and cultural skills needed for economic development (Coleman and Azrael, 1965) while a mass education system itself was seen as a key pillar of a ‘developed’ society.

Central to the recognition of the role of education in economic productivity was the emergence of human capital theory (Schultz, 1961; Becker, 1964). Human capital theory remains the dominant theory that provides the justification for much of the activity of the World Bank in the education sector (Jones, 1992; Klees, 2002; Jones with Coleman, 2005) and the OECD (Henry et al., 2001). The central premise of human capital theory is that investment in education is a key promoter of economic growth (Schultz, 1961; Denison, 1962; Denison, 1967; Becker, 1964). For modernisation theorists, human capital theory provided an important piece in the jigsaw of economic development, as low levels of educational investment in low-income countries were seen to be a causal factor in the relative inequality between north and south. As Schultz puts it; “…knowledge and skill are in great part the product of investment and, combined with other human investment, predominantly account for the productive superiority of the technically advanced countries” (Schultz, 1961: 3). If low-income nations followed these prescriptions, they too could enjoy the living standards of the ‘advanced’ societies. The West’s role in this process was to ‘help’ low-income countries through aid and technical expertise.

The paradigm of labour-force (or ‘manpower’) planning was one major means through which educational planners attempted to design the architecture of education, based on projections of future national skill needs (cf. Blaug, 1968; 1969). Manpower Planning fitted in well with the modernisation paradigm and the notion that one could predict future needs, despite early critiques of its efficiency, accuracy and narrow understanding of the role of education (World Bank, 1993).

2.3.2 Dependency theory

Dependency theory emerged as a challenge to modernisation theory. It raised the question of the relationship between national state development and the international capitalist economy (Frank, 1971; Rodeney, 1972; Amin, 1976). Where modernisation theory emphasized ‘internal’ factors that needed to be addressed for ‘development’ to be achieved, dependency theory focused on ‘external factors’. According to this theory, Western advanced countries had ‘developed’ not merely through the wise use of internal investments and education (as suggested by Schultz and Becker) but on the back of slavery and colonial exploitation. Furthermore, these unequal power relations had been reinforced in the ‘post’ colonial period. While varied in their emphasis, the central focus of dependency theories lay in the unequal power relations within the world economy which forced ‘low-income societies’ and peoples into particular and subservient roles and kept them there (exporters of primary raw materials, low paid labour, and so on).

Within dependency theory research, an educational strand emerged which viewed educational structures and content as the means by which the centre (developed countries) exercised control over the periphery (less developed countries), reproducing the conditions for the centre’s survival and advancement. This control operated not only in obvious ways (military power) but also in more subtly (through education systems – see Altbach and Kelly, 1978; Carney, 1974; Watson, 1982; Watson, 1984). These types of critiques were complemented and extended by Marxist theorists who explored the nature of education and class reproduction in developed countries. In the USA, for instance, Bowles and Gintis (1976) challenged the idea that schools functioned as mere producers of skilled workers, emphasising the transmission attributes of passivity and obedience and class inequalities. The dependency authors provided strong critiques of the assumptions of modernisation and human capital theory and addressed the issues of imperialism and colonialism that modernisation theory ignored.

By the late 1970s, much of the substantive critiques of the dependency theorists over the unequal world economic system had been incorporated into the call for a New International Economic Order. Ironically, it was precisely at this time that a ‘counter revolution’ in development theory emerged in response to shifting political preferences in the centres of industrial power (Toye, 1993).

2.3.3 The rise of neo-liberalism
For both modernisation and dependency theorists, the role of the state in national economic development was central, and a means to ensure that market inefficiencies could be overcome through state intervention. Yet, by the 1980s, a radical neo-classical economic critique of the role of the state in development had emerged that had a strong preference for markets as the mechanism through which production, distribution and consumption within an international economy should be efficiently managed (Bhagwati, 1982; Little, 1982; Lal, 1983).

Neo-liberalism has since come to dominate policy debates (albeit in modified forms) and given economic globalisation (at least to date) its central characteristics with important effects for aid, policy and education systems in low-income countries. An important question, however, is whether neo-liberal policies have delivered on the promised levels of growth and social welfare? In reviewing the recent evidence, there is good reason to feel less than confident about neo-liberal models of economic and social development.

2.3.4 Economic globalisation and its impact on social development

Our working assumption is that the globalisation of neo-liberalism as a development model must generate benefits that are widely shared for it to be able to sustain long-term growth and social cohesion (see also Green at al, 2007, see also Chapter 9 of this volume). In reviewing this literature, we necessarily enter into a debate on the relationship between economic globalisation and a range of pressing social issues such as poverty, unemployment and the informalisation of labour, inequality, violence and conflict, and educational opportunities. While a full and thorough exploration of these debates is beyond the scope of this chapter, we will provide a summary of three key reports and those areas that in our view have important implications for education.


Central to these concerns is a focus on the uneven nature and trajectory of contemporary globalisation and its relationship to social exclusion. They bring into focus those countries and population groups that have so far been left out of the benefits of globalisation. In line with a background paper by one of the architects of the ILO report (Hoeven van der, 2001), we will structure our analysis around an exploration of some of the ‘fault lines’ of globalisation that are particularly pressing for the education sector:

- integration;
- inadequacy of growth;
- informalisation;
- inequality and poverty;
- inadequate human resources.

Integration.

All three reports (ILO, 2004; UNDP, 2005; UN, 2005a) show a deep concern for the nature of global economic integration that has taken place over the last two decades. While demonstrating that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to the low-income world has increased over the last 20 years, the reports highlight that this is by no means an even process (see Figure 2.1). Asia and the Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean have seen marked increases in FDI, while Africa and Central and Eastern Europe have seen little growth.

Africa, particularly, has been left out of the process of FDI, leading some commentators to talk of a ‘Fourth World’ excluded from capitalist development (Amin, 1997; Amin, 2003). Figure 2.2 shows how narrowly FDI has been distributed, even within the different regions. During the 1990s, 23.7% of FDI to low-income countries went to China and a further 7.3% to Hong Kong. Alongside 10 other countries they account for 75% of FDI to low-income countries. The remaining 25% is dispersed unevenly across the remaining 176 low-income countries.

All three reports (ILO, 2004; UNDP, 2005; UN, 2005a) are concerned with processes that generate marginalisation and ask how countries and regions in the world can become more engaged in the global economy. Their concern is reflected more broadly across the range of interest groups and stakeholders engaged in international development issues. For some, overcoming marginalisation requires those states to further liberalise their economies to make them more attractive to FDI; for others, there is a call for a reorganizing of the rules of economic engagement – including Western subsidies and double standards, while other agencies appear to be calling for a combination of both, or are sceptical as to how free trade can assist in processes of equitable development given the power imbalances inherent within the global economy.

Regardless of the proposed solution, there is concern that not all countries, peoples and regions are benefiting from processes of economic globalisation and that measures need to be adopted at a range of levels to encourage more equitable engagement. Nevertheless there are also cautions in the ILO (2004) and UN (2005a) reports concerning the nature of that integration and the extent to which low-income countries seek to attract different types of FDI.
which focus on different types of economic processes. The developmental benefits of certain types of FDI for local populations, such as Export Processing Zones, are questioned. Zones typically offer workers few labour rights and contribute little to the social development of the region (ILO, 2004; UN, 2005a; Ocampo, 2002).

Figure 2.1 Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment, developing countries 1985-2002 (in US$ billions)

![Graph showing inflows of FDI from 1985 to 2002 for different regions.]


Figure 2.2 Distribution of FDI inflows to developing countries total for 1990s (in %)

![Pie chart showing distribution of FDI inflows to developing countries in the 1990s.]

Source: ILO, 2004:29

Many NGOs and development organisations are also concerned with the social effects of the privatisation of basic public services on poor and marginalized population groups (MacCuish, 2002; Yeates, 2002). As might be expected, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) is particularly concerned with global working conditions and labour standards (see ILO, 2004), and whether FDI may be causing a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of salaries, working conditions and terms of employment as continents, countries, regions and cities adopt measures to attract foreign capital (Gerrefi, 1994; ILO, 2004; Ocampo, 2002).

**Inadequacy of growth**
Despite more than 20 years of restructuring, economic growth rates have remained relatively low (see Figure 2.3), at least when taken as a mean average compared with earlier periods. While there was wide variation at the country and regional levels, the long boom in capitalist development of the 1950’s and 1960s has not been reproduced. According to the UNDP (2005: 186-187), average global economic growth between 1990-2002 was 1.2%; for low-income countries, it averaged 2.8%. This also hides considerable variation between continents with Africa showing zero growth, Latin America 1.3%, South Asia 3.2% and East Asia 5.4%.

Maddison (2003, see Figure 2.4) places patterns of growth in a longer perspective. If we take data on the 20th century in selected countries and regions, growth levels have declined quite dramatically in all countries and regions apart from China and India, with stark falls in Africa, Latin America and Japan.

As Figure 2.4 highlights, the countries that have shown most economic growth over the period since 1973 – China and India – while embracing international trade as a mechanism for economic advancement, could not be seen as examples of countries who have embraced the free market developmental models pursued by the World Bank and the IMF and countries such as the USA, UK, New Zealand and Australia.

Figure 2.3 World GDP Per Capita Growth, 1961 – 2003 (annual change in %)

China remains a country with a strong level of state intervention in the economy and a highly selective and strategic engagement with free trade (Harvey, 2005: 120-152). Similarly, despite being embraced by the World Bank in the 1980s as an example of the benefits of neo-liberal economics, the Asian Tigers’ developmental strategy highlights the key role of the state in strengthening and regulating national economic development (Wade, 1990). In response to these criticisms the World Bank began to revaluate the role of the state in developmental processes during the 1990. This reappraisal was evidenced in their World Development Report 1997 (World Bank, 1997) where a more strategic role for the state was proposed.

If we compare the growth patterns of Africa and China (Figures 2.5 and 2.6) over the last two centuries, the spectacular divergence of fortunes is even more apparent. While both economies were rising sharply during the 1950-73 period, China has continued in the 1973-2001 period while Africa has entered into freefall. Increasingly, question marks over the efficacy of neo-liberal solutions to growth are emerging even amongst erstwhile advocates (Leftwich, 2005).

The recipe for sustained economic growth remains a key issue and an increasingly elusive goal for both the developed and low-income countries. This raises questions about the efficacy of the neo-liberal model of economic development. Both the UNDP and UN reports consider how promoting a more equal distribution of wealth might also promote economic growth and significantly speed up achievement of the MDGs.

There is, of course, no guarantee that a more redistributive economic development model would kick start the global economy and revive the fortunes of those left out of the benefits of the contemporary development model. However, the arguments of the 1980s which suggested the initial suffering of some population groups as a result of structural adjustment policies would later be rectified has been shown to be wrong. Growth and redistribution has not been realized (World Bank, 1989; Leftwich, 2005).

**Informalisation and unemployment**

The negative social impact of neo-liberal restructuring is most evident in the twin effects of rising unemployment and informalisation of labour. According to a later ILO (2005: 7-8) report, global unemployment rose from 140...
million in 1994 to 184 million in 2004 (6.2% of eligible global workforce), with unemployment rates in Africa at 10.1%, Latin America at 8.6% and the Middle East at 11.7%.

Figure 2.5  Open Unemployment Rates 1990-2002 in %

![Chart showing unemployment rates by region from 1990 to 2002.](chart.png)

Source: ILO, 2004: 41

Youth unemployment rates were particularly high; 21.3% in the Middle East, 18.4% in sub-Saharan Africa, 17.6% in Latin America to 10.9% in South Asia. The ILO (2004) report highlights how the broad trends of unemployment between 1999-2002 have been disappointing in all regions with the exception of the most developed regions of USA and Europe. Notable is the persistent high levels of unemployment in the Middle East and North Africa and also sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 2.5).

While unemployment has become a major contributing factor to rising economic and social problems, there has been a shift to increasingly precarious and casualised labour. In Figure 2.6 we can see that, with the exception of the developed countries, informal work has increased, rising globally from 26% to 32% over the last two decades of the 20th century. Particularly notable is the increase from 29% to 44% of total employment in Latin America. The only exception has been in the most developed countries where there have been moderate declines in informal employment.

Figure 2.6  Non Agricultural Self Employment 1980-2000

![Chart showing non-agricultural self employment from 1980 to 2000.](chart.png)

Source: ILO, 2004: 42
**Inequality and poverty**

There have been important debates in recent years on the extent to which neo-liberal globalisation has effected poverty and inequality (cf. World Bank, 2000; Wade 2002b; Wade, 2002c; Dollar, 2004; Wade, 2004; Wolf, 2004; Bhagwati 2004; Sutcliffe 2004). While complex and contested, there appears to be some consensus emerging recently over these issues in the literature, at least on poverty.

**Figure 2.7** People Living on Less than 1US$ per Day, 1990 and 2000 (millions)

![Figure 2.7](image)

Source: ILO, 2004: 45

The number of people living in absolute poverty worldwide declined significantly from 1,237 million in 1990 to 1,100 million in 2000. Most of this is accounted for by the changes in two large countries, China and India, where 38 per cent of the world’s population live. In China alone, the number of people living in poverty declined from 361 million to 204 million. Elsewhere - in sub-Saharan Africa, Europe and Central Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean, poverty has increased by 82, 14, and 8 million, respectively (see Figure 2.7). However, regional and country-specific factors unrelated to globalization were key factors in these differences in poverty reduction. (ILO, 2004: 44)

**Figure 2.8 Evolution of Income Inequality Among Countries (Gini Coefficient Values)**

![Figure 2.8](image)

Source: UN, 2005a: 45
On the inequality debate, things become more complex, though there appears to be far greater evidence of rising inequality. Again, China is crucial in this process as Figure 2.10 below shows. If China is removed from Gini-coefficient calculations, then it is possible to see a steep increase in inequality over the last 20 years. If it is included then there is a modest decrease in world inequality.

2.5 Poverty and inequality in the world today

Debates about trends in global income distribution continue. Less open to debate is the scale of inequality. The world’s richest 500 individuals have a combined income greater than that of the poorest 416 million. Beyond these extremes, the 2.5 billion people living on less than $2 a day—40% of the world’s population—account for 5% of global income. The richest 10%, almost all living in high-income countries, account for 54%. (UNDP, 2005: 4).

As the Human Development Report (and Figure 2.9) notes:

Global income distribution resembles a champagne glass. At the top, where the glass is widest, the richest 20% of the population hold three-quarters of world income. At the bottom of the stem, where the glass is narrowest, the poorest 40% hold 5% of world income and the poorest 20% hold just 1.5%. The poorest 40% roughly corresponds to the 2 billion people living on less than $2 a day (UNDP, 2005: 36).

**Figure 2.9 Where the Money Is**

We can see growing gaps between the wealthiest 20 countries and the poorest (Figure 2.9). The poorest countries in the World have stood still, while the richest have increased GDP per capita by over 300%. What is striking in all of the recent UN institutions’ reports (UN, 2005a; UNDP, 2005; ILO, 2004) is a focus on inequality as representing a fundamental block to achieving the Millennium Development Goals and eradicating poverty.

While a highly contested arena, the UN institutions have begun to argue that inequality is actually not only a fetter to social development but also to economic development itself. The UNDP (2005) has moved furthest in this direction and argues, on the basis of a range of modelling exercises, that reducing inequality should be a central concern of all governments interested in reducing poverty and attaining the MDGs.

There are clear differences in the conceptualisation of pro-poor growth between the UNDP and the World Bank as the UNDP report (2005: 65) notes.
Like motherhood and apple pie, everybody is in favour of “pro poor growth”. The concept, like its increasingly popular and more recent variant “shared growth”, captures the idea that the quality of growth, as well as the quantity, matters for poverty reduction. But the concept means very different things to different people. The World Bank and international development agencies favour an absolute definition of pro-poor growth. What matters in this definition is not whether the incomes of poor people are rising in relation to average income, but how fast their incomes are rising. Pro-poor growth on this definition can be consistent with rising inequality, even in countries already marked by extreme inequalities. The progressive definition of pro-poor growth adopted in this Report focuses on the relative position of poor people. It highlights the potential for small distributional shifts to produce major gains for poverty reduction (UNDP, 2005: 65).

The UNDP argue that if a pro-poor redistributive model of growth was applied, then poverty could be halved in Brazil 19 years earlier and in Kenya by 17 years (UNDP, 2005). They suggest that “…when it comes to income poverty reduction, distribution matters as well as growth” and that this “conclusion holds as much for low-income countries as for middle-income countries. Without improved income distribution sub-Saharan Africa would require implausibly high growth rates to halve poverty by 2015” (UNDP, 2005: 8).

Furthermore, they argue that unless radical steps are taken to reduce inequality, then the MDGs will remain an empty pledge. As the UN Secretary-General has put it: “The MDGs can be met by 2015—but only if all involved break with business as usual and dramatically accelerate and scale up action immediately (UNDP, 2005: 5).

Failure to tackle extreme inequalities is acting as a brake on progress towards achieving the MDGs. On many of the MDGs the poor and disadvantaged are falling behind. Cross-country analysis suggests that child mortality rates among the poorest 20% of the population are falling at less than one-half of the world average. Because the poorest 20% account for a disproportionately large share of child mortality, this is slowing the overall rate of progress towards achieving the MDGs (UNDP, 2005: 5).

They estimate that at current trends “The MDG target for reducing child mortality will be missed by 4.4 million avoidable child deaths in 2015… The gap between the MDG target for halving poverty and projected outcomes is equivalent to an additional 380 million people living on less than $1 a day by 2015…. The MDG target of universal primary education will be missed on current trends, with 47 million children still out of school in 2015” (UNDP, 2005: 5). If their calculations are correct then current MDG targets will remain merely symbolic without a radical shift in development policy and planning.

What is evident is that inequality is emerging as a key policy challenge in the new millennium. Adrian Leftwich notes that even the World Bank appears to be changing its attitude. He quotes the draft copy of the World Bank’s World Development Report 2006 which states that ‘high levels of political inequality can lead to the design of economic institutions and social arrangements that systematically favour the interests of those with more influence’ (World Bank, 2006a: 1).

2.6 Inadequate human resources

As Figure 2.10 highlights, the trajectories of spending as a percentage of GDP over the 1990s, have seen a downward spiral in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (from roughly 6% to just over 4%), have been fairly stagnant in the Middle East and North Africa (around 5%) (ILO, 2004: 47), and have involved a move downwards in sub-Saharan Africa, from 4.5% down to just over 4%. Only Latin America has seen a steady rise in educational spending from 3% to just under 4.5%.

There is a highly uneven geography of educational access, provision and quality that mirrors the socio-economic and political marginalisation identified in the first half of this chapter. At the macro statistical level there remains around 115 million children excluded from accessing basic primary education; the majority of these children come from sub-Saharan Africa and Asia (UNDP, 2005: 24).

While Central Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, and North Africa, are broadly on track to achieve the MDG of Universal Primary Enrolment, sub-Saharan Africa, and South and West Asia are not (UN, 2005a: 74). However, access remains only one side of an increasingly diverging story between North and South.

As the UNDP report notes, while a child in Mozambique can expect 4 years of formal education, a child in South Asia can expect 8 and one in France 15. Table 2.1 (UNESCO, 2006) highlights the disparities between different regions. Furthermore, unlike access, these gaps are widening. The quality of that education is likewise diverging, with over 25% of Zambian Primary School graduates failing basic literacy tests.
Table 2.1 School Life Expectancy by Region in 2002 and Change Since 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>Change 1998-2002</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Developing countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Developed countries</td>
<td>16.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Countries in transition</td>
<td>12.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
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<td>Arab States</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South and West Asia</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America and Western Europe</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNESCO, 2006:38

The UNDP (2005: 25) report notes there is also continued concern with the gender dimension of educational access:

Gender inequalities continue to limit girls’ education. Even with the narrowing of gender gaps, on average girls can expect to receive one year less of education than boys in African and Arab States and two years less in South Asia. In 14 African countries girls represent less than 45% of the primary school population. In Pakistan they represent just 41%—gender parity would put another 2 million girls in the country in school. In the developing world as a whole primary school completion rates are 75% for girls but rise to 85% for boys. Gender disparities are even wider at the secondary and tertiary levels. These deep gender disparities represent not just a violation of the universal right to education but also a threat to future human development prospects: girls’ education is one of the most powerful catalysts for social progress across a wide range of indicators” (UNDP, 2005: 24-25)

However from 1998-2002, there have been marked improvements in access in the worst affected regions (UN, 2005a). Sub-Saharan Africa increased primary enrolment by more than 11 million. Nevertheless, increased access has placed pressure on existing infrastructure and resources and threatens quality. The report notes that the
deterioration of quality tends to exaggerate inequalities between those who can afford to opt out of the state sector and those who remain.

Table 2.2 shows educational exclusion by household. It highlights the wide disparities between regions, countries, gender and the rural dwellers. Some examples are illustrative here of these gaps. While 3% of men in Armenia have had no formal education, in Burkina Faso the number rises to 70%. Likewise, we can see that in virtually every country, women are more likely than men to have been excluded from formal education. Furthermore, growing up in rural areas increases the likelihood of educational exclusion in almost all of the countries under review.

Table 2.3 focused on primary enrolment, points to similar divergences between continents and regions. Here we can contrast the 90% enrolment rate in Latin America and the Caribbean with only 62% in sub-Saharan Africa. Secondary school enrolment statistics for the major regions and the world as a whole show the extent of educational inequality at the secondary level (see Table 2.3). The data indicates that net enrolment ratios are significantly lower in the secondary as opposed to the primary level in 2001. Central Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and North America and Western Europe had the highest levels of secondary enrolment, with ratios of over 80 per cent, while secondary enrolment in sub-Saharan Africa was a very low with 21 per cent. The data for 2001 indicates that females are less likely to be enrolled in secondary school, except in Latin America and the Caribbean and in North America and Western Europe. However, between 1998 and 2001, net secondary enrolment among young women improved markedly in Latin America and the Caribbean; Africa also registered a small increase. Higher education, however, remains a privilege for high-income countries or high-income groups within countries.

Table 2.2 Percentages of Total, Urban and Rural Households with No Education, by Sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Urban areas</th>
<th>Rural areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Urban males</td>
<td>Rural males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Females</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Countries with the highest proportion of uneducated males

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Urban areas</th>
<th>Rural areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Urban males</td>
<td>Rural males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Females</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>50.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN, 2005a: 74

Table 2.3 Inequalities in Primary School Enrolment: the World and Major Regions, 1998 and 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country or territory</th>
<th>School-age population at 2001 (thousands)</th>
<th>Enrolment in primary education</th>
<th>Net enrolment ratio in primary education (percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Females (percentage)</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>648 559</td>
<td>655 538</td>
<td>651 913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries in transition</td>
<td>14 256</td>
<td>15 000</td>
<td>14 767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed countries</td>
<td>97 948</td>
<td>70 406</td>
<td>65 052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing countries</td>
<td>566 369</td>
<td>570 207</td>
<td>569 017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab States</td>
<td>39 356</td>
<td>34 725</td>
<td>32 252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central &amp; Eastern Europe</td>
<td>25 079</td>
<td>25 484</td>
<td>23 677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>6 627</td>
<td>6 049</td>
<td>6 657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia &amp; the Pacific</td>
<td>189 557</td>
<td>219 912</td>
<td>211 106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America &amp; the Caribbean</td>
<td>59 064</td>
<td>76 585</td>
<td>69 990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. America &amp; Western Europe</td>
<td>51 664</td>
<td>52 856</td>
<td>49 043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South &amp; West Asia</td>
<td>107 874</td>
<td>158 066</td>
<td>160 308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>108 352</td>
<td>80 406</td>
<td>91 972</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN, 2005a: 75
Moving beyond access to formal schooling to examine patterns of global literacy, we can the unequal geography of access to educational opportunities with literacy rates below 40% in Haiti, Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso and between 40% and 60% in large parts of North Africa and Pakistan.

As the UN (2005a) report notes, “…while education is often seen as the medium through which inequalities can be tackled, it can also become the medium through which “the worst forms of social stratification and segmentation are created. Inequalities in educational attainment often translate into differentials in employment, occupation, income, residence and social class” (p.76). They cite research from Latin America (cf Behrman et al, 2003: 47) that demonstrates the strong relationship between income disparities and levels of education. Thus,

…although there are differences between countries, those with six years of education earn, on average, 50 per cent more than those with no education, and those with 12 years of education earn more than twice as much as those with no education. The study from which this information is taken notes that educational differentials explain 25 to 33 per cent of the income concentration in the countries of Latin America (UN, 2005a: 76).

Differences in returns from different levels of education are shown in Figure 2.11.

**Figure 2.11 Relative Returns to Different Levels of Education in Latin America**

![Graph showing relative returns to different levels of education in Latin America](source: Behrman et al, 2003: 47)

The UN is concerned with the strong intergenerational persistence of educational inequalities and suggests that:

To redress educational imbalances and thereby reduce the inequalities they engender or perpetuate, effective policies and programmes that target disadvantaged groups but also focus more broadly on improving educational access and quality for all must be implemented. The gender gap in education requires particular attention to ensure that neither sex is favoured over the other. The quality of education also needs to be addressed (ibid.).

### 2.7 Conclusion

All of the reports under review in this chapter (ILO, 2004; UNDP, 2005; UN, 2005a) recognize the immense possibilities that technological progress and increased communication can offer, yet all express a concern with the nature of the contemporary economic development model, both for its failure to deliver sufficient growth and for its tendency to exacerbate inequalities and give rise to conflicts at a range of levels. There are signs that this viewpoint is finding some sympathy amongst the Bretton Woods institutions, specifically the World Bank.

It’s World Development Report (2006) the World Bank recognises that if China and India are removed from the statistical equations, then global inequality has risen over the last decades. This may well signal a move away from a ‘one size fits all’ remedy for low-income countries narrowly focused on the economic towards one that recognises power and inequality and the inherent social failures of the model that has been promoted over the last decades.

The articulator of the concept of the Washington Consensus, John Williamson, perhaps expresses the dual problem most clearly:
...the objective that underlay the Washington Consensus was excessively narrow. It consisted in accelerating growth without worsening income distribution. If one regards poverty as an affront to human dignity, then one will care not simply about the level and growth of income but about its distribution as well (Williamson, 2002).

Furthermore, the notion that the route to that economic development lies “…not in a country's natural resources, or even its physical or human capital, but rather in the set of economic policies that it pursues” (Williamson 1999) meant that the same policies, regardless of context, history and capacity, were applied throughout the low-income world. Economic growth during the 1980s and early 1990s was seen as an ‘aim’ in itself rather than being the ‘means’ to achieve human development (Stiglitz, 2002).

This chapter has highlighted some of the key concepts that shape the education/development relationship, particularly within the context of contemporary processes of globalisation. Furthermore, it has also highlighted the complex nature of the wider social and economic setting for thinking about education and the way in which it is being drawn into the solutions for generating economic growth. The critical point to be made here is that education systems are not islands with their own resources. Rather they are highly dependent upon other institutions, including the state. Poor levels of economic growth will have important implications for funding education systems. Families with more limited resources will create new kinds of problems for education systems. The unequal distribution of resources within a society will limit the equal distribution of education unless policies are specifically targeted to overcoming these limitations. As we shall see in the following chapters, education policymaking and programmes are also hugely complicated by the emergence of the global economy.
Chapter 3: The Washington Consensus 1980-90

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter we examine the transformations that occurred in the global economy and polity towards the end of the 1970s and chart the emergence of a set of policy prescriptions commonly known as the ‘Washington Consensus’. We demonstrate how these policy prescriptions became globalised under World Bank/IMF-led structural adjustment policies and examine the relationship between these reforms and the nature and form of education as a means of development in low-income countries.

3.2 Transition to economic globalisation

There is a broad consensus amongst researchers that after more than two decades of uneven but steady growth the world economic system entered into a period of crisis in the 1970’s (Amin, 1997; Dicken, 1998; Amin, 2003). While its causes continue to be debated, there is general recognition that it ushered in a period of radical restructuring of the world economy. There is also broad agreement in the literature that neo-liberal economic policies were central to that structural transformation (Tickell and Peck, 2003).

A key milestone in the spread of neo-liberalism in low-income countries was the 1982 Mexico debt crisis (Branford and Kucinski, 1988). Mexico’s default on debt repayments led to shockwaves across a range of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) many of whom, during the 1970’s, had lent vast sums of money to governments in low and middle income countries. The Mexican crisis led to a dramatic shift in the policies of the World Bank and the IMF who developed a set of policies (now referred to as neo-liberalism) that served to ensure that debtor countries were able to service their debts. The policies were collectively known as Stabilisation and Structural Adjustment Polices (SAPs) (Berg, 1994; Walton and Seddon, 1994). These policies included a range of measures related to fiscal austerity, deregulating the economy and opening it up to international competition that later became known as the Washington Consensus (see Table 3.1 for the policy repertoire).

More generally, the policies reflected a shift in political trajectory in two key developed economies the UK and USA with the election of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan respectively. This new policy orthodoxy became known as the Washington Consensus (Williamson, 1993: 1332-1333). The policy measures were linked, through conditionality clauses with low-income debtor nations, to loan agreements issued by the IMF in agreement with the World Bank. Conditionality clauses thus became the key mechanism through which neo-liberal economic policies became globalised and spread throughout low-income countries (Hoogvelt, 1997; Veltmeyer et al, 1997; Checkel, 2000; Singh, 2002).

Table: 3.1 The Washington Consensus

adapted from Williamson, J., 1993: 1332-1333

The worsening economic situation, particularly in the low-income countries stemming from the 1973 oil crisis, meant many countries had spiralling debts and were left with little choice but to accept SAPs (Streeten, 1988). Between the years 1980-98, the World Bank/IMF made 958 adjustment loans across the world (Easterly 2001). While the notion of ‘imposition’ is prevalent in much of the academic literature (Amin 1997; Chossudovsky, 1997; Robinson, 1998), the World Bank literature argues that it was less ‘imposition’ by external forces than
‘recognition’ by internal forces that the policies of Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) (with a strong interventionist role for the state) had failed to deliver the economic prosperity that it projected (Kapur et al, 1997).

For the World Bank and the IMF, it was the ISI policies of protectionism that had produced the economic downturn. Rather than protecting products from the world market, the World Bank argued that economic prosperity would emerge from more active engagement with the world market through free and unfettered trade (World Bank, 1989; 1994). Through the new strategy of Export Led Development (ELD), countries could focus on certain sectors of their economy where they may have some comparative advantage (Jayarajah and Branson, 1995; Muuka, 1998; Bird, 2001).

While the immediate material reason for most countries following the Washington Consensus policies was the rationalisation of the external debt and control over fiscal imbalances, this new set of policy measures served to open up countries to world markets. Reductions in subsidies for local firms and industry, reductions in tariffs for imports and the removal of barriers to the movement of capital and goods, all sought to facilitate the entry of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into nations (Balasubramanyam et al, 1999; Lensink and Morrissey, 2001; Green, D., 2003). The World Bank advocated selling off to the private sector what it regarded as heavily subsidised and unprofitable nationally owned industries.

The private sector, it was argued, would be far more efficient. This process of privatisation meant that a whole range of state industries and public utilities companies went on sale. Furthermore, the ELD model that emerged to replace the more nationally-orientated ISI model meant that ‘development’ by focussing on ‘niche markets’ and ‘comparative advantage’, became orientated towards a nation-state’s insertion into the world economy rather than on national production/consumption needs. In many parts of the world public enterprises in key sectors of the economy – electricity, oil, water, telecommunications—were privatised. By 1992 more than 80 countries had privatised some 6,800 previously state owned enterprises; mostly monopolies supplying essential public services (Hoogvelt, 1997: 138).

In the 1980s, those Latin American and African countries who had begun ‘structural adjustment’ policies were hit by their worst economic recessions since the 1930s - referred to later as the ‘lost decade’ (Cheru, 1989; Green, 1995). During the 1980s, while world annual economic growth averaged 3.1%, in Africa it declined from 4.2 % (1965-1980) to 2.1% (1980-89). In sub-Saharan Africa this was even more extreme. In the decade 1980-1988, the average annual growth of GDP was -2.4 percent (Burkett, 1991: 474). In Latin America (Robinson, 1998: 45), growth during the two periods shifted from 6.1% (1965 – 1980) to 1.6% (1980-89).

There is evidence to suggest that the two continents most affected by the debt crisis and who had subsequently entered into SAPs programmes also suffered the most during the 1980s and 1990s. Meanwhile, there were alternative policies being followed by countries in South and East Asia – Tiger Economies— (including China and India particularly in the 1980s). While not rejecting the market, a number of these Tiger economies pursued a more strategic approach towards its role in the development project, retaining a strong role for the state (Wade, 1990; Harvey, 2005).

The difference in the development trajectories of China, the Asian Tigers and India during the 1980s and 1990s, especially compared to those in Africa and Latin America, is an important one. As we will see, during the 1990s there was a shift in understanding of the role of the state and market in development. This issue also remains a key one for debates on the relationship between poverty and inequality – on whether growth-based redistribution (market) or state-based redistribution strategies should be deployed to alleviate poverty and inequality.

3.3 SAPs and education

Education systems in low-income countries, particularly during the 1980s, were not spared from the adverse effects of Structural Adjustment Programmes. There has been a great deal of research exploring the long and short-term effects of SAPs on education (Adams, 1989; Reimers, 1989; Reimers, 1990; Reimers, 1991; Ghosh, 1993; Upendranad, 1993; Ilo, 1994; Reimers, 1994; Samoff, 1994; Todaro, 1994; Woodall, 1994; Carnoy, 1995; ILO, 1996; Carnoy, 2001). In this section we review the literature that concerns itself with the impact of SAPs on the financing, policy and governance of education in low-income countries, and the role of the World Bank in setting that agenda for education.

In a review of the literature, Bonal (2002) argues that there is a range of methodological problems in analysing the impact of SAPs on education. For instance, he notes that it is difficult to definitively say that SAPs policies were responsible for austerity measures in education, as even without SAPs programmes, many countries were forced into reductions in spending due to the world economic recession. Furthermore, Bonal shows that while educational policy measures that were broadly similar in content in countries undergoing structural adjustment, the outcomes varied – the result of local and national historical and political factors such as educational structure, class relations, trade union strength and so on. In sum, Bonal (2002: 5) argues that while ‘prescriptions’ converged, ‘outcomes’ often diverged as a result of policies being “…recontextualised at the national level”.

Before looking more closely at the effects of SAPs on education, it is important to remind ourselves of the broad policy repertoire that had emerged from the World Bank in the 1980s (see Chapter 2) regarding education. One was the Bank’s unswerving commitment to rates-of-return analysis emerging from human capital theory; the
second was a preference for decentralisation policies that challenged earlier state-centric model of educational governance that prevailed during the 1960’s and 1970’s. In combination, these two policy preferences were used to ‘roll back’ (Tickell and Peck, 2003) earlier policy prescriptions for effective delivery of education nationally.

Mundy (2002: 490) notes that the standard model of World Bank policy during the period included a “sharply curtailed role for government in educational provision” and the “rationalisation of its role in educational finance and system oversight”, a “commitment to decentralisation, cost-recovery and privatisation in higher education”, “increased attention to ‘productive’ inputs like textbooks”, and “a movement out of technical vocational education”. By the end of the 1980s, other policies were added. These included the use of national assessments and testing to hold schools and teachers more accountable. Central to all these policy interventions in low-income countries was a commitment to prioritising basic and general vocational education as the core building block for national educational development (Jones with Coleman, 2005). In Table 3.1 below we highlight the shifts that took place in education policy and priority during the period.

Table 3.1: Shifts in Policy During the Washington Consensus Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY THEMES</th>
<th>National Development Era</th>
<th>Neo-liberal Globalisation Era</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOMINANT THEORIES</td>
<td>Modernization Theory/ Dependency Theory</td>
<td>Neo-Classical Economic Theory (NCE), Human Capital Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEY ACTORS</td>
<td>Newly independent nation states, United Nations Institutions; the United States and the USSR</td>
<td>IMF/World Bank and other IFIs, OECD/DAC. US/USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINANCE</td>
<td>Largely state-funded. ODA focused on specific project funding, little bi-lateral/multi-lateral coordination. Legacy of colonial educational ties gives way to national development in Cold War context</td>
<td>Fiscal austerity and SAPs, User Fees, community financing, decentralization, privatisation, ODA reductions as Cold War ends (early 1990s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTICIPATION and PARTNERSHIPS</td>
<td>State and bi-lateral/multi-lateral. Few ODA partnerships with NGOs. Little coordination between ODA agencies. Soviet alliances with certain LICs, US alliances with others. NAM coordination</td>
<td>Top-Down, Donor Led; local participation often reduced to funding; Global recipe for education. Some bypassing of state to work with local government and NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROLE OF THE STATE</td>
<td>Strong state-led model of educational development.</td>
<td>Minimal State, preference for private sector and market-like delivery. Decentralised processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUITY and SOCIAL COHESION</td>
<td>State education as nation building project. Strong focus on national economic and social development objectives.</td>
<td>Narrow focus on fiscal austerity and economic role of education (human capital theory and rates of return)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3.1 ‘Rates of Return’ Analysis

Since the 1980s, the World Bank has relied heavily on rates of return to education as the main rationale for educational investment (World Bank, 1995; McMahon, 1981; Bennell, 1994; 1995; 1996; Psacharopoulos, 1994). These studies seek to assess the public/private cost of education and the public and private gains thereof. They have led to an assertion of the high social benefit of primary education, and the high private benefit of tertiary education to the recipient.

These led to a growing acceptance of the importance of Universal Primary Education (UPE), and, perhaps more controversially, growing calls for user-charges in higher education (World Bank 1995). Rates of return policies have also led to the active encouragement of private sector provision of education when increasingly shrinking government budgets cannot meet the costs of national education. These rates of return studies have also highlighted the relatively high social rate of return that education brings in agricultural, low-income, and less-industrialised nations. The studies also suggest a lowering in the social rate of return as countries increase GNP and invest more in education.
As Bonal (2002: 9) notes, these studies gave political credibility to the World Bank education sector, both internally and externally, because the policies relied on what was seen as ‘irrefutable arguments legitimated by the dominant paradigm of economics of education’; and also portrayed the Bank “as an institution concerned with the struggle against poverty and educational opportunities.” In that sense, investment in education served the economic and legitimation objectives of the World Bank (Jones with Coleman, 2005).

However Ayyar (1996), along with others (cf. Bennell, 1996), have challenged the reliability of rates of return analysis, suggesting that it is no more rigorous than the stages theory of the modernisation school (see Chapter 2 for an outline of modernisation theory and its relationship to education). In Chapter 4 on the Post Washington Consensus we will review the evidence that rates-of-return analysis has seriously underplayed the positive economic and social effects of higher levels of education to national development (McMahon, 1999).

3.3.2. Decentralisation

The second major education policy preference under SAPs was the decentralisation of public and governmental services. This reflected neo-liberal thinking that challenged state-led centralised planning models that had dominated development thinking in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Decentralised decision-making, assisted by market or market-like mechanisms of competition, were deemed superior models of system management, particularly for the education sector (Lauglo et al, 1985; Bray, 1996; Gropello, 1999; Kamat, 2000; Lemus, 2001; Behrman et al, 2002)

Applied to the education sector, it was argued that decentralisation would give power back to parents and local communities and weaken ‘vested’ interests. Relocating decision making to the local level meant that schools could be more responsive and adaptable to local circumstances. Increased local and school autonomy would increase participation, promote transparency, and allow for innovations in provision. Central to the rationale of decentralisation was a belief that the introduction of ‘market-like’ mechanisms would improve efficiency, and that the market rather than the state could deliver improvement in educational delivery (Bonal, 2002; Bray, 1996; 2000).

3.4 SAPs, budget cuts and the effects on education

The literature suggests that the World Bank’s SAPs had important direct and indirect effects on education. To begin we review the findings of two major evaluation studies that explored this period in order to highlight some general conclusions before turning to the broader literature.

3.4.1 UNESCO/ILO and SAPRIN reports

UNESCO/ILO Taskforce on Austerity, Adjustment and Resources

One landmark evaluation study conducted in the 1990s was a UNESCO/ILO Taskforce on austerity, adjustment and human resources. The Taskforce, led by Joel Samoff (see Samoff, 1994), carried out in-depth case studies of Brazil, Costa Rica, Hungary, Senegal and Tanzania – all of which had experienced SAPs. The findings of this Taskforce are noted below:

• While education remained a high priority for both governments and households during the 1980s, for many, the increased burden brought about by cost recovery mechanisms and increased poverty became unbearable.
• The reallocation of resources between sectors of education seemed to favour higher education, despite the intention by the Bank to direct it to primary education.
• Cuts in budgets tended to effect materials and capital expenditure first, although teachers’ salaries lost their real values of a decade earlier in many countries.
• The balance between public and private financing of education shifted towards the private.
• Quality and levels of achievement declined, though access seemed to have been broadly maintained. Access however declined for the poor and women.
• Economic crisis increased the power of foreign agencies (multilateral institutions and NGOs).

SAPRIN report

One of the most comprehensive attempts to assess the impact of structural adjustment beyond one country-level case study was a 4-year research project undertaken by a joint World Bank/Civil Society/Government Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRIN, 2002). The SAPRIN study explored nine countries spanning
poverty that SAPs’ economic policies generated in those countries undergoing World Bank/IMF adjustment Beyond the direct effects of SAPs on education budgets, there was also a range of effects related to the incr...education expenditure as a perc...of those that did not” (Reimers, 1994: 123).

...more likely to be cut back than in those not undergoing SAPs. Reimers (1994), in a broad comparative study...of levels of funding for education. In Costa Rica, government recurrent spending on education fell from 30% of public spending in 1975 to 20% in the late 1980s. Overall, spending declined in real terms by 30% in 1990 when compared with levels in 1980. In Tanzania, despite considerable effort by the Tanzanian government, education spending during the 1980s also declined (Woodhall, 1994: 179). In Senegal, the proportion of GNP devoted to education fell from 4.4% in 1980 to 3% in 1988. In Brazil, overall education spending fell by 8% between 1986 and 1988. Of the case studies, only Hungary reported a small increase. The SAPRIN (2002) study found similar evidence of cuts to spending on education.

...the education sector suffered disproportionately the adjustment burden and the promises of the seventies were dashed in the eighties. Changes in the structure of the education budget that are not justified on efficiency and equity grounds, accompanied these reductions (Reimers, 1991: 8).

In a further ILO (1996) study researchers found a direct correlation between declining GDP and reduction in education budgets. They argued that countries such as Colombia and Uruguay, who both experienced growth during the 1980s, also increased their educational budgets. However, countries such as El Salvador, Guyana and Mexico, which grew far more slowly or not at all, decreased their education budgets. The ILO study found similar evidence in Africa, with Botswana and Uganda increasing educational budgets as GDP grew. This could be compared with Sierra Leone and Zaire where budgets were reduced in proportion to the decline in GDP.

Taken together these studies suggest is that it was the failure of SAPs to generate economic growth that in turn led to a reduction in educational budgets. There is also evidence that in those countries undertaking SAPs, education was more likely to be cut back than in those not undergoing SAPs. Reimers (1994), in a broad comparative study of the impact of SAPs in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, suggests that the short-term focus of adjustment on reducing costs, did not allow for any special treatment of the education sector in the 1980s. The result was that education expenditure as a percentage of GNP “...diminished significantly more in countries which underwent structural adjustment than in those that did not” (Reimers, 1994: 123).

Beyond the direct effects of SAPs on education budgets, there was also a range of effects related to the increased poverty that SAPs economic policies generated in those countries undergoing World Bank/IMF adjustment.
policies. These particularly had an impact on educational quality and access. One key issue is the effect of increased austerity and poverty on demand for education. It was noted by several studies (cf. Grootaert, 1994) that reductions in household income placed additional pressure on families to seek alternative sources of revenue. This resulted in, for instance, pressure on children to work, or families simply withdrawing their children from education (Reimers, 1994).

In Costa Rica there was a slight decline in enrolment at secondary level that fell from 173,000 in 1979 to 107,000 in 1988. The researchers cited the reason as being the fall in household income coupled with the increased burden of user-charges (Carnoy and Torres, 1994). Gogue (1996) notes that during the 1980s there was a 15% decrease in school attendance in Togo, despite an increase in public funding. Their findings suggest that it was the indirect effects of structural adjustment on the broader economy that resulted in lower household income and lower levels of school attendance. Grootaert (1994) reports similar evidence for the Ivory Coast.

This evidence suggests that access is not an inevitable casualty of austerity. Nevertheless financial austerity does seem to be a widespread problem that affects educational demand. Reimers (1994) suggests that governments needed to do more, not less, during times of financial austerity. UNICEF estimates that “a 2 to 4% decline in income in Africa means quintupling such a drop for the poorest” (Reimers, 1994: 122). This cut would contribute to families taking children out of school and pressuring them into work. In a household survey of Bolivia in 1990, 14% of children in the bottom income quintile missed one or two of the five school days prior to the interview by the researchers, and 13% missed all five. In the top quintile, 6% missed one or two days, and only 1% all five (Reimers, 1994: 122). Clearly, the picture emerging is one of increasing stratification, according to class, gender, and location. The lower down the economic scale the greater the negative impact of structural adjustment on access to education.

Furthermore, the literature suggests that World Bank’s cost recovery/sharing policies exacerbated the situation (school fees, textbooks, uniforms, school transport). The scale of the issue can be seen in the figures for Costa Rica; in one decade, private expenditure in secondary education changed from 30% to 60% of direct costs (Carnoy and Torres, 1994: 81). For some families, the costs of enrolling their child in the education system may carry 30% of the family income (Reimers 1997). Carnoy and Torres (1994), in commenting on Costa Rica, note that:

...there is increased polarisation of access to the educational system, with fewer students from lower income families attending and finishing secondary school, and more students from higher income families going on to higher education...the democratisation of Cost Rican education, achieved by opening up secondary education in the 1970’s, has been effectively ended by the economic crisis of the early 1980s and by the structural adjustment process that followed (Carnoy and Torres, 1994: 80)

Similar results were found in the Dominican Republic (Paulino, 1994), and in the Ivory Coast (Grootaert, 1994). Grootaert notes that in 1985 nearly one third of primary students were a grade or more behind in school and the composition of this was approximately the same for the poor and non-poor. However, by 1988, the percentage of poor was markedly higher than non-poor. For very poor households the discrepancy doubled between 1985-89 to 64% for boys and 53% for girls (Grootaert, 1994: 139). She finds similar results in secondary school enrolment for students from very poor households. Grootaert notes that enrolment for boys fell by over two-thirds - to 3.5%, while for girls it dropped by almost 80% to 1.2%. Both the ‘urban-rural’ gap and the ‘rich-poor’ gap are greater at the secondary than at the primary level. Furthermore, this gap widened significantly between the years 1985-88. This suggests that the ability of the poor to escape from poverty is severely jeopardised by the conditions of economic recession and destabilisation (Grootaert, 1994: 140).

Grootaert also notes a dramatic rise in the percentage of household income spent on education between 1985-89, stating that:

It is remarkable that in 1985 very poor households displayed a willingness to pay for education twice as high as that of non-poor households. Unfortunately this willingness declined sharply over time so that in 1988 it had fallen to below that of the non-poor. This decline, in combination with falling enrolment rates and rising age-grade mismatch among children of very poor households paints an alarming picture (ibid.).

This change in attitude may reflect falls in the household income of the poor; it may also point to their loss of hope for the success of the adjustment program. Both Konadu-Agyemang (2000) and Ashiabi and Arthur (2004), in case studies of Ghana (a country that is often portrayed by the World Bank as a success story) show how structural adjustment policies negatively affected educational quality and increased inequality of access based on gender, geography and income. This view is supported by Arno et al (1996), who demonstrate that the gains made during the 1960s-1980s in extending and expanding education in low-income countries were undermined by the market-led reforms of the 1980s-early 90’s.

Obasi (2000) studied the impact of austerity programmes and economic recession on primary education in Nigeria and concluded that it led to a reduction in enrolments for the poor and particularly girls as a result of government measures that increased the private costs of education. Kant (1999) shows that in India the affect of SAPs was highly spatialised and increased urban-rural and inter-state disparities in social development, particularly through lower allocations of resources to education and health.
Schafer (1999), drawing on extensive cross-country data, argues that IMF/World Bank structural adjustment policies had negative effects on gender equity in education, on secondary school enrolments, and on drop-out rates. Buchmann (1996) finds similar effects on female educational enrolments of SAPs. The second and more general trend that appears to effect education demand relates to the differential rewards offered between highly skilled and lower skilled labour (Bonal, 2002). Gindling and Robbins (2001) note that inequality of earning in Chile and Costa Rica appear to be closely related to shifting demands for higher skilled labour. This differential may lead to reductions in the ‘rate-of-return’ to basic education.

3.4.2 Location of cut-backs in the education sector

As noted earlier in our review of Bonal’s (2002) evidence on the effects of SAPs on education, while the policy prescriptions from the World Bank may have been standardised, the outcomes were more contingent. Grootaert (1994), for instance, notes that cuts in the education budget could be implemented in a variety of ways. For the formal schooling sector, the two main areas were capital stock (schools) and recurrent expenses (teachers, school materials). Budget cuts could lead to a reduction in salaries, laying-off of teachers, cuts in materials, lack of maintenance of buildings and so on. Austerity could also lead to cuts in health provisions that are often administered through schools (free meals, milk, medical check-ups). These in turn affect students’ ability to perform in school. Austerity can also lead to the introduction of user fees, both of which, directly and indirectly, make up for budget shortfalls.

While budget reductions appear to be generalised, in many of the cases there were differences in the focus of austerity measures. In most countries, capital expenditure was the first victim of budget cuts. The most startling case in the UNESCO study was Senegal which reduced capital expenditure from 12% of total education budget in 1979-80 to less than 1% in 1986, while the share in salaries increased from 65% to 74% (Woodhall, 1994: 180). Figures for Africa on the whole in 1993 for the salary percentage of recurrent budgets were primary: 90.3%, secondary 69.2%, and tertiary 52.4%. All show an increase on the 1980s (Grootaert, 1994: 135). Countries in sub-Saharan Africa spent less than 3% of their primary budget on teaching materials in the 1980s (Reimers, 1994).

What is clear is that education spending was adjusted to declining budgets by increasing the share for teachers’ salaries at the expense of materials. This has obvious repercussions for educational quality.

Allocations of funding in the education budget highlight the complex process of negotiation, pressure and power within education systems. Senegal, in its 1985 budget—encouraged by the World Bank—gave high priority to primary education, and planned to draw money from higher education towards primary through the introduction of user fees, and a reduction in scholarships (Carton et al, 1994: 126-128). However between 1985 and 1989 the share allocated to primary education actually declined from 49% to 42%, whilst the University of Dakar increased its share from 14% to 21% during the same period.

In the Ivory Coast, though primary education represented 80% of enrolment - it received only 40% of the education budget, whilst primary held steady at 17% (Grootaert, 1994). Similar figures were reflected in other countries. Woodhall (1994) suggests that the relative strength of university sector trade unions and their access to those in power explains some of the difficulty of implementing World Bank priorities for primary education. Likewise, the relative strength of urban versus rural teachers in making an impact on policy is also important, as is the difference between the status and power of the primary and secondary schooling sectors respectively. The case studies suggest that the lower down the educational ladder, and the further away from the administrative centres of power, the more likely you are to bear a disproportionate share of the cuts (Woodhall, 1994).

However, while in the UNESCO study recurrent expenses on teachers’ salaries increased in all the countries except Hungary, this did not translate into wage rises in real terms. Woodhall (1994) suggests that the relative increase or decrease in the position of teachers was related to government and union strength. In Brazil, for example, where unions are characteristically strong, the percentage of recurrent expenditure on salaries increased from 56% in 1982 to 66% in 1989. Likewise, Costa Rican teachers, through a combination of strikes and legal challenges, managed in 1990 to restore salaries to their 1980 levels.

All of the above suggests a tendency to first cut capital and non-wage budgets. Then, if possible, teachers’ salaries were to be cut if teachers unions were not too strong. However, a study by the ILO (1996) challenges the notion that teachers managed to hold on to their salaries and argues that teachers’ salaries were seriously affected by austerity measures during the 1980s. Bonal (2002) argues that this had a negative impact on teaching quality and teacher attendance, with educators being forced to take on second jobs in order to survive. Camoy and Torres (1994) concur, stating that reduced salaries and increasingly low morale led many to leave the service.

We can now draw an important conclusion from the above discussion; that while austerity was widespread during the 1980s, the precise nature and balance of the cuts to education was dependent on the particular context. Nevertheless, this still took place in a setting where the pressure on governments to cut state budgets meant the educational spending was, by default, often the victim, due either to a lack of alternatives or an inability to cut budgets in other sectors.

3.4.3 Efficiency measures
As an alternative or complementary measure to budget cuts, a range of initiatives was also introduced during the 1980s to improve the efficiency of education systems. ‘Double-shift’ and ‘multi-grade’ schools were introduced in Senegal, while in Tanzania there was a move away from boarding schools to day schools. The use of volunteer literacy teachers in Tanzania was also introduced (Samoff, 1994). There was also an increase in teacher workloads after the findings of a World Bank study in 1991 indicated low productivity levels (Samoff, 1994). In Costa Rica there was a concerted attempt to divert resources to improvements in teaching materials and Information Technology. They also sought to recruit non-university educated teachers to reduce costs. This was done in conjunction with the introduction of new technologies, and the provision of course books.

Overall, there seems to have been little attempt to increase teacher/pupil ratios or lay off teachers. Colclough (1994) concurs on this point, suggesting that in the main the World Bank strategy sought to transfer costs from public to private sources, but did not reduce overall costs beyond arguing that private enterprises were more efficient. Colclough suggests that policymakers needed to consider class size, salary reform, school location, shift-based teaching or the introduction of new technologies in order to improve efficiencies and reduce costs.

3.4.4 Decentralisation, cost recovery and privatisation

Of all of the effects of SAPs policies, decentralisation is perhaps the most difficult to assess. This is because the term embraces an array of policies. Bray et al (2003) make a useful distinction between functional and territorial decentralisation. The first implies the reorganisation of roles and therefore decision making power from the Minister of Education downwards. The second implies a shift in authority, from national government down to regional or local territories. For some of the research, decentralisation also extends to the privatisation of educational systems, where authority is passed on to the private sector. There are also a range of rationales for decentralisation, including: fiscal pressures to reduce state budgets and pass on the cost of education to different sectors; measures to promote and respect the differing needs of communities; increasing popular participation in educational governance; weakening centralised national organisations such as teachers unions; improving efficiency through increasing flexibility (Ginsberg, 1991; Yoge and Rust, 1995).

Within the discourse of the World Bank, decentralisation was portrayed as a process that would increase educational democracy and participation. As Bonal (2002) notes, this often served to hide the actual processes taking place. Rather than decentralise, power and authority was often multi- rather than uni-directional, with states often increasing their powers over certain areas of educational governance while devolving others to different levels of educational governance.

Many commentators suggest that decentralisation was also a means for states to reduce their financial responsibilities (Carnoy, 1999); the result was often serious equity effects for those poorer regions, areas and populations who lacked the necessary resources to augment the overall decline in funds. Bray (1996) argues that there is clear evidence decentralisation actually increased regional and class inequalities. All of this was a serious challenge to the redistributive and nation building role of the state.

In a review of key World Bank and UNESCO literature on decentralisation, Bray and Mukundan (2003: 11) note:

Experience around the world suggests that decentralisation can indeed present a solution to some problems in some circumstances. However, it is not a panacea, and it can create other problems. With specific reference to the goal of EFA, decentralisation can stimulate diversity in educational provision to meet the needs of different target groups. It can allow teaching in different languages, for example, and permit different curricula and timetables to suit different religious, occupational and other groups. Decentralised structures can also encourage individuals and non-governmental organisations to make human and financial contributions to education, which might not be forthcoming in centralised systems. In this respect, decentralisation can help mobilise additional resources for education. Also, by reducing the number of links in a chain of control and reducing delays in the processing of decisions, decentralisation can help improve efficiency in education systems. However, decentralisation can also create major problems. Among the most obvious is the tendency for disparities to increase. In the case of territorial decentralisation, this means disparities between states/provinces, or, if the decentralisation is below the state/provincial level, disparities between districts and schools. Also, decentralisation can lead to proliferation of different models of schooling, which makes operation of a unified system of education more difficult. This may have implications for social cohesion as well as for other domains. These factors are among the reasons why in some countries decentralisation reforms have been reversed.

Evidence of these potentials and pitfalls was reflected in the UNESCO Task Force (Samoff, 1994) that showed decentralisation increased geographical inequality in Tanzania whilst, conversely, it facilitated increased participation in Senegal. These findings reflect the need for a more cautious and highly contextualised analysis of processes of decentralisation in the education sector.

3.4.6 Privatisation and private schooling
There was also a growing preference for private schooling. The rationale for private schooling was based on a wish to reduce the financial burden of education on the state by encouraging more affluent students to opt out of the state sector coupled with a belief that private education was more effective (Lockheed and Jimenez, 1996). This was particularly true for the tertiary sector that the World Bank perceived at the time as having a far higher personal rate of return and a lower social rate of return than basic education. For that reason the Bank has advocated both the expansion of the private tertiary sector and cost recovery schemes for students at state universities.

Bonal (2002) notes Chile as an example where the expansion of the private sector was encouraged during the 1980s and 1990s. Private education changed from 20% in 1980 to 43% in 1996, after choice and privatisation policies were introduced by the Pinochet government. Private schools in Costa Rica increased from 9,000 in 1980 to 22,000 in 1990. In Senegal there were 77 private schools in 1980; by 1990 there were 139. In Tanzania, a 1984 change of policy led to the active promotion of private schools. In 1984 there were 84 private and 85 public secondary schools; by 1990, these figures had increased dramatically with 213 private and 135 public secondary schools. Put another way, in 1965, 5% of Tanzanian pupils in secondary schools went to private schools; by 1990 the figure was 57% (Samoff, 2004). All the above evidence points to an increasing role of private capital in education, whether as a result of increased user-charges in state schools or because of the private provision of education.

3.5 Power of foreign agencies

Many studies note an increase in the power and influence of external agencies during the period of the Washington Consensus. In Costa Rica, the massive involvement of the World Bank and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) led to the control of educational policies by them (Carnoy and Torres, 1994: 73-74).

Between 1983 and 1989, total foreign aid amounted to US$1.8 billion, representing 7% of per capita income during the period. During the Reagan era, Costa Rica, due to its strategic political position (located next to Nicaragua), was able to follow a ‘heterodox’ structural adjustment policy that neither drastically reduced real wages nor increased massively unemployment. This example highlights the danger of over-generalisation of the effects of SAPs.

Some countries have more power and/or greater capacity to negotiate than others. Countries such as Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil, as Carnoy and Torres (1994) note, were not so lucky. Tanzania also saw a growing allocation of resources from abroad, though it was far less fortunate than Costa Rica. In a comparison of educational policy documents in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Namibia and Zambia, Takala (1998) notes the reproduction of World Bank policy clearly present, particularly in those countries undergoing SAPs. Samoff (1994: 134) argues that planning has become a process whereby those involved guess what kind of projects the foreign agencies are likely to give money for, and plan accordingly. Belshaw (2002) also challenges the ‘policy in a suitcase’ set of practices of some of the international institutions arguing that even a region such as sub-Saharan Africa represents within it a wide range of different countries with radically different policy environments.

Samoff (1994: 134) laments those days when ex-President Nyrere proclaimed ‘To plan is to choose!’ Samoff goes on to suggest that according to Nyrere;

“Education planning in Tanzania …is more like marketing than either planning or choosing…A study of education policy and planning in contemporary Tanzania is necessarily an exploration of the transition from the dependence of conquest to the dependence of foreign assistance.”

This notion of SAPs, as representing an extension of foreign domination and dependency, is in line with other academic research on the broader political economy of adjustment (Amin, 1997; Chossudovsky, 1997). This type of analysis is extended by Bonal (2002: 4) who suggests that ‘conditionality’ actually serves to rescale educational governance away from the local and national level, up to the multi-lateral or global and regional scale:

Interestingly, the extension of loan conditionality as the crucial mechanism for educational lending introduces paradigmatic changes in the form and content of policy making… the WB has shown the capacity to introduce new forms of educational governance through a rescaling process of decision making, from the national to the supranational level. In contrast with processes of policy borrowing or policy learning, the imposition mechanism embedded in loan conditionality make political negotiation residual and transfers the power of decision-making to the multinational level.

He goes on to suggest that:
For the last two decades the World Bank has increased its economic and ideological influence in setting the educational policy agenda of the so-called less developed countries (LDC). The economic crisis of two poor regions of the world in the 1980s (sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America), the reduction of bilateral forms of educational aid, and the economic and political protagonism of the WB through Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and loan conditionality have been important factors in locating the WB as a real subject of the educational globalisation process (ibid.: 4).

3.6 The lost decades

Lynne Ilon (1994) discusses the early effects of the Washington Consensus policies. She explored the relationship between structural adjustment, globalisation, and global trends in education, and showed that SAPs generally caused a decrease in funds available to the social sector which in turn was linked to the growing polarisation of societies more generally, as well as leading to a more stratified education system (assumptions that are backed up by our review of the evidence in this chapter).

Her first proposition was that globalisation and the penetration of international capital into the local market leads to the weakening of government obligations for education, which leads to private provision. Thus the close historical link between education, government legitimacy and social welfare becomes de-linked (Ilon 1994). The argument put forward was that globalisation reduces the role of the state, which sells off its assets to private interests, both national and international, so that the benefits that are accrued from them are no longer national, but more so individual gains; either by individual companies or individual people. Therefore, because the gains are no longer ‘national’ then there is no reason why the state should feel obligated to provide the services that these companies need. Either the companies or the individuals themselves will have to pay; the government no longer feels responsible.

The state’s withdrawal leads then to budget cuts, which in turn lead to less money in state education, which consequently leads to falling standards. Falling standards in public schools then cause more affluent members to move towards private institutions who can offer a better education. Once those who can afford it leave the state system, their families then become less willing to pay higher taxes for an education system that they no longer use. Because the rich, though fewer in numbers, have a disproportionate influence on government and tend to be listened to, education continues to be cut. These cuts lead to weaker and weaker state schools that in direct proportion to their decay increase private alternatives.

The picture painted by Ilon predicts a highly diverse education system built mainly along class lines, the rich being increasingly mobile, and requiring an international standard of education which allows them to compete on the international job market, the poor increasingly static will require an education which fits them into their regionally defined role. Ilon, in this vision of the future, picked up on many of the most important trends in the direction of education in the 1980s. Yet what Ilon failed to recognise in her somewhat teleological and deterministic prediction was the impact of the emerging evidence of the unwelcome consequences of and subsequent resistance to Washington Consensus policies.

According to Kenneth Kaunda (Pandor, 2004), Julius Nyrere, the former President of Tanzania met up with top level World Bank staff in Washington in 1998. During the meeting the World Bank experts asked him why his educational policies had failed. Nyrere replied:

>The British Empire left us a country with 85 per cent illiterates, two engineers and 12 doctors. When I left office 13 years ago. Then our income per capita was twice what it is today; now we have one-third less children in our schools and public health and social services are in ruins. During these 13 years, Tanzania has done everything that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have demanded (cited in Pandor, 2004: 3).

Nyrere then returned the question to the World Bank experts and asked: ‘Why have you failed?’ (ibid.).

Whatever, the merits and pitfalls of the national state-led development era, the evidence—particularly in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa—points to a serious deterioration in educational capacity and quality during the Washington Consensus period. A central cause in this deterioration was policies of fiscal austerity embraced in the educational reforms, and the failure to recognize the important role that education can play in transforming the life chances of people in low-income countries in an increasingly globalised economy. Carnoy (1999) notes:

>…globalization enters the education sector on an ideological horse, and its effects on education and the production of knowledge are largely a product of that financially-driven, free-market ideology, not of a clear conception for improving education (Carnoy, 1999: 59).
3.7 Conclusion

As we can see, this period generated a considerable degree of disquiet within the IMF and World Bank (Mundy, 2002; Jones with Coleman, 2005). Beginning in the early 1990s the World Bank and many of the major bi-lateral agencies began to rework their policy recipes to address some of these substantive criticisms ushering in what became known as the Post-Washington Consensus. The research outlining and reviewing this next phase of globalisation and development, together with an assessment of its consequences for low-income countries, is addressed in the following Chapter 4.
Chapter 4: Post Washington Consensus 1990-2005

4.1 Introduction

By the late 1980s there were major criticisms of the World Bank/IMF Washington Consensus reforms (Cornia et al, 1987; Walton and Seddon, 1994). It was argued that structural adjustment policies (SAPs) were undermining the capacity of low-income countries to ensure stability and social cohesion and provide for the most vulnerable sections of society.

The World Bank/IMF and other international financial institutions (see, for example, the Asia Development Bank) were placed under considerable pressure to address the outcomes of SAPs. The call for ‘adjustment with a human face’ (Cornia et al, 1987) represented a challenge to the international financial institutions whose policies, despite never calling explicitly for budget cuts to health and education, had nonetheless pushed many low-income countries (as well as those in the ‘north’) into prioritising debt repayments over social spending. Added to this, there was also criticism over the failure of SAPs to either reduce poverty and inequality or to achieve sustained economic growth in low-income countries.

Within this context the ‘good governance’ agenda emerged, as both an explanation of and solution to the deficiencies of the Washington Consensus development model. By the end of the 1990s a broader and more sustained alternative development model emerged, known as the Post Washington Consensus that extended and consolidated much of the Good Governance agenda. In the late 1990s, the Millennium Development Goals were signed; this reflected, in part, a more consensual and social-market approach that took seriously the inequities produced by the Washington Consensus. In the first part of this chapter we will explore these developments more generally, and in the second half highlight their implications for education development policy in low-income countries.

4.2 The emergence of good governance

The term ‘good governance’ was used first by the World Bank in a report on Africa in 1989 (World Bank, 1989). The report identified ‘poor governance’ as the main cause of the failure of SAPs and for the poor levels of economic growth in low-income countries, especially in Africa. The failure of SAPs was blamed not on the programmes themselves but on poor governments, corruption, secrecy, inefficient policymaking, lack of accountability, and disregard for the law. The announcement of the new ‘good governance’ agenda was proposed as a remedy to this poor level of development (Abrahamsen, 2000).

Broadly the concept ‘good governance’ embraces the idea of an efficient public service; respect for human rights; an independent judiciary and legal framework; economic liberalism; protection of private property; political pluralism; participation, administrative accountability; transparency and respect for the law (Leftwich, 1993:610; Osborne, 1993:67).

Western governments and bilateral aid agencies explicitly talk about democracy as an essential condition for development and economic growth. Some also emphasise the promotion of popular participation, while others stress the promotion of human rights and democratic reforms (Robinson 1993). However, the World Bank saw good governance more narrowly as “sound development management” and defined it in a far more administrative and managerial way. Its focus was not on the type of regime, but on the more pragmatic sounding issue of the process of government- accountability, the nature of policy making processes, information, and the role of law (Moore, 1993; Lancaster, 1993).

4.3 Contextual roots

In reviewing the literature there appears to be several important reasons that led to a shift in development policy in the early 1990s. Firstly, the end of the Cold War and the fall of communist regimes in the eastern bloc led to a reorganisation of global politics. The Cold War provided the rationale for a whole set of social and economic policies in both the East and the West. The end of the bi-polar world system signalled the arrival of the new uni-polar world order (Abrahamsen, 2000; Leftwich, 1993). During the Cold War, geopolitical priorities gave particular shape to aid policies. Both the West and the East supported regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America to secure their power and influence others. Western governments, especially the USA, supported several highly repressive and authoritarian regimes in return for their alliance and help against communist expansion (such as General Pinochet in Chile and other military juntas in the Southern Cone of Latin America). The decline of the Soviet super power and the end of the Cold War removed western justification for supporting these types of regimes (Burnell, 1997).

Secondly, the intellectual climate had changed with the collapse of the communist regimes in the eastern bloc. This was widely regarded as a victory of capitalism over communism. Communism was articulated as a corrupt, stagnant, inefficient, mismanaged regime and associated with an unsuccessful development model that produced unsustainable economic growth. Fukuyama (1992), in welcoming this victory, argued that mankind had reached
the “end of history” and capitalist democracy was revealed as the final form of “human government” (Abrahamsen, 2000: 33, Kiely, 1998: 684). Linked to this, there was a growing consensus emerging that liberal democracy was the only “model of government with any broad ideological legitimacy that can produce sustained economic growth in the world today” (Diamond et al, 1988: 186).

Thirdly, during the 1980s, the number of NGOs and human rights organisation had increased dramatically across the world. This was true in both the North and the South. Indigenous democracy movements had arisen in Latin America and in countries like the Philippines, and these processes encouraged similar movements in other part of the world, particularly Africa (Leftwich, 1993). These movements put an unfavourable spotlight on the structural adjustment policies and programmes of the international financial institutions. The increased awareness of social and political issues meant that many western governments were heavily criticised for the negative impacts of neo-liberal economic policies, for creating inequalities and deepening poverty in many low-income countries, and for their support for regimes such as Pinochet’s Chile. Western governments needed to find other justifications and purposes for their aid budgets in light of these new post Cold War realities. In this context, the good governance agenda could be regarded as a new “grand moral crusade” (Abrahamsen, 2000:36).

Fourthly, SAPs (as we have shown in Chapter 3), even within its own stated narrow economic objectives, had failed to resolve the economic crises of low-income countries and rapid and sustained economic growth had not been realised. SAPs had generated steep declines in national income and high increases in unemployment, they had crippled public services, deepened poverty, widened social polarisation, and damaged the most vulnerable sectors of the population (Archer, 1994). SAPs had also weakened the capacity of the state and increased corruption and clientelism in many low-income countries. One consequence of this was the growing number of people and institutions who opposed the negative social, political and economic effects of the programmes.

As the consequences of the Washington Consensus policies became clearer, so the legitimacy of the institutions advocating SAPs began to be challenged (White 2002). The World Bank and IMF were criticised for creating uneven development and social inequalities. Opposition to SAPs and the IFIs came not only from those badly affected—the poor people and working classes—but also from the middle classes and from NGOs and human rights organisations in both the North and South (Caufield, 1996). Past failures, and the need for legitimacy gave rise to the formation of a new development agenda that, at least on the surface, appeared to address the inadequacies of the Washington Consensus. By 1990 even the World Bank began to admit that “…in the short run, some of the poor may lose out” (Sebastian Edwards, Chief Economist for the World Bank in Latin America and the Caribbean, cited in Caufield, 1996:162).

Fifthly, the success of the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) in Asia (the Asian Tigers) raised questions about the efficacy of a market-led development model (Wade, 1990). The market, left to itself, would not always result in the most efficient and effective way of allocating resources for development (Stiglitz, 1998). Recognition of the importance of non-economic actors and factors and their role in successful market economies began to be seen as crucial. The ‘good governance’ agenda, it was suggested, would assist in the process of creating a more predictable, stable environment for economic development.

However, while the new agenda acknowledged the relevance of non-economic factors to economic success, it did not represent a complete break from the Washington Consensus. SAPs overall logic remained largely unchanged within this agenda, with macroeconomic policies (such as market liberalisation, export-oriented free markets, the removal of trade barriers and tariffs), all remaining paramount. In the World Bank’s report on Africa in 1994, neo-liberal economic policies are still seen as the obligatory first step towards sustainable development and poverty reduction:

There is hope that Africa like East Asia thirty years ago, will move on to a faster development track. For that to happen more programs will be required in macroeconomic reform to provide a stable environment in which economic activity can flourish. Good macroeconomic policies have paid off in East Asia, and they will pay off in Africa (World Bank, 1994:8).

As with SAPs, there was considerable continuity in the application of conditionalities, although in the ‘good governance’ agenda, they are much broader, incorporating not only economic, but political reforms as well. In this respect the ‘good governance’ agenda is argued to have some similarities with early modernisation theory (Leftwich 1993; Abrahamsen 2000) aiming for “a profound change in social culture” and “a long term process of changing mentalities” (Landell–Mills, 1992: 564-565).

For some commentators, the ‘good governance’ agenda is seen as a tool for transferring western ideologies and values (Zanger, 2000:296). Just as with SAPs, weak bargaining conditions and dependence on foreign assistance are likely to create situations in which low-income countries tend to accept particular conditionalities. As Gore notes, in the context of a globalised world economy:

Countries which do not follow western countries will be especially penalised, as they will be cut off and thus excluded from intensifying global fields of flows, those countries following the right policies will be rewarded, as they can capture foreign direct investment which brings technology and market access in to the country (Gore, 2000:793).
The ‘good governance’ agenda embraced by the World Bank continued to suggest that the state’s role should be minimal and that it should have a limited developmental function, far away from the 1950/60’s conception of the role of the state in modernisation theory.

Nonetheless the ‘good governance agenda’ did represent recognition that the state was an important player; as a facilitator and organiser for the market to be more effective. “Sound development management” requires not just less government, but better government (World Bank, 1992:1). Governments must concentrate their efforts less on direct intervention and more on enabling others to be productive (World Bank 1989:5). In other words, the role of the state is to enable the private sector to lead economic activity (Kiely, 1998). State intervention must be limited to “areas of market failure and the provision of the necessary social and economic infrastructure” (Jauch, 1999:8).

The recuperation of the role of the state in this particular form was officially consolidated into the World Bank policy agenda when the Bank produced its 1997 World Development Report The State in a Changing World (World Bank, 1997).

Linked to this new notion of the state was also an appreciation of the role of civil society. The state was thought to be more efficient if there are a range of checks and balances on it. The embrace of civil society became a new approach that differentiated the ‘good governance’ agenda from SAPs and the Washington Consensus. Civil society was now seen as the third major actor between state and markets, and an important countervailing power to curb authoritarian practices and corruption.

The World Bank also promoted the view that policy implementation worked better when it involved the participation of stakeholders (World Bank, 1997; Pender, 2001). A strong civil society was seen to be an important barrier to social fragmentation and societal collapse (Mehmet, 1999). Likewise, trust between civil society and the state became an important link, and participation and empowerment become key words (Goetz and O’Brien, 1995). NGOs were given a special role as an intermediate organisation linking the state and the Bretton Woods Institutions with the grassroots (Mhina, 2000; Leftwich, 1993).

An important aspect of the ‘good governance’ agenda was the promotion of democracy. A legitimate rather than an appropriate regime was deemed important for the state to mobilise its citizens. Democratisation would compel government to be more accountable, less corrupt, and more efficient (Burkett, 1991:475). Democracy would also provide stability, credibility and predictability in a market-friendly atmosphere and improve state capacity to implement adjustment policies (Leftwich, 1996:5-16). This helps explain political conditionality, or rather how democracy emerged as a necessary condition for economic development (Leftwich, 1993).

Other commentators suggest, however, that issues of ‘good governance’ in the context of respect for human rights, democratic structure, and the role of law were often less important than other foreign policy objectives, national security and the economic and political interest of the country (Barya, 1993; Zanger, 2000; Robinson, 1993). All of these policy shifts were part of a broader recognition that politics and society mattered, and that the ‘correct’ economic policies alone were not sufficient to stimulate sustained development. By the late 1990s, this line of thinking emerged as a more coherent set of development policies - to what became known as the Post-Washington Consensus.

4.4 The Post-Washington Consensus

Towards the end of the 1990s there was a real sense that dogmatic market fundamentalism (Soros, 1998) was being undermined in both of the centres of neo-liberal orthodoxy – the UK and the USA. Just as Thatcher and Reagan had played important roles in shaping and transmitting the Washington Consensus, the election of Clinton (1992) and Blair (1997) represented a shift in the model of economic development.

In the UK the emergence of a ‘third way’—between state and market—fitted well with the critiques of the Washington Consensus era (whilst not seeking a return to the post-war period of Keynesian economics).

In the World Bank, Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz in 1997 called this new phase, the ‘Post-Washington Consensus’ (Stiglitz, 1998; 2002). Fine (2001a: 139) describes its features as follows:

First, it is sharply critical of the Washington Consensus and seeks an alternative in which state intervention is greater in depth and breadth. Second, it rejects the analytical agenda of state versus market, arguing that the two are complements and can work together and not against one another. Third, if less explicit, it poses an alternative agenda for development economics and policy debate, seeking to establish the appropriate role of the state in view of market imperfections. Fourth, it also brings the social back into the analysis as the means of addressing, and potentially correcting, market imperfections – rather than simply creating them as for the Washington Consensus for which the world would be a better place if it were made more and more, if not completely, like the market.

Interestingly, as Fine (2001a) argues, this was not a rejection of the broad trajectory of neo-liberal economic policy but rather a deepening and widening (Stiglitz, 1998). In that sense it can be seen as a logical extension of the ‘good governance’ agenda to embrace wider concerns.

While state intervention remained focused on areas of ‘market failure’ the expansion of these areas was notable. If the 1980s represented a period where the dominant focus was on markets, and the early 1990s markets and states,
then the late 1990s can be seen as a re/turn to the social but always with a focus on the primacy of markets. Stiglitz critiqued the Washington Consensus as too narrow in focus. Further, it failed to recognise the complex and interlinked nature of development:

The Washington consensus advocated use of a small set of instruments (including macroeconomic stability, liberalized trade, and privatization) to achieve a relatively narrow goal (economic growth). The post–Washington consensus recognizes both that a broader set of instruments is necessary and that our goals are also much broader. We seek increases in living standards—including improved health and education—not just increases in measured GDP. We seek sustainable development, which includes preserving natural resources and maintaining a healthy environment. We seek equitable development, which ensures that all groups in society, not just those at the top, enjoy the fruits of development. And we seek democratic development, in which citizens participate in a variety of ways in making the decisions that affect their lives (Stiglitz, 1998:30).

A key policy initiative during the later 1990s centred on the concept of social capital (Fine, 2001a). This concept merits explanation as a central idea in the policies and politics of the Post Washington Consensus. According to the World Bank:

Social capital refers to the internal social and cultural coherence of society, the norms and values that govern interactions among people and the institutions in which they are embedded. Social capital is the glue that holds societies together and without which there can be no economic growth or human well-being. Without social capital, society at large will collapse, and today’s world represents some very sad examples of this (cited in Fine, 2001a: 158)

Social capital and the production of trust were increasingly seen as one of the key non-market externalities that could promote growth through social cohesion. In a period of increasing social fragmentation, civil conflict and destabilisation produced by migration, market volatility, and economic and social exclusion (see also Chapter 9), social capital was seen as a vital antidote.

Within the World Bank, particularly after the arrival of its new President James Wolfensohn in 1995, interest in social capital was linked to the search for a more participatory, bottom-up model of development and policy implementation. The idea of social capital was also used in the development of Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes (PRSPs) in 1999 that replaced SAPs as the IMF/World Bank mechanism to develop national policy agreements.

According to the IMF (2005) PRSPs were ‘country-driven’ and thus would promote strong national ownership of development strategies including broad and active involvement of civil society. They were also ‘result oriented’ with a clear focus on benefiting the poor, ‘comprehensive’ in their understanding of the multidimensional nature of poverty, ‘partnership oriented’ involving careful coordination between all the different stakeholders and donors and ‘long term’ with a view to addressing poverty reduction.

This new approach to policy by the multilateral institutions was welcomed as a step in the right direction. Yet many critics of the Washington Consensus were sceptical about whether the Post Washington ‘paradigm’ could address the problems of a highly unequal global economy and polity (Fine, 2001b; Fine, et al 2001).

As Martin (2000) notes:

The central thrust of the Stiglitz arguments is that this can be done by widening and deepening the role of an active and re-engineered state and through participatory processes to win peoples' consent. It is here that we see the significance of his consistent attempts to argue for his alternative vision both in terms of democracy, sustainability and equity as goals in themselves and in terms of the narrower economic goals so characteristic of the Washington Consensus. The implication is that the World Bank's increasing attention to reform of the state and public management, and involvement of civil society, will be designed to shape those processes to the requirements of an unchanged globalization, rather than the converse (Martin, 2000: 14).

Despite criticism as to the limits of the ‘good governance’ and post-Washington consensus agendas in terms of equity issues, it is clear that both had important effects on education and on broader policy development during the 1990s.

4.5 Education for All

Central to the reduction of poverty through education policy was the prioritisation of primary education over other areas of education – largely driven through calculations as to the higher ‘rates of return’ in this sector. Particular attention was paid to the elimination of gender disparities in access to primary schooling. Yet as we have seen in Chapter 3, the Bank’s commitment to UPE emerged within a Washington Consensus policy environment and was
Beyond this, Buchert (1996: 37; see also, Buchert, 1995a) argues that: "National and international donors have realised. Declaration, for instance) but that these also necessarily built in multiple possible fault lines that could impede its prevaled in the Declaration), it is also clear that not only was the Declaration necessarily written in order not to of basic education, and whether it embraced more than primary education (the broad...is about more than knowledge or skills. Though it is clear that there was some dispute over the meaning...that its focus is strongly on the needs of low

From these accounts, it is possible to discern the major emphases and themes driving the Declaration; for instance "a uniform ideology, structure and practice by nation states" for the provision of education (McGinn, 1997: 237).

The framework was provided by the World Bank. Recommendations included donor coordination, sector rather than project support, institution and local capacity building, support for recurrent costs, decentralisation of educational provision, acceptance of user-fees in post basic education, privatisation, and the relative emphasis on the quality, efficiency and effectiveness of basic education. These aims were further elaborated in 1995 with the publication of the Bank’s educational strategy (World Bank, 1995). It also led to more pledges by donor states towards basic education and the aim of providing Universal Primary Education for All by the year 2000.

Different aspects of the origins of the Jomtien Conference are well described in Chabbott (1998; 2002), King and McNab (1990) and King (1990). Chabbott analyses the political issues that led to the proposal for a conference on Education for All, in particular the separate motives of, and relationships between, the different international agencies (UNESCO, UNICEF, World Bank and UNDP) involved in sponsoring the conference. She explores the ‘working out of the sponsoring agency heads’ medium- and long-term internationalist visions and their agencies’ short-term needs to secure resources commensurate with ever expanding organizational goals’ (Chabbott, 1998: 211).

These differences became more important after the Jomtien conference “…as funding materialized for some goals but not for others. The World Bank emphasized Education for All... (especially) formal primary schooling for children… (while) UNESCO emphasized Education for All, including out of school youth and adults…”(Chabbott, 1998: 212). King and McNab provide very detailed accounts of the rapid development of the three drafts of the Declaration before the Conference began and the sense of involvement that emerged through the complexity and range of participation involved in discussing and finalising them (see King and McNab, 1990: 1-45).

From these accounts, it is possible to discern the major emphases and themes driving the Declaration; for instance that its focus is strongly on the needs of low-income countries, that education is more than schooling, that basic education is about more than knowledge or skills. Though it is clear that there was some dispute over the meaning of basic education, and whether it embraced more than primary education (the broader definition eventually prevailed in the Declaration), it is also clear that not only was the Declaration necessarily written in order not to excessively offend any of the multiple bodies subscribing to it (which led to its title being changed from Charter to Declaration, for instance) but that these also necessarily built in multiple possible fault lines that could impede its realisation.

Beyond this, Buchert (1996: 37; see also, Buchert, 1995a) argues that: “National and international donors have adopted the original dimensions differentially, often depending on their particular priorities and what they consider to be their comparative advantage. The translation of the concept into practice among the agencies is, therefore, related to different focal areas and activities, aiming at different target groups and using different instruments”. For
instance, Buchert shows both that the use of the term ‘capacity building’ varies between agencies and that these different uses correspond to real differences in their approaches (Buchert, 1995b).

More specifically, King has argued that it was donor preferences that shaped the Jomtien agenda most crucially, narrowing it from Education for All to Schooling for All, and from basic education to primary education, which “…rapidly became the core element of the external agenda on education...being powerfully promoted by the World Bank, UNICEF, UNESCO and a number of influential bilateral donors such as USAID and Britain’s ODI” (King, 2004: 87). However, Jomtien also broke important new ground by pledges “‘long term budgetary support’ to help the poorest countries reach SFA” (ibid.).

The theme of inter-agency differences is taken up by Brock-Utne, describing two African regional conferences leading up to the EFA mid-term conference in 1996. “It was clear in both of the conferences”, she writes, “…that there was a struggle over the power to define the concept ‘basic education’. The struggle appeared, crudely, to be between the World Bank along with UNICEF on the one side and the African states along with UNESCO on the other. While the first two agencies equated basic education with primary education, African Ministers of Education as well as other officials from African states, along with UNESCO…refused this equation and insisted that “basic education” had to include also non-formal and adult education” (1996: 24).

In terms of both the relationship between globalisation and education, and the fate of the EFA initiative, these discussions and comments about the origins and processes of the initiative are important and instructive. On the one hand, they point to the processes of a new global governance of education, emerging from and through the disputes between the international agencies and their relationships to national policies, of both donor and developing countries.

We will now examine three particular aspects of the outcomes of Jomtien: the focus on basic education; the move towards sector support; and the creation of an educational consensus. These can be understood within the wider context of the ‘Good Governance’ and then later the ‘Post Washington Consensus’ agendas.

**Basic education**

The prime target that emerged from Jomtien was the goal of ‘Universal Primary Education’ by the year 2000. This was seen to be the most beneficial for low-income countries by all the competing organisations and institutions. It was also a goal that was supported by all the donor agencies, and NGO’s. While an important objective, there were also dangers in this approach. Buchert (1995a) expressed concern about the risk of the stagnation of intermediate and high-level labour-power due to trade offs between the primary sector and others. The World University Service was:

…concerned that an exclusive emphasis on education at basic level keeps the poorest countries in the thrall of foreign ‘experts’ and disempowered to manage their own development and to speak for themselves internationally (World University Service, 1998).

Ndoye (1997) suggested that the emphasis on basic education had become a method to ensure that Africa remained underdeveloped and reliant on the North for technology and innovation. Likewise, Curtin and Nelson (1999) felt that the focus on primary education had a range of negative effects on poverty indicators, health and the status of women. They suggest that women with primary education have the same probability as those without in experiencing poverty, and that post-primary education should be equally prioritised. Curtin and Nelson (ibid.) also argue that it is the flawed use of human capital theory that fails to take account of the benefits of education at other levels. There were also tensions between primary and other basic education initiatives, for example adult literacy strategies (heralding later tensions between MDGs/UPE and wider EFA goals) As we will show later, recent research within the economics of education has begun to acknowledge the limitations of these earlier arguments (McMahon, 1999).

**Sector support**

The development of a sector support approach emerged as a response to the failures of project support in aid to education. Effectively, sector support necessitates looking at the whole educational sector in a country and deciding where assistance can be best used. It necessitates working much more closely with both national governments and donor organisations. King offers a vision of this type of approach where donors:

…would seek to secure a government policy framework for vocational training, university development or whatever, and within that broad policy establish whether there was a case for another Swedish, German, British, Danish, or World Bank supported training centre. But in order to establish this, the donor might have to fund the policy development process, using as far as possible local institutional capacity (King, 1992:261).

This new paradigm included governance, and aimed at being open, transparent and accountable, with respect for human rights, and the rule of law. Projects would be authorised not only for their educational merits, but on other issues as well.
This ultimately seems to be where aid agencies are heading. Good projects will be dependent on good policies, and good policies upon good politics...there will be strong pressure for the donors to define good (King, 1992:262).

In many ways, the shift to a sectoral approach was a much more logical way to channel aid, as it attempted to avoid the contradictory policies of different donors (Verspoor, 1993). However, by necessitating approaches that deal directly with governments, it may undermine the role of NGO’s and close off alternative educational policies. Furthermore, because it requires co-ordination between governments and donors, it needs policy consensus which entails asking the question as to what constitutes ‘good’ policy and practice and who defines it.

**The Jomtien consensus**

Out of Jomtien thus came a ‘uniform practice’ for both aid to education, and policy priorities that broadly remains intact today. As with any major global policy shift there were concerns raised about the new direction. The main concern seems to be the risk of the international agenda steamrolling national policies, and leading to the standardisation of education throughout the world. King asked this potent question concerning policymaking. “Are recipients asking for the same things because they want them or because they know what the donors want to give?” (King, 1992:260). Samoff (1994) suggests that the ability of low-income country governments to control educational planning was being restricted by the power and influence of the World Bank and its major creditor nations. ‘Good’ in education increasingly seemed to be defined by the World Bank.

There were other policies, such as increased support for user-fees and privatisation, which were far less contradictory and reflected the incorporation of the Washington Consensus Agenda. The World Bank, as the intellectual-financial complex (Samoff 1994), had stamped its policies and influence well beyond the confines of its budget. It had become the provider of the dominant discourse on education and development. This discourse has then provided the focus for the rest of the world to discuss education, and the orthodox to follow. This is as true for Sweden as it is for USAID (Buchert, 1994).

As Mundy (2002: 493) notes:

> Much of the success of the Bank’s education sector lending in this period can be attributed to the institutionalization of a standard model for educational reform and educational investment across Bank programs.

### 4.6 The rise of the poverty agenda

Therien (2004) argues that over the second half of the 1990s, the ideological differences between the two major groups of multilateral agencies involved in development, the UN agencies (UNESCO, UNDP, UNCTAD, ILO, ECOSOC), representing the ‘Left’, and the Bretton Woods Institutions (IMF and World Bank) representing the ‘Right’, (see Therien, 1999), decreased to the point where they came closer together than ever before.

This convergence resulted from changes from two directions; for instance, the UN agencies were more receptive to ‘market’ solutions, and the IMF/World Bank who began to attribute greater importance to the social dimensions of development. This merging of views was symbolised with the publication, under the collective names of IMF, OECD, UN and World Bank of ‘2000 A Better World for All’ (IMF, OECD, UN, World Bank, 2000; Parris, 2000). *A Better World for All* committed itself to achieving seven goals, focused on the elimination of poverty; it was based on agreements and resolutions of UN conferences in the 1990s at the heart of the MDGs.

Therien suggests that for the IMF/World Bank the move was a response to the lessons drawn from the Asian crisis of 1997 and their increasing sensitivity (post-Wolfensohn) to issues of poverty reduction, while the UN ‘paradigm’ became more ‘market friendly’ and gave more acknowledgement to the contribution of ‘liberalization to growth’, thus ‘(H)enceforward...for the UN …in the field of development, markets have to be seen as more of the solution than of the problem’ (2004: 11, 12).

This merger is also signalled in the *Global Compact* between the UN and private business, which Therien and Pouliot (2006) suggest “…epitomizes the current state of the politics of international development”. First, “…it is premised on the assumption that the UN and the private sector have a common interest in the promotion of sustainable development on a global scale”. Second, it breaks with old (failed) forms of multilateralism; and third, “…it offers an excellent vantage point for the assessment of the competing world views that currently structure the development debate” (but see Zammit, 2003 for a less optimistic view of the Compact and its consequences for services like education).

Moreover, “…the new multilateral compromise has made it possible to target one critical priority: poverty reduction… (which) has become so pervasive in the discourse of international organizations that (it) is now for many the new name for development” (Zammit, 2003: 8; see also World Development Report 2000/2001 (World Bank, 2001)). Here the most prominent reasons for this shift appear to be the direct and indirect consequences of the failure of the Structural Adjustment Programs of the 1990s (see Stiglitz, 2002; Kanbur, 2001) and the East Asian financial crisis (Stiglitz, 2002).
In terms of educational policy changes during the period we can thus broadly map out the shifts in the table 4.1 below. While represented as two discrete columns, perhaps as this chapter has shown, we need to conceptualise them as a gradual process that developed from the late 1980s and remains ongoing – with continued tensions between left and right, and advocates of neo-liberal and more social market approaches continuing an ongoing tug of war both within education and beyond in the broader policy debates on international development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neo-liberal Globalisation Era</th>
<th>Mid 1990s- 2005 Post Washington Consensus</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>KEY THEMES</strong></td>
<td><strong>1980s- early 1990 Washington Consensus</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KEY ACTORS</strong></td>
<td>IMF/World Bank and other IFIs. OECD/DAC. US/USSR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FINANCE</strong></td>
<td>Fiscal austerity and SAPs, User Fees, community financing, decentralization, privatisation, ODA reductions as Cold War ends (early 1990s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EDUCATIONAL PRIORITIES</strong></td>
<td>Basic Education prioritised – rates of return analysis; Tertiary Sector ignored; vocational &amp; technical education support reduced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PARTICIPATION and PARTNERSHIPS</strong></td>
<td>Top-Down, Donor Led; local participation often reduced to funding; Global recipe for education. Some bypassing of state to work with local government and NGOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ROLE OF THE STATE</strong></td>
<td>Minimal State, preference for private sector and market like delivery. Decentralised processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EQUITY and SOCIAL COHESION</strong></td>
<td>Narrow focus on fiscal austerity and economic role of education (human capital theory and rates of return).</td>
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Table 4.1 Educational Policy: From Washington to Post Washington and Beyond

By the end of the millennium, poverty reduction had become the central policy objective of the major development agencies. Central to this was a shift from a simple focus on growth (GDP) as the major determinant towards the UNDP’s Human Development Index which has a far broader focus (Pender, 2001: 406); and second, a focus on pro-poor growth which included continued commitment to export-led development focused on labour intensive industries, the protection of the health and education sector and targeted subsidies for the poorest and most disadvantaged sections of society, with a particular focus on gender inequalities (see Chapter 6).

However, until the late 1990s, poverty had been seen as a ‘second order problem’, connected less with “country-specific imbalances, policy errors or political difficulties”. Indeed, “the primary responsibility for fighting poverty rested with the governments and people in developing countries themselves” (Noel, 2005: 13; quotes from World Bank 1995 and 1996 documents quoted in Therien 1999: 729-30). Within the framework, at best, selective measures could be targeted at specific countries and populations to help the poor adjust to a fundamentally sound
international economic order. In time, “efficient markets and economic stability would assure growth, to the benefit of all” (Therien, 1999: 732).

4.7 Conclusion

Despite the continuity of educational policy, there have also thus been shifts over the 1990s. Perhaps most crucial has been a move away from an overemphasis on fiscal austerity and a more focussed attempt to understand education as a key component of successful integration into a new and more globalised economy.

Mundy (2002) notes the contrast between the World Bank’s 1995 *Education Strategy Paper* and the 1999 counterpart. She argues that one can see a World Bank much more sensitive to the failures of the past and less dogmatic in its policy prescriptions. Furthermore, she notes the shift in World Bank research to concerns relating to adult literacy, gender, moral education and violence that reflect a more social focus. In the policy domain there has also been a range of more *ad hoc* experimentations. Mundy suggests that these policies reflect a more heterodox World Bank than the 1980s and early 1990s. While Mundy suggests that these shifts in policy reflect a Bank less sure of itself and more susceptible to organised pressure from civil society Klees (2002) remains more sceptical. He suggests that it is the language and broader packaging that has changed rather than the substance of educational policy. These different positions mirror a broader debate over the nature and extent of the transformations taking place within the World Bank and the broader international development community.

This chapter has highlighted the underlying rationales of the shifting policy environment that began to emerge in response to the failures of the Washington Consensus during the 1980s. The dogmatic and narrow policy focus of the 1980s was gradually replaced with a more open and wide ranging policy repertoire that entailed a reengagement with dialogue, negotiation and debate about the complex relationship between economic, social and political development. However, while the turn of the millennium appeared to be ushering in a more pragmatic development policy, the events of September 11th, 2001 were to challenge this as we shall now explore in the next chapter.
The international development community has not yet been swept up into the war on terror, but it stands on the threshold. The international development architecture is already being transformed. Donor governments must act quickly to ensure that their development aid mission to deliver effective aid and to meet specific human development goals—even as they pursue other goals—stays at the forefront of the emerging aid regime (Woods, 2005).

5.1. Introduction

The events of September 11th, 2001 appear to be radically altering the geo-political and geo-strategic activities of the dominant Western powers and posing a challenge to the shift towards a post-Washington Consensus outlined in the last chapter. Within the space of three years two major wars were fought by US led coalitions on two predominantly Islamic countries: Afghanistan and Iraq. Both of these conflicts remain politically, socially and militarily unresolved. Furthermore, the terror bombings in Bali, Madrid and London have shaken the foundations of Western conceptions of internal security and reframed debates on freedom of speech, information and movement. This shift in global geo-politics is of great importance to issues related to international aid, development and education, yet the literatures on these issues remain sparse and embryonic. In this chapter we try to explore some of the literature and review a range of themes relating to education, international development aid and the merging of security and development. In particular we speculate on the possibility that the ‘war on terror’, just like the predecessor conflict ‘the Cold War’, threatens to prioritise geo-politics as the new rationale for development policy with potentially damaging effects for the promotion of a more needs based global development policy based on the poorest and most needy countries and population sectors.

5.2 Merging Security and Development

Since the end of the Cold War there has been an increase in conflict in many low-income countries that predates the events of September 11th, 2001 (see Chapter 9). Throughout this period there has also been a reconceptualisation of the relationship between ‘development’ and ‘security’ that, while still ongoing, poses a challenge to agencies working in these two separate fields. This has had serious consequences, not least in the blurring of the line between military and security ‘interest’ and development and humanitarian ‘activities’ (Woods, 2005). The shift towards the securitisation of development emerged out of the changing global security situation after the end of the Cold War (Stewart, 2003). Despite initial optimism of a ‘peace dividend’, conflict and war did not disappear:

Immediately after the end of the Cold War there was a rise in major conflicts in every region except Latin America, followed by a fall in each region from the mid-1990s. At the end of the 1990s, there was a resurgence of serious conflict in Africa; in 1998, the number of serious conflicts was at the same level as at the peak in the early 1990s. Africa suffered by far the largest number of major conflicts during the 1990s, with more than 40% of the total. However, lesser conflicts (those with deaths of 25–1000 annually, and more than 1000 cumulatively) were concentrated in Asia (Stewart, 2003: 327).

Central to the process was the appearance of what has been termed ‘new wars’ (Duffield, 2001a) that differed significantly from the Cold War era and required radically different local, regional and international responses. Conflict in low-income countries as a percentage of total conflicts increased during the 1990s, with 40% taking place in Africa (UNDP, 2005: 154). Most disconcerting of all is that 9 out of the 10 lowest countries in the HDI index experienced conflict during the last decade.

Picciotto (2005:1) notes the difficulty of merging development and security:

…until recently, security and development issues have been framed in isolation from one another. The development discourse has focused on economic management and social development while national security strategies have relied on assessments of geopolitical threats and the design of military responses… For diplomats and defence specialists, security still aims largely at the protection of the homeland against hostile states. By contrast, for aid donors and voluntary development agencies, human security is defined in terms of access to productive employment, health and education, social safety nets, etc. The end result is that more often than not aid has yet to be combined with other policy instruments in a coherent package.

While Picciotto (2005) treats the merging of security and development as a difficult but necessary task, NGOs such as Christian Aid question whether these two different and largely separated concerns should be coordinated together at all (Christian Aid, 2004). Of greatest concern is that aid workers and relief organisations begin to be
seen as mere adjuncts to the broader military and security concerns of the most powerful nations, reminiscent of the conduct of the Cold War:

Aid has always, to some extent, been given with at least one eye on the self-interest of the giver – be it to secure influence, trade or strategic resources. But the past 15 years have seen a marked change, advocated for and applauded by Christian Aid, towards vital aid funds being far better targeted at alleviating poverty. Now, however, we seem poised to return to some of the worst excesses of the recent past, when whole nations and regions were blighted by the subsuming of their interests to a global crusade. Aid was then allotted on the basis of where a country stood in the great Cold War confrontation (Christian Aid, 2004:1).

Nine days after the New York attacks, in a speech to the US Congress, President Bush set the tone of policy to come in the post 9/11 period when he stated “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”

He went on to say that the US;

…will direct every resource at our command – every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war – to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network (President George W Bush, address to joint session of Congress, 20 September 2001).²

In 2003, the head of USAID, Andrew Natsios, made explicit what merging US foreign policy, security and aid meant for US funded NGOs, as Klein (2003) notes:

On May 21 in Washington, Andrew Natsios, the head of USAID, gave a speech blasting U.S. NGOs for failing to play a role many of them didn't realize they had been assigned: doing public relations for the U.S. government. According to InterAction, the network of 160 relief and development NGOs that hosted the conference, Mr. Natsios was "irritated" that starving and sick Iraqi and Afghan children didn't realize that their food and vaccines were coming to them courtesy of George W. Bush. From now on, NGOs had to do a better job of linking their humanitarian assistance to U.S. foreign policy and making it clear that they are "an arm of the U.S. government." If they didn't, InterAction reported, "Natsios threatened to personally tear up their contracts and find new partners."

This preoccupation by USAID represents a broader concern of the US government that there is an image problem which necessitates increased public diplomacy to tell “America’s assistance story to the world” (GAO, 2005: 8) and win over the “hearts and minds” of the international community. This reflects the growing concern of powerful states, particularly the USA, to be seen ‘individually’ and ‘visibly’ acting in the humanitarian and development field, which threatens to reduce willingness to pool funds in multilateral institutions in the long term. This is exemplified in the creation by the US of new high profile initiatives such as the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which bypasses multilateral organisations working on the same issues.

The MCA is not the only new mechanism for US aid delivery. Indeed, a small and decreasing percentage of US aid tends to be channelled through multilateral institutions. In 2004 this dropped to 5 per cent of US aid flows, as US bilateral aid increased more rapidly than multilateral aid. While it has continued to fund its existing multilateral commitments, assistance to Iraq and the fight against HIV/AIDS bear witness to the same trend reflected in the creation of the MCA: a turn towards new mechanisms which eschew multilateral cooperation and the technical expertise and experience concentrated in existing aid-directing institutions (Woods, 2005: 400).

Whilst the US was the most active in initially promoting the merging of security and development, the EU quickly followed by reinterpreting the relationship. Javier Solana, the EU’s head of common foreign and security policy, speaking to heads of State at the European Council in 2003, stated that:

European assistance programmes, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments such as the European Development Fund. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries (Christian Aid, 2004: 14).

The most notable change has been the definition of what constitutes official development assistance (ODA). This definition is controlled and regulated by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), and for the first time in its history has recently allowed certain military and security funding to be directed via the aid budget (OECD, 2005b). As Picciotto notes:

The DAC strictures on the types of aid eligible for Official Development Aid (ODA) status have been adjusted in partial compliance with the wishes of donors who wish to allocate aid funds to programs managed by the military, development training for security forces and security sector reform assistance programs that involve working with military establishments (Picciotto, 2005).

While the current changes have been significant, as yet consensus has not been reached on two further key proposals which could radically alter ODA budgets and allow funding for training the military in non-military matters and peacekeeping expenditures. These issues will be returned to in the DAC High Level Meeting of Ministers and Heads of Aid Agencies in 2007.

Paradoxically, attempts surrounding the coordination of policy related to the MDGs have been eclipsed by coordination of security policy:

...coherence is now emerging in one area which may pose more of a risk to development assistance than the lack of it. Following the search for greater coherence across agencies to meet human security and development objectives in the 1990s (with very limited success), real coherence is emerging—centred not on a development agenda but rather on achieving global and regional security imperatives which cut across and often run counter to the pursuit of human security and development (Woods, 2005: 397).

In the rest of this section we examine the literature surrounding the relationship between this new security environment, development aid and education. A key question posed within the literature is whether the post September 11th period represents the beginning of a new cold war that threatens to redirect and reorganize the consensus built up around setting the Millennium Development Objectives (Christian Aid, 2004, also see Chapter 6) and the Post Washington Consensus (see Chapter 4). We also explore the literature in order to review the impact on education aid, not only in terms of the volume of aid flows and their geographical dispersion, but also on the type of educational interventions. In all aspects we find evidence of a shift, though it is too early to draw any definitive conclusions on the future trajectories of educational aid and development policy more generally. The is partly because there is a paucity of reflexive literature on the implication of a shift towards the securitisation of development, and partly because of the different theoretical underpinnings related to security and development that can and have produced widely variant policies, as we will now explore.

5.3 Approaches to security and development

The literature reveals diverse responses to the threat of terrorism and conflict largely as a result of the different views as to the underlying rationale for what causes security problems and conflict and what type of interventions might be appropriate (Duffield, 2001a; Jung, 2003; Münkler, 2005). Much of this literature refers to the ‘new wars’ that have emerged which involve non-state actors and intra or trans-state conflict – the war on terror being one exemplary case.

Picciotto (2005) lays out three broad theoretical approaches to the relationship between development and security. The first draws on the modernisation theorist, Samuel Huntington (Huntington, 1993; 1996; 1997) and his thesis surrounding a ‘clash of civilizations’. The second draws on the work of Mark Duffield (2001a; 2001b) and explores the relationship between structural inequalities within the global economy and politics and violence. The third draws on the work of Paul Collier and explores intra-state conflict from a neo-liberal rational choice perspective, where violent acts are regarded as generated by individual motives of ‘greed’. Each of these underlying theories, as we will show, is likely to lead to very different developmental and educational policy interventions in relation to the issue of the ‘war on terror’.

5.3.1 Clash of civilisations

Huntington’s post Cold War work (1996) argued that while previous conflicts engaged ‘princes’, ‘nation states’ and then ‘ideologies’ (Cold War), today’s conflicts are located around civilisations. He suggests that cultural differences have become the key driver of global insecurity both within and between states, while the key conflict is between Islam and Christianity.

Within this worldview, one can see how educational policy interventions would likely be targeted at addressing the cultural obstacles and differences that divide the two groups. This can help us to understand why, in the present period, the central thrust of USAID’s educational aid thinking is directed particularly, though not exclusively, towards altering perceptions of the West within Islamic societies. According to USAID’s administrator for Asia and the Near East, James Kunder (US Info, 2005) “our current education approach responds to the overall goal of moderating radical intolerance and anti-Western ideologies”. Kunder clarifies this through recognising the need for “a multi-sectoral strategy that fosters socio-political stability and economic growth”. In sum, this represents an important policy shift from the 1980s where it was centrally preoccupied with neo-liberal reforms. Kunder (US Info, 2005) points to the increases in education spending that have emanated from this:
Since 2001, USAID's education portfolio in the Near East and South Asian region has dramatically expanded from 1 to 13 programs. The budget for education in the following 13 countries rose from $99.5 million in FY 2002 to nearly $274.5 million in FY 2004: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, West Bank/Gaza, and Yemen.

In terms of programmes, Kunder mentions the translation and broadcasting of an Arabic version of Sesame Street across Egypt (Alam Simsim) and Bangladesh (Sisimpur) which will "reach as many as 4 million pre-school age children who will watch Sisimpur in Bangladesh, which premiered on April 15, 2005. Alam Simsim reaches 86% of rural Egyptian children and 45% of their mothers. Program themes include learning to be tolerant, practising good hygiene and getting a head start in school" (US Info, 2005).

There has also been a parallel increase in funding for educational and cultural exchanges between the US and the Muslim World:

The President's Budget also supports the Department of State’s efforts to communicate our values abroad by providing more than $1.2 billion for public diplomacy programs to inform, engage, and support freedom-loving people around the world. For example, the Department of State will fund annual exchanges of about 35,000 Americans and people from other countries to share perspectives on our policies, people, values, and society (White House, 2005:18).

Evidence from the 2005 US budget also identifies the need to use education as a vehicle for addressing US security concerns:

For there to be security in the long run—both in the Greater Middle East and here at home—we must marshal the energy and ideals upon which our Nation was founded and work to promote democracy in the region. The President’s Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) promotes political, economic, and educational reform efforts in the Middle East, especially focused on opportunities for women and youth. MEPI funds grants, partnerships, training, and technical assistance. The President proposes to increase funding for this important initiative in 2005 to $150 million (White House, 2005:17).

Many commentators have noted the role played by the US government’s National Endowment for Democracy (NED) during the Cold War (Robinson, 1996). It is also possible to see its central role in the new post 9/11 era:

The President also proposes to double funding to $80 million in 2005 for the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) for a Greater Middle East Leadership and Democracy initiative. The Endowment is a grant-making foundation that distributes funds to private organizations for the purpose of promoting democracy abroad. NED focuses on democracy building through civic education, developing political parties, encouraging a free press, and promoting human rights (White House, 2005:18).

There have also been shifts in US-funded media broadcasting. Once focused on the Soviet Union and its allies – it is now shifting towards the Middle East and Asia:

The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) broadcasts news and information throughout Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and to Cuba, and provides information on U.S. policies and activities, as well as cultural and educational programming. Since 2001, BBG has shifted its funding to focus on broadcasting to regions that are the most critical in the War on Terror, including the Middle East, Central and South Asia, and the Pacific. This includes revamping Arabic radio broadcasting to the Middle East and launching a new Arabic satellite TV network. BBG has also revamped Persian radio broadcasting to Iran to appeal to broader audiences (White House, 2005:18).

These kinds of interventions, if informed by a ‘Huntington conceptualisation’ of the problem, can be viewed as oriented more toward changing perceptions than altering the inequalities that exist in the world. One key document produced by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2005) addressed the issue of the ‘anti-Americanism’ that is ‘spreading and deepening around the world’ (GAO, 2005: 1) and recommended setting up ‘a national communications strategy’ to coordinate inter-agency contact with the rest of the world. Implicit in the USAID conceptualisation is that projects address the ‘hearts and minds’ of poor population groups, not the underlying structural inequalities which, according to Duffield (2001a), contribute to insecurity and conflict.

### 5.3.2 Structural inequalities and (in)security

Duffield (2001a) argues that increased violence is a product of the highly exclusionary contemporary ‘informational economy’ and ‘polity’ where large geographic parts of the world are marginalised. He suggests that the neo-liberal global economy and its related governance mechanisms lock many groups out of the benefits of ‘globalisation’ and increase the likelihood of entry into illicit activities, such as crime and violence. This argument is also put by the ILO (2004) and UN (2005a). Within this framework intervention is likely to address the ‘human
security’ and ‘insecurity’ that produces violence. Here the traditional literature on development meets security studies and the interventions seek to address issues of social exclusion, marginalisation and inequality.

This kind of conceptualisation is evident in all of the major donors. DfID, for instance, notes that

> UK development assistance helps build global peace and stability for the longer term, by reducing inequality and exclusion, supporting the development of capable, responsible states and reducing conflict. Money spent on reducing poverty is money spent for a more secure world (DfID, 2005a: 23).

Likewise, Australian Aid has a similar take (AusAID, 2003). Australian policy has been deeply influenced by the events of September 11th and particularly the Bali bombing which left almost 200 Australians dead (AusAID, 2003). While this preoccupation has lead to increased military and security measures, it also appears to be interpreted more broadly — addressing the inequalities, poverty and social exclusion that have arisen over the last two decades of economic reform and transformation.

> While poverty provides no justification for acts of terror, entrenched poverty can create an environment in which terrorist networks may be fostered. Terrorist leaders can exploit the frustrated, the poor and the politically and economically excluded. The aid program restricts environments conducive to terrorism by assisting the poor to access basic services, including quality and affordable education, improving their employment prospects and helping them cope with risk and vulnerability (AusAID, 2003:4).

The interrelationship between poverty and terrorism also functions in the opposite direction. AusAID (2003) notes that:

> Terrorism threatens poverty reduction and stability in our region. This in turn impacts on Australia’s security and prosperity. The aid program plays a significant role in broader efforts to counter terrorism, drawing on its own expertise and experience in building capacity and promoting environments for growth and poverty reduction in the Asia-Pacific region (AusAID, 2003: 11).

There is a conscious attempt to address the fact that poverty may act as a catalyst to security problems, and that all of the OECD members have, to a greater or lesser extent, taken on board this aspect of preventing terror. As Christian Aid notes:

> From the start of the post-Cold War era, donors, especially the US, began to realise that targeting poverty could also deliver security benefits. In 1994, the Congressional Budget Office’s paper, ‘Enhancing US Security Through Foreign Aid’, noted: A brief survey of the world’s trouble spots show[ed] a fairly striking correlation between economic malaise on the one hand and domestic unrest and political instability on the other. If the United States can address those problems by using its foreign aid to help to create economic opportunities and invest in human capital, then the chance of conflict may be reduced (Christian Aid, 2004: 11).

This may lead to shifts in the geo-strategic focus of aid to countries whose ‘instability’ might pose a greater threat to Western interests than others, particularly where the West has interests in natural resources. DfID, while stressing that its priorities remain on the least developed countries, nevertheless suggests that

> …we will pay greater attention to countries that play a critical role in promoting regional stability – or instability. This will include poor countries, such as Angola, as well as Middle Income Countries, such as South Africa. We will work in some of these countries through our bilateral programmes. Elsewhere, we will work through multilateral agencies, including the European Union, which operate in a wider range of Middle Income Countries than DfID; for example, in the Middle East and North Africa (DfID, 2005a: 23).

Cosgrave (2005) notes that even in humanitarian aid, which was previously targeted on the basis of need, there has been a shift in emphases. He cites Kosovo as an example of a place where a disproportionate amount of aid was allocated to the situation compared to other equally difficult conflicts. Likewise;

> Afghanistan and Iraq are both the targets of large amounts of Humanitarian Aid, but here the intention appears to be more about delivering a regime change dividend than about humanitarian assistance (Cosgrave, 2005: 16).

Woods (2005: 407) notes that UK foreign policy and aid budgets have both shifted noticeably towards Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. He estimates that UK military budget in Iraq has surpassed £2.5 billion pounds, and that between financial years 2001/2 to 2004/5, expenditure on Iraq and Afghanistan will be in the region of £4.5 billion.

DfID’s own direct contributions to Afghanistan have increased from £35 million in 2002/3 to over £70 million in the following two years. Likewise DfID’s aid to Iraq in 2003/4 increased to £207 million. Similar patterns of aid growth are notable in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Indonesia. Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan are now at the top of DfID's
bilateral recipients, which while not affecting low-income country aid levels has led to reductions in spending to middle income countries estimated at GBP100 million in 2004-05 and 2005-06 (Christian Aid, 2004). However, Woods (2005) notes that so far the financing for the war on terror has largely emerged from outside traditional aid budgets.

5.3.3 Homo-economicus and rational choice theories

The third and final major approach reflects mainstream neo-liberal ideas (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000). Drawing on rational choice theories of human action, Collier suggests that wars are driven less by justified ‘grievances’ and far more by personal and collective ‘greed’. In this approach, humans are viewed as engaged in conflict as ‘economic agents’ seeking out profit. As a result, the route to peace and security is not through addressing inequality and structural exclusion but through cutting off access to resources of ‘violent actors’.

This approach has gained sympathy in the US and the World Bank. In practical terms this results in attempts to cut off financial networks and illicit activities that lead to the purchase of weapons. This framework treats security issues as crimes and seeks to increase the ‘opportunity costs’ of engagement by cutting off funds and addressing ‘enemy’ groups through military force. This strategy has less substantive educational content, although increased interest is placed on ‘good governance’ involving, for example, training civil servants to prevent corruption.

As Picciotto (2005) notes, each of these theories sheds some light on an aspect of the security issue, however it misses out other important aspects. Both Huntington and Collier and Hoeffler avoid issues of poverty and inequality, while both Collier and Hoeffler and Duffield avoid issues of cultural conflict. In future policy, we may well see a combination of these different strategies emanating from the OECD countries.

Being able to identify these different theories of conflict enables us to understand that recent security concerns do not inevitably mean that the MDGs will be placed at risk. If donor nations take a more structural approach to security this might lead to more policies aimed at addressing global inequality and poverty, albeit in selective geographical areas. The recent interest in Africa might well reflect the recognition of this (see Chapter 10). Cosgrave (2005) is far more pessimistic, arguing that the poor are likely to lose out in the new security environment as funds go to countries and areas that are not necessarily the poorest.

Woods see three key challenges for foreign aid:

None of these challenges is new, but each risks being magnified and exacerbated by the ‘war on terror’ and the war in Iraq. The first concern is the goals of aid. Donors may hijack foreign aid to pursue their own security objectives rather than those which would help the poorest. The second concern is about money. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the wider war on terror have been extremely costly, and the debts incurred may soon gobble up aid budgets. The third concern is about the delivery of aid. Major donors are failing to coordinate aid through existing multilateral institutions, choosing instead to create their own new mechanisms and pursue their own priorities (2005: 393).

5.4 Aid and the new security environment

While the post September 11th environment is very different from the security threats involved with the Cold War, we can learn from the uses that overseas aid were put to by the competing blocs.

Both Lundborg (1998) and Wang (1999) note the close relationship between the volumes and direction of foreign aid and voting patterns within the United Nations during the Cold War era. Likewise, Cosgrave (2005) shows how patterns of overseas aid and ODA often mirrored the concerns of the major powers, a process which continues to date:

Forty years ago one eighth of all Aid went to India. Newly independent Algeria got 7% of all aid spending in 1962 at the end of the long war with France. The pattern of aid varies with different political developments over the years. In 1972, during the Vietnam War, Vietnam was the second largest recipient, and anti-communist Indonesia came next. Pakistan, the bulwark against al-Qaeda, and a battleground in the war on terror was the largest aid recipient in 2002 (Cosgrave, 2005: 12).

Crucially, the geography of aid was based less on perceived humanitarian need and more on political alliances that often led to a blind eye being turned to human rights violations. In the post-Cold War environment two contradictory but related phenomena began to emerge. On the one hand, the end of the Cold War led to less politically motivated aid and a shift to channelling aid to those in least developed countries and grouped around a set of common goals (MDGs):
With the end of the Cold War, new criteria emerged. There was increasing concern about the lack of development in sub-Saharan Africa and concern about the impact this would have on developed countries. Flows of migrants from developing countries were already a very contentious issue in the west. Donors set international development goals at conferences throughout the nineties culminating in the Millennium Development Goals in September 2000.

Secondly, there was an overall decline in overseas aid, largely related to the lack of necessity for powerful nations to court less developed countries. This downward pattern can be seen in Figure 5.1 below which charts OECD/ODA contributions as a percentage of GNP.

![Figure 5.1 Overseas Development Assistance Disbursements as a % GNI 1990-2002](source: Cosgrave 2005: 7)

However, after 2000 this began to change. Substantial increases in overall ODA were pledged in the March 2002 ‘Financing For Development’ Conference by the USA and the EU (Mundy, 2005). This is projected by the DAC to increase overall ODA to $75 billion dollars in 2006, up from $52 billion in 2001. While not at the levels of the Cold War era, volumes of aid appear to be increasing.

Despite the stagnation in ODA levels from 1990 to 2000, aid to education managed to slightly increase its percentage from 9.8% in 1990 to 11.2% in 1995. However, it began to steadily decline from 2000 onward. Basic education did manage to steadily increase its percentage of overall aid from 0.1% in 1993 to 2.2% in 2002. This is set to continue, with increased pledges to UPE from Canada, Nordic Countries, Japan, France, the UK and the USA (Mundy 2005: 18-19). Nevertheless the new pledges still fall short of the estimated resources required for the achievement of the two educational targets by 2015 (Bruns et al, 2003; Delamonica et al, 2004; see also Chapter 6).

It remains to be seen whether the new security realities and the costs of Iraq and Afghanistan may further impact on achieving the MDG goals. As Cosgrave (2005: 2) notes:

In October 2003, the US pledged 20 billion dollars for reconstruction in Iraq. This amount is equal to one and a half times the USA’s annual development aid budget. Pledges by other donors were far smaller, but those like the UK, the European Commission, or Spain that have pledged an amount equivalent to 20% of their annual development budget for Iraq will have to dig deep. This will have a cost for existing development programmes as most countries have drawn contributions for Afghanistan and Iraq from existing budgets.

In order to explore these patterns in more detail, we will now look more closely at the literature which outlines the volume and direction of aid from the biggest donor, the USA, and one of the biggest recipients, Pakistan, to see what patterns might be emerging.

5.4.1 The case of the USA
As Woods (2005: 398) notes:

The United States is at present the largest provider of development aid. Already in 2002 it accounted for 23 per cent of global development aid, the top six recipients of which were Egypt, Russia, Israel, Pakistan, Serbia and Colombia. Since 2002 US aid flows have almost tripled. Between 2002 and 2004 US aid rose from $12.9 billion to $33.2 billion, including $18.6 billion for Iraq in the 2004 supplemental budget. Is the increase in aid due to the new security imperatives? Most of the increase in US aid has been destined for projects designed to serve the security imperatives prevailing in the wake of September 11. Hence, almost all of the $2 billion supplemental in 2002, the $4 billion supplemental in 2003 and the $20.1 billion supplemental in 2004, plus roughly $2 billion annually in “budgeted” funds—a total of approximately $32 billion over the past three years—went to help countries on the front lines of Afghanistan, to build support for the war on Iraq or to fund the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan.

None of the top recipients appear on the least developed country list, however they do represent countries of vital geo-strategic and political importance for the USA. Absent from Woods’ analysis are the new budgeted resources for HIV/AIDS: the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) which pledged $15 billion between 2003 and 2008 to combat HIV/AIDS in Africa and the Caribbean (US State Department, 2004) and the Millennium Challenge Account which committed $1 billion in 2004, $1.5 billion in 2005 and requested $3 billion for financial year 2006 for aid focussed on low-income countries (MCC, 2005). These initiatives draw attention to the fact that while the US may be acting increasingly unilaterally, it is not reducing its commitment to the MDGs. However, the USA’s new geo-strategic priorities have facilitated the return of Pakistan into an alliance with the West.

5.4.2 The case of Pakistan

The unprecedented attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 dramatically reoriented American policy interests in South Asia. Before the attacks, the George W. Bush administration had nearly relegated Pakistan to the category of a ‘rogue state’ because of its coup against a democratically elected government, its support for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, its involvement in terrorist insurgency in the Indian-controlled Kashmir, and its involvement in nuclear and ballistic missiles deals with China and North Korea. In the immediate aftermath of September 11, the Bush administration did a complete volte-face in its dealings with Pakistan (Kozicki, 2002: 1).

In the late 1990s, Pakistan had an uneasy relationship with the international community after first testing nuclear weapons (1998) and then being governed by General Musharraf after a military coup (1999). International aid flows decreased, with the US cutting back aid by $40 million dollars in 1999 to leave total aid in 2000 at $88.5 million (Christian Aid, 2004). Likewise, the UK reduced aid from around $60 million dollars per year prior to the nuclear testing and the military coup to $23.7 million dollars in 2000 (Christian Aid, 2004).

Yet this changed after September 11th, 2001 following Musharraf’s commitment to support the ‘war on terror’. Picciotto (2005) notes that from this point onward, significant aid has gone to Pakistan. In 2002 US aid increased from $88.5 million to $775 million dollars. DfID’s aid to Pakistan increased from a low of £12 million in 2001 to £64 million in 2003/4, with a further projected increase to £90 million by 2007/8 (DfID, 2005b: 10). All of these increases place pressure on DfID’s commitment to spend 90% of its budget on the least developed countries.

5.5 Politicisation of aid to education

Beyond trying to understand the shifting pattern in overall aid volumes, it is important to understand the form and use of aid to education currently. Coulson (2004) notes the dangers of following an aid policy based on the presumption that my enemy’s enemy is my friend. During the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan during the 1980s, the USA, via Pakistan, channelled a great deal of resources to a range of armed ‘mujahideen’ fighters that had been recruited from across the Islamic world and from Afghan refugee camps along the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Education was not immune from these processes and USAID provided substantial grants to develop school textbooks to be used to promote anti-Soviet propaganda through recourse to radical Islam:

Special textbooks were published in Dari and Pashtu, designed by the Centre for Afghanistan Studies at the University of Nebraska-Omaha under a USAID grant in the early 1980s. Written by American Afghanistan experts and anti-Soviet Afghan educators, they aimed at promoting jihadi values and militant training among Afghans. USAID paid the University of Nebraska U.S.$51 million from 1984 to 1994 to develop and design these textbooks, which were mostly printed in Pakistan. Over 13 million were distributed at Afghan refugee camps and Pakistani madrasas “where students learnt basic math by counting dead Russians and Kalashnikov rifles” (ICG, 2002: 13).
Craig (2000), in findings from doctoral research on primary education in Afghanistan, found that during the 1980s textbooks promoting violence were produced and widely distributed thanks to the USAID grants. A maths textbook for 4th grade children puts the following question (ibid.: 92-93):

The speed of a Kalashnikov bullet is 800 meters per second. If a Russian is at a distance of 3,200 meters from a mujahid, and that mujahid aims at the Russian’s head, calculate how many seconds it will take for the bullet to strike the Russian in the forehead.

During this same period there was a general reduction in funding for state schools due to fiscal crisis and an increase in religious boarding schools known as ‘madrasas’ in Pakistan. It is these same ‘madrasas’ that have now become the focus of the US as alleged promoters of Islamic violence:

The only way to end the culture of violence we now face is to undermine the institutions that sustain it. Radical groups require radical schools. A nuanced approach can be mounted towards the challenges that stem from militant Madrassahs (Singer, 2001: 10).

USAID has responded to this by increasing funding to state school education both in Pakistan and Indonesia and recently invested large amounts of funding to the education sector (USAID, 2005; Bond 2005).

USAID’s strategy is to deny recruits from terrorist organizations by offering better alternatives: basic education vs. radical madrasas, skills training vs. unemployment, and the development of micro-enterprises generated jobs vs., terrorism out of a sense of hopelessness and desperation. USAID targets areas where terrorist recruiting conditions are the strongest: large Muslim communities, relatively poor communities, areas characterized by high youth unemployment, and where there are large pockets of disaffected groups (USAID, 2005: 10).

An earlier USAID report notes that:

The United States has been short-sighted in leaving countries or abandoning the social and educational sectors. This lack of vision creates a vacuum in which extremism may flourish. NGO activity, no matter how useful and energetic, cannot substitute for state capacity. That is why taking control of the education ministry often forms a vital part of the agenda of any fanatical creed when it wins power. However, education with a strong secular bias (though by no means anti-religious), open to both sexes, offers one of the most effective ways to delegitimise terrorism (Clad, 2001:2).

He continues on to suggest that

In this new era, many “old” development strategies may find new life in the context of economic assistance aimed at combating terrorism over the longer term. For example, vocational training and craft apprenticeship put idle hands to work; job creation will help drain the pool of potential recruits to terrorist organizations (ibid.: 4).

The cases of Pakistan and Afghanistan shows how the US is now following an educational policy that seeks to address both the structural inequality caused by poverty and the cultural hostility to the West exacerbated by their own earlier policies of neo-liberal structural reform and anti-soviet propaganda. Overall the example of US Cold War policies in Afghanistan and Pakistan show the potential policy outcomes and unintended consequences of intentional action.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter’s review of the literature on security and aid suggests that there is a shift in aid policy. The different theoretical approaches to understanding the relationship between security and development demonstrate that the consequences of these shifts can be diverse. There is considerable concern in the literature that the negative impacts of economic globalisation might either contribute to or exacerbate conflict and security, while at the same time undermining global commitments to the MDGs and the nature of aid to the poorest countries in the world. Although the evidence is fragmentary, partial and selective, there nevertheless appear to be signs that the Post Washington Consensus’s more consolidatory approach towards international development policy may be under threat from the new security focus of the post September 11th period. Table 5.1 summarises in a highly schematic form some of the changes noted above.
Table 5.1 From Post Washington to the War on Terror

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOMINANT THEORIES</td>
<td>NCE and New Institutionalism, and Third Way/Post-Washington; a range of globalisation theories.</td>
<td>'New Wars' thesis; Weak State/Failed States; theories linking security and development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEY ACTORS</td>
<td>IMF/World Bank and IFIs; G8 and WEF; End of Cold War leads to US hegemony.</td>
<td>US military alongside previous column. Emerging Latin block? Islamic Block? World Social Forum?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINANCE</td>
<td>Education sector prioritised and protected. MDGs, Public Private Partnerships, Free Basic Education; ODA increase (mid 1990s); recurrent budget support in SWAs, PRSPs.</td>
<td>Noticeable shifts towards Pakistan, Indonesia. Recent focus and concern over Africa. PPP’s accompanied by large increase in ODA. Security and, Defence linked together.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATIONAL PRIORITIES</td>
<td>Commitment to UPE as part of MDGs but more holistic attitude towards Secondary, VET, non-formal and Tertiary (High Skills knowledge Economy). Focus on International testing standards.</td>
<td>As in Post Washington but stronger focus on security, social integration and education in zones of conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTICIPATION and PARTNERSHIPS</td>
<td>Country Owned? Poverty Reduction Strategies, Sector Wide Approaches, increased participation, more sensitive to local needs?</td>
<td>As in Post Washington, but USA increasingly seen to be creating new aid structures (MCA). State partners in ‘war on terror’ becoming criteria for aid?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROLE OF THE STATE</td>
<td>Reshaped state role, state as catalyst and strategic actor (NIEs).</td>
<td>Reshaped state role, state as catalyst and strategic actor (NIEs). Emphasis on internal security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUITY and SOCIAL COHESION</td>
<td>Wider understanding of education’s social function: citizenship and social capital. Increasing concern with conflict.</td>
<td>As in PWC but USAID concern over anti-Americanism and the role of education (madrasas).</td>
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Part II - Dynamics and Directions
Chapter 6: Poverty, MDGs and Education

6.1 Introduction
In September 2000, the United Nations (UN) held a Millennium Summit at which all the members of the United Nations made a commitment to work toward a world in which the elimination of poverty and sustained development had the highest priority.

The Millennium Declaration was signed by 147 heads of state and passed unanimously by the members of the UN General Assembly. The resulting eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – which range from halving extreme poverty to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS as well as providing universal primary education, by the target date of 2015 – grew out of that declaration and the agreements and resolutions at world conferences organized by the United Nations during the 1990s. They form a framework for developed and developing countries and international agencies through which the efforts of the world community might be channelled and implemented in order to achieve significant and measurable improvements in people's lives by the year 2015 (see Box 6.1).

6.2 The emergence of the MDGs
It is possible to discern two complementary strands of literature that shed light on the emergence of the MDGs. The first focuses on the political changes in the fields of development and aid in the latter half of the 1990s; the emergence of the central theme of poverty, was the cohering core of the MDGs. The second examines their roots in the responses of international conferences and international agencies to changing forms and patterns of globalisation in the 1990s.

6.2.1 The rise of the poverty agenda
In Chapter 4 we argued that the ideological differences between the major groups of multilateral agencies involved in development decreased to the point that they came closer together. We also noted that this new multilateral compromise made it possible for them to target one critical priority—poverty reduction.

By the end of the millennium, poverty reduction had become the central policy objective of the major development agencies. Central to this was a shift from a simple focus on growth (GDP), as the major determinant, towards the UNDP's Human Development Index which has a far broader focus (Pender, 2001: 406); and second, a focus on pro-poor growth which included continued commitment to export-led development focused on labour intensive industries, the protection of the health and education sector and targeted subsidies for the poorest and most disadvantaged sections of society, with a particular focus on gender inequalities.

However, until the late 1990s, poverty had been seen as a ‘second order problem’, connected less with “…country-specific imbalances, policy errors or political difficulties”. Indeed, “…the primary responsibility for fighting poverty rested with the governments and people in developing countries themselves” (Noel, 2005: 13; quotes from World Bank 1995 and 1996 documents quoted in Therien, 1999: 729-30). Within the framework, at best, selective measures could be targeted at specific countries and populations to help the poor adjust to a fundamentally sound international economic order. In time, “efficient markets and economic stability would assure growth, to the benefit of all” (Therien, 1999: 732).
Box 6.1

THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS

**Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger**
- Target 1: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day
- Target 2: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger

**Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education**
- Target 3: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling

**Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women**
- Target 4: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and to all levels of education no later than 2015

**Goal 4: Reduce child mortality**
- Target 5: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate

**Goal 5: Improve maternal health**
- Target 6: Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio

**Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases**
- Target 7: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS
- Target 8: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases

**Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability**
- Target 9: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources
- Target 10: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water
- Target 11: By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers

**Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development**
- Target 12: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system [Includes a commitment to good governance, development, and poverty reduction – both nationally and internationally]
- Target 13: Address the Special Needs of the Least Developed Countries (LDC) [Includes: tariff and quota free access for LDC exports; enhanced programme of debt relief for HIPC and cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous ODA (Overseas Development Assistance) for countries committed to poverty reduction]
- Target 14: Address the Special Needs of landlocked countries and small island developing States (through the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the outcome of the 22nd special session of the General Assembly)
- Target 15: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term
- Target 16: In co-operation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth
- Target 17: In co-operation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable, essential drugs in developing countries
- Target 18: In co-operation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications
There are a number of theories regarding what brought about this major shift. Noel concludes that,

...a new debate about poverty took hold in the last few years because it made it possible, for all social forces, to move beyond the relatively old and sterile opposition between the status quo and retrenchment, and beyond, as well, an unsatisfying convergence around ideas related to social investment. Poverty reduction works well as a locus of opposition because it allows that right to claim that market oriented policies and globalisation are not inimical to the poor (see, for example, Bhagwati (2004: 51-67); Brooks (2004)), while it allows the left to bring back redistribution and social justice and make them once again central political issues (Noel, 2005: 30).

Despite this evident merging of interests, Therien (1999) concludes that the convergence between ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ agencies will not remove the basic differences between them, one fundamental aspect of which is that

...the BWI speak in terms of poverty, the UN agencies in terms of inequality. The former frame the problem as one of individuals who are not well adapted to the demands of the market: the latter define it primarily as a structural issue whose solution would require global redistribution measures (so that) ...the current consensus on poverty reduction...can be interpreted as a victory for the Bretton Woods perspective (Therien, 1999: 14).

The recent history of the discourse of poverty and its very rapid rise to prominence (the first PRSPs were implemented in 1999, for instance, while the 2000 World Development Report was entitled ‘Attacking Poverty; see also Wade 2001) throws into relief some of the key issues, discourses and debates that were contemporaneous with the Millennium Declaration and that clearly framed it in significant ways.

6.2.2 Discourses of international agencies in the 1990s

The source of the discourses and discussions of the second half of the 1990s most commonly identified in the literature as significant, is the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee’s paper Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation (OECD, 1996a). It is significant that it was the DAC/OECD that set the agenda.

Shaping the 21st Century foreshadows the MDGs; it is the first attempt to put together a set of specified international development goals presented in the form of targets. Its introduction states: ‘We are proposing a global development partnership effort through which we can achieve together the following ambitious but realizable goals’. It is time, the report said, to “select a limited number of indicators by which our efforts may be judged”—the first two of these are halving “the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by 2015” and “universal primary education in all countries by 2015” (Op Cit: 2).

Shaping the 21st Century advanced three principal motivations for official development assistance: fundamental humanitarianism; enlightened self-interest; and the solidarity of people. The Report reflects on the wider political changes, arguing that

...the old distinctions between “North” and “South” as well as between “East” and “West” are becoming blurred, (i)issues can no longer be divided into “domestic” and international” (and) (r)isks of social disintegration and exclusion affect all countries, as do opportunities to benefit from participation in a growing global economic system.....Everyone is made less secure by the poverty and misery that exist in this world (OECD, 1996a: 6).

The outcome of the conference was a set of six ‘International Development Targets’ (IDT’s) said to have been synthesised from the recommendations of a series of world conferences over the first half of the 1990s (see DfID, 2001). These contained the core of what emerged a few years later as the MDGs.

The DAC/OECD document contains a very clear specification of the risks and promises generated by globalisation, and of the need to meet the challenges implied by poverty and inequality at a global level. It is, though, equally important to note the position and interests from which the document is written and its proposals made. Notwithstanding statements about the blurring of North and South, we are told that the targets

...represent only a proposal of what we as donors consider to be helpful measures of progress to inspire effective development cooperation. Their achievement will require agreement and commitment from developing country partners, through their own national goals and locally-owned strategies (OECD, 1996a: 9).

The power relations between donors and developing countries implied here are clear. While this may be only a proposal of what ‘we as donors consider helpful’, it is difficult to imagine them being resisted by the recipients of aid, whose contribution will be ‘agreement and commitment through their own national goals’.
The literature reveals a considerable amount of history concealed in the emergence and specification of the MDGs, which is obscured further by the ‘universal’ status bestowed on the targets when they are anointed as the UN’s Millennium Development Goals, confirmed by the Heads of all member governments.

6.3 The MDGs

The gist of the argument presented in this section is that the MDGs represent the centre of a new and different approach to development that has major implications for the relationship between globalisation and education. A similar argument is advanced by Roberts (2005), who, while acknowledging the failures of previous attempts to set global goals for education, suggests that there are good reasons to expect that the MDGs may be different. He acknowledges that the goals and targets were more politically than technically determined “…inevitable in membership organisations such as the UN agencies where decisions are reached by negotiated consensus” (ibid.: 117). And while the Education MDGs had something of a head start over the other goals (due to the decade long experience of EFA), this does not mean that there was either consensus or clarity over the definition of ‘primary school completion’ (see UNESCO [2002] where four interpretations of primary completion are given; see Bruns et al, 2003). What makes the MDGs different, Roberts (2005: 117) argues, is that they are associated with a range of implementation mechanisms that will increase the likelihood of the MDGs as ‘ultimate outcomes’ being attained.

More fundamentally, they represent the confluence of a number of different streams, raising the profile and recognition of the importance of, poverty in numerous ways, from the Monterrey Consensus to the making Poverty History campaign. They emerged into a world whose fundamental assumptions had been shaken by the events of September 11, 2001, and are necessarily implicated in some of its repercussions for the purpose and allocation of aid. The 2005 United Nations World Summit’s main purpose was to review progress toward them. They are also hugely significant in themselves. This has stimulated fresh and radical rethinking of the purposes, strategies, funding and delivery of aid that has both placed the MDGs at the core of a new assembly of processes and mechanisms that collectively constitute what has been referred to as a ‘new meta-narrative’ (Maxwell, 2005) or a new construction of the means to achieve poverty reduction, and stimulated a “…conscientious re-examination and re-alignment of the institutions and organisations that configure the international development architecture” (Sagasti et al, 2005, i). We will briefly examine these two elements in turn.

6.3.1 The new meta-narrative

Maxwell (2003: 5-6) suggests the components which became ‘locked together’ to form the new metanarrative were:

• the MDGs - focussed on poverty reduction;
• an international consensus on how best to tackle poverty reduction, symbolised in the World Development Report 2000/1;
• Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers as a mechanism for operationalising the goals at country level (Roberts (op cit) suggests that the PRSPs are the most important component of the ‘package’);
• technologies for delivering aid in support of the PRSPs in the form of Medium Term Expenditure Forecasts, Sector Wide Approaches and Poverty Reduction Support Credits; and
• a commitment to results –based management.

To these it seems sensible to add the Global Funds such as the Education Fast Track Initiative, since they clearly come from the same set of principles. These mechanisms might be seen as a kind of gestalt, a field of mutually dependent elements, necessary but insufficient components contributing to the achievement of an agreed objective.

We will now elaborate briefly on each of these elements, considering both their assumptions about the relationship between globalisation and education, and their possible individual effects on that relationship.

The international consensus on tackling poverty reduction

It is important to consider the strength and basis of the international consensus. While the focus of the World Development Report 2000/1 was poverty reduction, and it clearly contributed to, as well as reflected, the rising profile of poverty reduction, the overall impression given by the report, and especially the response of the International Financial Institutions to it, suggest that while the focus of the programme may have shifted, the dominant programme ontology did not require major overhaul, though possibly new implementation measures will be necessary.

In the particular case of the MDGs, Jan Vandemoortele, the leader of the UNDP Poverty Group, in an examination of whether the MDGs had created more opportunities for pro-poor growth at the country level, points out that:
• the MDGs themselves have been viewed in rather different ways, with some seeing them as a major step forward, since they represent an internationally agreed agenda for development, others seeing them as a step sideways ‘because they represent a familiar agenda that is rather minimal in scope, and others seeing them as a step backwards ‘because the quantitative and time-bound targets do not explicitly cover human rights, jobs, reproductive health, governance or the role of the private sector’;
• they may be seen as an agreed agenda, a minimalistic agenda or an incomplete agenda for human development’;
• they project different paradigms of development, seeing either a new global compact between rich and poor countries, or an old paradigm of welfare entitlements or North-South recriminations (from which perspective the ‘new’ paradigm is seen as driven by good governance and the private sector);
• there are different views of their relevance—to poor countries, or even the very poor, on the one hand, or to include pockets of poverty in middle income countries, on the other; and
• they were set on the assumption that global trends observed in the 1970s and 1980s would continue until 2015—which leaves out the impact of HIV/AIDS in particular (Vandemoortele, 2003: 3–4).

He concludes that although the objective of poverty reduction is clearly on the agenda, “…its actual pursuit remains conventional, unimaginative and often ineffective” (Vandemoortele, 2003: 1).

**Poor reduction strategy papers**

PRSPs represent the core of the meta-narrative. “The PRSP approach aims at providing the crucial link between national public actions, donor support, and the development outcomes needed to meet the United Nations’ MDGs” (IMF PRSP website).³

PRSPs were introduced as the means of implementing the World Bank’s new Comprehensive Development Framework, which “…claims to place poverty reduction at the fore and to allow recipient countries to own and direct their own development agendas” (Stewart and Wang, 2003: 4). The CDF reflected (a) increasing awareness of the extent of poverty in the world; (b) the failure of the Washington Consensus-based suite of approaches to development; and (c) the consequent criticisms levied at the World Bank and IMF (see Cling et al, 2004).

**Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers** were initiated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in September 1999 as a means of ensuring that aid was more effective in addressing poverty. More than this, the project saw poverty reduction as an end in itself. Under the PRSP initiative, developing countries wishing to apply for financial aid from either of the organisations, or for debt relief under the HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries) Initiative, are required to draw up poverty reduction programs known as **Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP)**, thus bringing poverty reduction to the core of the implementation of development. Both developing countries and donors have ‘signed up’ for the initiative that now channels all official international aid resources destined for low-income countries, including the MDGs.

Five core principles underlie the development and implementation of poverty reduction strategies. The strategies should be:

• **country-driven**, involving broad-based participation by civil society and the private sector in all operational steps;
• **results-oriented**, focusing on outcomes that would benefit the poor;
• **comprehensive** in recognizing the multidimensional nature of poverty and the scope of actions needed to effectively reduce poverty;
• **partnership-oriented**, involving coordinated participation of development partners (bilateral, multilateral, and non-governmental); and
• based on a **long-term perspective** for poverty reduction.

They are expected to be based on:

a. A description of the participatory process that was used;
b. Comprehensive poverty diagnostics;
c. Clearly presented and properly costed priorities for macroeconomic, structural, and social policies;
d. Appropriate targets, indicators, and systems for monitoring and evaluating progress. ⁴

PRSPs have had a mixed reception. The Bank recognises that “…some tensions are inherent to the process, such as those between quality and speed in preparing country strategies, and between country ownership on the one hand and Bank and IMF assessment of country strategies on the other” (ibid.). The latter “…reflects two competing principles—that strategies genuinely reflect country priorities, but that the Bank and Fund ensure, on behalf of their shareholders, that concessional assistance and debt relief will be wisely used in a policy environment and for purposes that promote poverty reduction” (ibd.).

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⁴ See [http://www.worldbank.org/prsp](http://www.worldbank.org/prsp) Last accessed on 14/08/06
This latter point is perhaps the most widely made criticism of the PRSPs. Essentially they are little more then ‘dressed up’ versions of the discredited Structural Adjustment Policies of the 1990s, and updated versions of strategies of conditionality on the other (see Stewart and Wang, 2003; King and Rose, 2005; UNCTAD, 2002: 6).

Against this should be noted Levinsohn’s view that the PRSPs are not just window dressing, or good marketing, though the programme has been disappointing because of the absence of evidence of distributional effects and its emphasis on best practice’ (Levinsohn, 2003: 6).

For Cling et al (2004), ‘the principles of "ownership" and "conditionality" appear antithetic. The principle …extolling national sovereignty … remains, in fact, largely illusory: the means of intervention by the international financial community remain dependent, to a great extent, on coercion. PRSPs are, above all, conditions imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund for the granting of new financial aid. This puts a bias on the process of national ownership from the start. As the strategy must be ratified by these institutions, the respect for conditionalities and policies suggested by the latter take precedence over those judged adequate by national players (Cling et al, 2004: 116).

A similar view is expressed in the 2006 Global Monitoring Report on the EFA, where attention is drawn to “…contradictions in both content and formulation…” between the ideas of “country ownership and participation, and IFI ‘endorsement’ of the plans, as well as to a lack of links between priority statements and resource allocation and planned actions” (UNESCO, 2006: 245-7)—while Alexander and Kessler quote one World Bank official as saying that “The PRSP is a compulsory process wherein the people with the money tell the people who want the money what they need to do to get the money” (John Page, The World Bank, Inter Action NGO Forum, 4/12/00) (Alexander and Kessler, 2003).

Bullard (2003) makes the following rather different points about the linking of the MDGs and PRSPS:

- it limits national policies to MDG goals;
- progress towards goals does not necessarily signal structural change;
- the MDGs are externally imposed, PRSPs formally country-led;
- all aid is channeled through MDGs and PRSPs, so countries have to stick to PRSP assumptions;
- PRSP now the main vehicle to implement MDG on debt;
- “tying the MDGs to the PRSP …signals an important convergence of ideology and power of international development agencies and financial institutions, but it is not necessarily the most effective way, and certainly not the only way, to eliminate poverty and the structural causes of poverty in the South” (Bullard, 2003: 16)

Craig and Porter provide a more even-handed balance sheet of the Uganda PRSPs which is widely regarded as the most successful so far:

Uganda has achieved an unprecedented joining-up of poverty eradication plans, corresponding budgets, negotiated agreements and the extraordinary focus of resources around a common sense of purpose in the PRSP framework. But the costs are unprecedented as well, not just in terms of the bevy of international and local consultants, civil servants, politicians, critics and advocates required to design and manage the fine detail of these financing instruments and superintend the multitude of donor-government-community forums to sustain agreement. Rather, the main cost is in opportunities forgone by the lopsidedness between the ‘technical’ and the ‘political’ in conventional PRSP processes as national and local political authorities are reformed and narrowed down to focus on the plethora of financial stability and integration ‘best practice ‘rules’ considered necessary for the ‘accountable’ delivery of resources to areas of local need according to globally determined standards (Craig and Porter, 2003: 66).

**Technologies for delivering aid**

Here, we consider one item on Maxwell’s list of technologies for delivering aid, Medium Term Expenditure Forecasts, before going on to widen the conception of ‘technology’. They are the prime example of what Harrison (2005: 245) refers to as the “intermediate level…framed by the execution of specific reforms”.

The relationship between MTEF and PSRP is described by Holmes and Evans as one where the “…PRSP provides the roadmap and the MTEF provides the discipline within which explicit policy choices and tradeoffs are made” (2003: 6). The focus is strongly on the improvement of policy making and planning, including the effective application of donor financing, that can be made possible by moving beyond annual budget cycles to a medium or longer term strategy, and there is a strong emphasis on management, not only directly of public expenditure, but of expectations (34).

An important feature of the article is the need for donor practices to change as well as those of recipients. This is reinforced by resistance to the idea of ‘projectisation’, which pervades the paper, and the fear that *ad hoc* donor behaviour, not integrated into the country’s budget framework, may jeopardize the stability that the MTEF is designed to bring about. A major threat to the MTEF comes about through the national ‘political economy’, which
“...has to be recognized and reform efforts needed to work it” (sic) (7). Harrison refers to the MTEFs in Uganda and Tanzania as “…mat(ing) it more difficult for specific ministries to gain discretionary funding through special pleading…” and opening up possibilities of rewarding efficient departments” (ibid.: 249).

This represents a shift from both an ante-hoc conditionality strategy and a post-hoc target indicators strategy, towards what might be called an ‘inter-hoc’ strategy, based on management through not only disciplining but socialising the parties involved. Indeed, the idea of ‘development as management’ (Green, M. 2003) emerges strongly not only to reinforce, but possibly to extend the importance of the technologies of development management referred to in this section.

In her ethnographic account of the practices of participatory project management in Tanzania, Green demonstrates the centrality of the idea of management in that process, indicating the practices through which it is performed, and shows that it is the application of a consistent body of practices, which she refers to as the ‘logical framework’, according to which consultants (whose expertise is seen as generic rather than country specific) work, irrespective of any difference in local conditions.

Thus, “Development management entails the social constitution of projects as slices of manageable reality in which, in the short term, outputs can be achieved” (ibid.: 140). As Lazar points out, “Whether meeting those particular objectives leads to the ‘higher aims’ is functionally irrelevant, because this is simply how accountability works…”, and she describes very similar experiences from her work on capacity-building projects carried out by charities and NGOs in Bolivia, noting that “…charities and NGOs all over the world have to respond to quantitative targets set by donors or lose their funding” (Lazar, 2004: 313)

Adding to the importance of this set of technologies, Harrison’s (2005: 256) experience of researching in Uganda and Tanzania leads him to be “struck by the way donor money has generated a ‘governance habitus’ that pervades a range of institutions and practices, “…not clearly related within the state more broadly”.

A commitment to results-based management

While there has been an emphasis on results-based management for some time—part of the perceived need to increase the effectiveness of aid (see, e.g., OECD/DAC, 2000)—as Levinsohn points out, it is difficult to see what the alternative to results-based management might be. He suggests that the prior question is what counts as a result. This is important because: “There is a danger that the parties involved will shy away from the difficult question of just how policy impacts the poor and instead take the much easier route of suggesting that any policy that promotes economic growth is good for the poor since in general growth is good for the poor” (Levinsohn, 2003: 3).

In another DAC study, attention is drawn to the different consequences for practice, and equally importantly for the definition of the activity itself, of two different intended uses of the kind of performance information generated by Results Based Management. “While a managing-for-results focus would tend to encourage risk-taking, experimentation and learning, there is a danger that an emphasis on accountability-for-results might encourage more conservative or risk-averse behaviour (e.g., avoiding potentially risky projects, focusing on lower-level results, setting easily attainable targets)” (OECD/DAC, 2000: 17).

Morgan and Qualman (1996) emphasize the importance of distinguishing between management (as measurement) by results (a donor oriented process) and management for results, a distinction that becomes important when we consider Barder and Birdsall’s suggestions for ‘paying’ developing countries for each additional enrolment in school, that bear an interesting resemblance to the old UK system of payment by results for teachers (Barder and Birdsall, 2005).

However, the fullest and most relevant account and critique of Results Based Management for our purposes is that provided by Eyben (2005). She suggests that the “…default’ meta-theory of donor governments is one of order rather than complexity” (Eyben, 2005: 99). She goes on to argue that a Results Based Management approach, based on strategy setting and devolved responsibility for implementation, is part of this, particularly when combined with elements that are recognisable components of the New Public Management (ibid.: 101).

Eyben suggests that Results Based Management “…may be symptomatic of donors’ current learning difficulties because it ignores the unequal relations of power in fixing the strategy …and sees all problems as similar… (in that). There is broad agreement between all parties concerned on the nature of the problem that the strategy has been designed to address; there is some mutual recognition of what a solution would look like; the problem is bounded in terms of the time and resources required for its resolution” (Eyben, 2005: 103)—a list that has the characteristics of a programme ontology. Her argument is essentially that all these elements are problematic because (a) they bear little relationship to the ‘real world’, and (b) they limit the opportunities for “…transformative learning, the kind of learning required for managing non-bounded problems” (ibid.).

6.3.2 The architecture of aid

The second element of the ‘rethinking of aid and development’ focuses on the system for delivering international development assistance itself. It is based on the recognition that the system is not a neutral conduit, or to be
regarded as a black box that can safely be left closed, but is itself a key variable in the whole process and requires proper theoretical scrutiny in its own right. One important basis of the rethinking is the fear that the aid system may be part of a context that is "...generating a particular effect or pathology at ground level" (Christiansen and Rogerson, 2005, 1). Finance needs to be reorganised, and progress towards this has been made in a number of ways that we will mention below, but the problem is not reducible to a matter of finance. Rogerson suggest that the problem is an historical one: "The aid system has developed incrementally, without evident systematic intent, over several decades...it managed to adapt to the various events, theories and fashions shaping development practice during and after the Cold War" (Rogerson, 2004, 11). But the question is whether the current aid architecture is fit for purpose (Christiansen and Rogerson, 2005). The historic accretion of multiple overlapping and sometimes conflicting and competing purposes, agendas and interests across a vast range of different kinds of agencies, and "...actors (with) diverse operational modalities, underlying assumptions, mindsets and approaches" (Christiansen and Rogerson, 2005: 1) has created major problems of policy coherence and operational congruence. The coherence issue applies not only to policies but also to operations and the recognition of their independent effects. For Christiansen and Rogerson: "The main 'pathology' emerges around each development actor's lack of strategic and operational awareness of other actors. If each actor is meeting their own programme objectives effectively, the deeply unsafe further assumption is often made that overall each of their objectives will thereby be met" (2005: 1). And the problem is increasing, as increasing numbers of agencies enter the system. However, as Christiansen and Rogerson make clear: "The system for delivering aid as well as its modalities and habits is part of the political and foreign policy strategies of western donor governments" (2005: 2).

The current aid system can be seen as the product of multiple and often competing objectives, donors and arrangements. We have already made reference to the contributions of the International Financial Institutions, United Nations agencies and other international organisations, in particular the OECD/DAC. We have also referred to changing patterns of bilateral aid (which remains much the largest source of aid). However, it is also necessary to consider briefly one other prominent source of aid. Civil society and International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) have always been notable providers of development aid, but there is evidence (see, for example, Mundy and Murphy, 2001; Mundy, 2006) that the contribution of that aid to development is changing in quantity, focus, organisation and impact. On the one hand, as Rogerson points out, NGOs are 'becoming financial intermediaries in their own right' (2004: 14). On the other hand, they are forming into more effective transnational advocacy networks (Mundy and Murphy, 2001), in particular with the emergence of the Global Campaign for Education (which was initiated by Education International - the international association of teachers' unions, Action Aid and Oxfam International), whose membership and influence has continued to grow (Mundy, 2006: 38-9).

Mundy sees these developments as significant parts of 'several unprecedented shifts' in assisting the poorest countries with their educational development. She argues that: "The education community has gone farther than in the past in establishing a clear, common set of priorities in education", through the MDGs and "new forms of donor coordination at the country level and global levels, and new aid modalities" (Mundy, 2006: 44).

This suggests some overlap, if not common purpose, between the meta-narrative and the architecture of aid, and these elements also come together in what Rogerson describes as "...the leading paradigm of effective aid" (2004: 19). The components of this paradigm are: the MDGs; partnership approaches, such as the PRSPs; streamlined conditionality; performance-based aid allocations; and 'a compact linking sovereign responsibility in developing countries for good governance and development choices with better aid quality and sharply increased aid volume in developed countries' (ibid.). The first four of these have essentially been treated here as elements of the meta-narrative; we will focus briefly here on the nature and elements of the compact on the architecture of aid, and recent developments within it.

The basis of the compact is the Monterrey Consensus (named after the UN conference on Financing for Development held in Monterrey, Mexico in 2002), which called for commitments to significant and sustained increases in aid volumes (moving closer to the 0.7% of GDP target) on the part of donors and 'good governance' on the part of aid recipients. It also emphasised the need for harmonising donor practices so as to reduce transaction costs for donors and to make aid more predictable over a longer period (such as that foreseen to achieve the MDGs) for recipients.

In a sense, 2005 can be seen as a watershed year in the development of the architecture of aid, with the United Nations special summit on the MDGs, the UK presidency of the G8, and high profile campaigns to Make Poverty History. More widely, Sagasti et al suggest that "...the early years of the 21st century have brought about an unprecedented (and at least in part prompted by the MDGs) ‘window of opportunity’ for a conscientious re-examination and re-alignment of the institutions that configure the international development architecture” (2005: i), and indeed, there have been a number of quite radical proposals for new aid arrangements, such as ‘thematic global funds’ and the International Financing Facility.

The largest, and possibly the model, global fund is the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and malaria. It was set up to mobilise more rapidly and more effectively than had been achieved through conventional aid strategies against expanding global threats: “The emphasis was on matching committed groups with implementable ideas, to adequate external resources that could be speedily mobilised” (Rogerson, 2004: 29). It thus represents at the very least a critique of the existing aid architecture and an identification of some of its perceived shortcomings, in particular the inward facing, effectively purchaser-provider coalitions that have accreted with the development of
the existing aid architecture. However, “...the global fund’s central driving principle is ‘additionality’, which means that ‘it must not displace existing programmes, but add new activities or coverage’ (and this) is inherently inconsistent with the (principle of) complementarity with existing activities” (Rogerson, 2004: 29). Further, it is not clear that global funds, like the Fast Track Initiative, will bring in more funding or just mean the reallocation of existing funding, while the concept of ‘thematic’ funds might be seen to add little to initiatives like EFA, or indeed the MDGs themselves, which are targeted on the global threat of poverty.

In terms of the IFF, as Rogerson puts it: “The IFF idea is all about accelerating the availability of funding for development by securitising future aid expenditure through bond markets. In this way, the increased aid that Monterrey pledged for 2006 onwards (around US$16 billion per year), and perhaps other increases later, can be ‘leveraged into much faster increases in funds received by recipients in the years before 2015” (2004: 30). It thus represents potentially a response to the arguments that the costs of achieving the MDGs have been underestimated and that they are not affordable. The IFF has major implications, the most important of which may be to require some transformation in the existing aid architecture, since (a) once it existed “…it would instantly become a huge ‘synthetic donor, potentially the largest single source of development finance in the world’ and (b) “...it breaks the absolute link between government budgets which pledge commitment streams to the Facility (which it then uses to back its bonds) and the use of the proceeds from the sale of those bonds” (Rogerson, 2004: 30-31).

6.4 The education-related MDGs

Just as we have emphasised the importance of their historical contexts in understanding the emergence of the MDGs as a set of global goals, so we will attempt the same process with respect to the specific Millennium Development Goals for Education, MDG2, whose target is Universal Primary Education by 2015.

In tracing this history as it reflects changing relationships between globalisation and education, we shall focus on both the framework within which this relationship, what we refer to as the global governance of education, was being shaped, and its substantive outcomes. While we shall go on to discuss the frequency of international expressions of educational aspiration over the past 50 years, the most immediate and important context for MDG2, both in terms of changes in the global governance and of the designated purposes of education, are the World Conferences on Education for All, held at Jomtien, Thailand in 1990 (which was discussed in Chapter 4), and in Dakar, Senegal, in 2000, and the changes that took place between the two conferences.

The disputes between the agencies and their relationships to national policies, all characteristic of Jomtien, still dominated the agenda of the Dakar conference in 2000, and continued to dominate the agenda in the MDG+5 meeting of the UN in 2005. In terms of the globalisation of education, these continuing disputes are not however indicative of such a fragmentation of views, interests and approaches that any idea of a ‘global’ level of influence with respect to education has to be jettisoned. In relation to the parties to the disputes, UNESCO was the agency given oversight of education in the world in the 1945 settlement (see Chapter 1 on multilateralism). As the guardian of the idea of education as a human right, its achievements in this area should be acknowledged. It was almost alone among such agencies to continue to operate on both sides of the Iron Curtain. It carried sufficient prestige to make membership important to a very wide range of regimes, and was able to promote major initiatives on a world scale (see Jones, 1988; Mundy, 2002; Jones with Coleman, 2005). However, it was not successful in establishing an effective global presence (there is an interesting parallel with the earlier struggle in the late 1950s between the World Bank and the UN over financing education – see Chapter 1 on multilateralism). There was no talk of globalisation and education that was based on UNESCO comprising the global element, a failure frequently put down to its poor leadership and organisation, or to its lack of adequate funding (cf. Torres, 2001).

In the technical vacuum that followed, the World Bank succeeded in imposing a new type of technical ‘expertise’ and legitimacy in the field (Torres, 2001: 7). Wilks and Lefrancois stress that: “The Bank most of the time no longer has to rely on its financial clout alone, as it is winning arguments upstream”. With its extensive studies and networks of contacts, “...the Bank has an important influence even where it is not lending...but it is clearly in the most influential position when it can combine its ‘knowledge’ and lending functions, imposing conditions to support its advice” (Wilks and Lefrancois, 2002: 5). However, Mundy’s identification of a ‘legitimacy deficit’ among World Bank education staff, and a ”...palpable loss of certainty...as to where (its) education work was headed, what its educational priorities should be and how it can work most effectively” (Mundy, 2002: 491, 483) (possibly exacerbated by Psacharopoulos’ departure from the Bank in 1998) does seem to have led by the end of the decade to a broadening of the Bank’s educational priorities—even if, as we have see, primary education continued to dominate. For instance, Post et al (2003) show how the Bank is now fully persuaded of the contribution of higher education, not only in an era of the ‘Knowledge Economy’, but also as contributing to democratic values and social cohesion. The addition of post basic education to primary education (see Palmer, 2006), along with a balance between these different levels to attain a knowledge–based economy (see Hayman, 2005), is also recognised more widely.

Another (along with UNESCO/World Bank one) constant over this period was the continuing prominence of primary education as the best way of linking education and development, an emphasis that has persisted despite the preferences of developing country governments, and arguments about the importance of post-primary education (see Birdsall, 1996; Hayman, 2005; Palmer, 2006; Post et al, 2004). One explanation of this continuing emphasis on primary education may be found in the methodologies and associated funding policies of the World
Bank. The rates-of-return analyses pioneered by Psacharopoulos (1985) showed that the rates of return to investments in primary education were higher than those from investing in vocational or tertiary education, and these analyses drove Bank lending policy in education increasingly from 1980 onwards. In the 1980s lending to the primary sector made up 18.9% of bank funding to education, in the 1990s it made up 35.6% and in 2001, 45%. The corresponding figures for vocational post-secondary education, for instance, were 25.1%, 7.5% and 8.1% for the respective periods. The dominance of this kind of analysis and reasoning is recognised both by those in the World Bank who embraced and promoted it (see Psacharopoulos, 1994; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004; Psacharopoulos, 2006) and those who regretted and opposed it (see Heyneman, 2003).

We also see over the decade of the 1990s, the shift from EFA to MDGs. This was a shift from, first, the original UNESCO conception of an international forum where countries could meet and cooperate to mutual benefit in the pursuit of aims of education as a human right, to second, a group of international agencies and national donors collectively taking the responsibility to make a universal declaration of Education for All, to third, the collective agreement to pursue a set of common goals that had as their main target the ‘global’ problem of poverty, a problem that was a global responsibility and could only be solved globally.

This sequence might be seen as a shift from a ‘multilateral’ agency approach (see Mundy, 2002) to a ‘global agency’ approach. The constitution of the EFA might be seen as creating a common project from which all countries might benefit, while the MDGs represented a more collective and common agenda from which all may benefit through the collective subscription to that agenda and its pursuit.

The second insight to be drawn from the accounts of the construction of EFA is that it relied on hope and enthusiasm rather than organisation and structure. The multiple competing mandates and definitions of the target, their different interpretations by different agencies, and the range of capacities to implement them, represented massive obstacles in the way of success to the point where, in the absence of any accepted ‘steering’ capacity on the part of the International Consultative Forum on Education for All (the EFA Forum), success would have been almost impossible to achieve, irrespective of the quality and energy of the management of the programme, typically identified as a major cause of the programme’s failure (see Torres, 2001).

The same body—composed of representatives of UNESCO, UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA and the World Bank, bilateral cooperation agencies, governments and NGOs, as well as some education specialists—that was created at Jomtien to monitor EFA also organised the Dakar Conference to appraise the efforts of the decade of the 1990s to implement the Jomtien agenda.

The Conference was essentially given the task of coming up with a new Framework for Action to continue the project, following the failure to achieve EFA in the decade that had been devoted to it, The Dakar conference sought to broaden the conception of education to recapture the original Jomtien agenda, which Torres (2001: 5) argues “had visibly shrunk over the course of the decade and risked being incorporated into the new focus on poverty”, by promulgating a set of six EFA goals.

However, as the 2006 EFA Global Monitoring Report acknowledges: “In practice, achieving good quality primary education and gender parity (the MDG education goals) has dominated attention” (UNESCO, 2006: 3). The content of the goals set at Dakar was not its most notable achievement, nor advance on Jomtien. What is best known, and certainly most quoted from the Dakar report is the financial commitment it made—“We affirm that no countries seriously committed to education for all will be thwarted in their achievement of this goal by lack of resources” (World Education Forum, 2000: 9)

Torres contrasts the ‘spirit’ of the two events quite starkly. Jomtien was positive, looked forward to a promising future, it held out great hopes for the potential of ICT and was about creating and dreaming. The atmosphere at Dakar was one of failure, overshadowed by the increase in poverty and the digital divide (see Chapter 7 on the digital divide and low-income countries) and “faced with the crass contrast between rhetoric and reality, between documents and facts, between goals and achievements, restrained the imagination, encouraged excuses and self-justification, and provided a temptation to inflate numbers and to blur realities” (Torres, 2001: 6).

From Torres’ analysis, we can infer three fundamental reasons for this change. One is that the world changed over the decade in ways that were not recognised by those involved in EFA so that the poverty alleviation discourse tended to be repeated while trust was still placed in economic growth as the solution to social inequality.

Second, the deep and complex collaboration between international agencies which had set up Jomtien had, by the time of Dakar, proven very difficult to implement, leaving the organisations to “…withdraw(n) into their own ‘niches’ and institutional styles” (Torres, 2001: 6). Moreover, “…the differences and disputes between them, which were already present in 1990, had not diminished but had worsened to the point where …the most unfortunate aspect of Dakar was the infighting between agencies, particularly between UNESCO and UNICEF…in open competition for hegemony over the world panorama of education, and specifically over EFA” (Torres, 2001: 6-7).

The third reason is that though “…there is no doubt that we now have more refined statistics which would allow the magnitude of the problems to be better understood… neither the Declaration nor the Framework for Action suggests that ten years of practical application of EFA have led to any better understanding of the nature of these problems or of suitable ways of dealing with them” (Torres, 2001: 9). And added to this,
The reiteration of Jomtien’s vision and goals, and the postponement of the target date, assume that failure and potential success can be explained in terms of a linear axis between more and less, that what is needed is not to rethink the diagnosis, objectives and strategies, but more of the same: more time (15 more years), more money (new loans and donations, and better use of existing resources), more commitment, and more action (Torres, 2001: 8).

It might be inferred that by the time of the Dakar meeting, a few months before the Millennium Declaration, while the agenda for MDG2 differed in important ways from that of EFA and Dakar, the tools for reaching it differed little in their fundamental assumptions from those that had informed the EFA campaign.

**Nature of MDGs 2 and 3**

The process by which the actual *Millennium Development Goals* were developed occurred through the Millennium Project, an agency especially set up for this purpose. Task forces were created for each of the goals, and they issued background papers, interim reports and most recently a summary report for the MDG + 5 UN summit. The Task Force for MDG2 was “assigned to take a systematic look at how dramatic improvements in education could be achieved in the developing world” (Birdsall et al, 2004: 19)

The history of MDG 2 is the subject of a separate section of Levine et al’s background Paper for the Millennium Project’s Task Force on MDG 2. (Levine et al, 2003); interestingly, it is also taken up in the Task Force’s interim report (see Levine, 2004), in its final report (UNDP 2005), and in Birdsall’s subsequent comments (Birdsall and Vaishnav, 2005).

Based on the work of Clemens (2004), the paper draws attention to the long history of the promulgation by UN agencies of far reaching high level goals and their subsequent failure before immediately moving into what amounts to much more a critique of the goals and the possibility of their achievement, than a programme for their implementation.

The purpose of the earlier papers appears to be to demonstrate that the goal could not be achieved, to explain why it could not be achieved, and to put forward alternative means of achieving it. The goal is described as characterised by: an imperfect link between rhetoric at the political and the realities at the technical level; oversimplifying complex phenomena; being advanced with no effort at establishing its feasibility; employing less than optimal indicators, and as implying that one size will fit all. Further, agreement by world leaders on a global stage does not guarantee commitment at home, where competing domestic agendas may intrude. Finally, “…there is the question of whether the Goals apply to the ‘world’ or separately to each country” (Birdsall and Vaishnav, 2005: 259).

Levine et al (2003) point out some of the specific differences of the MDGs in relation to other attempts at global development. They are clearly oriented towards social and individual level results rather sector-specific objectives. They address poverty directly, rather than through its correlates, and incorporate the need for quantitative information to enable effective monitoring. They are produced in an era where the *effectiveness* of development aid is a priority. Further, “…they represent a global compact between developed and developing countries to increase the living standards of the world’s poorest citizens” (Birdsall and Vaishnav, 2005: 257).

To this we might add the list produced by Fukuda-Parr:

…they are generated by an unprecedented assembly of world leaders; they put human development, not growth, at the heart of the agenda; the MDGs do not just state ideals but specify concrete and monitorable goals; and they address inputs from rich countries as well as development outcomes, forming a compact that holds both rich and poor countries accountable for opening markets, giving more aid and transferring technology (2004: 395).

It is important to note Colclough’s (2005a: 101) point, that while many of the earlier attempts to bring about universal education rested on the ‘strong and comprehensive legal basis’ of international covenants and conventions, the MDGs (like the EFA project before them) are the results of international conference Declarations. One consequence of “…securing public political commitment to social and economic goals…” , he suggests, “…may (be) at least (to) make it less easy for national policy messages to ignore the human rights provisions to which legal commitments have already been made by national governments” (101-102).

Beyond these suggestions we might also note a number of other features that make the MDGs novel and qualitatively different from the many similar projects and aspirations that have were proposed in the second half of the 20th century (see Clemens, 2004):

- education is not a separate target but one of a wide range of goals; it is associated with gender parity on MDG3, this is the only formal link with the other goals;
- the MDGs have as a common target the reduction of global poverty;
- a particular level of schooling, primary education, is nominated; this represents a difference from EFA where the goal is a level of achievement; and
- enrolment is the main criterion.
The first two of these both enrol education in the form of UPE as a key weapon in the fight against world poverty, and see the current state of education in the developing world as both a key symptom and a key consequence of poverty at national level. In the first understanding, it is seen as a crucial component of the multi-faceted strategy of escaping poverty on a world scale; in the second, it is a target in itself.

The second two bullet points are considerably more precise and accountable (though as will become evident below, that precision is itself highly relative and challengeable) than ‘basic education for all’ within a decade. They also exhibit some of the consequences of measurement.

More specifically, it is important to note that what counted as ‘significant and measurable improvements’ were both defined in and took on concrete form through the Target(s) associated with the Goals. The process of establishing time-limited targets and benchmarks against which success and progress might be ‘measured’ is in itself highly significant. Fundamentally, it means that the targets essentially ‘become’ the Goals; in the case of education, MDG 2 is the goal directly concerned with education, and the Target associated with it (Target 3) is to ‘Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling’, which is typically translated as Universal Primary Education (UPE) and increasingly Universal Primary Completion (UPC).

This has considerable consequence not only for the achievement of the goals, but for what might be considered the scope and need for education in developing countries and for the relationship between donors—whose activities are framed by pursuit of the single goal of UPE—and recipients—whose goals may extend much wider.

Here the Interim Report of the Task Force (Birdsall et al, 2004) is implicitly critical of the narrowness of the target and the consequences of an exclusive focus on achieving UPE. Its central perspective is that of ‘Transformation vs Evolution’ (p. 4). This meant on the one hand recognising the complexity of education and its role in social reproduction. As the Report notes, “education cannot be reduced to a simple set of inputs and outputs” (Birdsall et al, 2004: 4). On the other hand it meant recognising that

...efforts that are fundamentally evolutionary—that is actions that seek to make the existing system “bigger”—are unlikely to succeed, particularly in societies characterized by profound economic, gender and ethnic inequality. Rather, success depends on actions that are fundamentally transformational—using specific levers to induce fundamental changes to a more democratic and egalitarian future (Birdsall et al 2004: 4; emphasis in original)

Reinforcing this, the Interim Report points out that “Many developing countries have sharp education inequalities across income and ethnic (as well as gender) groups” and that: “Although the education and gender parity MDGs fail to include a distributional (or equity) dimension, achieving universal primary education requires that progress in action and completion disproportionately benefit poor and disadvantaged children” (Birdsall et al, 2004: 11) The Report also suggests that a goal and target focusing on primary education alone is “...insufficiently ambitious to generate the hoped-for benefits...” and it presents evidence that “…focuses attention on the crucial role of continuing education past the primary level to gain and secure returns in many areas” (Birdsall et al, 2004: 17)

**Millennium Development Goal 3 - gender equality**

One other MDG includes education specifically, MDG 3, and it is necessary for a full appreciation of the way that the MDGs framed the relationship between education and globalisation to consider its contribution to that framing. The goal is to ‘Promote Gender Equality and empower women’. However, the single target specified for the realization of this goal is eliminating gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005 and in all levels of education by 2015. In addition, there are four indicators to measure the attainment of the goal:

- the ratio of boys to girls in primary, secondary and tertiary education;
- the ratio of literate females to males among 15-24 year olds;
- the share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector;
- the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments.

It can be seen that there are some gaps between Goal, target and indicators, with the target representing a narrow version of the Goal and only two of the indicators related to the target. The nature of the goal, targets and indicators have been subject to three main lines of criticism, all of which are relevant to an understanding of the relationship between globalisation, education and development. First, there has been considerable criticism of the Goal itself, particularly as it fails to reflect the discussions and outcomes of the series of UN conferences held between 1993 and 1995, and in particular those of the Fourth World Conference on Women that took place in Beijing in 1995. The Beijing Platform for Action included 12 areas of critical concern, and it is suggested that

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5 But note King’s point that it was not the ‘Millennium Declaration’ that set the targets but members of the UN Secretariat after the world leaders had left New York. See King and Rose, 2005.
“The MDG goal on women’s empowerment falls far short of the standard set (in the BPA)” (Painter, 2004: 61). This is reinforced in the background Paper of the Task Force on Education and Gender Equality (Grown et al, 2003: 8); “Glar in by their absence are targets to measure progress to reduce gender inequalities in each of the other Millennium Development Goals”.

Second, it has been argued that the target draws on and reproduces a particular, narrow, interpretation of gender equality in education. Painter (op cit) reports that the work on “…girl’s education was not directed at understanding how gender inequality affects girls’ education, but on a much narrower question of access” (p. 29). This is linked to the emphasis of MDG2 on primary education as measured through access rather than completion, and to the narrowing of the gender equality agenda to a focus on girls’ education (Rose and Subrahmanian, 2005: 2). These responses are seen by Unterhalter as demonstrating and reinforcing a particular (and in her view, limited) approach to gender equality in education. This she calls the WID (Women in Development) framework “…(which stresses) expansion of education for girls and women, linked to efficiency and economic growth….but not necessarily challenging the multiple sources of women’s subordination” (2005a, 15, 17; see also Unterhalter, 2005b). In this approach, ‘gender’ is equated with women and girls: “Education” is understood as schooling, Development is linked with economic growth or social cohesion and sometimes improved governance” (p.18). It is confined to seeking equality of resources within education, rather than the redistribution of power, recognition of difference or equality of rights and capabilities. More broadly: “This quantitative work on gender, access, retention, and achievement tends not to deal with other dimensions of (educational) inequality, particularly, race, ethnicity and disability. While some acknowledgement is made of the differences between rural and urban girls, there is little engagement with the complexity of social division” (p. 19).

The third criticism concerns the content of initiatives aimed at bringing about greater gender equality in education. These tend not to be focused on gender parity within education and to often involve girl specific initiatives (Rose and Subrahmanian, op cit: 3). This approach “…pays little attention to gendered processes of learning, …or the meanings that children make and take from the images they see in textbooks” (Unterhalter, 2005a 19; see also Aikman et al 2005).

6.5 How far has MDG2 been achieved?

In order to answer the question of whether the MDG2 have been achieved, we need to look at the data on access. Data on changes in enrolment levels are available, though not entirely reliable. Data on number of children in school (Table 6.1) and changes in gender disparities in primary education (Table 6.2), together with Box 6.2, highlights the likelihood of different countries achieving UPE.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.1 Enrolment in Primary Education for School Years Ending in 1999 and 2004, by Region</th>
<th>Total Enrolment (000)</th>
<th>Gross Enrolment Ratios 1999 (%)</th>
<th>Gross Enrolment Ratios 2004 (%)</th>
<th>Net Enrolment Ratios 1999 (%)</th>
<th>Net Enrolment Ratios 2004 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>644,985</td>
<td>682,225</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>100.2</td>
<td>82.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing countries</td>
<td>568,733</td>
<td>600,879</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>100.8</td>
<td>81.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed countries</td>
<td>70,418</td>
<td>67,160</td>
<td>102.2</td>
<td>101.4</td>
<td>96.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries in transition</td>
<td>15,834</td>
<td>13,926</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>107.3</td>
<td>85.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>79,772</td>
<td>101,424</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab States</td>
<td>34,725</td>
<td>36,700</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>77.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>3,853</td>
<td>3,376</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>101.6</td>
<td>92.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>217,575</td>
<td>206,217</td>
<td>111.9</td>
<td>113.2</td>
<td>90.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>214,277</td>
<td>202,712</td>
<td>112.2</td>
<td>113.5</td>
<td>96.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>3,298</td>
<td>3,505</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>97.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South and West Asia</td>
<td>157,510</td>
<td>167,884</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>102.9</td>
<td>77.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>70,206</td>
<td>69,239</td>
<td>120.7</td>
<td>117.9</td>
<td>83.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America/Europe</td>
<td>25,469</td>
<td>22,650</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td>101.5</td>
<td>89.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNESCO 2007: 26
Table 6.2 Changes in Gender Disparities in Primary Education by Region between 1999 and 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1999 Male</th>
<th>1999 Female</th>
<th>GPI (F/M)</th>
<th>2004 Male</th>
<th>2004 Female</th>
<th>GPI (F/M)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>104.2</td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>109.3</td>
<td>103.0</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing countries</td>
<td>104.5</td>
<td>94.9</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>110.2</td>
<td>103.2</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed countries</td>
<td>102.0</td>
<td>102.5</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>102.1</td>
<td>100.6</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries in transition</td>
<td>100.7</td>
<td>99.4</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>107.9</td>
<td>106.8</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>85.4</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>85.4</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab States</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>88.3</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>99.2</td>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>102.3</td>
<td>112.5</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and Pacific</td>
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<td>111.4</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>113.9</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>112.8</td>
<td>111.7</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>114.2</td>
<td>112.6</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>96.3</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South and West Asia</td>
<td>102.6</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>114.7</td>
<td>104.8</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America/Caribbean</td>
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<td>118.8</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>119.7</td>
<td>116.1</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>116.6</td>
<td>113.4</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>127.8</td>
<td>124.7</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
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<td>119.0</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>116.4</td>
<td>116.9</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America/Europe</td>
<td>102.4</td>
<td>103.3</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>102.6</td>
<td>100.6</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and E. Europe</td>
<td>101.6</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>102.8</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNESCO, 2007: 39

Box 6.2 Country Prospects for Achievement of Universal Primary Education by 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUADRANT I</th>
<th>QUADRANT II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At risk of not achieving the goal 20 countries</td>
<td>High chance of achieving the goal 20 countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania, Bahrain, British Virgin Islands, Czech Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Georgia, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Slovenia, Maldives, Malaysia, Netherlands Antilles, Palestinian A.T., Paraguay, Romania, South Africa, TFYR of Macedonia, Uruguay, Vietnam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, Indonesia, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Lesotho, Lithuania, Malta, Mauritius, Morocco, Nicaragua, Vanuatu, Venezuela</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUADRANT III</th>
<th>QUADRANT IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low chance of achieving the goal 44 countries</td>
<td>Serious risk of not achieving the goal 3 countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Chile, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Djibouti, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Iran (Isl. Rep.), Kenya, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lebanon, Macao (China), Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Niger, Oman, Republic of Moldova, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Swaziland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates, U. R. of Tanzania, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan, Papua New Guinea, Saudi Arabia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNESCO 2006: 70
A series of reports from international agencies concur on the lack of progress made in attaining the MDGs and lamenting that lack of progress, though their proposed remedies are rather different. The World Bank, for instance, puts forward a 5 point agenda for accelerating progress towards the MDGs:

- anchor efforts to achieve (them) in country-led development strategies;
- improve the climate for private-sector led economic growth;
- scale up human development services;
- dismantle barriers to trade; and
- substantially increase the level and effectiveness of aid (World Bank, 2005a: 3).

For the Global Governance Initiative, commenting on the MDGs in general, “…the major flaw in current approaches to achieving global goals is that structures and policies are not in place to channel the enormous energies of private enterprise” (2005: xi), while the EFA Monitoring Report for 2006 states that: “The development goals set by the majority of the world’s nations have a slim chance of being achieved unless governments and the international community rapidly expand learning opportunities for youth and adults, while assuring every child of a good quality education” (UNESCO, 2006).

In terms of explaining these results, the first point of interest is the nature and focus of the official responses to the progress achieved over the early years of the MDG programme.

Neither the Task Force set up for MDG2 nor the report of the UN’s Joint Inspection Unit (Bertrand 2003) appear to have carried out any systematic research or evaluation of the state of play with respect to progress towards meeting the education goals. In the case of the Task Force, the ‘urgency of the task’ was brought into stark relief by the reality that the goals would not be achieved by 2015 (Levine et al, 2003: 19).

The UN Joint Inspection Unit report states that its purpose is “…to examine whether at this time all the conditions are in place to allow Member States to attain the universal primary education (UPE) and completion goal” (Bertrand, 2003,vii). It is almost as though there is a tacit recognition that MDG2 should be regarded as, and reacted to as, a general aspiration to improve education in developing countries, rather than in the terms in which the goal was presented.

There are, however, many explicit and implicit discussions about the reasons for the relative failure of the MDG/UPE. It will be useful to divide them into two main groups, those that focus on their feasibility and credibility, and those that lay the blame at the door of what we have called the ‘programme ontologies’ on which their achievement was based.

### 6.6 Explaining lack of achievement of MDGs

So, why has it been so difficult to progress the MDGs? In the following section we a number of criticisms and responses that have emerged to overcome the problems of progress.

#### 6.6.1 Feasibility

One line of criticism—or possibly comment—on the MDGs concerns their credibility, especially in terms of the feasibility and costs of their achievement. The most powerful critique has been mounted by Michael Clemens (Clemens, 2004; Clemens and Moss, 2005). The basic argument is that “…responsibility for the near-certain ‘failure’ lies (neither with African inaction nor a lack of aid) (but) with the goals themselves and unrealistic expectations placed on aid” (Clemens and Moss, 2005: 1). They suggest that nearly all African countries will miss the targets by a wide margin, but their argument is that this has to do with the unrealistic nature of the goals rather than with failures of political will on the part of either donors or recipients, or because of insufficient aid.

Clemens and Moss (2005) further argue that the target of UPE completion by 2015 is unrealistic, given that many countries are starting from such a low level that they must attain in about a decade what rich countries took nearly a century to complete, and they demonstrate that to achieve the goals would mean a rate of growth in primary enrolments that would far exceed any ever attained, including the ‘historical best’ rate of growth of enrolments, that of Korea.
Figure 6.1 Growth Goals Versus Performance

Each dot represents one country. Only a handful of countries on earth, in the best of circumstances, grew recently at the rate all of Sub-Saharan Africa would need to grow in order to halve poverty by 2015.

Includes all 153 countries for which the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2005 lists constant-price GDP.

Source: Clemens and Moss, 2005:1

Figure 6.2 Achievement of MDG 2 vs. Historical Performance of Education Systems

Source: Clemens and Moss, 2005:2
At the same time, Clemens and Moss (2005: 4) argue,

...many of the world’s poorest countries will in all likelihood make great progress in improving the quality of life of their people—and aid will almost certainly have played a part. It would be a shame if the MDGs, in trying to make the case that the world can and should help the world’s poor, wound up undermining the cause by over-reaching on the targets and over-selling on the efficacy of aid (2005: 4).

In a longer paper, Clemens (2004) situates the MDGs as the latest effort in an extended history—"roughly once every two decades since the Second World War"—of promises by international policymakers to achieve UPE within twenty years (these efforts are usefully documented in Appendix E.1.1 of Clemens’ paper on pp. 70-72). This generates questions for a study of globalisation and education that go some way beyond the immediate case of the MDGs and go to the heart of the relationship between globalisation, development and education.

6.6.2 The programme ontology of the MDGs

What becomes evident in looking at the programmes intended to promote universal access to education is that they have what we will refer to, following Pawson (2002), as identifiable programme ontologies. The meaning and value of ‘programme ontologies’ is given in the following brief account by Pawson:

According to this perspective it is not ‘programmes’ that work: rather it is the underlying reasons or resources that they offer subjects that generates change. Causation is also reckoned to be contingent. Whether the choices or capacities on offer in an initiative are acted upon depends on the nature of their subjects and the circumstances of the initiative…. The vital ingredients of programme ontology are thus its ‘generative mechanisms’ and its ‘contiguous context’. The causal power of an initiative lies in its underlying mechanism—namely its basic theory about how programme resources will influence the subject’s actions. Whether this mechanism is actually triggered depends on context—the characteristics of both the subjects and the programme locality. Programmes, especially over the course of a number of trials, will therefore have diverse impacts over a range of effects… What this tries to break is the lazy linguistic habit of basing evaluation on the question of whether ‘programmes work’. In fact, it is not programmes that work but the resources they offer to enable their subjects to make them work (Pawson, 2002: 342).

In applying this to the MDGs, we can say that the dominant approach to the achievement of the MDGs sees the construction of a new and coherent set of policy implementation instruments that take for granted and accept what may be called the hegemonic programme ontology of neo-classical economic development theory as the axis around which the success or failure of the MDG project revolves (see Sindzingre, 2004; Fine, 2001b; Booth, 2005). The problem of development remains framed ‘as one of individuals who are not well adopted to the demands of the market, and states that need to bear responsibility for development failures...[rather than as] an understanding of development focused on inequalities that require both national and global measures of redistribution’ (Mundy, 2006, 44-5; see also Therien (op cit) and Maxwell 2005, 4). These framings define what is considered as good policy, the basis and level of funding, the source and direction of political activity and the basis of accountability.

The generative mechanism in that programme ontology is that poverty—and all other social ills in the world—can be solved by trade and policies that foster free trade, while the contiguous context is held to be irrelevant, except where it is associated with ‘inefficiency’ in the allocation and implementation of aid. This is linked to another notable feature of the dominant paradigm, that the generative mechanism and the key means of its implementation have been very closely intertwined. This is to be expected if we recognize that the major institution for the implementation of policy ‘on the ground’ is the state (which is itself held in deep suspicion by the dominant paradigm—particularly around its alleged inefficiency in the implementation of aid programmes).

We see this very clearly in the case of the Washington Consensus and its associated implementation strategy, Structural Adjustment Programmes backed up by conditionality (and, a little later, the pressure for good governance – see Chapter 4), (see also example, Hermele, 2005) which effectively neuters the (still formally necessary) national state (see Jayasuriya, 2001).

However, the evident failure of the Washington Consensus, and its even greater unpopularity, meant that it was necessary for the World Bank and the IMF to come up with an alternative, which is what we see being constructed as a means of implementing the MDGs.

6.6.3 The EFA-Fast Track Initiative

In a sense, the Education For All-Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI) has become the main means of understanding, and responding to, the MDGs. It may be seen as the major instantiation of the new aid architecture in the area of education, and in particular of the implementation of the MDGs; despite its title, it is the MDGs, and not the EFI
Dakar agenda that it was set up to meet (Colclough, 2005, 105-6). Originally launched as the Fast-Track Initiative of the World Bank in 2002, the origins of the EFA-FTI were the Bank’s disappointment at the slow progress of the Dakar goals, and the sense that the risk of not achieving the EFA goals was much more serious than had earlier been believed (Bertrand, 2003: 21). It was also supported by the UN Development Committee and the G8, and had the blessing of the Global Campaign for Education.

EFA-FTI was seen, at least by UNESCO, as a global initiative, and not a global fund (Rose, 2003). It was seen by the World Bank as a ‘global partnership between donors and developing countries to ensure accelerated progress towards the MDG of UPE’ (World Bank 2004a, 4). It is seen as “…the first global initiative to operationalise the Monterrey Consensus, as a partnership between developing countries and the donor country, at both international and country levels” (ibid.: 5).

In its structure and operation, it is very much part of the World Bank, which happily took it on when UNESCO was seen to lack the capacity to implement it (ibid.). Its secretariat is provided by, and hosted by the World Bank (for a discussion of the pros and cons of this arrangement, see in particular Bose, 2004: 13, 24ff), and it has two co-chairs, one of whom is always the current president of the G8. However, it is suggested that there are different views among its stakeholders about priorities and strategies and these have been held partly accountable for one of the common criticisms of the initiative, that it is, ironically, too slow (ibid.: ii, viii).

The crucial objective of the FTI were “…building a new development compact for basic education; closing the finance gap for countries that implement the right reforms; creating clear incentives for country action; and coordinating donor efforts in alignment with country plans” (Global Campaign for Education, 2003: 1). It is built on mutual accountability, with donors transparently and predictably providing coordinated and increased financial and technical support, and developing countries agreeing to put primary education at the forefront of their domestic efforts and to develop sound national education plans (World Bank, 2004a).

To receive funding a country must also have a PRSP or equivalent. Those countries that lack the capacity to produce an education plan may be supported by two FTI Trust Funds—The Catalytic Fund and the Education Program Development Fund. FTI endorsement is intended to give recognition to country plans which are subject to assessment guidelines and a common indicative framework (based on analysis of successful EFA countries), including government spending on education (20% of budget, with 50% of that on primary education), resource mobilisation, student flows, number of teachers, teacher salary about 3.5 times per capita GDP, teacher-student ratios of about 40:1, and enrolment. FTI endorsement also signals to potential investors that the program is credible and sustainable (World Bank, 2004a), though it is anchored at the country level where the local education donors have the responsibility of supporting the development of a sound sector plan (World Bank, 2003), and the exact mix of policy actions will be country-specific (Bertrand, 2003: 22). This link to the PRSP has made the EFA-FTI vulnerable to the same kind of criticisms discussed above, around issues of local preferences, for instance. For instance, a study of its consequences in the case of Niger points to the consequences for the number of teachers, their conditions of employment, and their salaries, all of which deteriorated, with negative consequences for the quality of education. (Murphy, 2005)

The pilot phase of the FTI began with 18 countries; five larger countries were added later. By 2005, fourteen countries had had their education plans endorsed and were receiving support through the EFA-FTI. However, there is general agreement in the literature that though the initiative is recognised as “…a key coordinating mechanism for donor agencies, it has not resulted in a significant increase in aid” (UNESCO, 2006, Summary: 35; see also Global Campaign for Education 2003). For instance, only US$7.5 million of the US$98 million pledged has been disbursed from the Catalytic Fund, while the EPDF has attracted only US$6 million (ibid.: 121). Thus, despite its “…impressive potential…further progress has been blocked by rich countries’ failure to deliver the funds and political leadership need to make the FTI function effectively” (Global Campaign for Education, 2003: 1). In addition, a number of other criticisms have been made (see Bertrand 2003: 23):

- the concentration on one MDG (UPE) thus neglecting broader EFA agenda;
- only six of the chosen countries come from the group of those at highest risk;
- there is excessive emphasis on the speed and extent of domestic policy reform;
- the risks are ‘dominated by the concerns of a minority of the core partners rather than reflecting the consistent, coordinated, coherent work (UNESCO, 2003) sought by Dakar;
- concern is expressed about whether there is adequate recognition the limitations of poor quality data, the unpredictability of economic growth and unreliable population projections (ibid.);
- concern over the balance between equity and efficiency;
- concern about extent of country ownership and involvement of civil society;
- eligibility criteria may be oriented towards performance rather than needs;
- there is a shift in bilateral support away from rights and equity-related work;
- the programme is biased in favour of economic considerations at expense of UN rights-based approach;
- the World Bank is seen as keen to dominate field.

Nevertheless, many of the concerns noted above are being addressed and the model could serve to improve confidence between development partners (Bertrand 2003)

It will be useful to conclude this chapter with some possible consequences of the centrality of the EFA-FTI agenda and mechanisms for the discussions in the following chapters. At the heart of that agenda is the single focus on the
attainment of UPE by 2015. While we have already considered a number of reasons why this is unlikely to be achieved, it is not so much achieving the target as the consequences of the nature of the target that we address here. We might discuss those issues under the question of what futures it prepares students for.

First, it is worth noting that the main criterion for the achievement of a ‘phase-related’ target like ‘primary education’ is its duration, and this could be as brief as three years (see Murphy, op cit.: 364). This differentiates it from the ‘basic’ education specified at Jomtien, for instance, and raises questions about its potential suitability as a basis for secondary education. There is also concern that as presented in the MDG, it is not specified as a human right, with all that would entail in terms of governments’ legal commitments (see Tomasevski, 2005; for a more sanguine view see Colclough, 2005). Thus, one concern must be that the tight focus of the MDG may lead to what scholars (eg. Zuckerman, 2002) have referred to in the case of gender policies as ‘policy evaporation’, where policies that are assumed to be mainstreamed, rather than specified, simply fall off the agenda. We have also referred above, for instance in the case of Rwanda, to the way that the single focus on UPE can override local preferences and perceived needs. There may be an especial problem here, when all countries in the world are not only ‘being told’ that they are part of a global knowledge economy, but all seen as subject to, and comparable on, the same Knowledge Assessment Methodology developed by the World Bank (see Chapter 7). There does seem a possible tension here, between the exclusive focus on UPE and a simultaneous comparison of countries on a measure that assumes far greater levels of educational attainment. This leads to a real fear that countries in the EFA-FTI are in danger of being excluded from, or made subjects of, the kinds of knowledge that it is recognised is essential for participation in a global knowledge economy (see Murphy, op cit.). A further fear is that the educational level reached in primary education may be insufficient to support effective participation in higher levels of education (see, for example, World Development Report 2007 Overview). Finally, as we have emphasised elsewhere in this report, dealing separately with MDG 2 from all the other MDGs, except MDG3 both makes it more difficult to achieve and threatens the social cohesion, which is also becoming recognised as an increasingly significant ‘deliverable’ of education (see Chapter 9).

### 6.7 Conclusions

We might best summarise the relationship between the new development meta-narrative outlined by Maxwell and the specification and implementation of MDG2 by setting it against the critiques of the formulation of the Goal in the Task Force papers, and of the previous strategy employed in the pursuit of EFA.

This is firstly exemplified in Torres’ conclusions – that the Dakar response to the failure to achieve EFA by 2000 was to stay on the same ‘linear axis between more and less’ and in essence to assume that the failure would be overcome by more of everything—time, money, commitment, and action. Levine et al (2003) saw the goal as characterised by an imperfect link between rhetoric at the political level and the realities at the technical level. This meta-narrative certainly appears to recognize this problem and to make it central to the strategy. In a sense the PRSPs are designed precisely to strengthen that link, while all the other elements might be seen to reinforce it in various ways, for instance through the heavy emphasis on management. The question raised in some of the literature, and perhaps best summarized by Craig and Porter’s Uganda balance sheet, is whether the problem has been solved by strengthening the link, or it has been dissolved through making the political technical. Secondly, simplifying complex phenomena: This is perhaps most evident in approaches to solving the intrinsically difficult issue of enrolment, which in itself represents a simplification of the complex phenomenon of UPE. The target itself necessarily reduces the complexity of the phenomenon of UPE, but there seems to be little in the metanarrative that would do anything but welcome and reinforce such a narrowing and targeting. Third, being advanced with no effort at establishing its feasibility. This has been discussed above. Fourth, employing less than optimal indicators and as implying that one size will fit all. The question of the indicators is directly linked to the issue of what it is that they indicate. Most of the indicators within the components of the meta-narrative appear to be linked to process rather than product issues; that is to how fully countries might meet the requirements of the PSRP or FTI, rather than to elaborate the issue of enrolment. In terms of one size fitting all, the evidence seems to be that the meta-narrative reinforces this, is seen in the close similarity of the PSRPs of very different countries, or the application of the same management tools across the board. Finally, agreement by world leaders on a global stage does not guarantee commitment at home, where competing domestic agendas may intrude: This appears to be the case with both sets of world leaders, donors and recipients, as is clear from the results of both the FTI where donors are notably reluctant to be involved, and in and some of the PRSPs, where involvement did not extend far beyond the formal. One mechanism that does appear to have had some success here is MTEF, in alliance with PRSP, which does seem to have controlled competition between domestic agendas somewhat.

In terms of Torres’ (2001) more-less axis, the meta narrative does seem to offer some movement, though the issue of cost did remain central and acted as something of a distraction, as Clemens and Moss (2005) have demonstrated. PRSPs and FTI do not fall along the more-less axis and they do not address issues of ‘how much’ or ‘how many’. Rather, the question is simply ‘how’, or ‘how best’, and here we do see some continuity with pre-MDG development programmes, in so far as several of those we have quoted pointed out that the answers still draw on the same fundamental assumptions.

While (as we have seen in this report) the contents of the elements of the programmes may vary and the particular mixes between them change, the view that ‘sufficient cash + good policies + conditionality + political will’ are the
means to bring about either successful attainment of targets like the MDGs, EFA, or more limited goals for education in developing countries, has scarcely wavered or been challenged.
Chapter 7: The Knowledge-Based Economy and Lifelong Learning

7.1 Introduction

The idea that we live in an ‘information age’, that the new economy can be called ‘knowledge-based’, and that learning for workplace flexibility should now occur over the course of a lifetime, has emerged as a powerful discourse informing policy and programmes in the education sector. Essentially the argument is that with the advent of new digital technologies the rate of knowledge creation and dissemination has increased significantly (Chen and Dahlman, 2005). Knowledge economy discourses are also linked to pressures to competitiveness agendas and the expansion of post-primary education.

The World Bank has identified four pillars which they argue underpin knowledge-based economies: (i) information and infrastructures; (ii) economic incentive and institutional regime; (iii) innovation systems; and (iv) education and training for lifelong learning. These ideas are taken up in the World Bank’s policy-oriented reports on education (see for example the World Bank report Lifelong Learning for a Global Knowledge Economy) where they argue that knowledge based economies need to develop:

- a supportive economic and institutional regime which provides incentives for the efficient use of existing and new knowledge and the flourishing of entrepreneurship;
- an educated and skilled population to create, share and use knowledge;
- a dynamic information infrastructure to facilitate the effective communication, dissemination and processing of information; and
- an efficient innovation system of firms, research centres, universities, consultants, and other organisations to tap into the growing stock of global knowledge, assimilate and adapt it to local needs, and create new technology (World Bank 2003: 2).

Similarly, agencies such as the OECD, UNESCO and ECLAC, in a series of publications on the knowledge economy, emphasize the importance of technology, innovation, a nation’s research/development or ‘science’ institutions, and learning (cf. OECD, 1996b; 2001; Hilbert and Katz, 2003; UNESCO, 2005a) to maximise performance and facilitate well-being. As the UNESCO Report notes:

Today the concept of a knowledge society has become an essential framework of reflection not only for most member countries of the Organisation of Economic and Cooperative Development (OECD) but also for many emerging economies and developing countries, especially in East and Southeast Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, sub-Saharan Africa, Central and Eastern Europe and the Arab States (2005a: 21).

The four pillars outlined above will be used to structure a critical discussion of knowledge and learning in this chapter, in particular the way in which new divides (digital, opportunities for learning) are emerging between the developed and low-income economies. We conclude by focusing on two important issues: the excessive reliance on the economic and technological as solutions to development, and brain drain.

7.2 Locating the idea of knowledge-based economies

Current knowledge economy arguments borrow heavily from work developed by Daniel Bell (1973) in the 1970s around the transformation of industrial to post-industrial societies, and more recently by Manuel Castells (1996) and his network society thesis.

A core argument of this body of work is that knowledge is a new factor of production. This is contrasted with classical arguments which posit that land (natural resources), labour (human effort) and capital goods (machinery) were the three main factors of production. ‘Knowledge’ and information in these approaches approach is treated separately from labour.

As the sub-title of Bell’s The Coming of the Post-Industrial Age: A Venture in Social Forecasting, indicates, this work was rather speculative. Perhaps as a consequence, Bell’s thesis was greeted with considerable scepticism amongst the academic community (see Webster, 2002). Nonetheless, it received a great deal of attention amongst policymakers and the popular press.

There were several core propositions to Bell’s argument:

- all societies evolve, moving from pre-industrial to industrial to post industrial;
- in this evolutionary cycle, work moves from being muscle-based to mind-based;
- post industrial societies are more dependent upon ‘theoretical’ knowledge – or the knowledge of professionals, such as scientists, engineers, teachers, health workers; and
- post industrial societies generate greater degrees of wealth than industrial societies.
Understanding Bell’s conception of knowledge is important, for this view dominates much of the contemporary knowledge economy policymaking. Bell argues:

Knowledge is that which is objectively known, an intellectual property, attached to a name or group of names and certified by copyright, or some other form of social recognition (e.g. publication). This knowledge is paid for—in the time spent in writing and research; in the monetary compensation by the communication and educational media. It is subject to a judgement by the market, by administrative or political decisions of superiors, or by the peers as the worth of the result, and as to its claim on social resources, where such claims are made. In this sense, knowledge is part of the social overhead investment of society, it is a coherent statement, presented in a book, article, or even a computer program, written down or recorded at some point for transmission, and subject to some rough count (1973: 176).

Knowledge is defined as intellectual property (IP) that has commercial value. By patenting various kinds of knowledge, value can be realised, in turn creating economic growth.

The OECD was influenced by these debates, and during the 1970s adopted the idea of an ‘information society’ (Mattelart, 2003: 113). These developments can be better understood if set against the wider context of economic crisis at the time, in particular a declining share of manufactured goods in the developed economies, and the hope that new technologies might open the way for new forms of economic growth. During this period, the OECD enlisted the expertise of a range of economists concerned with mapping and measuring information, including Marc Uri Porat the Franco-American economist, who later produced a nine volume study of the definition and measurement of the information economy for the US government.

In 1996, Manuel Castells published his book The Network Society where he argued this was a more substantive and analytical representation of what was being called a post-industrial or information society. A network society is one where the key structures and activities of a society are organised around electronically processed information networks (Castells, 1999: 2) and technological innovations rapidly accelerate the pace of change. A network, Castells argues (1996; 1999), is the new organisational form emerging. It is a set of interconnected nodes enabling the flexible and rapid flow of goods, services, ideas and people throughout the network.

Castells argues that information now drives the new economy. Information also characterises the new mode of production – defined as informational capitalism. And, it is not just information and knowledge “…but the application of such knowledge and information to knowledge generation and information processing/communication devices, in a cumulative feedback loop between innovation and the uses of innovation” in the pursuit of profit.

...this is a brand of capitalism that is at the same time very old and fundamentally new. It is old because if appeals to relentless competition in the pursuit of profit and individual satisfaction (deferred or immediate) is its driving engine. But it is fundamentally new because it is tooled by new information and communication technologies that are the roots of new productivity sources, of new organizational forms, and of the formation of a global economy (Castells, 1996: 32).

While Castells pays considerable attention to technology, he also insists that ‘minds’ are the most important asset: “the human mind has always been, but more than ever now, the source of wealth, power and control over everything... ideas and talents are ultimately the source of productivity and competitiveness” (Castells, 2000: 3-4). Minds programme technologies rather than the other way round, and minds can make or lose money (Castells, 2000: 3-4). Information societies, as a result, value humans’ ‘minds’ or ‘brains’ as a key resource. These ideas are taken up in the World Bank reports when they argue, for instance that

A knowledge economy relies primarily on the use of ideas rather than physical abilities and on the application of technology rather than the transformation of raw materials or the exploitation of cheap labor. It is an economy in which knowledge is created, acquired, transmitted and used more effectively by individuals, enterprises, organizations and communities to promote economic and social development. …The knowledge economy is transforming the demands of the labor market in economies throughout the world. In industrial countries, where knowledge based industries are expanding rapidly, labor market demands are changing accordingly (World Bank, 2003: 1).

According to the World Bank (see Chen and Dahlman, 2005) and the OECD (1996b), the combined power of information technologies, networks and minds) should enable countries to leapfrog stages of economic growth by being able to modernize their production systems and increase competitiveness faster than in the past. If countries are excluded from developing new technological systems, “…their retardation becomes cumulative” (Castells, 1999: 3). In order to facilitate countries trying the make the transition to a knowledge-based economy, the World Bank has developed a Knowledge Assessment Methodology (KAM) centred on four main pillars as outlined below. The World Bank now deploys this instrument in countries in order to focus attention on sectors where new policy and investments need to be made. Given that our interest is with education, we focus specifically on the way in which these are mediated through education.
7.3 The four pillars of the knowledge economy

7.3.1 Pillar 1 - information and infrastructures

The first pillar of a knowledge economy refers to information technologies and infrastructures. Harnessing the 'potential' of ICT for learning is seen as a major challenge for governments around the world (Selwyn and Brown 2000; Scanlon and Buckingham 2003: 191).

International organisations, such as the OECD and the World Bank, have major programmes promoting digital technologies in education. According to the World Bank reports (2003), technology is the means for reaching more learners, as well as paving the way for the entry of a new range of private providers into the provision of learning, such as the large transnational firms and organisations, such as Cisco Learning Systems, Microsoft, Phoenix International. Most significantly, private providers are viewed as having the capability to transform education in low-income countries, while the role of the state is to ensure that “risk averse and “liquidity or wealth constrained learners and companies do not under-invest in learning” (ibid.: 78).

However, there are huge differences between the developed and low-income countries in their capacity to implement such changes. There are also differences among countries as to whether the initiatives will be supply or demand led; that is, whether they are top-down and state-led, or bottom-up and market driven.

Broadly, digital provision in education in the Western countries, such as the US and UK, has tended to be more market driven, whilst amongst the Asian economies, such as (for example, Singapore, Malaysia, Korea and Japan) provision tends to be top-down and state-led (Selwyn and Brown, 2003). This can be contrasted with the model being promoted by the World Bank, which is for the private sector to take the lead role.

The scale of investment required to launch digitally based learning in the education system can be appreciated by examining expenditures on technology in countries such as the UK, the USA, Singapore and Japan. In the UK, the National Grid for Learning (NGfL) initiative launched in 2000 committing £1 billion for the purposes of equipping schools with computers, teacher training, and the development of a portal. More recently, the British government has invested heavily in software and the development of curriculum materials.

Similarly, in the USA the Federal Government, under the Technology Literacy Challenge (1996), made available US$2 billion to provide each school with Internet access. This was followed by a series of other initiatives. Nonetheless, developments have been left to the market rather than the state.

Though slow in responding to the call for the digital revolution of schooling, more recently Germany has implemented a range of projects intended to develop the overall infrastructure for schools. There is considerable variation across regions because of the different governance arrangements.

Amongst the Asian economies, Singapore’s aim of becoming an ‘intelligent island’ has resulted in its IT vision integrating a range of sectors, including healthcare, education, leisure and tourism, manufacturing and retail. Singapore has also committed itself to making one quarter of the school curriculum experience technologically-oriented. Similarly, Malaysia has developed a 25 Year Plan to become a technologically-driven nation whilst its ‘Smart Schools’ initiative is intended to promote a radical shift in the way in which teaching and learning are delivered and experienced. Korea has lofty aspirations to become one of the world’s five largest telecommunications countries, although commentators observe that there has not been sufficient state investment in the education sector; instead parents are relied upon for investing funds (Selwyn and Brown 2003) making development much more uneven.

By way of contrast to the above, within the African region there continue to be major problems associated with the lack of investment infrastructure. Whilst most African universities have email connections, this is often restricted to staff and graduate students rather than being available to the student population as a whole. South Africa, along with Botswana, stand out amongst the African countries in terms of active policymaking and investment in digital infrastructure, however connectivity in schools and colleges is still low and there are generally no ICT budgets in schools (Naidoo and Schutte, 1999).

Nonetheless, interesting initiatives are being developed in countries like India to tackle fundamental problems, such as illiteracy, especially among adult learners using digital technologies (Dahlman and Utz, 2005: 9). For example, a computer-based functional literacy (CBFL) programme uses a mixture of methods including teaching software, multimedia presentations and printed material, to teach an uneducated person to read much quicker than conventional methods.

There are, then, huge differences between the developed and developing regions in investments in digital technologies for the education sector (for learning, research and administration). As the recent World Bank (2006b) report on ICT observed, while most developed nations have connected nearly all of their primary and secondary schools to the Internet, only 38% of developing countries have done so and for Africa, the figure is less than 1%. This is despite the huge investments that have been made since 1990.6

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6 Between 1990 and 2003, 122 of 154 developing countries received foreign investment in telecommunications, and annual FDI in telecommunications in developing countries has increased from US$2 billion in 1990 to US$35 billion (World Bank, 2006b).
This has resulted in a mounting literature on the highly uneven distribution of digital technologies globally, and the implications of this for development. In a UNESCO Report (2005a) on knowledge societies, this uneven access is put in stark terms (ibid.: 29).

- Only 11% of the world’s population have access to the Internet;
- 90% of the people connected come from the industrialised countries (30% North America, 30% Europe and 30% Asia Pacific);
- 2 billion people not linked to an electricity grid—a precondition for computer access;
- the cost of technology is very high for low-income countries;
- the digital content reflects the language and cultural priorities of the English speaking developed economies.

### Figure 7.1 Number of Internet Users in 2003 (per 10,000 inhabitants)

Source: UNESCO, 2005a: 32

### Figure 7.2 The Number of Personal Computers in 2002

Source: UNESCO, 2005a: 34

UNESCO (2005a) notes that though there has been a rapid escalation of access to technology in countries such as China, India, Brazil and the Russian Federation, in sub-Saharan Africa, the Arab States and the least developed countries, there has been slow progress except for among the elites (see Figures 7.1, 7.2). In summary:

- digital technologies are concentrated in the capital cities,
- the number of Internet Services Providers are small,
- bandwidth is narrow, and
- the numbers connected to the Internet remain low (Naidoo and Schutte, 1999: 91).
The costs of connectivity are still so high in many countries that it is not feasible to think of a connection in the home. For instance, in Bangladesh, the annual cost of connection to the Internet is sufficient to feed a working class family for a year.

In a report prepared for the UN Research Institute for Social Development, Castells addressed the problem of exclusion from the global economy. He notes:

It is urgently necessary to reverse the downward spiral of exclusion and to use information and communication technologies to empower humankind. The reintegration of social development and economic growth in the information age will require massive technological upgrading of countries, firms and households around the world, a strategy of the highest interest for everyone, including business. It will take a dramatic investment in overhauling the educational system everywhere. It will require the establishment of a worldwide network of science and technology, in which the most advanced universities will be willing to share knowledge and expertise for the common good. It must aim at reversing, slowly but surely, the marginalization of entire countries, or cities or neighborhoods, so that the human potential that is currently being wasted can be reinvested (Castells, 1999: iv).

Despite considerable optimism that digital technologies might reverse the spiral of exclusion, in his Report Castells identifies a number of trends associated with ‘informational capitalism’. These are:

- the extreme social unevenness of information driven capitalism, and the precarious nature of being linked in or excluded;
- education, science and technology become critical sources of value creation; in low-income economies, most education systems do not have the right capacity;
- new technologies eliminate agricultural based work, while the informal economy finds it difficult to absorb this level of displaced labour; and
- under conditions of free trade and limited state regulation, there is a tendency toward under-employment and exploitation of labour.

Castell’s argument is that digital technologies need to be geared toward wider questions of social development, rather than being a cost lowering formula for economic development that propels a race to the bottom (for example, labour displacing, low wages, new forms of exploitation):

Without social development, without institutional stability, there may still be a diffusion of economic development around the world, but it will be based upon a cost lowering formula, than a productivity-enhancing models. …If firms and countries compete on the basis if worsening the conditions of work, and concentrating as much as possible of the productivity bonanza in a few hands, they will kill off incentives for most workers to invest their own mental capital in a collective undertaking, they will slow down the learning curve, and they will restrict purchasing power and the drive toward innovation (Castells, 1999: 12).

Castells goes on:

The reintegration of social development and economic growth through technological innovation, information management and shared world development will not be accomplished by simply relying on unfettered market forces. Neither will it be born out of the individual efforts of states, engaging in defensive strategies. It will require massive technological upgrading of countries, firms and households around the world—a strategy of the highest interest for everyone, including business, and particularly for high technology companies. …It will take a dramatic investment in overhauling the educational system everywhere, through co-operation between national and local governments, international institutions and lending agencies, international and local business (ibid.).

Bridging the digital divide is a major priority for the international community. However, this will require the close cooperation of governments, international organisations, the private sector and civil society.

To this end, in 2000, the Davos World Economic Forum launched the Global Digital Divide initiative while in July 2001 the G8 adopted an action plan that specified the role of new technologies in development strategies and specifically how they might contribute to fighting poverty. UNESCO has also sponsored a major initiative concerned with the digital divide—the World Summit on the Information Society—with a major meeting in Tunis in November 2005. A stocktaking report was issued, however UNESCO is heavily dependent on member countries furthering the digital infrastructure agenda.

Low-income countries face major issues of financing. A draft World Bank Report Financing Information and Communication Infrastructure Needs in the Developing World: Public and Private Roles, (World Bank, 2005b) circulated in February 2005 emphasized the importance of combining public and private sector set of initiatives. The Report proposed strategies for governments to attract private sector investment, while the World Bank has prioritised support through instruments such as grants, loans, investments and advisory services.
Selwyn (2004: 342), among others, argues that more sophisticated ways of thinking about the digital divide are needed if we are to make progress on ensuring social equity and inclusion in the education sector. He challenges the narrow conception of ICT – as largely computers – when in fact a range of digital tools – such as mobile phones and other devices ought to be considered within this category. A narrow conception leads to “simple, formalistic and thus idealistic policymaking” (p.345) and is likely to produce ineffective policies. In reconsidering the divide, access to computers, as in the statistics presented above (computers per student), does not tell us how patterns of access are divided along social class, regional, ethnic or other lines as the result of the differential access to and deployment of social, economic and cultural capital. In other words, simply giving a person a computer, as in the proposed schemes to provide each child with a computer (as in the UN strategy), does not ensure that the computer will be used. Use will enable us to see who and how, but as well as the purposes to which this technology is put, along with what the consequences for individuals and groups are. There is nothing inevitable about computers in terms of opportunities to learn, capacities to learn and learning outcomes. Learning is likely to be influenced by the situational relevance of technology to the life of the individual.

7.3.2 Pillar 2 - economic and institutional regimes

The second pillar of the World Bank’s KAM refers to the economic and institutional regime (Chen and Dahlman, 2005: 8). Specifically, the Bank argues that the economic and institutional regime needs to provide economic agents with incentives to create and use knowledge efficiently, while the economy should be open to international trade and free from protectionist policies. There should also be systems of governance limit corruption and which promote property (including intellectual property) rights. In education this means opening up the governance of education to a new range of providers of learning (such as public private partnerships), including for profit firms such as Cisco Learning Systems, Microsoft, Phoenix International, as well as using the regulatory tools and service agreements of the World Trade Organization, and specifically TRIPS and GATS, to promote a more competitive and responsive education sector. Most significantly, private providers are viewed as having the capability to transform education in low-income countries, while the role of the state is to ensure that “risk averse and “liquidity or wealth constrained learners and companies do not under-invest in learning” (ibid.: 78).

7.3.3 Pillar 3 - knowledge and innovation systems

Since the mid-1990s, the OECD in particular has focused considerable attention on understanding the relationship between knowledge and innovation, and the national and institutional conditions for their development broadly referred to as National Systems of Innovation (NSI). More recently the World Bank have also approached the question of knowledge and innovation with their Knowledge Assessment Methodology (KAM) which they are using to determine where selected countries are on a set of indicators.

National systems of innovation (NSI)

While there are several strands to National Systems of Innovation (NSI) approaches (see McKelvey, 1991 for an elaboration and comparison of the main approaches), they share a common core of ideas that sees the explanation of differences between countries being based on endogenous factors rather than external constraints. NSI theory, whose focus is the idea of a learning economy, began from questioning how and why some countries were more productive and innovative than others. It is perhaps significant here that for some time, Japan was taken as a kind of model of a successful NSI.

The most significant element of the approach from our point of view is that relative success in innovation—and development— is not to be explained in terms of ‘technical’ issues, or levels of investment in R&D alone, but in terms of combinations and interactions of institutional and cultural factors that are nationally-specific and include national histories and traditions, and language.

The Aalborg group, whose leader, Bengt-Åke Lundvall, has been the leading figure in developing NSI theory and its rise to prominence (NSI became almost an ‘orthodoxy’ in the OECD7 and other influential agencies during the 1990s), stress how “…institutions understood as norms, habits and rules are deeply ingrained in society…and play a major role in determining how people relate to each other and how they learn and use their knowledge”.

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7 Though it is interesting to compare the OECD definition, with the larger broader conception of significant institutions given by Lundvall et al (2002). This may be associated with the OECD and, in a slightly different way, the EU) seeking to make NSI a mobilising concept to drive policy, to generalise the concept (for instance, through the construction of indicators; see OECD, 1994b, 1997; Godin, 2002) so as to construct a ‘model pathway’ (that may be far from some of the assumptions of modernisation theory); the absence from the definition of any reference to ‘social capital’ which shortly become the fashionable concept for international organisations such as the World Bank—and which, as Robertson shows in her paper, has recently been emphasised by Lundvall at an OECD conference—is particularly notable.
(Lundvall et al 2002: 220). They also stress the importance of more formal institutions, such as intellectual property rights, contract laws, and industrial relations systems.

One notable feature of the NSI literature is the emphasis it places on the importance of education and training. This is, however, for people interested in education systems and practices, a rather frustrating emphasis, since it is rarely, if ever, followed up as systematically as the other, more "obviously economic", elements of the approach. It is perhaps not so much a case of lip service being paid, but, as is often asserted (and regretted) in the literature, of the absence of work on education that addresses the questions of most concern to NSI. And when there are references to work on education, they tend to be to rather 'human capital' based approaches that do not sit easily with the NSI's institutionalist, as opposed to neo-classical, approach to economics. A recent statement by Lundvall illustrates this point:

So far, the studies of national systems of innovation have given too little emphasis to the sub-system related to human resource development. This includes the formal education and training, the labour market dynamics and the organization of knowledge creation and learning within firms and in networks. This sub-system will be confronted with very strong needs for social invention in the near future in all national systems and quite a lot of the national peculiarities of national systems are rooted in this sub-system (ibid.: 224).

Central to the system of innovation approach is the idea that interactive learning and innovation processes drive and form growth and development (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Edquist, 1997). Patterns of interaction and the production, distribution and use of knowledge are supported and formed by the institutional structure and knowledge infrastructure of the country (region) (Johnson and Segura-Bonilla, 2001: 5).

Crucial to the conception of innovation systems is the idea of the learning economy; this refers to a phase of economic development in which processes of technical, organisational and institutional learning have been built into the fabric of society’ (ibid.). Lundvall and Borras point out that they use the term ‘learning economy’ rather than the ‘knowledge-based economy’ (as for example stressed by OECD), since the key to modern success is not so much as to have access to a stock of specialised knowledge, as to be able to learn rapidly and then forget when older ways of doing things get in the way of newer ways’ (Lundvall and Borras, 1999). As Lundvall and Soete (2002) put it:

In national education systems people learn specific ways to learn. In labour markets they experience nation specific incentive systems and norms that will have an impact on how and what they learn.  

This approach has been extended from its Danish origins and applied to the rest of the world, to focus on the globalising learning economy (Lundvall and Borras, 1999) largely through the Globelics initiative (see Lundvall and Soete, 2002). When applied in the South, the focus should be

- not so much on research and development but on everyday activities within firms and in the competences and capabilities of ordinary people;
- on development more widely conceived than macro economic growth because that would give limited insights on the growth potential of low-income countries;
- on Innovation Systems as constituted by ‘a common knowledge base embedded in local institutions and embodied in people living and working in the region’ (ibid.: 2);
- learning capabilities and innovation processes and their role in development; and
- all aspects of competence building in all types of socio economic activities (distilled from Johnson and Segura-Bonilla, 2001)

Recently, attempts have been made to apply the fundamental NSI concept to problems of development (see for instance Johnson et al, 2003; Arocena and Sutz, 2000a; Muchie et al, 2003). It "...places the focus on innovation and learning processes, (thus...distinguish(ing) itself from other approaches where technological change and other innovations are regarded as exogenous” (Johnson et al, 2003: 5).

Johnson et al (2003) identify three recent trends in development thinking which might fruitfully be integrated in the NSI approach. These are the ‘capability’ approach, the World Bank’s focus on knowledge, and the tendency to see institutions as the root causes of development. However, these still provide narrow economistic views on economic development and what is needed to broaden and enrich them is a focus on learning and innovation (ibid.: 10).

What this means for developing countries is elaborated in a series of papers by Arocena and Sutz (2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005). At the centre of their argument is that “...without learning capabilities it is impossible to forge ahead in a knowledge-based and innovation driven economy” (2004: 8), but that opportunities to develop learning capabilities are extremely unequally distributed, to the point where they suggest that the ‘learning divide’ is one of the most important dimensions of distinction between rich and low-income countries.

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8 See http://www.globelics.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=Sections&file=index&req=printpage&artid=1. Last accessed on the 14/08/06.
As they put it: “Innovation today is deeply rooted in ‘knowledge-demanding’ activities, both on the producers’ side and the users’ side (and)...to become and stay a player it is necessary to participate in knowledge demanding activities where learning capabilities are crucial” (2000a: 4).

Knowledge demanding activities include things like R&D, formal and informal training, keeping up-dated with the most relevant information, and engaging with different types of people in solving problems - this view is consistent with that of Castell’s outlined above. They go on:

In some societies, a fair proportion of the population and of the social and economic organisations permanently perform knowledge demanding activities where many actors need to and are able to upgrade their skills. Those societies can be named learning societies but in the ‘South’, most nations are not evolving towards learning societies ... A new divide then establishes itself between nations, a ‘learning divide’ that is partly built... in the world expansion of the knowledge-based and innovation-driven economies (Arocena and Sutz, 2000a: 5, 6).

What is needed, they suggest, is ‘bottom up’ approaches and “…creating situations in which actors have the opportunity to strengthen their capacities to learn while interacting in the search for a solution to a given problem’ opportunities that they refer to as ‘interactive learning spaces” (Arocena and Sutz 2000a: 7).

The NSI approach has also been applied to Africa (Muchie et al, 2003), where a major theme is the value to be gained from organising at a regional level where NSIs could ‘become an integrated element in the current trend by Africans to accelerate the African Union and NEPAD initiatives’ (Machine et al, 2003: 9). The book is largely made up of country studies of how the concept might be applied.

**Technology and capacity**

Coming from a similar theoretical position as Lundvall’s work on national systems of innovation, Fagerberg et al (2004) examine the conditions of low-income countries using knowledge to ‘catch up’.

They argue that the two crucial conditions of catch up are ‘institutional instruments’ and ‘organizational innovation’ that might include, but are no means confined to, education. These are based on the assumption that there are 2 forms of contribution of knowledge to growth, ‘the capacity to generate new knowledge and the capacity to exploit it commercially’; the former of these they refer to as technological competitiveness, which refers to the ability to create new goods and services (for example, to innovate), and the latter as capacity competitiveness, where they focus on three dimensions; (i) investments in human capital (especially as indicated through gross enrolment rates in secondary and tertiary education), (ii) efforts directed towards diffusion of technology (for example, ICT) and (iii) relevant policy-aspects (for example, governance and human rights).

Fagerberg et al (2004) plot low-income countries on these two dimensions (see Figure 7.3; 7.4, 7.5). Figure 7.3 plots the level and trend in technology competitiveness in selected countries. As a general rule, countries either move ahead of the others or fall further behind (with only a few staying in the middle). Those falling further behind include most of the former centrally planned economies and the low-income countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Figure 7.4 plots the level and trend of capacity competitiveness against each other showing that many developed countries, joined by the new EU member countries and the Asian tigers, have high and growing capacity for exploiting new technology. This contrasts with the position of the countries that belonged to the former Soviet Union and for most low-income countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

What are the crucial factors behind these developments? To better deal with this question we illustrate in Figure 7.3 the factors behind the observed changes over time in technology and capacity competitiveness. The differences across country groups are striking. As for technology competitiveness, there is a clear divide between the advanced countries, with healthy and continuing increases, and the rest of the world, which are stagnant at best, with a partial exception for East Asia. The Asian tigers stand out with the best performance. A divide of a different sort is clearly visible along the capacity dimension. In this case there actually is some catch up along one dimension, human capital, particularly by the new EU members, but also for many other low-income countries. This, however, is more than counteracted by an increasing digital divide (ICT infrastructure), caused by much faster diffusion of computers in the already developed economies and among the Asian tigers than elsewhere.
Figure 7.3 Technology Competitiveness*

Source: Fagerberg et al, 2004
* dashed horizontal and vertical lines indicate sample averages

Figure 7.4 Capacity Competitiveness*

Source: Fagerberg et al, 2004
* dashed horizontal and vertical lines indicate sample averages

…there is no unique way to successful catch-up. All countries must find their own way ‘based on an understanding of (a) contemporary global technological, institutional and economic dynamics, (b) the behaviour (and needs) of the relevant agents (of which the firm arguably is the most important) and (c) the specific context in which the catch-up takes place and the broader factors that influence it’…not every country is equally well equipped with the capabilities necessary to pursue (the Asian Tigers) strategy and investing in education may be a good place to start for countries that have not succeeded in catering for those needs already. But this will hardly be sufficient… they will need to overcome the increasing digital divide as productivity and income per capita increases, and the gap vis-à-vis the frontier countries becomes smaller, the requirements for continuing success become more stringent.

Again, this work reinforces the close connection now between technology and learning, but that each, alone, is not sufficient. To catch up, low-income countries will need to have access to both opportunities for learning and for the take-up of technologies. Given what we have seen above the growing divide between low and high income countries, then ‘catching up’ is becoming harder rather than easier. For some observers, this places even more importance on the need to develop systematic strategies for the management of knowledge for low-income countries if they are to change their situation in the world economy.

### 7.3.4 Pillar 4 - knowledge, skills and lifelong learning

The fourth and final pillar refers to the need to have a well-educated and skilled population to create, acquire, disseminate and utilise relevant knowledge for productive economic growth. Knowledge economies (see Chen and Dahlman 2005; Dahlman and Utz 2005), depend on the establishment of technical secondary-level education, higher education in engineering and scientific areas and in higher-level teaching and research.
Both the World Bank and the OECD argue that a country’s human capital is identified as an essential ingredient for achieving growth. They cite the work of Barro (1991) along with Cohen and Soto (2001) to support their argument, that school enrolment rates had statistically significant effects on growth of per capita real GDP, a while average years of schooling is statistically significant in being positively correlated with effects of education on economic growth.

Running parallel with arguments for investing in education is the idea of ‘lifelong learning’. In reviewing the central assumptions underpinning lifelong learning, Frank Coffield (1999: 480) points out that a nation’s competitiveness in global markets is regarded as depending on the skills of all of its people; the new economic forces of globalisation and technology require constant skill upgrading, and individuals are expected to renew their skills regularly in order to ensure their employability. In the Foreword to Lifelong Learning for the Global Knowledge Economy (LLLGKE) the World Bank states:

Lifelong learning is becoming a necessity in many countries. It is more than just education and training beyond formal schooling. A lifelong learning framework encompasses learning throughout the lifecycle, form early childhood to retirement, and in different learning environments, formal, non-formal and informal. Opportunities for learning throughout one’s lifetime are becoming increasingly critical for countries to be competitive in the global knowledge economy (World Bank, 2003: 1)

According to LLLGKE, the emergence of knowledge-based economies has far reaching implications for education and training (ibid.: 2) as

- Knowledge becomes obsolete very quickly: education systems must teach pupils lifelong learning skills – that is learning to learn, through doing, with educators as a guide rather than a source of knowledge (see Table 7.2).
- Education is inadequate in low-income countries; coverage is insufficient, access is inequitable, and the quality of education is poor. Children must compete basic education and while adults need to improve their literacy rates. Performances must be improved on international tests.
- Opportunities for learning must be expanded. The Report notes the increased number of enrolments in higher education in countries like China and Brazil and that this expansion has been enabled by opening education to the private sector – to complement traditional providers. The Report states that the public sector can no longer be the sole provider of education.
- Teacher training needs changing. Teachers also need to become lifelong learners, updating their knowledge and changing their pedagogical relationship with pupils.
- ICTs can facilitate learning by doing as well as extending access to pupils and teachers through distance learning. Digital technologies are not only a means for distributing knowledge but they “change the role of the teacher” (ibid.: 36). The Internet is viewed as an alternative provider of knowledge, able to replace poorly qualified teachers (ibid.: 36).
- Governments need to coordinate their activities better at multiple scales in order to ensure resources are more effectively used.
- Quality assurance systems must be set up to monitor learning. This information can then be used to determine the adequacy of provision and to ensure standards.
- Creating a system of lifelong learning is dependent upon increasing levels of expenditure. This can come from the private sector as well as from households in terms of fees and loans, especially for upper secondary and tertiary education.

As Table 7.2 taken from the report highlights, current forms of learning (referred to as ‘traditional learning’) are presented as problematic. A new model of education and training is proposed replacing

…the information based, teacher directed rote learning provided within a formal education system governed by directives with a new type of learning that emphasizes creating, applying, analyzing and synthesizing knowledge and engaging in collaborative learning throughout the lifespan (2003: 36)

Despite lifelong learning being a very strong policy emphasis in national competitiveness agendas, research by Gorard (2002) in the UK, for example, shows that expansion in overall numbers involved in education tends to concentrate on initial and continuing post compulsory education. If one were to look at ‘later learning’ – by which Gorard means episodes of education and training taken after the break from continuous education and training following school leaving age – these are getting worse and are more unevenly distributed over time (p. 126). This leads to a contradiction in that though adults are targeted in the lifelong learning discourse, levels of participation are reducing rather than increasing.

The most pressing learning issue for low-income countries is not so much lifelong learning, but opportunities for learning at all. In other words, expanding levels of enrolment and dealing with issues of quality in upper primary and secondary schools. “It is estimated that in 2003, one in every five children between the ages of 6 and 11 in developing countries—an estimated 113 million children—is not in school” (World Bank 2003: 74). Of this group, 40 percent come from sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 40 percent from South Asia and around 15 percent come from the Middle East and North Africa. Of this group, 60 percent are girls. Setting target for secondary education
would require huge increases in the expenditure of education as well as exploring ways in which the overall costs of education might be reduced (it is pertinent to note that teachers’ salaries make up a significant component of the overall cost of education).

### Table 7.1 Characteristics of Traditional and Lifelong Learning Models

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<tr>
<th>Traditional Learning</th>
<th>Lifelong Learning</th>
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<tr>
<td>The teacher is the source of knowledge</td>
<td>Educators are guides to sources of knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learner receive knowledge from the teacher</td>
<td>People learn by doing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learners work by themselves</td>
<td>People learn in groups and from one another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All learners do the same thing</td>
<td>Assessment is used to guide learning strategies and identify pathways for future learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tests are given to prevent progress until students have completely mastered a set of skills and to ration further learning</td>
<td>Educators develop individualized learning plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers receive initial training plus ad hoc in service training</td>
<td>Educators are lifelong learners. Initial training and ongoing professional development are linked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Good’ learners are identified as permitted to continue their education</td>
<td>People have access to learning opportunities over a lifetime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source World Bank, 2003: 29

The magnitude of the funding problem can be seen from the following figures. To achieve universal primary completion by 2015 would require a 7-fold increase in funding in SSA countries. 60 percent gross enrolment in secondary schooling would absorb 4 per cent of GDP, while 100 percent would require spending of more than 6 percent of GDP (see Lewin and Caillods, 2001 report to UNESCO). This far exceeds the levels of economic growth in these regions. If quality were factored into the equation (such as professional development, teaching resources, and so on), this would increase the cost even further. Secondary education for a digitally rich global knowledge economy presents even further challenges. As the World Bank (2003) notes, the cost of computers, laboratories, Internet connections and so forth (the sort of infrastructure that is increasingly being taken for granted in secondary schools in the developed economies) is priced internationally rather than locally, creating even further hurdles. Nevertheless, and despite the huge impediments, most countries are now moving to basic secondary education (nine years) and are determined to expand upwards. The Bank’s solution here is to argue for demand-side driven initiatives, such as targeted vouchers, and other subsidisation and cost recovery mechanisms. Rather than exploring ways of supporting public-funded education, the Bank’s policy stance has largely been to open up the education sector to multiple players in the field - learners, families, providers, employers, the state, with a range of new providers, many specialising in IT, such as private sector trainers, virtual institutions, content brokers, media companies, education publishers to complement and challenge traditional institutions. There are changes in the World Bank’s approach, however. While concerned with cost recovery, the Bank nonetheless also accepts the need for some public investment in order to secure growth and equity of opportunity.

#### 7.4 Issues

Two important questions emerge from the focus on knowledge for the economy which we address below: the implications for societies of the narrow framing of knowledge in knowledge economy policies, and the question of whether greater competition over knowledge leads to drain or brain gain.
7.4.1 Knowledge economy or knowledge society?

The UN (2005b) and UNESCO (2005a) reports take issue with the technological determinism of the information society narrative and narrow economism of the knowledge economy discourses. The UNESCO report insists on valuing of all kinds of knowledge rather than only the kind of knowledge that has scientific and commercial value (UNESCO, 2005a: 18). Table 7.2 below compares the different knowledge economy discourses and locates the knowledge society assumptions that are being promoted by UNESCO and the UN.

In Toward Knowledge Societies (2005a) UNESCO outline what knowledge societies are not. They are not simply societies with high indices of new technologies. Nor are they societies where one model of knowledge dominates, or where there is only one way of knowing. Rather, a knowledge society

- has a much broader engagement with the social and political dimensions of lives, as well as with cultural and linguistic diversity;
- are made up of a plurality of societies;
- integrates all of its members and promotes solidarity;
- protects human rights – such as the right to an education, the right to freedom of speech (UNESCO, 2005a: 17).

The Report is critical of conceptions of information as a commodity and the idea of ‘useful knowledge’, and it points to the excessive focus on information as evidence of the spread of knowledge economy models. “Useful knowledge is not simply knowledge that can be immediately turned into profit in a knowledge economy” (UNESCO 2005a: 19). The report is also critical of developments in the traditional knowledge production sector, especially higher education, as a result of the development of economic competitiveness strategies by governments and institutions. The Report states (as examined in detail in Chapter 8) that this has resulted in significant changes in national higher education and scientific research policies, and altered the very definition of the goals of education. The UNESCO Report (2005a) goes on to note:

Knowledge cannot be considered an ordinary saleable commodity. The current trend toward the privatisation of higher education systems and their internationalisation deserves attention from policymakers and should be examined in the framework of the public debate at the national, regional and international levels. Knowledge is a common good (ibid.: 23).

Similarly, the UN (2005b) Report Understanding Knowledge Societies is critical of the preoccupation with knowledge for the development of markets that, it argues, are likely to produce a ‘warped knowledge society’ (ibid.: vii; 102). It is also critical of the view that new digital technologies will drive development (ibid.: 18), arguing that most of the people in the world need older technologies, like books, school text books, and teachers before they need computers and Internet connections.

| Table 7.2: Comparing Knowledge Economy 1 and 2 with Knowledge Society Discourses |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| **Society** | industrial | post-industrial | cosmopolitan |
| **Economic development** | physical capital | human capital | human development |
| **Economy society relation** | society dominated by economy | society absorbed by economy; use social networks | economy mediated by society |
| **Labour** | manual labour | mental labour | labouring as embodied social process |
| **Knowledge** | physical skills | theoretical knowledge | knowledges |
| **Tools** | machines | digital | diverse cultural tools |
| **Knowledge production system** | ‘education’ | ‘knowledge’, ideas and innovation | teaching and learning as a dialogic process |
| **Pedagogy** | schooling | lifelong learning | learning for life |
A ‘smart knowledge society’ assures the economic and social development of its people through the transformation of existing institutional structures and processes aimed at developing a well-informed citizenry able to question and make judgments about claims about progress (ibid.: 7) for themselves rather than depend on those made by a small self-interested economic elite (ibid.: 11). A ‘smart knowledge society’ is dependent upon the prioritisation of a new moral code (ibid.: 109); co-existence and mutuality, along with the ‘to do’ knowledge oriented toward creative production of goods and services for the market in ways that do not undermine the environment and human life (see Table 7.2).

### 7.4.2 Brain drain or brain gain?

Developing, recruiting, attracting, or retaining highly skilled workers from different parts of the world in order to develop a competitive economic advantage has led to a renewed concern with ‘brain drain’. This term, popularised in the 1950s with reference to migration to the United States has, in the past ten years, become a controversial political and economic issue. Its importance derives from the view that politicians and policymakers that brains are the basis for a competitive edge in the so called ‘the new knowledge economy’ leading to a race between countries to attract the best brains from around the world in order to generate the ideas that will in turn lead to innovations, patents and profits.

The question facing policymakers, industry leaders and universities, is how to attract and keep these individuals in particular locations – which is what makes this a particularly political matter - as they are clearly moving from somewhere. Much of the concern, then, is with the movement of the talented and highly skilled from those countries that can least afford to lose them, such as many of the sub-Saharan African countries, to countries like the United Kingdom, the United States of America, France and Germany, who seem to act like a magnet by offering better conditions for work and study. This seems particularly unfair if the sending country has invested heavily in the education and training of these students and skilled workers, only to lose them to another country. At the same time, some observers point out that this view fails to take account of the remittances that are often sent back to the home country, in some cases making up a very large proportion of national GDP.

The issue is controversial in that opinion is quite sharply divided as to exactly what is going on, and how best to assess it. This division can be seen in the different views on the implications of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) General Agreement on Trade in Services Agreement (GATS), specifically the issue of what is referred to as Mode 4 or ‘presence of natural persons’ in education. What this means is that countries committing their education sectors are being asked to remove any barriers to the free movement of students and academic staff. Low-income countries regard Mode 4 as potentially useful in that mobile labour might also bring the benefit of remittances. However, the evidence suggests that “transfers from educated migrants are not necessarily higher than for uneducated migrants; the former have higher earnings potentials but migrate on a more permanent basis (with family) and hence tend to remit relatively less than their unskilled compatriots” (Rapaport, 2002: 2). Added to this, given the private nature of remittances, there is evidence that remittances are not useful to the macro economy and they also push up prices and reduce parity. There is doubt, then as to whether remittances can ultimately relieve poverty and income gaps on a macro-economic level (Tanner, 2005: 5).

Since the 1980s’s there has not only been a tremendous increase in the mobility of students and highly skilled labour. According to a recent United Nations report, the total number of international immigrants (that is those residing in a country other than where they were born), was 175 million in 2000, or about 3% of the world’s population (UN, 2002). This is twice as large as it was in 1970.

Less than a generation later the US Census of 1990 revealed that there were more than 2.5 million highly educated immigrants from low-income countries residing in the United States alone, excluding students (Rapoport, 2002). Most importantly, global migration is predominantly the migration of educated labour in the low-income countries to the developed (OECD SOPEMI, 2002) with 88% of immigrants to the OECD countries having a minimum of secondary education. By comparison, notes Tanner (op. Cit: 2), asylum-related migration is only 9% of the 175 million and decreasing.

The size of the problem can be seen from the following figures from the Institute for Public Policy Research quoted by Tanner (2005: 3) – where 40% of tertiary educated adults from Turkey and Morocco, and nearly one third from Ghana, have emigrated to OECD countries, while over half of the tertiary educated Jamaicans and Haitians live in the United States. The issue is particularly acute for Africa; Stalker (1994) estimates that between 1960 and 1987 Africa had lost 30% of its skilled professions.

The reasons for the increased movement are also largely economic, spurred on by the dynamics of globalisation. Foreign fee-paying students, for instance, are now a significant source of revenue for higher education institutions, while those who specialise in areas such as science, engineering and technology, are also valued for their potential contribution to the development of new ideas, innovations and patents. These individuals are the ‘stars’ or knowledge entrepreneurs who are sought by the leading global and regional research-intensive universities, research centres and firms.
Foreign students, largely from Asia, are also a significant economic resource for the US economy. Indeed, the USA is dependent on highly skilled science and engineering capacity mostly from countries such as India and China. A large number are enrolled particularly in the science and technology areas. More importantly, these students tend to remain in, or return to, the USA following their studies. Chalamwong (2004: 6) reports figures for the year 2002 where, of the 646,000 foreign students studying in universities in the United States on student visas, more than half were from Asia. However, supplying countries—such as China—have become particularly concerned with the effect of this brain drain. There is good reason for the Chinese concern. Chalamwong (2004: 17) notes that over a 10-year period, less than 50 percent of Chinese students studying abroad returned to China. As a result, the Chinese government has sought to stem the outflow of students. In response, the Chinese government has also looked at ways of expanding its own higher education provision to meet the high level of demand for education domestically.

Countries, regions and cities are now developing strategies for attracting the best talent, or seeking to lure talent back. Malaysia, for instance, has a national strategy for bringing ‘home’ Malaysian scientists, while the European Commission has developed a series of instruments – such as Marie Curie resettlement packages or Erasmus Mundus launched in 2004 – intended to develop Europe as the most favoured destination for study abroad for scholars from around the world. The competition is perceived to be the United States.

Other initiatives promoted by the EC (though initiated by the European Universities Association) have included the development of newer higher education degree architecture amongst Member States in order to become a more attractive, responsive and less complicated system that in turn would become the basis for a competitive Europe. The movement of talent and skills from one place to the other is not limited to the higher education sector. Particular categories of skilled labour – such as teachers, doctors and nurses from countries such as South Africa – have been prominent (Adepoju, 2004) and also controversial because of the devastating effects of HIV/AIDS, undermining an already stressed services such as education and health.

The issue here, it seems, is whether highly skilled labour are likely to return after a period of time in the host country, hence contributing not to the idea of draining the intellectual elite form a country but enabling the circulation of ideas and expertise. However, as some observers note, the policies of countries such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand are oriented toward positive integration (for instance through family settlement), making it more unlikely that this group of emigrant labour return to their home countries (Tanner, 2005).

7.8 Conclusions

Research on the knowledge economy and lifelong learning, particularly as it applies to low-income countries, tends to be prescriptive and normative rather than analytical. Worse than this, while on the one hand the developing countries are being encouraged to think about their education sectors in ways that might enable them to be more globally competitive, on the other hand there is very little sense of what this means in terms of the kinds of knowledge and skills for industries that might contribute to economic growth. What is evident, however, is that for low-income countries to generate an adequate platform for development, there needs to be a significant amount of funding directed to the development, not only of basic education, but to upper secondary and the tertiary sectors where the basis for research and development might be nurtured. This will require investments in these sectors of education, as well as inducements for those working in these sectors to continue to work there in the face of encouragement to pursue opportunities in the north. To what extent, then, might digital technologies be deployed to overcome problems of access to learning and quality learning environments and experiences? The question of access is central. It is now a new divide between the metaphoric north and the south; a divide that turns on technology, knowledge, opportunities for learning and power. In sum, it might be concluded that both technology and access to quality education might well be becoming an even further divide, made more problematic by the way in which knowledge itself is being commodified potentially a higher transaction cost for low income countries.
Chapter 8: Trade in Education Services

8.1 Introduction

Education has emerged as a maturing sector for trade since the early 1990s, with a number of the key developed economies now receiving significant export revenues from trade across all sectors of education, though predominantly higher education. Paralleling this development has been the emergence of the World Trade Organisation in 1995, with the specific mandate to promote free trade, and to regulate global trade. The innovative feature of the World Trade Organisation’s mandate has been to bring not only the goods but also the services sectors within the ambit of the global trading regime.

This move has been particularly controversial, as service areas like education have been regarded as an important ‘public’ service and ‘public infrastructure’ and an important development space for national economies. This development has important implications for low-income countries, not the least being that they may well lose control over their education sectors as a result of the positions within the structure of global negotiations. Thus, while much of the story in this chapter is about middle and high-income countries and the economy value to be gained from trading in education services, this story is incomplete unless we see that one of the targets are lower income countries with limited capacity to provide education, or who have a solvent middle class willing to pay significant fees to gain an education in a high status ‘northern’ institution.

In this chapter we will consider the literature that examines why the services sectors have been targeted by key interests in the high income countries, and what the implications are for both access to and the governance of education in low income countries. To do this we focus particularly on the strategies pursued by the high-income countries in trying to mediate the consequences of de-industrialisation in the 1970s, namely the development of the services as opposed to the goods sectors.

8.2 Changing international economy

By the mid-1970s, trade in services was becoming a major component of international trade and accounted for an increasing proportion of international investment. Marchak (1991) argues that the internationalisation of manufacturing firms that took place throughout the 1960s and 70s was a precondition for the growth of the international services sector. Thus, when US manufacturing went global, the export of services also expanded. However, by 1984, the US’s share of trade in services had not only levelled off but declined as new competitors entered the arena—including local suppliers—who were better able to provide services locally to transnational firms. Marchak (1991: 86) observes that though the advent of telematics was able to reduce the tyranny of distance, many of such services, such as banking or insurance, were best located near the consumer. However, accessing the services sectors of other economies presented transnational firms with huge problems as they were protected by domestic regulations. These impediments significantly inhibited the expansion of service firms globally. Barriers included regulations on investment, establishment, foreign exchange, insurance, shipping, employment and so on (Marchak 1991: 84).

In order to respond to the challenges presented by these barriers, various service coalitions were formed, such as the US based Coalition of Service Industries (CSI) (1982), to lobby for change. The CSI, for instance, was dedicated to pressuring the US government7 to negotiate for the reduction of barriers to US services exports. It also used its lobbying capacity to shape trade negotiations taking place under the GATT, to include services and not just goods. Getting rid of domestic regulations, the CSI argued, would enable service firms to expand globally and enhance the global competitiveness of its members.10

8.2.1 Estimating the size of the services market

Trade in services is estimated to be one of the most dynamic growth sectors. Based upon current WTO trade figures, trade in services accounts for 20% of global trade and 60-70% of GDP in the advanced OECD countries (Hartmann and Scherrer, 2003: 5). 75% of the trade in services is located in the industrial OECD countries, especially the US, Canada, EU (the biggest exporter, largely composed of the UK, France, Germany) and Japan, while the remaining 25% is shared by Hong Kong, China, South Korea, Singapore and India (ibid). At present, while most of the services trade is in transport and tourism, observers note that this could change if domestic regulations in service areas like education, health, insurance and banking were to be lifted.

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9 For instance, it advises US government agencies such as USTR, Treasury and the Commerce Department through regular briefings and consultations. It also seeks to educate members of Congress and staff on important developments affecting US services trade and engage key officials in international organizations and other governments to promote positions beneficial to member companies.

10 See (http://www.uscsi.org/about) last accessed on 14/08/06
If it were possible to quantify the global value of education, industry analysts estimate it to be huge, with expenditures on education generally (that is public and private) upward of US$2 trillion (Oxfam, 2002), while expenditure on public education specifically is estimated to be around US$1386.8 billion (Fredriksen, 2003). Heyneman (2001) also gives us some clue as to what the education marketplace might include; for example, technology services, books, testing services, patents, the provision of schools and universities (see Heyneman, 2001). However, access to national education systems is not a straightforward matter. This is largely because until the early 1980s education continued to be regarded by national states as a public service.

8.2.2 Nationally driven global education markets

In a number of countries, significant changes have taken place in the organisation of the education sectors. For instance, between 1980-82, the Thatcher government created a full-fee-based regime in international education in the UK to generate export revenue, while local students were encouraged to regard themselves as customers and choosers of education services. In Australia and New Zealand, following a period of significant public sector restructuring throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, both governments set about aligning themselves with the ‘Asian’ region (Ziguras et al, 2003; Dale and Robertson, 1997: 212) with a specific eye to the ‘internationalization’ of higher education and the provision of English language in locally-organised English Language Schools. Not only were huge numbers of full-fee-paying students (particularly from Asia) recruited into (largely business) programmes offered in UK, New Zealand, and Australian universities (Ziguras et al, 2003: 360), but many of these universities set up off-shore operations around the Asian region and beyond. The result was a spectacular increase in the volume of student movement from the Asian region as a result of supportive government policy, very entrepreneurial higher education institutions, an expanding middle class that valued such education, and the demand for English (Marginson, 2004: 138).

For many education institutions, the foreign fee-paying market is a highly lucrative one. It is also a highly profitable business for a national economy. The Australian Bureau of Statistics figures show, for instance that in 2002 education service exports grew by 2.9%, while education has remained the third largest export services earner, bringing in AU$4.1 billion each year (behind tourism AU$9.3 billion) and transportation (AU$7.6 billion). Currently it is Australia’s 14th largest export earner and one of the most aggressive in developing its education export industry. Indeed, despite or because of its location “…Australia has grown in trade in education services faster than any OECD country, and has one of the world’s highest proportion of overseas students in education, second only to Switzerland” (Ziguras et al, 2003: 360).

Figures for the UK tell a similar story. By 2004 there were around 270,000 students studying in UK universities (both off-shore and in the UK), paying around GB£1.5bn in fees and contributing to GB£3bn to the economy. With such a significant investment in and dependence upon the ‘education export market’, there is also a concern expressed in the UK as to how best to maintain or increase market-share as the UK faced competition from the US, Australia, Malaysia and Singapore.

In New Zealand, universities not only opened their doors to trade, but the state-funded schooling sector did as well. As Lewis (2005: 21-23) observes, the increase in number of foreign students in New Zealand schools has been spectacular, boosted by the marketing efforts of local schools and the government. By 2001, the export of education was estimated by the New Zealand government to be worth SNZ 1.5 billion—or 1.4% of GDP (Ministry of Education 2001)—placing it in the top 10 export income earners (compared with $5.8 billion for tourism). With heavy dependence on the income earned from education exports, the New Zealand government has now turned to marketing the idea of ‘place’ - that is New Zealand, as well as looking at ways of protecting the reputation of this new industry from ‘rogue traders’. One response is the creation of ‘Brand New Zealand’ now stamped across education along with one several other selected creative industries that the New Zealand government has chosen to individually promote, wine and fashion.

These developments in the UK, Australia and New Zealand have had a significant effect on the US’s share of the market. A report by the US Department of Trade presented the US government with a worrying trend; that their share of the global student market had declined from around 40% to 30% over the 1980s and 90s. The report noted not only impediments to the development of the education market, such as the cost of studying in the United States, but barriers being placed in the way of students, such as obtaining exit visas from their home countries to study in the United States. The revenue implications for the US have been and continue to be immense. As the

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11 These estimates and trade figures more generally, must be viewed with some degree of skepticism. Peet (2003) raises a more general point about the calculation of trade statistics by the WTO. He notes, for example, that the WTO offers estimates of between US$109 and US$510 billion, and asks whether it is possible to have any confidence in figures that are so wildly different.

12 In particular the extent of privatisation across all of the education sectors - see Fredriksen, 2003

13 New Zealand’s exports to the Asia-Pacific region rose from 4.1 percent to 52 percent of total exports.

14 In 2003, UK universities had 24% of the market for overseas students in English speaking countries (BBC News, 20th April, 2004 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/education/3640141.stm)

15 See (http://www.ed.gov/offices) last accessed on 14/08/06

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As competition over a share of the global education services market stepped up, key actors (governments, institutions and transnational firms) within the developed economies intensified their interest in the way in which the domestic and international regulatory systems of the inter-state world impede their project of creating a global trading system.

8.3 The WTO and the global regulation of trade

There is a rapidly increasing literature on the World Trade Organization (WTO). In the following section we look at the mandate for the WTO, and focus particularly upon the agreement that relates to education, the General Agreement on Trade in Services.

8.3.1 The WTO and the creation of service agreements

The establishment of the World Trade Organization in 1995, from the Uruguay Round of negotiations was deeply symbolic of the emerging global regime. This new institution replaced the GATT and now reached ambitiously into two new areas of trade regulation; trade in services and intellectual property. These two agreements – the General Agreement on Trade in Service (GATS) and Trade Related Intellectual Property Services (TRIPS), substantially advanced the rules-based nature of the trade regime. As the WTO Secretariat observed: “…the economic rationale calling for services liberalisation under GATS is no different in principle from the rationale that has driven the liberalisation of merchandise trade under GATT since 1948” (WTO Secretariat, 1999: 1).

The role of the WTO was to “…formalize, deepen and widen an international system of trade regulation. It was also to bring greater coherence in global policymaking by drawing together the work of the WTO with that of the IMF, the World Bank as well as to develop relations with other bodies such as the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the Telecommunications Union and the International Organization of Standards” (Wilkinson, 2002: 129).

Pressure had begun to build from the developed economies—particularly the US—shortly after 1979 to expand the GATT regime to include new issues such as services and investment (Winham, 2005: 100). This was sharply resisted by countries like India and Brazil who regarded their service sectors as public services. There were also added problems of defining services, using the language of trade. As Winham points out:

…services are processes, defining them is difficult, unless a strict functional definition is employed. …The tasks for the negotiators at the Uruguay Round were to incorporate GATT principles of transparency, national treatment and reciprocity, as well as newer principles such as market access, into areas of trade that was conceptually dissimilar from trade in goods (2005: 101).

This meant developing a code of principles (GATS) as well as identifying which sectors these principles would be applied to – a revolutionary move on the evolving global landscape (Robertson and Dale, 2003). Negotiators then identified measures that restricted trade in services – such as barriers to labour mobility, cross border supply, commercial presence and the purchase or consumption of services across borders. The result was an agreement that “…is not yet complete, not terribly user friendly, with a complex geometry and ala carte obligations set against the backdrop of near universal coverage and sovereign immunity in liberalization matters” (Sauve, 2001: 3).

8.3.2 The WTO as a system of global governance

The WTO is best described as a global, formally contracted body of rules backed by a judicial system, a dispute panel, and a minimum of political structure. The WTO Agreement outlines a number of specific functions to be taken by the WTO as a collective body; these include the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements, maintenance of a forum for further negotiations, administration of the dispute settlement system, administration of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, and liaison with the World Bank and the IMF (Winham, 2005: 107).

The structures created to carry out the functions of the WTO are a Ministerial Conference meeting every two years, a General Council which can also meet as a Dispute Settlement Panel and Trade Policy Review Mechanism Body, and three councils in the areas of goods, services and intellectual property. There is a small secretariat (of around 500 employees) located in Geneva.

Decision-making in the WTO is made on the basis of consensus though there is considerable evidence that consensus is achieved through the powerful countries (known as the Quad – the EC, USA, Japan, Canada) and

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16 By contrast, the World Bank has nearly 7,000 employees, and the IMF approximately 2,500.
their allies (Singapore, Australia, Brazil, New Zealand) ‘bullying’ the less powerful countries into agreement (Jawara and Kwa, 2003). Hartmann and Scherrer suggest the degree of influence of each country in the WTO is determined by their share of world trade (2003: 9).

The tasks of the WTO are carried out by professional staff along with the various delegations from those Member States (at present 147) who are able to maintain a presence in Geneva. For instance, in 2000, around 24 countries (out of the 144 members at the time) had no permanent presence in Geneva (Kwa, 2002). Added to this, the sizes of the delegations of the developed economies (lobbyists aside) are twice as large as those from the low-income countries (if they are able to establish a presence). This uneven state of affairs suggests a shortfall in legitimacy for the WTO, a view strongly put by the House of Lords (Select Committee on Economic Affairs, 2002: 47) on the management of the international trading system where they observe:

We recognise that member countries of the WTO vary in size and economic power. They vary, therefore, in their capacity to influence decisions in the WTO and more fundamentally to maintain a presence in the WTO. It would be naïve to believe that an organisation like the WTO would not be dominated by a small group of rich countries. The important question, which applies to the International Monetary Fund and to the World Bank as well, is whether this domination is excessive. We believe it is in all three institutions, but the evidence we received placed most emphasis on the WTO. We urge the Government, with its European partners, to consider, first, how to improve the balance of power in the WTO, and, secondly, how to ensure that decisions are more transparent.

Over and above the structures mentioned above, there are over 20 committees and working groups, with various numbers of working parties. Again, without a presence in Geneva, low-income countries are unable to participate in important negotiations that take place between the Ministerial Meetings that occur every two years. Furthermore, negotiators from the low-income and least developed countries are often excluded from key negotiations, or bullied into accepting proposals that undermine their interests (Kwa, 2002; Kapoor, 2004: 529; Wilkinson, 2002: 134).

Such criticism has made the WTO vulnerable to the anti-globalisation lobby. As a result, countries like Canada, and bodies such as the British Commonwealth have been working to ensure country representation to the WTO in Geneva as well as providing technical support for Commonwealth low-income country ambassadors in Geneva, and engaging in capacity building in trade policy formulation, implementation and negotiation skills training to negotiate national interests effectively in the WTO (Williams, 2003).

Finally, and this is critically important, because of the historical circumstances in which the WTO and its various agreements were fashioned, the WTO’s system of regulation better suit the needs of the developed Western countries rather than their low-income counterparts. More than this, it is a system of regulation that favours the economic preferences and legal customs of its founding members, (Wilkinson, 2002). Members who join the WTO opt in under a single undertaking to a series of binding rules and a built-in agenda to engage in ongoing negotiations leading to progressive liberalisation.

8.4 GATS and education

Within the WTO framework, the GATS consist of three components:

- a framework of rules that lays out the general obligations governing trade in services, which it does in much the same way as the GATT does for trade in goods; it provides disciplines on transparency, most favoured nation treatment, market access, and national treatment;
- annexes on specific services sectors; and
- schedules detailing the liberalisation commitments of each WTO member.

These result in a combination of top-down rules where all measures and sectors are covered unless they are explicitly excluded (MFN, Transparency, Domestic Regulation, government procurement, subsidies) and bottom-up rules where measures and sectors that are specifically identified are included (market access, national treatment) (Sinclair, 2000; see also Table 8.1). In theory this means it gives countries a chance to pace their liberalisation of trade in services (Eglin, 2003: 7), however the overall direction is nonetheless toward liberalisation.

GATS include all sectors of education within its scope; primary, secondary, higher, adult and other. Four modes of trade are identified:

- **Mode 1**, cross border supply – for instance, services through international mail, Internet, tele-conference facilities;
- **Mode 2**, consumption abroad – for instance, students studying abroad;
- **Mode 3**, commercial presence – for instance, foreign direct investment in the form of setting up branches in the territory of another Member State; and
- **Mode 4**, presence of natural persons – ‘temporary’ (with temporary yet to be defined) entry of workers in the territory of another Member State.
Table 8.1: Top Down and Bottom up Features of GATS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top down features of the GATS</th>
<th>Bottom up features of the GATS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Covers all government measures affecting trade in services</td>
<td>National treatment and market access rules apply only to sectors or sub-sectors that governments have listed in their country schedules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal rules (MFN) apply across all service sectors</td>
<td>Specific commitments in certain sectors may be designated ‘unbound’ leaving governments free to take otherwise inconsistent measures in future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applies to all means (or modes) of supplying a service internationally</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a government lists a sector in its country schedule it must list or lose all non conforming measures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sinclair, 2000: 30

8.4.1 Controversial issues – are public education sectors included?

One of the main issues for those concerned with education is whether Member States’ education sectors are exempt. GATS Article 1.3 excludes services “supplied in the exercise of governmental authority”. GATS Article 1.3 (c) further defines a service supplied in the exercise of governmental authority as: “…any service that is supplied neither on a commercial basis nor in competition with one or more service suppliers”. Given that public services have been radically transformed since the early 1980s, the category of services supplied purely by government without any commercial interest or intent is small if not almost non-existent. While trade negotiators have provided a few examples of what might count as an exemption (social security, central banking, army), as Sinclair (2000: 57) notes: “…most public services, including even basic universal services such as primary and secondary education (K-12), are provided through a mix of public and private funding and in competition with private suppliers, both not-for-profit and commercial”.

The considerable ambiguity around the status of the education sector in relation to Article 1.3 has been a major concern. It is here that we see a clash between those who see education as a public service regulated by states and those who see it as a service that could be delivered by any supplier regulated by global trade rules. Hartmann and Scherrer (2003: 6) note:

…state rules for the supply of services is based on a quite different set of motives. They are intended to ensure that basic services are provided nation-wide, are universally accessible, that quality standards are maintained, and particularly in the case of infrastructure services, that democratic participation and control are assured …this encroaches deeply into a body of rules that was and still is committed to other goals than hindering or facilitating cross border economic activities.

Similarly, in commenting on the higher education sector, Altbach (2004: 2) notes that while there are differences amongst the anti-GATS lobby, what unites them is “…a concern with what can be called a public good and by a conviction that higher education is not a commodity to be traded without constraint. There is a recognition that higher education is a complex phenomenon involving not just the marketplace but also national culture, the values of society, and access and social mobility…it is therefore a public good and to some extent a public responsibility”.

In response, supporters such as Sauve (2001: 16) argue that governments are not forced to become members of the WTO or to offer their education systems for the purposes of trade and that “detectors often present false, inflammatory and misleading characterisations of the purpose, rules and policy consequences of the GATS” (Sauve, 2001: 12). He also argues: “…the market for trade in education services is big, diverse, innovative and growing fast. It will almost certainly continue to grow as societies place an increased premium on human capital enhancement as a source of development and as a means of better equipping individuals and societies to confront, adjust to and take advantage of the demands arising from closer economic integration.” (ibid.: 4). If the high demand sectors (such as the lifelong learning market) are to respond to rising levels of demand, new suppliers who have experience in cross-border supply must be allowed to enter the market (Larsen, 2003).
For countries such as the United States and the larger European countries with strong and mature higher education systems, the likelihood of being significantly affected by foreign providers (such as transnational firms) is slim. However, for smaller and low-income countries with high unmet demand for access to education and with smaller academic systems and universities, GATS could result in considerable external impact (Altbach, 2004: 1).

A second significant issue concerns the difficulty or costliness of reversing decisions. Once a sector and mode are committed, if a Member State wants to withdraw will have to wait for a period of three years, they will have to exchange the commitment for another, and will have to pay potential firms future lost earnings. Commentators like Sauve (2001: 10) argue that commercial suppliers must feel confident about the conditions of their investments in the education sector.

The highly controversial nature of the inclusion of education in the GATS, coupled with the activities of the anti-GATS lobby in pointing to and monitoring the negotiations, has resulted in an element of wait and see in national negotiating strategies, with only a handful of Member States (8) tabling their requests or offers (Knight, 2003: 6).

8.5 WTO and development

The WTO represents a particular model of economic development. As Rodrik observes:

It is widely accepted, not least in the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO), that the purpose of the world trade regime is to raise living standards all around the world—rather than to maximise trade per se. Increasingly, however, the WTO and multilateral lending agencies have come to view these two goals—promoting development and maximizing trading—as synonymous, to the point where the latter easily substitutes for the former. The net result is a confounding of ends and means. Trade has become the lens through which development is perceived rather than the other way around (Rodrik, 2001: 5).

Rodrik (2001: 16) argues that the augmented Washington consensus, the political context against which to read the creation of the WTO, is a particular model of institutions and economic development, and there is no reason to assume that this is the best or only way in which trade ought to take place.

As our review of the literature in Chapter 2 and 4 also pointed out, China and India developed a dual track system – of an export zone with a highly protected economy. For Rodrik (2001: 25), the real debate is not whether integration is good or not, but what the consequences of integration are over national and local policies and priorities. A ‘development’ focus rather than a ‘trade focus’ would mean that low-income nations could articulate their needs, not in terms of market access, but in terms of the policy autonomy needed to exercise institutional innovations” (op. Cit: 7). In this kind of model, the WTO could be an institution that managed diversity rather than one that tended to reduce national institutional differences. This is supported by Rose et al (2003: 6); their views formed the basis of advice to the Commonwealth Meeting of Education Ministers in 2003.

8.5.1 GATS, education and human rights

The right to education is recognised in several international instruments (see Article 13, para 2 of the ICESCR, 1976). To achieve full realisation of this right: (a) primary education should be compulsory and available free to all; (b) secondary education in its different forms shall be made available and accessible to all, in particular by the progressive introduction of free education, and (c) higher education in its different forms shall be made equally accessible to all, in particular by the progressive introduction of free education. To ensure this, states must ensure availability, accessibility, acceptability and adaptability (UN High Commissioner Human Rights, 2002: 17).

The emergence of the GATS and its relationship to education as a human right has become a major concern of the UN Commission on Human Rights. In a specially commissioned report on GATS, the Special Rapporteur stated that the “rapid development of international trade law necessitates a decisive reaffirmation of education as a human right” (Tomasevski 2001: 5). This led the High Commissioner (2002) to observe that:

…the liberalization of trade in services, without adequate government regulation and proper assessment of its affects, can have undesirable effects. Different service sectors require different policies and time frames for liberalization and some areas are better left under governmental authority (p. 20)…While the WTO Agreements provide a legal framework for the economic aspects of the liberalisation of trade, they focus on commercial objectives. The norms and standards of human rights provide the means of providing a legal framework for the social dimensions of human rights…A human rights approach to trade liberalisation emphasizes the role of the State, not only as negotiator of trade rules and setter of trade policy, but also as duty bearer for human rights (p. 10).

In their report, the Commission points to the different ways in which GATS might exaggerate social inequalities in education. For instance, in Mode 1 (cross border supply) those advantaged by virtual suppliers are those who have the necessary infrastructure, such as the Internet as a means of accessing education. Mode 2 (consumption abroad) could lead to the introduction of a dual market of fees, and exaggerate inequalities if the governments do not have
a way of ensuring cross subsidization (see Lewis, 2005). Under Mode 3 (commercial presence), if user fees for example, were introduced, then services might become more expensive, and it is not always easy to regulate foreign suppliers. Finally, under Mode 4 (presence of natural persons), while it but can enable knowledge transfer and remittances to be returned to the sending country, it can also lead to brain drain – an issue we have taken up in Chapter 7.

Furthermore, locking countries into their schedule of commitments and penalising them for seeking reversals highlights the tension between commercial interests and human interests. In making this point the High Commissioner observed:

> From a commercial perspective, holding countries to their commitments to liberalise is important to ensure transparency and predictability in international trade and the payment of compensation is a legitimate commercial response to the settlement of disputes. From a human rights perspective, however, the focus is less on predictability and more on the need for flexibility to modify or withdraw commitments to liberalise services where experience demonstrates that a commitment constrains or limits the enjoyment of human rights. The need for flexibility is particularly relevant for low-income countries given that they are in a dynamic process of building infrastructures. Moreover, while compensation to affected parties might be appropriate in some cases upon withdrawal of commitments, a human rights approach would question whether states should be sanctioned for taking action to protect human rights (2002: 28).

GATS is also seen as having important consequences for the marginalised and poorer sectors of societies, including indigenous peoples, and women and girls. For instance, GATS does not provide for any recognition of indigenous rights or cultural identity. In the New Zealand case, Kelsey argues that there is no recognition of obligations to Maori under the Treaty of Waitangi (2003: 8).

There are also concerns with the way in which gender-based inequalities are likely to be exaggerated. Williams (2003: 106), in a report on multilateralism and gender to the Commonwealth Secretariat, states:

> The implementation of GATS and the expansion of commitments in the education sector are likely to exacerbate negative trends in education. These include diminishing the role of the state/decentralisation of education through (a) shifting the financial responsibility from national to household budgets; (a) the privatisation of the education system; (c) imposing community based and user fee systems for primary education; (d) inadequate resources for universal primary education, (e) insignificant movement toward universal secondary education, (f) rising costs of private education (106-108).

The irony, it seems, is that

> …if a child does not get the education he/she is entitled to according to the Convention of the Human Rights of the Child (para 28 and 29) there is no way to force that government to meet its commitments. However, if a company trading in education services loses its right to trade in a particular country, that country where the company is based will have, according to the WTO rules, the right to compensation. Rules concerning trade seem to be much stronger in international law than rules concerning human rights (Fredrikssen 2003: 8).

8.5.2 Recent developments – benchmarking

There was considerable hope that the meeting in Hong Kong in 2005 would be used to progress the interests of the developing countries, and the broad coalitions (such as the G20 led by Brazil and India and the G33 led by Indonesia and the Philippines) would give the developing countries more clout. However observers, in reviewing the Hong Kong Ministerial meeting that took place in December 2005 (cf. Oxfam, 2005), argue that in the services area, the developed countries “…were not satisfied with the developing countries offers” with the result that the EC called for ‘benchmarking’. In essence this means that all countries have to demonstrate a minimum commitment in terms of numbers of sectors and level of ambition. This over-rides the bottom-up approach that ostensibly enabled countries to move forward at their own pace. While the bilateral process is preserved, developing countries face increased pressure to take part in pluri-lateral negotiations. In essence, if a country asks another to take part in pluri-lateral negotiations, they are obliged to consider such requests (though in the initial first draft countries were required to enter into negotiations rather than merely consider them). Developing countries are also being urged to aim for new qualitative benchmarks, such as enhancing levels of foreign equity participation.

There are also continued concerns about the way in which the developed economies, in particular the EC and to a lesser extent the USA, have used their power to influence proceedings. As the Oxfam briefing paper notes: “In a move symptomatic of the way development considerations are squeezed out by power politics as a ministerial approaches, the chair of the services negotiations produced a draft text in October 2005 that suited the EU’s proposals, despite developing country opposition” (2005: 4). Concerns over process, in particular transparency and accountability, and the pressure on countries to respond in a very short period of time, continue to be
expressed by delegates, especially with regard to negotiations over services (Oxfam, 2005: 6; 16). Taken together, these recent developments suggest that the will be continued pressure on countries to both commodify their education sectors and to regulate them through global rules.

8.5.3 Reform or removal

For the reasons that are evident above, some organisations have called for the abandonment of the WTO and its various agreements; others have looked at ways in which the processes might be reformed. European public sector unions have called for a systematic assessment (Hartmann and Scherrer, 2003: 9) of the impact of liberalisation policies, with adequate funding to undertake this assessment while countries such as Canada have responded to public pressure and withdrawn their expressed interest in negotiating access to education markets in WTO member countries.

There is a strong view that public services, such as education, should be excluded and if included, that at the very minimum, that the clause that locks countries into the agreements should be removed. There is also a view that improvements could be made in the consultation process both at global, national and local levels, while requests should not be able to be made in secret. Funds should also be made available to low-income countries to enable them to adequately participate in the negotiation process.

8.6 Conclusion

Seen through the lens of low-income countries and their need for the development of education infrastructures and the development of capacity, it might be argued that opening up national education sectors to the private sector might also create new opportunities for learning. However there are five issues here related specifically to the GATS and the idea of education as an area of trade. First, the GATS framework does not give low-income countries sufficient policy leverage over their education sectors and how it might be harnessed for development. Second, a trade framework is not sensitive to the very important role of education in redistribution of opportunity and equality, and the need for states to regulate this in ways that ensure quality and opportunity for citizens. Third, the GATS framework as it stands tends to promote the interests of for-profit transnational firms, whose interests and investments might be much more short-term and strategic given that they are tied to profits. Provision may well be uneven and also rather tenuous. Finally, education is a human right and one that is endorsed in the Declaration of Human Rights and the aspirations of Education for All and the Millennium Development Goals. The explicit ‘trade’ focus on the GATS has the potential to undermine this. Finally, education and its content are never neutral or apolitical. It would remain to be seen how national governments might ensure the teaching of particular content. Taken together, it might be argued that there are limited possibilities for development for low-income countries through signing on to the GATS to trade in education services.

17 For example, in 2004 the EU made a request to 109 countries but this was only published after the deadline and pressure from other countries to make this request public.
Chapter 9: Education, Social Cohesion and Conflict

9.1 Introduction

Historically, education systems have played an important role, not only in developing human capital, but also in promoting societal cohesion through the development of values and social and national identities. In this chapter we review some of the literature on the relationship between education, conflict and social cohesion through drawing together literature on education and social capital, education and conflict, and education for citizenship, peace and human rights. In part this serves to highlight the renewed importance of education and social cohesion within the new Post Washington development paradigm, but also to problematise education’s non-linear and complex relationship with these issues.

In order to locate this within the context of the contemporary situation we shall first review some recent evidence on the extent of conflict, violence and insecurity within low-income countries as a means to highlight why policy makers have returned to questions of the ‘social’ role of education and the problems of social cohesion and integration within the contemporary neo-liberal globalisation model of development. From there we will critically explore the rise of social capital as a key development concept in the 1990s. This will then be followed by a review of both the literature on education, citizenship and human rights and then education, war and conflict. Finally, we will conclude the chapter with some critical reflections on the state of the literature on education, social cohesion, and conflict and offer some suggestions for further research.

9.2 Instability, violence and insecurity

Drawing on research carried out by the World Health Organisation, the UN (2005a) Report on the World Social Situation 2005: The Inequality Predicament notes that in 2002 around 1.6 million people died from intentionally inflicted injuries (UN, 2005a: 92-3) with men more likely than women to be both victim and perpetrator. While suicide accounts for over 50% of deaths, armed conflicts caused around 35% and interpersonal violence 15% of deaths. However, Africa and Latin America differ from the global patterns with more lives lost to violence and crime than to suicide (UN, 2005a: 92-3). Furthermore, in 2004, more than 17 million people were living as refugees or internally displaced persons owing to violence or the threat of violence (UN, 2005a: 93).

Perhaps unsurprisingly in light of the events of September 11th, 2001 and subsequent military conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, there is increasing concern over violent conflict (see also Chapter 5). Both the UN (2005a) report on the World Social Situation and the UNDP (2005) Human Development Report place special emphasis on the causes and effects of increased conflict. The trend in conflicts can be interpreted in a variety of ways. As the UNDP (2005: 153) report notes, while in 1991 there were 51 conflicts taking place globally, in 2003 there were only 29. However, more people are dying in these conflicts (the Rwandan Genocide left 1 million people dead; the Democratic Republic of Congo lost 7% of the population; in Sudan 2 million people have died as a result of conflict), and more of the dead are civilians than in earlier wars. Likewise there has also been a shift both in the nature and the geography of those wars and conflict. As the UNDP notes:

> The twentieth century, one of the bloodiest in human history (Hobsbawn 1994), was defined first by wars between countries and then by cold war fears of violent confrontation between two superpowers. Now these fears have given way to fears of local and regional wars fought predominantly in poor countries within weak or failed states and with small arms as the weapon of choice. Most of the victims in today’s wars are civilians (UNDP, 2005: 12).

Their geographical location of war and conflict has changed with the vast majority now taking place in low-income countries. Between the years 1946-89, low-income countries accounted for around one third of all conflicts; between 1990-2003, this increased to nearly a half. As the UNDP notes, 40% of the world’s conflicts are in Africa (UNDP, 2005: 154). Of the 25 countries ranked lowest in the human development index in 2004, 23 are in Africa, and 20 are currently or have recently been in conflict. (UN, 2005a: 94). Nine of the ten lowest countries on the Human Development Index have experienced some form of armed conflict since the 1990s, and seven in recent years, while five of the ten countries have the lowest life expectancy; nine out of the ten countries that have experienced conflict in recent years have the highest child mortality rates, and eight out of the ten countries with the lowest primary enrolment rates have experienced some form of conflict since 1990 (UN, 2005a: 154).

From these examples we can see that conflict and development are clearly linked in both directions –increased conflict blocks development, and failed or uneven development works as a catalyst to produce conflict. Furthermore, recent concern over failed states reflects the late realization amongst developed nations that problems of violence and conflict in low-income countries may not end at the borders. As DfID (2005c, cited in Leftwich, 2005: 592) notes, failed states are “…more likely to become unstable, to destabilise their neighbours, to create refugee flows, to spread disease and to be bases for terrorists”. Conflict, it seems, in the post September 11th world has become a transnational problem that cannot be avoided.
While interstate and civil wars raise widespread media attention rises in violence and murder are often hidden from view. The UN (2005a) report notes an increase in both crime and interpersonal violence, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean, with slower increases in Africa, the Arab States, Eastern Europe and the CIS, and South-East Asia and the Pacific (UN, 2005a: 90). Murder rates and levels of human development normally have an inverse relationship, with the highest murder rates taking place in middle or low-income countries. Latin America and the Caribbean have levels of murder running at some 25 per 100,000 inhabitants; Sub-Saharan Africa has levels of between 17-20 per 100,000 inhabitants. Levels of murder are low in both the EU and Canada (less than 3 per hundred thousand) and while the US level during the 1980s rose to 10 per one 100,000 population, in the 1990s it has dropped to 5.6 per 100,000. In the opposite direction, murder rates in Eastern Europe and the CIS increased from 5 per 100,000 in the 1980s to 8 per 100,000 inhabitants in the early 1990s. Patterns for South-East Asia and the Pacific remained steady at 4 per 100,000. In the Arab States, there was more movement but always below 4 per 100,000 (UN 2005a: 91).

While the causes of homicide and violent crime are complex (World Bank, 1999a; Fajnzylber et al, 2002), a recent comprehensive cross-country study carried out by World Bank researchers on the relationship between violent crime and inequality highlights a high positive correlation (Fajnzylber et al, 2002). Furthermore, the UN’s report notes that:

Inequality does not always lead to increased violence and is by no means the only explanation for violent crime. However, it does increase the likelihood of violent crime and armed intra-country conflict, especially when it coincides with other factors (UN, 2005a: 91).

The UN draws a clear causal relationship between poverty and inequality and violence, crime and armed conflict. This in turn raises questions about the relationship between rising inequality and poverty in many parts of the world and the rising levels of violence:

The violence associated with national and international acts of terrorism should be viewed in the context of social inequality and disintegration. In situations in which inequalities are extreme and there is competition over scarce resources, the likelihood of social disintegration and violence increases. Violence is more common where inequalities are greater, and trends suggest that growing up in poverty often leads to social exclusion, which can contribute to crime. Countries with high rates of poverty and inequality generally have poorer social support and safety nets, more unequal access to education, and fewer opportunities for young people. The likelihood of armed conflict is also greater under such adverse social conditions (UN, 2005a: 6).

While the literature in this area remains contradictory on the causes of violence, conflict and civil wars, there is consensus on the damaging effects it is having on development indices:

If human development is about expanding choice and advancing rights, then violent conflict is the most brutal suppression of human development. The right to life and to security are among the most basic human rights. They are also among the most widely and systematically violated. Insecurity linked to armed conflict remains one of the greatest obstacles to human development (UNDP, 2005:151).

The UNDP report notes how conflict and civil war are undermining the possibility of achieved the MDGs (UNDP 2005: 151) with conflict undermining nutrition and public health, destroying education systems, devastating livelihoods and retarding any prospects for economic growth (UNDP, 2005: 12).

In synthesis what we can note is a growing ‘social’ crisis running alongside processes of globalisation that manifests itself in violence ranging from street crime, to civil wars to international terrorism. Whether this can be attributed directly to processes of globalisation is of course another matter, but regardless of this it is clear that since the 1990s and most visibly since 2001, concerns with social integration, social cohesion and good citizenship have risen up the international policy ladder and these have serious and important implications for education systems. While the 1980s were characterised by a clear focus on the economic function of education systems, the mid 1990s onwards have seen economic focus combined with concern for issues of social cohesion. One of the first signals for this shift that we will turn to was the emergence of the concept of social capital within the World Bank.

9.3 Social capital and the return of social cohesion

One of the new buzzwords of the development community over recent years, paralleling the rise of globalisation, has been that of social capital (Fine, 2001a; 2003). Its emergence coincided with a stronger recognition of the conflictual nature of contemporary society and the problems of social integration. Furthermore, the use of ‘capital’ reflects how trust is necessary not only for social integration but also for economic growth – excessive violence, internal conflict and lack of trust and cooperation within societies can deleteriously affect the economic prospects of nation states, and deter investment. As noted in Chapter 4, social capital emerged as a central concept within the Post Washington Consensus – reflecting the recognition of the range of non-market externalities that contribute
or inhibit economic development (Stiglitz, 1998) with ‘trust’, and ‘social networks’ being seen as crucial explanatory factors.

The origins of the term social capital can be located in the critical social theory of Pierre Bourdieu (Farr, 2004) and in the rational choice theory of James Coleman, before being popularised in the US through the work of Robert Putnam. Putnam defines social capital as ‘trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action’ (Putnam, 1993: 167). In a later work, he argues that,

Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital refers to the properties of individuals, social capital refers to connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them. In that sense social capital is closely related to what some have called “civic virtue.” The difference is that “social capital” calls attention to the fact that civic virtue is most powerful when embedded in a sense network of reciprocal social relations. A society of many virtuous but isolated individuals is not necessarily rich in social capital (Putnam, 2000: 19).

Taking up Putnam’s theme, the World Bank defines social capital as follows:

Social capital refers to the institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society’s social interactions... Social capital is not just the sum of the institutions which underpin a society – it is the glue that holds them together (World Bank, 1999a).

A more behaviourist understanding is provided by Cohen and Prusak who argue that:

Social capital consists of the stock of active connections among people: the trust, mutual understanding, and shared values and behaviours that bind the members of human networks and communities and make cooperative action possible (Cohen and Prusak, 2001: 4).

Within this renewed concern for the ‘social’ within the Post Washington Consensus, the idea of social capital has come to be referred to as the ‘missing link’ in development economics (Grootaert 1998). On the one hand, the concept speaks to the idea of community empowerment espoused by many in the development community, including grass roots NGOs. On the other hand, analyses based on the concept tend to lend support to forms of social action that fall outside of the state and within civil society. In this respect the idea of social capital finds support amongst proponents of neo-liberal and free market ideas who typically wish to see a reduced role for the state in development. Therefore, in common with ‘pro-poor growth’ social capital has a strong ability to mean many things to different actors and be conceptually broad enough to embrace a range of different stakeholders.

Analyses involving social capital often involve measuring the number of different kinds of associations at a local level and their membership and quantifying the extent of ‘social characteristics’ such as compassion, altruism, respect and tolerance. Measurements can be made quantitatively and qualitatively, and correlations are then made between the existence of these phenomena and poverty reduction. The conclusion is drawn that social capital measured in these terms assists poverty alleviation and economic prosperity.

Factors such as ethnicity are viewed as playing a ‘good’ and a ‘bad’ role in relation to social capital formation in that ethnic bonds can lead to inter-generational prosperity on the one hand or, to ethnic conflict on the other (Bates, 1999). In this respect, social capital has a ‘dark’ side as evidenced, for example, in the forms of association implicated in the Rwandan genocide and in Colombian drugs cartels.

Despite its ambivalent status as a description of positive and negative social practices, social capital is growing in importance as a concept within the development literature. Social capital is also increasingly identified as a key theme in social development by the World Bank and by other agencies and donors including DFID. Summarising the findings of studies undertaken by the World Bank’s Social Capital Initiative, Grootaert argues the following:

The overriding lesson that emerges from the SCI is that it is possible to measure social capital and its impact. The empirical studies indicate that social capital has a profound impact in many different areas of human life and development: it affects the provision of services in both urban and rural areas; transforms the prospects for agricultural development; influences the expansion of private enterprises; improves the management of common resources; helps improve education; can prevent conflict; and can compensate for a deficient state. More generally, it helps alleviate poverty for individuals and for countries as a whole. Lest this sound excessively simplistic or overly generalized, we note that the extent to which social capital matters varies tremendously across settings, as do the aspects of social capital that are effective (Grootaert, 1998: 21).

Social capital has also taken on particular significance in the global era as a way of understanding the contribution of social factors to processes of successful globalisation, for example in SE Asia (Fine, 1999, 2001a) and as a way of understanding the relationship between social capital and poverty alleviation (Fine, 2001a; Dolfsma and Dannreuther, 2003).

However, the concept of social capital has not been without its critics. Both Fine (2001a) and Harris (2001), two key commentators on social capital, argue that the idea of social capital is so general that it lacks analytical purchase. They claim that it has allowed economists associated with the World Bank to ‘colonise’ the social sphere
that had previously been the domain of other disciplines. They argue that in the hands of developmental economists, the term serves to ‘depoliticise’ social and cultural relations by removing a consideration of the broader socio-historic context from the analysis of social interactions between groups and of fundamental power relations based on social relations such as class, gender, ethnicity and so on. For these critics, the way that the concept of social capital has developed has tended to lay the ‘blame’ for poverty at the feet of communities themselves on account of them not having sufficient stocks of social capital. They also suggest that the term is culturally loaded in that the underlying concepts and forms of association being assumed are often western in nature.

Grootaert (1998) argues that human and social capital are mutually reinforcing, that is, that increases in social capital enhance access of poorer households to education and that increased levels of education can lead to an increase the likelihood of collective action. The relationships between human capital and social capital are further developed by Schuller (2001) (see Table 9.1). Schuller lists a series of ways in which social capital is linked to human capital formation and sees it as being multi-directional with strong social capital promoting human capital development and educational institutions promoting stocks of social capital.

Table 9.1 Framework for Considering the Relationship between Human and Social Capital

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<th>Framework for considering the relationships between human and social capital</th>
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<td>Human Capital</td>
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<td>Individual agent</td>
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<td><strong>Measures</strong></td>
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<td>Duration of schooling</td>
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<td><strong>Outcomes</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Model</strong></td>
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Source: Schuller 2001:20

The close relationship between education, social capital and human capital is also picked up by Fukuyama who argues that

…the area where governments probably have the greatest direct ability to generate social capital is education. Educational institutions do not simply transmit human capital, they also pass on social capital in the form of social rules and norms. This is true not just in primary and secondary education, but in higher and professional education as well. Doctors learn not just medicine but the Hippocratic oath; one of the greatest safeguards against corruption is to give senior bureaucrats high-quality professional training and to create an esprit de corps among this elite (Fukuyama, 2001: 18).

Similarly, Heyneman (2001) sees education as providing knowledge to pupils about social contracts between individuals and the state, providing a context to develop appropriate norms and behaviours for upholding those contracts, and a forum within which different social groupings interact and learn about each other. Education systems also explain the consequences for breaking social contracts.
Green and Preston (2001) however challenge the overly simplistic positive representation of the relationship between education and social cohesion that typifies the work on social capital. Their empirical evidence and analysis through cross-country studies demonstrates that at the national level there is no correlation between aggregate levels of education and social cohesion. However, they did find close links between income inequality and inequality in access to education, and suggest that inequality is the most important causal factor in relation to social cohesion. This kind of research lends support to the kinds of criticisms offered by Fine (2001a); namely that the analytical framework deployed by social capital researchers avoids issues such as class, race, and structural inequality which have provided the core material for social scientists over the last century.

The somewhat romantic view of education’s socially cohesive role is also challenged by authors such as Davies (2004; 2005a; 2005b) who argue that, just as social capital has its dark side, so schooling does not necessarily transmit positive values and behaviours to students. On the contrary she notes how, in a myriad of ways, education systems may well be contributing to social breakdown by reproducing gender, ethnic and class inequalities. Beyond that Davies notes how violence in schools (officially sanctioned or otherwise), promotes attitudes that often run contrary to socially cohesive and tolerant societies.

The conclusion to be drawn from these literatures is that it is not just more education, but a particular type of education that might promote positive social integration. In the next two sections we will explore two areas of particular interest to educators in relation to social cohesion and education: Education for Citizenship and Human Rights and Education and Violent Conflict. In each section we will explore the scope of the field of inquiry, why these issues have risen up the agenda of educators over the last decade and review the central debates within the literature.

9.4 Education, citizenship and human rights education

The urgency of the need to tackle war and violence, to foster a national identity without the counter-effects of patriotism, to promote inclusion and to recognise rights as universal have led to acceptance of citizenship education and human rights education as legitimate sites of learning. International pressures towards good governance have also been influential in countries dependent on aid. It is likely that globalisation will generate concerns about global citizenship, albeit for a number of different economic and social reasons (Davies, 2000: 4).

Citizenship and human rights education covers a wide variety of issues ranging from civics, political education, national identity, global education/global citizenship, environmental education, peace education, gender/equity critiques of citizenship, inter-culturalism and ethnic minority inclusion (Davies, 2000). It can take place in a wide range of social settings and serve a range of purposes.

Davies (2000: 2), in a review for the British Council, notes how citizenship and human rights education falls under six areas:

- formal curriculum of schools and higher education;
- organisational structures of schools: student councils, student unions;
- links and work with the community;
- non-formal education or popular education;
- training courses for public officials; and
- public awareness campaigns, using media and road shows.

Osler and Starkey (2005) and Davies (2004) note how citizenship education increasingly overlaps with human rights education, with the latter being embedded within the former in an increasingly globalised world. Citizenship refers to a citizen’s particular relationship with a single state while human rights refer to more general global rights and responsibilities of a citizen of the world. The increased recognition of human rights as being universally applicable and integrated into national law reflects how processes beyond the economic have been globalised over recent years (Santos 1999), and how these processes begin to blur the line between local, national, regional and global identity formation.

9.4.1 Rise in interest in citizenship and human rights education

During the current post 1970s globalisation phase there has been renewed interest in citizenship education in both the North and South (Osler et al, 1995; Finkel et al, 2000; Lawton et al, 2000; Turner, 2001; Jackson, 2002; Jarvis, 2002; Quisumbing, 2002; Kohl, 2003; Lockyer et al, 2003; Osler, 2005; Reimers and Reimers, 2005).

Osler and Starkey (2005) in a comprehensive review of the literature on education and citizenship in the UK suggest six reasons to explain the growth of interest in citizenship education over recent years. Firstly, injustices and inequalities have persisted locally, nationally and globally – a concern exemplified in the establishment of the

Secondly, migration and globalisation are viewed as placing pressures on nation states to address issues of social integration and develop a balance between national unity and national diversity with education being seen as a natural tool to facilitate this. A recent OECD report noted:

The issue for education is how to develop not only successful individuals with good workplace skills, but also ‘democratic citizenship’ — an outcome both linked to, and supportive of, social cohesion. Defining the qualities we might wish to see in citizens of democratic societies remains a political and context-dependent task. It might include qualities such as fairness, tolerance and a co-operative approach, recognition of the value of social norms, and a civic spirit. While education and informal learning, in isolation, cannot create model citizens, they can, alongside other factors, make a constructive contribution. Devising a policy response will require clear objectives, keeping a balance between the ‘nation-building’ role of civic education and its role in valuing and recognising social diversity (OECD, 2004: 4).

Thirdly, there is growing concern in many societies that young people are disinterested and disengaged from the political system, and that citizenship education can provide a route towards stimulating a re-engagement with politics. This is offered as an explanation for the Crick Report, and the consequent decision to include citizenship education in the UK curriculum (Osler and Starkey, 2005). Fourthly, citizenship education has been seen as a means to influence, modify and improve the behaviour of youth groups engaged in anti-social behaviour (Osler and Starkey, 2005; Osler, 2005). Fifthly, the end of the Cold War led to the need, particularly in Eastern Europe, to promote democratic behaviour (can be extended to those countries that lived under dictatorships in Latin America, particularly in the Southern Cone). Finally, particularly in Europe, citizenship education has been seen as a means to counter the rise of racist and anti-democratic movements that utilise the rise in immigration to promote fear and social dislocation. The Council of Europe, a long-term promoter of citizenship and human rights education stresses the need to:

…give particular attention to education and awareness-raising in all sectors of society to promote a climate of tolerance, respect for human rights and cultural diversity, including introducing and strengthening such measures among young people (Council of Europe, 2000).

While in any particular country interest in education and citizenship and human rights may be triggered by a particular combination of these elements, there is a growing appreciation of the role of education in promoting and strengthening social cohesion and tolerance within societies undergoing processes of rapid social change such as those associated with globalisation.

9.4.2 Teaching citizenship and human rights education

As interest has developed so too has a burgeoning literature exploring these issues in both North and South (Kerr, 1999; Davies, 2001; Barrett, 2002; Davidson, 2003; Hammond, 2003; Sherrold, 2003; Zembylas, 2003; Ahmad, 2004; Callan, 2004; Holden, 2004; Bates, 2005; Davies, 2005a; Davies et al, 2005a; Davies et al, 2005b; Davies and Issitt, 2005; Lakes, 2005; Papastephanou, 2005; Rahn, 2005; Gordon, 2006). Osler and Starkey (2005) favourably quote the work of the ‘International Consensus Panel’ report Democracy and Diversity developed by the University of Washington (Banks et al, 2005) which identifies four key principles for teaching citizenship. That;

…students should learn about the complex relationships between unity and diversity in their local communities, the nation and the world; that they should study the ways in which people in their community, nation and region are increasingly interdependent with others around the world; that the teaching of human rights should underpin citizenship education in multicultural nation-states, and that students should be taught knowledge about democracy and democratic institutions (cited in Osler and Starkey, 2005: 16).

In the literature reviewed, it is clear that citizenship and human rights education takes place in schools, either primarily as a particular subject (as in the UK), or integrated across the curriculum as part and parcel of many subjects. One Commonwealth report noted how citizenship and human rights education was nested inside a range of different curriculum, such as ‘the Constitution’ (Pakistan), ‘Moral Education’ (Malaysia), and ‘Social Studies’ (Jamaica) (Davies, 2000: 2).

In the UK, citizenship education is currently taught as a specific subject. However, in many parts of the world (and particularly in many postcolonial nations), it was a key development for nation building after the defeat of colonialism (Davies, 2000). Central to any analysis of citizenship is its particular definition in each locality where it is used. Who determines who is and who is not a citizen? And, what might inclusion entail in terms of rights and responsibilities? As Davies notes on her recent work on conflict and education, citizenship education can just as easily promote xenophobia and racism as it can promote tolerance, peace and respect for diversity (Davies, 2004).
In a review of recent literature, Davies (2005a) identifies different types of citizenship and human rights education – with some aimed at transforming social reality and others aimed at legitimising the status quo. Because citizenship is so contested, teachers are often forced into deciding whether they are there to socialize and mould children into loyal citizens or to transform them into active agents seeking to challenge unequal structures. As Davies notes, there is a problem with the literature on citizenship and human rights in that it is much easier to research social exclusion and demonstrate the role of education in addressing these issues than it is to measure the impact of that education on the issues themselves.

Research on the Dominican Republic on the impact of USAID funding for democracy and citizenship education found that while increasing individual knowledge, efficacy, and other supportive democratic values, it decreased the sense that governmental institutions are worthy of citizen trust. Interestingly, Bratton et al (1999) made a similar discovery in Zambia. This type of research highlights the political and politicised nature of these types of education programmes. In respect to this, Finkel et al (2000) note that USAID needs to be clear what the objectives are for their educational programmes and perhaps tailor courses according to whether they are seeking to challenge undemocratic regimes or support newly democratic ones:

This points to what may be a necessary distinction in civic education programming between programs that seek to mobilize popular opinion and participation against undemocratic or corrupt institutions and leaders, and those programs that seek to collaborate in that reform once the transition occurs or once they have gained the ear of political leaders. Once this political opening occurs, donors and civil society groups should consistently explore ways in which they can assist in this process to bring genuine results (Finkel et al, 2000: 1871).

As we saw in Chapter 6, these types of politicised interventions into education systems have recently become tied up with the US-led ‘war on terror’ and are highly contentious.

UNESCO (2001), in a broad review of human rights and citizenship education of member states, welcomed the fact that many more countries were recognising its importance and were developing plans to integrate it across the curriculum. However, they were also concerned that this type of education was not accorded the financial resources necessary for its efficacy. They suggested that there was a gap between the rhetoric of many states and the practical and financial measures necessary for implementing a systematic programme of education for citizenship and human rights.

The UNESCO (2001) report stressed the importance of integrating citizenship and human rights education in formal education settings with the non-formal education delivered by NGOs and other civil society organisations. They also raised a number of key issues and topics for this type of education including the promotion of language teaching and mother tongue education to foster intercultural understanding. Secondly, they called for gender to be understood within the framework of the UN Conference on Women (Beijing 1995), and to be integrated both into curricula and institutional practice within education systems. Thirdly, they were concerned that insufficient effort was being directed towards racism, racial, ethnic and religious intolerance. Fourthly, they called for a broader integration of education directed at promoting environmental awareness. Fifthly, they suggested that in response to the rise of endemic diseases and increases in drug and alcohol abuse that raised awareness of these issues should be promoted. Finally, they called for the enhancement and strengthening of programmes promoting democratic values and practices, tolerance and peace.

The scope of the focus of citizenship and human rights education reflects the increasing importance of education systems in overcoming and addressing some of the political and social challenges of economic globalisation. Perhaps the worst and most important challenge is that of violent conflict that we will now turn to.

### 9.5 Education and violent conflict

Education is one of the building blocks of human development. It is not just a basic right, but also a foundation for progress in other areas, including health, nutrition and the development of institutions and democracy. Conflict undermines this foundation and also contributes to the conditions that perpetuate violence. Violent conflict destroys education infrastructure, reduces spending on schools and teachers and prevents children from attending classes. Schools are often a target for groups hostile to the government because of the association with state authority (UNDP, 2005: 159).

According to a DfID commissioned report (Smith and Vaux, 2003:9), 82 percent of the reported 113 million children out of school were from crisis and post-crisis countries. While this figure is contested (the Women’s Commission 2004 report suggests around 27 million children are out of school due to war and conflict), it nevertheless highlights the importance of addressing the education/conflict relationship. As we also noted above, the vast majority of post 1990s conflicts took place in low-income countries, and that there appears to be a strong relationship between poverty, inequality and violence.

The recent UNDP (2005) report observes that half of all primary schools were closed or destroyed during Mozambique’s civil war between 1976 and 1992. The Oxfam Education Report too showed that two thirds of the African countries affected by conflicts at that time have enrolment rates of less than 50 % (Watkins, 2000).
Furthermore, the UNDP state that countries in conflict are likely to spend less on education, and parents are less likely to send girls to school for fear of violence (Kirk 2004). They highlight that the ratio of girls to boys enrolled in primary schools was 0.83 for 18 low-income countries that were in conflict at some point since 2000 and 0.90 for those not in conflict (UNDP, 2005: 159). Similarly, poor children are far more likely to be deprived of education and affected by conflict than wealthier children (Seitz, 2004). For the reasons elaborated above, there is an increasing consensus in the literature that if we are serious about reaching the MDGs, and particularly the educational MDGs then we need to address conflict as an integral part of any comprehensive poverty reduction strategy and ensure that education systems are geared up to prevent, cope with, deal with the after effects and generally contribute to the promotion of non-violent solutions to the wide range of inequalities that have emerged out of recent processes of globalisation (Stewart, 2003; Colenso, 2005).

9.5.1 Violent conflict and military spending
War not only affects civilians physically and psychologically, it also diverts necessary resources away from social sectors such as education. Military spending globally has increased greatly since 2000. The UNDP (2005), UN (2005a) and ILO (2004) reports all note with great concern the increases in military spending over recent years within both developed and low-income countries. The ILO (2004: 105) report notes that if the 15 top military spenders diverted just 5% of their spending to ODA it would generate an extra US$30 billion a year (based on 2001 figures of US$839 billion military budget) which would go a long way towards creating a more secure and peaceful global environment.

The UN report (2005a) notes:

High levels of military spending have impeded the progress of social development, as those countries that allocate a substantial share of total government expenditure to the defence sector also tend to reserve the lowest portion of the budget for the social sectors. Global insecurity resulting from the rise in international terrorism has contributed to increased national security spending in many countries, leading to a further diversion of resources from social development.

UN, 2005a: 5

While the UNDP report notes that:

The chronic under-financing of aid reflects skewed priorities in public spending. Collective security depends increasingly on tackling the underlying causes of poverty and inequality. Yet for every $1 that rich countries spend on aid they allocate another $10 to military budgets. Just the increase in military spending since 2000, if devoted to aid instead, would be sufficient to reach the long-standing UN target of spending 0.7% of GNI on aid. Failure to look beyond military security to human security is reflected in under-investments in addressing some of the greatest threats to human life. Current spending on HIV/AIDS, a disease that claims 3 million lives a year, represents three day’s worth of military spending (UNDP, 2005: 8).

Both in cause and effect then the world community is implicated in the conflicts across the world and any solutions need to address both the internal and external factors promoting conflict.

9.5.2 The effects of war on education
Across recent literature reviewed on conflict and education, there is increasing recognition of the highly complex relationship between education and violent conflict that will be reviewed in this section. Conflict affects the educational chances of children in a range of different ways. Seitz (2004) identifies three different levels at which violent conflict can affect education. Firstly, it affects children directly through the loss of relatives, physical violence, and rape, need to leave home etc. Secondly, the damage caused by war can have a direct affect on the possibility of attending school: danger to get there; economic situation no longer allows for children to pay for schooling (Davies, 2004: 95-99). Thirdly, educational infrastructure and institutions become targets and destroyed – either accidentally or for political reasons. Schools can also be occupied and used as bases for warring factions (as has happened in Colombia).

There is a range of ways that violent conflict directly affects education:

• teachers and children stop going to school out of fear of physical danger, and schools can become recruiting grounds for child soldiers (Bensalah et al, 2001, 18);
• schools are destroyed – in East Timor over 80% of schools were destroyed in September 1999 (Nicolai and Triplehorn, 2003: 2);
• violence in schools can increase as a reflection of the violence outside (Nicolai and Triplehorn, 2003: 2);
• increases in sexual and gender abuse in schools in areas of conflict (ibid.: 5), which leads families to keep their children at home (Women’s Commission, 2004: 16);
• psychological effects of conflict impact on children’s ability to learn;
• both educational access and quality can be destroyed;
- funding to education from the state and the family can be reduced;
- education institutions can often become the battleground upon which wars are fought;
- increases educational inequalities, as richer students are more likely to be able to continue in education and escape the effects of war (Seitz, 2004).

All the factors points suggest that there is a need for an urgent response to the impact of war and conflict on the education of future generations.

### 9.6.2 Education and the production of conflict

Despite the appearance of education as victim of and solution to violence, recent research has noted how education often contributes to the promotion of violence. Many analysts agree that war and conflict are generally caused by exclusion. Issues such as political, cultural and economic inequalities, lack of trust in government, mistrust and suspicion between different ethnic and religious groups, and lack of avenues for peaceful interaction. Recent research (see Bush and Saltarelli, 2000) highlights how education has two faces, and its negative side can promote rather than reduce the chances of violent conflict. The authors note in their introduction:

The negative face shows itself in the uneven distribution of education to create or preserve privilege, the use of education as a weapon of cultural repression, and the production or doctoring of textbooks to promote intolerance. The positive face goes beyond the provision of education for peace programmes, reflecting the cumulative benefits of the provision of good quality education. These include the conflict-dampening impact of educational opportunity, the promotion of linguistic tolerance, the nurturing of ethnic tolerance, and the ‘disarming’ of history (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000: vii).

Through social exclusion, violence and indoctrination, schools can serve as powerful weapons to produce rather than reduce violence. One example of this relationship is pointed out by the UNDP who highlight how school exclusion as a result of poverty contributed in Sierra Leone to young people joining the rebel armies.

> Education provides another example of how violent conflict creates a cycle that is hard to break. One survey of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone found that an overwhelming majority of those who joined the brutal rebellions were youths who had been living in difficult conditions prior to the onset of the war. Based on interviews with 1,000 ex-combatants, the survey found that half had left school because they could not afford the fees or because the school had shut down (UNDP, 2005: 159).

Davies (2004) also discusses the multiple ways that school systems might reproduce social inequalities, increase tension and be a catalyst for war. However, in some countries it is the school system itself that promotes xenophobia and racism towards ethnic groups/religious minorities, and from this sows the seeds of war and conflict. Davies (2004: 110-111) notes schools in South Africa during Apartheid, in Kosovo, and in Taiwan school prepared children, psychologically and militarily, for conflict in explicit ways. These schools thus perpetuate the range of inequalities and prejudices that existed beyond school walls rather than challenging their legitimacy.

Seitz (2004), drawing on the work of Salmi (2000), highlights the different types of violence that can take place in relation to education moving from direct, to indirect, to repressive, and finally alienating violence (Table 9.2). This analysis fits well with Davies (2004) who sees contemporary schooling structures as serving to reproduce inequalities, as well as reproducing and conveying powerful masculine and authoritarian environments and disseminating a highly nationalist and essentialist notion of citizenship that negates the pluralistic reality of societies.

Seitz (2004: 52), drawing on the work of Bush and Saltarelli (2000), provide a range of examples of violence in education: the uneven distribution of education and educational opportunities (restricted access for Kosovan Muslims, similar in Burundi and Rwanda); education as a weapon of cultural repression (Kurdish students denied the right to speak in their mother tongue in Turkish schools); denial of education as a weapon of war (closure of Palestinian schools by Israel); manipulation of history for political purposes (Nazi’s rewriting German history); the manipulation of textbooks (Sri Lankan textbooks in 1970s and 1980s declared Tamils as historic enemy of Sinhalese); the conveying of images asserting superiority of one group over another (South Africa under apartheid conveyed black population as inferior to white); and, segregated education (South Africa).

On a more positive note, all of the authors recognise that education is not necessarily or wholly deleterious. Salmi’s (2000) work is typical of the type of solutions offered to redress the different forms of violence that educational institutions engage in. He notes how each level of educational violence — direct, indirect, repressive and alienating—has its educational antidote/counterpart: education for peace, education for all, ‘education for democracy’ and ‘education for cultural diversity’ (see Table 9.3). These types of analysis point towards the need to attend to both issues of access in low-income countries and also issues of quality, as well as to recognise the complex and doubled edged nature of education as a system of knowledge production.
### Table 9.2 Forms of Violence in the Context of Education

| 1. Direct violence (“deliberate injury to the integrity of human life”) | e.g. Effects of violent conflicts, weapons and violence in the school, corporal punishment, sexual abuse, suicide of students due to failure. |
| 2. Indirect violence (“indirect violation of the right to survival”) | e.g. Illiteracy, inequality of access to education, inequality of education opportunities, insufficient educational infrastructure (lack of hygiene etc.) |
| 3. Repressive violence (“deprivation of fundamental political rights”) | e.g. absence of democracy and co-determination opportunities in schools. |
| 4. Alienating violence (“deprivation of higher rights”) | e.g. culturally biased curricula (dominance culture), suppression of: subjects/views/language of ethnic minorities, no teaching in mother tongue. |

Source: Sietz, 2004: 51

### Table 9.3 Positive Strategies to Stem Violence

| 1. Direct violence | “Education for Peace”: weapon-free schools, ban on corporal punishment. |
| 2. Indirect violence | “Education for All”: equal education opportunities for all, full integration of the disadvantaged, adequate infrastructure. |
| 3. Repressive violence | “Education for Democracy”: democratic school on all levels, civic education. |
| 4. Alienating violence | “Education for Cultural Diversity”: use of mother tongue, bilingual lessons, suitable curricula which respect diversity. |

Source: Sietz, 2004: 54

### 9.6 Education in emergencies and post conflict reconstruction
Education in emergencies is a relatively new field of action and an even newer area of inquiry and investigation (Retamal and Aedo-Richmond, 1998; Sinclair, 2002; Crisp et al, 2001; Bensalah et al, 2001). Sinclair (2002: 22) defines ‘emergency programmes’, of which education is one area, as “all programmes for refugees and displaced or conflict-affected populations, as well as disaster victims”. These programmes seek to guarantee access to education in conflict situation, to take into consideration the special psycho-social needs of youth and adults, contribute to societal reconstruction and reconciliation. Education in Emergencies can be subdivided into the following categories: education for refugees, education for internally displaced persons (IDPs), education under conditions of armed conflicts, insecurity and instability, education for reconstruction after armed conflicts and catastrophes.

Within this field, UNICEF and UNHCR (as might be expected) are particularly active. Likewise, UNESCO has developed a range of educational interventions in this field. Other organisations are the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Norwegian Refugee Council, the International Save the Children Alliance, the Jesuit Refugee Service, and the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children. The Interagency Network on Education in Emergencies (INEE) was set up by UNICEF, UNCHR and UNESCO in 2000, seeking to coordinate action, research and evaluation in this area and ensure that EFA goals in conflict areas are not forgotten. Its objectives are to:

- share knowledge and experience;
- promote greater donor understanding of education in emergencies;
- advocate for education to be included in emergency response;
- make teaching and learning responses available as widely as possible;
- ensure attention is paid to gender issues in emergency education initiatives;
- document and disseminate best practices in the field; and to move towards consensual guidelines on education in emergencies. (Nicolai and Triplehorn, 2003, 14).

Bensalah et al (2001) note that the field of education in emergency and post-emergency situations is new, that it is under researched and poorly evaluated, and there is little analysis of the effectiveness of programmes. Within the field we can loosely divide the types of educational interventions in terms of the nature of conflicts (Table 9.4.)

### Table 9.4 Conflict Status and Type of Educational Initiative

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict status</th>
<th>Type of educational initiative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non conflict; relative peace</td>
<td>Education for prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal trouble; unrest; &quot;pre&quot;conflict</td>
<td>Education in emergencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed conflict</td>
<td>Education for social and civic reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition out of violence; Peace process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Post&quot; conflict</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Seitz, 2004: 40

There is a growing recognition in the programmes and research that education cannot be seen simply as an emergency measure but that it needs to be integrated into broader long-term development objectives. Smith and Vaux (2003: 44) argue for;

...education to be included in a comprehensive analysis of the causes of conflict and a factor in its dynamics, uniting relief responses with development approaches in a ‘smart’ and ‘coherent’ way. Short-term humanitarian assistance should include an education response.

The Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children (2004) lists a series of measures used in the field:

- structured recreational activities for children and young people;
- development of youth centres;
- formal education;
- vocational training;
- accelerated short-term education programmes;
- bridging programmes;
- life skills education;
- teacher training; and
distance courses.
The wide variety of activities reflects the need to think beyond children (Pigozzi 1999: 15) and beyond formal schooling. As Davies (2004) notes, conflicts are highly complex phenomena and thus need highly sophisticated educational responses. Sinclair (2002) has drawn up a total of 14 principles that might be regarded as exemplary and comprehensive standards for “emergency education”:

I. Access to education
1. The right of access to education, recreation and related activities must be ensured, even in crisis situations.
2. Rapid access to education, recreation and related activities should be followed by steady improvement in education quality and coverage, including access to all levels of education and recognition of studies.
3. Education programmes should be gender-sensitive, accessible to and inclusive of all groups.
4. Education should serve as a tool for child protection and prevention of harm.

II. Resources
1. Education programmes should use a community based participatory approach, with emphasis on capacity-building.
2. Education programmes should include a major component of training for teachers and youth/adult educators, and provide incentives to avoid teacher turnover.
3. Crisis and recovery programmes should develop and document locally appropriate targets for resourcing standards, adequate to meet their educational and psychosocial needs.

III. Activities/Curricula
1. All crisis-affected children and young people should have access to education, recreation and related activities, helping to meet their psychosocial needs in the short and longer term.
2. Curriculum policy should support the long-term development of individual students and of the society and, for refugee populations, should be supportive of a durable solution, normally repatriation.
3. Education programmes should be enriched to include life skills for education for health, safety, and environmental awareness.
4. Education programmes should be enriched to include life skills for education for peace/conflict resolution, tolerance, human rights and citizenship.
5. Vocational training programmes should be linked to opportunities for workplace practices of the skills being learned.

IV. Co-ordination and capacity-building
1. Governments and development cooperation agencies should promote co-ordination between all agencies and stakeholders.
2. External assistance programmes should include capacity building to promote transparent, accountable and inclusive system management by local protagonists.

This broadening of the field and focus of ‘emergency education’ reflects the shift from seeing education in emergency situations as a problem of delivery and logistics, to recognition of the complex relationship between education and development. Education is now considered a central component of any pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict situation, as both a catalyst to resolve issues but also as a potential contributor to the generation of conflict (Kagawa, 2005).

9.8 Education for peace, tolerance and reconstruction
One direct pedagogical intervention that education can bring to pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict situations is that of ‘peace education’. The peace education discourse and literature, as might be expected, overlaps with the citizenship and human rights education literature and many researchers, such as Davies (2004), contribute to both fields. Specifically, much of the peace education work promotes a pedagogical approach that can develop proactive conflict resolution and prevention attitudes that can transform societies (Fountain, 1999; Baxter, 2000; Sommers, 2001).
Fountain (1999: 1) defines peace education as

Peace education (…) refers to the process of promoting the knowledge, skills, attitudes and values needed to bring about behaviour changes that will enable children, youth and adults to prevent conflict and violence, both overt and structural; to resolve conflict peacefully; and to create the conditions conducive to peace, whether at an intra-personal, inter-personal, inter-group, national or international level (Fountain, 1999, 1).

Types of ‘Peace Education’ activities include:

- breaking down a segregated and developing an integrated education system;
- promoting mother tongues and foreign languages and the establishment of bilingual schools;
- developing new teaching materials and revising examination contents;
- anchoring peace-building and conflict-preventive work in the curriculum;
- participative structure and opening of schools through peer group education;
- recreational and integration offerings for children and young people (incl. work camps, mediation training, encounter work, sporting activities);
- conflict and reconciliation work in community work;
- training of teaching staff (among other things on the fundamentals of constructive conflict management and dealing with collective traumata); and
- international exchange measures (among other things between countries with similar conflict situations and within the framework of the North-South dialogue).

In some of the literature reviewed there is some concern expressed over the lack of theoretical sophistication in the area; the implication here is that there is a great deal of practical action but little theoretical and conceptual development (Seitz, 2004). Salomon and Nevo (2002) suggest that there is widespread disagreement as to what peace education is; there is little or no consensus on the ability of peace education to achieve its objectives and there is insufficient empirical evidence and analysis to explore what does and does not function. Yet despite the criticisms, in much of the literature there is a commitment to moving the pedagogy and practice of peace education forward.

9.9 Conclusions

In the literature on social capital, citizenship and human rights and education and conflict, there is renewed interest in the role of education as a mechanism for social cohesion to manage a world of change and flux. Much of the literature reflects a concern with processes that are often destabilizing and which can threaten stability within and between nations. Within this context Social capital’s emergence as an analytical tool is a recognition by powerful institutions, such as the World Bank, that in order for markets to function they need transparent and efficient institutions and social cohesion and trust amongst the population. Conflict serves to undermine economic development in a myriad of ways. However, some researchers continue to regard social capital as too ‘capital’ centric, seeing the social as merely a necessary tool to promote economic development, and serving to obscure the fundamental structural issues of racism, ethnic, gender and social inequalities that represent the catalysts for the emergence of conflict.

The recent literature on citizenship and human rights and that of education and conflict overlap in important ways in recognising the two faces of education’s role in these issues, which has been an important development. There is also concern expressed within the literature on human rights, citizenship and peace education of the lack of good evidence as to the value and impact of this type of education in helping address the kinds of problems they seek to overcome. More systematic research is needed to evaluate to what extent progressive educational interventions are really able to challenge the wide-ranging conflicts that exist.

Despite these broad concerns, the literature provides evidence of the re-emergence of a more holistic understanding of the competing functions and role of education within modern societies and a shift away from the narrow economism of the 1980s, which is to be welcomed. The danger however, is that at the turn of the millennium the social re-merges either as a mere adjunct or facilitator for economic development (as in much of the mainstream social capital literature) or as a means of social indoctrination (as we saw in Chapter 5 on the role of USAID during the Cold War). Active and responsible citizenship that promotes the values and principles of the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights needs to go beyond narrow economism and indoctrination and towards the cultivation of inquiring, active and critical minds that can produce a new generation of citizens able to challenge the serious inequalities and conflicts that persist across the world. For educators across the world, this represents one of the key challenges of the new millennia, in both the North and the South.
Chapter 10: Globalisation, Regionalisation and Africa

10.1 Introduction

In Chapter 2 we described the phenomenon of regionalism as an important aspect of globalisation. In this chapter we deepen and extend the analysis through considering regional responses to globalisation in Africa and the implications of these for education and training policy and practice. The focus on regionalism is significant because, as we will see, regional initiatives in education and training have proliferated in the global era. Further, although regionalism affects all parts of the globe, we have focused on Africa because as a region it is most at risk of being left behind by the globalisation process (World Bank, 2006a; ESRC, 2006). References will be drawn, however, to examples of regionalism elsewhere. The key question to be addressed is if a regional model of educational development provides a suitable basis for Africa to respond to the challenges posed by globalisation.

The chapter will provide a resume of the impact of globalisation on Africa and will set out key regional initiatives in the area of education and training. Discussion will then turn to outlining ten themes that have emerged from the literature. Each theme provides a useful focus for educational issues and debates about how the continent as a whole might deal with issues related to globalisation and education as described in earlier sections of the report. Rather than representing a coherent regional response the ten themes instead highlight a series of policy tensions related to differences in priorities and approaches between initiatives as well as to more intractable problems of widening austerity and a lack of capacity. It will be argued that despite these tensions, developing regional initiatives in education and training is increasingly important for Africa in the global era but that there are currently important barriers that limit or mediate the effectiveness of these responses. These are related on the one hand to the dominance of global agendas and on the other to the fact that education and training policy remains in large measure a national concern. Although the focus of this chapter - in keeping with the overall emphasis of this book - is on the supra-national level, we envisage that it will provide a context for the discussion of national case studies such as that of Kenya in the complementary volume to this book (see Green et al, 2007). In this respect, we have drawn particularly on an East African perspective on regionalism, a perspective that reflects the backgrounds and experiences of our African based team members.

10.2 Africa in a globalised world

The impact of globalisation on development has been discussed in previous chapters (see in particular Chapter two). It is worth summarising some of the key findings relating to Africa using the same framework as was employed in Chapter 2 and 9. This will provide a basis for considering regional responses in the next section.

There can be no question that the challenges facing Africa in the global era are stark. However, there are differing interpretations as to the root cause of Africa’s predicament. The recent Commission for Africa (CFA, 2005) identifies a range of causes. At the political level, the CFA identifies issues of poor governance and civil conflict. It also identifies a host of structural issues including a poor investment climate linked to instability and poor governance; a continuing dependency on primary commodities; high transport costs; a weak transport infrastructure going back to the colonial legacy; and, late entry into manufacturing. These structural factors are exacerbated by environmental ones; such as, low agricultural productivity and the impact of climate change. Finally, the report identifies a range of human factors including the impact of poor health and low levels of education coupled with the pressures of population growth and urbanisation. Significantly, the CFA does implicate a range of factors associated with Africa’s relationship with the outside world as contributing to the continent’s malaise including low levels of FDI, a changing aid environment and Africa’s lack of control over world markets for primary commodities although interestingly they are not given the same causal status as the political, structural, environmental and human factors cited.

The Commission for Africa was launched by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair in February 2004 with the aim of taking a fresh look at Africa’s past and present and the international community’s role in its development path. Although it was established in part to respond to NEPAD and other initiatives on the African continent, it was also designed to take advantage of the United Kingdom’s chairmanship of both the G8 and, in the second half of the year, the European Union, and to target recommendations at these bodies as well as other wealthy countries and African countries.
### Box 10.1 Africa in a Globalised World

#### INTEGRATION

- With 11 percent of the world’s population (700 million people), Sub Saharan Africa accounts for only about 1 percent of the global gross domestic product (GDP) (World Bank, 2005c: xx).
- Africa has seen its share of world trade fall from 6% in 1980 to less than 2% in 2002. Africa has suffered because developed countries restrict Africa’s ability to sell its products in their countries as well as other ‘supply side’ barriers (CFA, 2005).
- Share of world exports that dropped from more than 3.5 percent in 1970 to about 1.4 percent at the end of 2002 (World Bank, 2005c: xx).
- Flows to investment in Africa by foreign investors are average for all low-income countries if measured as a percentage of Africa’s income (2-3%) but are low in absolute terms. It is strongly focused on high value resource-based industries like oil and diamonds (CFA, 2005).
- Large sums of money depart Africa in the form of capital flight estimated at $15 billion a year. About 40% of the stock of African savings is held outside the continent (CFA, 2005).
- As a percentage of GDP, Africa’s share of remittances is higher than that of either the East Asia or Pacific region or the Europe or Central Asia region. However, in cash terms, Africa receives less in remittances than does any other low-income region. (CFA, 2005)
- Over the last few years, nearly half of all aid money to Africa has returned to the developed world in debt repayments; that is to say that for every dollar received in aid, nearly 50 cents has gone straight back to the developed world in debt payments (CFA, 2005).
- Measured as a share of donor countries’ incomes, aid has halved since the 1960s. However, Africa now receives around 5% of its income from aid, which is a much bigger proportion than other low-income regions get (CFA, 2005).

#### INADEQUACY OF GROWTH

- The GDP per African has fallen by 13 percent, compared to 1981 (World Bank, 2005c: xx).
- Between 1980 and 2002, sub-Saharan Africa’s population grew from 2383 to 689 million people – an increase of 80%. This population is moving into towns at a very rapid rate placing a huge strain on infrastructural investment for housing, water, supply and sanitation (CFA, 2005).
- Sub-Saharan Africa – needs an annual growth rate of income per capita of 5% for 10 years to achieve the MDG target of halving poverty. The actual growth rate since 2000 has been 1.6% (UNDP, 2005: 66).
- Despite an overall gloomy picture, there is considerable diversity between African countries. 24 countries in sub-Saharan Africa had 5% or more economic growth in 2003 and falls in poverty are directly associated with growth (CFA, 2005).

#### INFORMALISATION

- Open Unemployment increased from 13.7% in 1990 to 14.4% in 2002 (ILO, 2004: 42).
INEQUALITY

- 34 of the world’s forty-eight poorest countries in the world and twenty-four of the thirty-two countries ranked lowest in human development are in Africa. (World Bank 2005c: xx).
- Per capita income levels in sub-Saharan Africa decreased between 1980 and 2001 from 3.3 to 1.9 per cent (UN, 2005a: 47).
- Average per capita income is US$342 per person (excluding South Africa) but wide variance: $100 per head in Burundi to over $7000 in the Seychelles (World Bank, 2005c: xx).
- Poverty and hunger are deepening in sub-Saharan Africa with the number of poor people expected to rise from 315 million in 1999 to 404 million by 2015. (CFA, 2005).
- Some 34% of the population are malnourished – almost double the figure in the rest of the low-income world and hunger kills more people than the entire continent’s infectious diseases put together (CFA, 2005).
- Average life expectancy in Africa is only 46 years compared to 63 years in South Asia and 69 in South East Asia (CFA, 2005).
- Whereas thirty years ago the average income in Africa was twice that of both East and South Asia the situation is reverse now and the average African income lags behind that of people in all other regions of the world (CFA, 2005).

INSUFFICIENT HUMAN CAPITAL

- African has the lowest school life expectancy of any region. A child in Africa can expect to attend school (including primary, secondary and tertiary education) for 7.8 years compared to a world average of 10.5 and an average for all low-income countries of 9.9 years (UNESCO, 2005b: 38).
- The gross enrolment ration (GER) in pre-primary education is the lowest for any region at 5.6% compared to a global average of 48.6% and an average for low-income countries of 34.3% (UNESCO, 2005b: 302).
- The region has the lowest GER in primary education of any region at 91% in 2002 with the largest number of children of primary school age out of school children. Primary education on the continent has the highest drop out rate for any region (40.5% compared to 25.5% for all low-income countries) and the lowest transition rate to secondary education (53.8% compared to 84.5% for all low income countries) (UNESCO, 2005b: 44).
- Africa has the lowest GER for any region in secondary education at 28.4% and in 2002 compared to a global average of 65.2% and an average for all low-income countries of 58.3% (UNESCO, 2005b: 342).
- At 2.5% Africa has the lowest GER of any region in tertiary education. This compares with a global average of 21.2% and an average for low-income countries of 11% (UNESCO, 2005b: 350).
- Sub-Saharan Africa – 25 million people are infected with HIV in sub-Saharan Africa, out of a global total of 38 million (p. 26). Fewer than 4% of people in need of antiretroviral treatment for HIV are receiving drugs (UNESCO 2005b: p. 27).
- About 150,000 African children die per month as a result of malaria (World Bank, 2005c: xxi).
- Health expenditures averaged only $13 per head in sub-Saharan Africa, excluding South Africa, and were below $10 per head in 16 countries (World Bank, 2005c: xxi).
- Illiteracy was 35 percent in 2003 (World Bank, 2005c: xxi).

INSTABILITY AND INSECURITY

- In 2000, 20 out of 45 SSA countries were directly involved in armed conflict (Obidegwu 2004:2).
- Of the 49 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, at least 19 of them (excluding Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe) have been involved in internal armed conflicts (Obidegwu, 2004:2).
- Over 800,000 people were killed in the genocide in Rwanda in three months in 1994 (Obidegwu, 2004:2).
- 200,000 people killed in Burundi since violence erupted in 1993 (Obidegwu, 2004:2).
- Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), formerly Zaire, has witnessed the mother of all complex violent conflicts since the mid 1990s with an estimated 3.5 million lives lost in this continuing tragedy. (Obidegwu, 2004:2).
- It is estimated in 2000 that about 14 million people have been uprooted from their homes by conflict in Africa. (Obidegwu, 2004:2).
An alternative analysis, written from the perspective of the Namibian labour movement, exemplifies a more radical tradition of thought on the continent dating back to the work of Walter Rodney (1972) and Kwame Nkrumah (1965) and incorporating recent analyses of Africa’s problems by scholars of globalisation discussed in earlier chapters (see Amin, 1997; Bond, 2001; Hoogvelt, 1997). Although some of the issues highlighted overlap with those identified by the CFA, there is a difference in tone and emphasis, particularly with respect to the role of the former colonising countries in Africa’s current crisis. From this perspective Africa’s current position in relation to globalisation is explained principally in terms of the legacy of the slave trade and extraction of natural resources by Europeans which culminated in the colonisation of the continent and more recently by neo-colonialism which has been exacerbated by neo-liberal globalisation; the impact of the ‘Cold War’ which fuelled many foreign funded wars and conflicts; the continued material, financial and intellectual dependency of Africa on her former colonisers; the Bretton Woods institutions (IMF / World Bank) and the use of foreign aid as instruments through which the West continues to dictate - often to the detriment of the African people - policy and governance in Africa; and, poor leadership by most African leaders who are preoccupied with their positions of power and self-enrichment with only a minority of African leaders prepared to voluntarily relinquish power (LaRII, 2003).

These different approaches to understanding the causes of Africa’s challenges in the global era are also reflected in alternative views as to how the region as a whole ought to respond to the challenges posed by globalisation.

### 10.3 Regionalism in the African context

In Chapter 2 we presented ‘regionalism’ as a process of intergovernmental collaboration. We also discussed new regionalism. Crucially, as far as a consideration of Africa is concerned, the new regionalism is not confined to formal associations between nation states but includes informal networks and associations between actors in civil society operating at a number of different scales.

It is instructive to consider regionalism in Africa in relation to these broader shifts in understanding. To begin with, regionalism on the continent is far from a new phenomenon. Regional flows and networks including the migrations of the Bantu people and the development of trade routes predate the colonial encounter. Different eras of colonialism saw the spread of Islam and Christianity and other cultural forms, including languages and formal schooling along Islamic and European lines, across whole swathes of the continent. Formal efforts to create greater co-operation between African states were instigated under colonial rule and these associations sometimes formed the basis of fledgling regions in the post-colonial era such as the East African Common Market (EACM) (which has subsequently collapsed) and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) (which has transformed itself into the Southern African Development Community (SADC)). Pan-Africanism, understood as a process of forging solidarity and a common identity between peoples of African descent has a reach beyond even the African continent. Garveyite thinking along with ideas such as negritude, Black consciousness, Black Power, Africanism and African socialism influenced the form and content of struggles, including educational struggles, against colonial rule. Ideas of projecting an essential African ‘essence’ and common cultural identity onto the global stage lie at the heart of some interpretations of the African Renaissance project which in turn lies behind initiatives such as the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD)19 (Cheru, 2002; Tikly, 2003a).

The post-independence era coincided with the first wave of regionalism described above. Besides, SADCC and COMESA, the now defunct Organisation for African Unity (OAU) can be seen as examples of the old regionalism in so far as the key underlying principle was to bolster the sovereignty of the participating nation states. By way of contrast, the new-look Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the recently inaugurated Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), along with the newly fledged African Union (AU), have been overtly modelled along lines similar to that of the EU and are concerned with projecting new macro- and sub-regional identities as well as encouraging economic integration and development.

The focus on informal as well as formal co-operation between nation states is particularly significant for a study of the African context. Informal, regional networks between NGOs and the private sector have grown in number and influence in recent years, as we will see in relation to education. Other examples of informal regionalism including the operations of West African criminal gangs in Southern Africa, trans-border gun running and drug and diamond smuggling, war zones and regional conflicts have also proliferated and represent a darker side of the phenomenon on the continent. The analysis below will take account of formal (state centred), informal (civil society based) and mixed (state and civil society based) examples of educational regionalism. Unlike examples of the old regionalism on the continent, these structures also operate at a range of scales. The recent Commission for Africa (CFA) and indeed NEPAD, for example, are often portrayed as a partnership between Africa and the rest of the World and in the case of the CFA, its trans-continental nature is reflected in its membership. The AU and NEPAD are perhaps more accurately described as ‘macro-regional’ in scope, on a par with other macro regions such as the EU.

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19 NEPAD was adopted by African Heads of State in October 2001. It is the official development project of the newly fledged African Union (AU). NEPAD is an integrated development plan with the goals of achieving sustainable economic growth, eradicating poverty and ending Africa’s marginalisation from the globalisation process (NEPAD, 2001a). It is conceived as a commitment on the part of Africa’s leaders to their people and as a framework of partnership between Africa and the rest of the world.
NAFTA and ASEAN. SADC and COMESA are variously portrayed as either ‘macro-regions’ in their own right or as ‘sub-regions’ (when considered in relation to the AU, NEPAD and so on.)

Although there are clearly differences between the old and new regionalisms in Africa there is also continuity and overlap. For example, just as the old regions were primarily concerned with economic integration, the new regions in Africa as elsewhere have also generally prioritised economic over socio-political and cultural goals (Robertson, 2006; Vale and Maseko, 1998). Indeed, arguably more than is the case elsewhere, the new regionalism in Africa is understood mainly as a vehicle for economic development. For example, some commentators argue that regional initiatives ought to be principally focused on pre-emptive national and regional development strategies and economic policy co-ordination amongst African countries (Mazrui, 1999; Adedeji, 1998; Mayer, 1998). The South African President, Thabo Mbeki, draws on the idea of ‘developmental regionalism’ as a means of securing African interests. In this view, Africa’s successful integration into global markets lies in the extent to which African economies can diversify their industrial base and export markets and hence become less dependent upon domestic markets and foreign imports. Successful participation in the global economy can be achieved through participation in regional and sub-regional trading blocks that are more able to attract foreign investors and intervene in the market than are individual nation states. In these kinds of analyses, the socio-political aspects of development are considered important but follow from the economic ones.

Further, just as the old regions were sometimes portrayed as representing the interests of elites on the continent and legitimising unpopular regimes, questions have also been raised about the nature and extent of the democratic process in the new regional structures (Simon, 2003). Many commentators have questioned the credentials of some of the leaders and regimes associated with the new regions. These criticisms have been most vociferous in relation to the AU and NEPAD (Bond, 2001; LaRRI, 2003) and the Commission for Africa. They must be seen, however, in the context of a discussion of the form of the nation state that has emerged in Africa.

The development of old and new regionalism in other parts of the globe has been linked to the predominance of the so-called Westphalian state model. The form of state in Africa, however, is more commonly characterised as a ‘post-colonial’ state. Whereas nations based on the Westphalian model emerged from pre-existing empirical entities where the borders that territorially defined post-colonial African states were arbitrarily drawn by colonisers. Unlike in the Westphalian model, the mode of rule in post-colonial states has variously been described as ‘personal rule’, ‘elite accommodation’ and ‘belly politics’ and as a ‘shadow’ or ‘neo-patrimonial state’ (see Basis, 2003 for a summary). These alternative models are relevant for a consideration of the ‘good governance’ agenda in Africa (see Chapter 6). In the model of the neo-patrimonial state, for example, bureaucratic and patrimonial norms co-exist. The state is able to extract and redistribute resources but this process, unlike in the Westphalian state model, is privatised. ‘In redressing the colonial legacy of racially inherited privilege, the independent states create a specific patrimonial path of re-distribution which divides the indigenous majority along regional, religious, ethnic and at times, family lines’ (Boáis, 2003: 33). The resulting phenomenon of weak states but strong regimes provides a source of contradiction within the African state system though it remains resilient.

Through providing a legal framework protecting the sovereign authority of post-colonial states, the OAU and, arguably the AU and other regional bodies, can be seen as complicit in the whole process. Some commentators also writing about the AU and NEPAD, however, attempt to chart a third path. For instance, whilst recognising the validity of some of the criticism levelled at Africa’s leadership and of the NEPAD consultation process, they point out that the framework contains clear commitments to peace, security, democracy and greater public accountability but that these aspects need to be further strengthened. These commentators point to the establishment of the peer review mechanism as an example of this (see Cilliers, 2003 on the African Peer Review Mechanism [APRM]). Some also suggest that ‘good governance’ should not necessarily rely on Western models (Cornwell, 1998; Cheru, 2002; Ake, 1988)21. Cheru (2002) for example, has identified a series of grass roots, civil society organisations

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20 An interesting but unexplored dimension would be to consider the implications for education of the proliferation of ‘micro-regions’ on the continent, i.e. regions that operate within or across national boundaries but at a scale that is between the national and the local. Examples here include conservation areas and spatial development initiatives such as the Maputo corridor (see Simon, 2003 for a discussion of these initiatives).

21 A summary of the submissions to the CFA secretariat collected during the consultation process reveal that whilst there was wide praise for the opportunity created and the open nature of the process there was also criticism of a perceived patronising tone with too much emphasis on ‘African leadership’ or ‘African success’ which risked appearing to give credibility to current leaders who may not all deserve it. The need for real partnership and African ownership was repeatedly stressed. There was criticism of an apparent hesitation to name the ruling class oppression that exists in many places (with women, the rural poor, migrants and refugees among principal victims), and the divisive role of ethnicity, tribalism, religion and regionalism. There was a strong message that youth needs to be treated as a priority’ (CFA Secretariat, 2005: 1). Others have criticised the fact that the CFA was instigated and led by the British Prime Minister that casts further doubt on whether it can be considered a truly African initiative.

22 A particular ‘ideal type’ model of the state as a sovereign authority associated with the peace agreement in Westphalia in 1648 that is characterized by a demarcation between the public and private institutions; the autonomy of the state which lies in its control over economic resource and a monopoly on violence; the assumption that the rule of law is based on popular support; and, that the state is a nation-state, in the sense that it is governed by an ‘in-group’ based on common cultural and ethnic heritage.

23 Cornwell argues that greater accountability of African leaders ought to involve ‘the creation of voluntary neighbourhood governments and rural grass roots movements that produce alternative institutions of decision making, drawing on customary notions of justice, fairness and political obligation’ (1998: 14). In a similar vein, Ake (1988: 35), suggests that involving the vast
such as peasants’ organisations, informal economy and self-help associations, the human rights movement, trade unions and religious organisations whose participation in the political process would help to guarantee a form of ‘democracy from below’. Although Cheru is here referring to processes of political representation and voice at the level of the nation state, these ideas are also expressed in relation to the regional level as well. They accord, for example, with Mittelman’s (2000) concept of ‘transformative regionalism’ which refers to the alternative and bottom-up forms of cultural identity and regional self-organisation and self-protection, such as pro-democracy forces, women’s movements, environmentalists and other civil society movements.

Critics have also asked whether the new regionalism in Africa reflects the hegemony of neo-liberal economic models that are designed to simply slot Africa into the global market (Simon, 2003; Mittelman, 2000). Indeed, a consistent criticism of both NEPAD and the CFA have been in terms of their supposed neo-liberal and market-led underpinnings (Bond, 2001; LaRRI, 2003; WDM, 2005) which many critics perceive as being against the interests of the poor. These commentators argue that both initiatives see Africa principally as a vast and, as yet under-exploited market place. A related criticism levelled specifically at NEPAD, is that stronger economies, such as South Africa, are more disposed to acting as the agents of globalisation, leading other African economies into the global market and providing a ‘way in’ for non-African, particularly US interests into Africa (Bond, 2001)24.

These authors question the efficacy of such an approach and suggest that since the 1980s, neo-liberal policies, associated for example with structural adjustment, have served to increase rather than to decrease poverty and Africa’s marginalisation (see also LaRRI, 2003). They also argue that the neo-liberal model put forward in the initiatives represents a ‘one size fits all’ approach to development that does not take account of the huge differences in the economic and political contexts between countries (LaRRI, 2003; CFA Secretariat, 2005; WDM, 2005). Some of them (LaRRI, 2003, for example) advocate a return to more protectionist policies projecting what Scholte et al describe as an ‘economic nationalist’ perspective (ESRC, 2006). That is to say they represent a backlash against the worst effects of globalisation on the African continent through reasserting the need for individual governments to intervene in markets through, for example, creating conditionalities that make it much harder for overseas firms and TNCs to operate.

In contrast to this position, Scholte et al also outline a global ‘social market’ or ‘social democratic’ approach. This can be seen to characterise the views of other commentators who have attempted to chart a third, critical but supportive position in relation to regionalism in Africa (Ajulu, 2001; Cheru, 2002; Khor, 2002, Africa Now, 2005). These authors argue that whatever one may think of globalisation and regionalism, it is unavoidable and that the task for African economies is to maximise the advantages it brings whilst minimising the risks. Ajulu, for instance argues that Mbeki, one of the chief architects of NEPAD, is actually opposed to the idea of untrammelled market forces and sees a significant role for national, regional and global regulation and intervention in markets in order to achieve the objectives of ending poverty and underdevelopment. Such a view is also based on the assumption that instead of globalisation being seen simply as serving the interests of the richer nations and global elites that it can also be made to work to some degree at least, in the interests of the world’s poor, i.e. that globalisation is an inherently contradictory process. Such a view accords with what Held et al (1999) describe as a ‘transformationalist’ view of global flows and networks (see Chapter 2) and falls within the grain of more recent calls for instituting new forms of democratic governance and accountability at the global level including reform of the WTO and a stronger voice for Africa and other low-income countries within the World Bank and other multilateral organisations (Khor, 2002; Atkinson, 2002)25.

10.4 The new regionalism in African education

The aim of this section is to provide an overview of the key characteristics of a range of regional initiatives in education that between them exemplify what may be termed the ‘new regionalism in African education’. Space does not allow for a detailed exposition of each initiative although references are given. Of more significance than the details is the analysis of the phenomenon itself. Although some of the initiatives are not exclusively educational in content, they all have important implications for education and training policy and practice. They all vary considerably in scope and focus, as we will see.

Arguably the two most influential initiatives to be discussed are NEPAD and the CFA, which have already been mentioned. Of the two, NEPAD has the highest profile on the continent and operates as a key point of reference for the other initiatives. Education and training have a critical role to play in relation to both initiatives. In NEPAD, for example, education has a role to play in agricultural development through agricultural extension initiatives, in health education and measures to reduce population growth, in bridging the digital divide and developing science and technology. The Secretariat has produced four key documents in the area of education and measures to reduce population growth, in bridging the digital divide and developing science and technology. The Secretariat has produced four key documents in the area of education and training covering reversing the brain drain (NEPAD, 2001b); bridging the education gap (NEPAD, 2001c); skills...
development (NEPAD, 2001d); and, on integrating higher education (NEPAD, 2001e). Likewise, the CFA (2005) report has a considerable amount to say about education and, like NEPAD, perceives it as part of a larger framework of investing in people and capacity building.

The Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE) was created in 1992 as a response to the slow pace of implementation of Education for All goals in sub-Saharan Africa28. The overall goal is to increase access and retention as well as improve the quality of education for all girls within the school system, and for women in universities. The Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA) was established at the initiative of the World Bank in 198827. Then called "Donors to African Education" (DAE), its objective was to foster collaboration and coordination between development agencies in support of education in Africa. ADEA now focuses on developing partnerships between Ministers of Education and funding agencies in order to promote effective education policies based on African leadership and ownership. The African Virtual University (AVU) also originated as a project of the World Bank but is now an independent NGO based in Kenya. Its aim is to build capacity and support economic development by provide world-class, quality education and training programmes to students and professionals in Africa. Through using the power of modern telecommunications technology the AVU is able to broadcast lectures from world class academics to 57 learning centres in 27 African countries29.

The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) protocol was signed and ratified by the 14 SADC heads of States on 8th September 1997 at Blantyre, Malawi29. Whereas the emphasis and priorities of NEPAD, the CFA, FAWE and ADEA are linked to tackling broader continent-wide systemic issues of poverty reduction and human resource development, the SADC protocol is more overtly related to education’s role in supporting regional economic integration, principally through achieving the ultimate objective of equivalence, harmonisation and standardisation of education and training systems in the region within twenty years. The Great Lakes Initiative (GLI)30, on the other hand, is a recent inter-governmental response to civil strife, political instability, and health calamities (like Ebola and the HIV/AIDS pandemic) in the Great Lakes Region. Even though education is touched upon only perfunctorily in the founding declaration, the members did make some commitments including: a pledge to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); to develop and promote comprehensive curricula on the culture of peace in their educational systems; and, to promote the use of Kiswahili as a working language in the Great Lakes Region.

The Association of African Universities (AAU) and the Inter-University Council for East Africa (IUCEA) are regional bodies representing higher education interests on the continent31 whilst the Southern and East African Consortium for Monitoring Education Quality (SACMEQ) developed out of a programme of research collaboration between the International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) and a number of Ministries of Education in the Southern Africa Sub-region. The focus for this work has been on developing long-term strategies

28 FAWE was registered in Kenya as a pan African NGO in 1993 with a Secretariat in Nairobi. Since then, it has grown into a network of 33 National Chapters with a wide range of Membership that includes women policy makers and male ministers of education who are associate members. FAWE manages to attract third party funding to commission research and has published a series of working papers and research reports covering topics related to access and quality of education for girls and women at different levels in formal and non-formal settings and in different country settings and on specific issues such as teenage pregnancy and sexual harassment30. A good example of this was the Female Education in Science and Mathematics in Africa (FEMSA) project which was conducted across four African countries in West and Eastern Africa. FAWE has a website (http://www.fawe.org) and produces a quarterly newsletter.

29 The specific objectives of ADEA are to Promote dialogue and partnerships; develop consensus on policy issues facing education in Africa, reinforce African Ministries' capacities to develop, manage, and implement education policies; promote the sharing of experiences and successful strategies; promote nationally-driven education policies, projects, and programs. ADEA’s core activities focus around a biennial conference for education Ministers, donors and specialists. It also has a series of working groups in key areas such as learning materials and distance education and these broadly aim at commissioning research and disseminating good practice. ADEA organises exchange programmes and study tours as well as sub-regional Ministerial meetings on specific topics such as HIV/AIDS prevention and the use of ICTs in distance education. The Steering Committee is composed of ten African ministers of education, chosen by their peers, and funding agencies (currently 20). ADEA has a permanent secretariat housed at the Institute for International Education and Planning in Paris.

28 For details of the AVU, see http://www.avu.org/about.asp.

29 The protocol expresses conviction that “in Education and training a concerted effort by member states is necessary to adequately equip the Region for the 21st century and beyond” (SADC 1997: 2). The SADC heads were further convinced “that concerted effort can only be effected through the implementation of co-ordinated, comprehensive and integrated programmes of education and training that meet the needs of the Region” (ibid).

30 See http://www.aglionline.org/ (Last accessed 14/08/06).

31 The AAU, whose headquarters is in Accra, Ghana, was formed in November 1967 at a founding conference in Rabat, Morocco, attended by representatives of 34 universities who adopted the constitution of the Association. This followed earlier consultations among executive heads of African universities at a UNESCO conference on higher education in Africa in Antananarivo, Madagascar, in 1962 and at a conference of heads of African universities in 1963 in Khartoum, Sudan. The AAU is the apex organisation and principal forum for consultation, exchange of information and cooperation among the universities in Africa. The IUCEA is the only surviving Institution of the East African Community, which became defunct in 1977. Writing in the IUCEA News letter (No. 22, 2001) the Secretary General emphasized their resolve to move the council to the centre position in co-coordinating and enhancing academic undertakings of both private and public universities and providing advice to member states on matters pertaining to higher education in East Africa.
for building the capacity of educational planners to monitor and evaluate basic education systems. In 1993 a proposal was prepared by a group of educational planners that aimed to extend the reach and formal status of this work by creating the consortium. SACMEQ is ‘owned’ by the Ministries of Education that it serves and the mission is to assist educational planners and researchers to undertake studies of the quality of their education systems by working in a co-operative manner that allows them to share their experiences and to learn from each other.

Clearly, the above initiatives are extremely diverse in terms of their origins, scope and their objectives. Nonetheless, an attempt will be made to make some generalisations about the new regionalism in African education on the basis of a consideration of these initiatives. Firstly, although most of the new regional structures that have been discussed developed during the 1990s and thus coincide in a temporal sense with the emergence of the new regionalism globally, this is not uniquely the case. The IUCEA, for example, is the last surviving institution of the East African Community, which was established during the colonial era. The continent-wide AU also dates back to the early 1960s and the development of the OAU. Secondly, they all combine aspects of formal and informal networks. Some, such as the AU, NEPAD, the GLI and SADC are best described as ‘formal’ because they hinge on governmental cooperation. Others, such as the AUU, the IUCEA and the AVU, are more accurately described as ‘informal’ in so far as they are almost completely non-governmental in their membership and operations. The situation is more complex with actors. FAWE, for instance, although rooted in civil society, includes Ministers of Education and other government officials in many of its senior positions. Likewise, although ADEA and SACMEQ include donors, NGOs, researchers and other kinds of civil society-based organisations and individuals in their core activity, both are led by government ministers and are based at a national level within Ministries of Education.

Thirdly, all of the organisations operate at a number of scales in ways that suit their objectives. Organisations such as FAWE, ADEA, the AVU and the AUU also operate at a macro-regional level whilst the SADC protocol on education and training, the IUCEA and SACMEQ operate across two or more sub-regions. Although they each project a regional identity, the nature of that identity clearly varies. Some project a more top down approach to regionalism as we have seen in relation to NEPAD and the CFA for instance. Others, such as FAWE, project a more grassroots approach. A feature of all of the initiatives is that they each seek to project an indigenous, regional response that is critical for gaining popular support and legitimacy within the continent. ADEA, the AVU and SACMEQ have their origins as initiatives instigated by multilaterals before leadership over the initiatives was placed in the hands of African Ministers themselves as this was considered important for the legitimacy of the projects.

The development of these initiatives reflects the growing significance of the regional level. For African governments, operating at a regional scale provides an opportunity for linking regional education and training frameworks and initiatives to regional development projects. This is most clearly seen in relation to NEPAD and the CFA. The regional level provides unique opportunities for sharing and disseminating effective practice across country contexts, enabling economies of scale in dissemination and other activities. In the case of some of the initiatives (NEPAD, ADEA, FAWE, AUU and SADCMEQ, for example), organising at the regional level is important for enabling comparative cross-national research. Distance education initiatives such as the AVU offer significant opportunities for education and training across regions. The SADC protocol on education and training (SADC, 1997), for example, aims to encourage co-operation in policy analysis and formulation, basic and intermediate education and training, research development, lifelong education and training and publishing and library resources. The ultimate objective of the protocol is to progressively achieve the equivalence, harmonisation and standardisation of the education and training systems in the region in order to assist the sharing of resources and to encourage student and staff mobility.

A pan-African, regional or even sub-regional focus can also be attractive to donors and outside agencies for many of the reasons set out above but also because it provides a means for communicating simultaneously with a number of African leaders and to influence developments across a number of country contexts. In this respect, the regional level provides a convenient ‘way in’ outside of the confines of more traditional bilateral mechanisms and

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32 The network works closely with the International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) to co-ordinate the delivery of intensive training programmes focused on the requirements of the research, and also to facilitate access to advanced technical knowledge and computer-based techniques. The SACMEQ Coordinating Center is located within UNESCO's Harare Office. It has a Coordinator and operates under the overall guidance of a Management Committee chaired by Zimbabwe's Minister for Education. The SACMEQ network has completed two major cross-national studies of the quality of education in Southern and Eastern Africa. The SACMEQ I Project (1995-1999) was completed by seven Ministries of Education (Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Tanzania (Zanzibar), Zambia, and Zimbabwe). The SACMEQ II Project (2000-2003) was completed by fourteen Ministries of Education (Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania (Mainland), Tanzania (Zanzibar), Uganda, and Zambia).

33 A good example of this was the recent Female Education in Science and Mathematics in Africa (FEMSA) project which was conducted in across four African countries in West and Eastern Africa. FAWE was a grantee for this project.

34 The recent expansion of the University of South Africa's distance education programmes, for example, into Southern and Central Africa also serves to highlight the potential of using information and communication technologies to foster skills formation across national borders.
relationships. This is seen in relation to the CFA, for instance\textsuperscript{34} but also in the AVU, ADEA, SACMEQ and SADC. For these reasons the CFA, along with many of the other initiatives, sees building capacity at the regional as well as the national level as a priority. In the case of bodies, such as the AVU, ADEA, SACMEQ and SADC, capacity building incorporates developing not just expertise in leadership but also in research and other technical areas of expertise.

Despite the increasing significance of the regional level it is critical for all of the initiatives that they maintain influence at the national level reflecting the fact that education policy remains the principle responsibility of national governments. (To this extent they remain more in keeping with the so-called ‘old regionalism’ which is ‘state-centric’). Influence over national policy agendas is achieved in slightly different ways, however. With the exception of the IUCEA, the other initiatives include in their leadership and/or in their core activities representatives of national ministries. In the case of NEPAD and SACMEQ they also have representatives working within national ministries to implement initiatives. Meta-regional initiatives, like ADEA, also operate at a sub-regional level to address issues that arise at that level. Even for a predominantly civil society based organisation, such as FAWE, it is significant that it is organised in terms of national chapters that are then represented at a regional level. This provides an opportunity for FAWE to mobilise and provide a forum for individuals and organisations that operate exclusively at a local and national level to put pressure on national policy agendas. It is also at the local level that FAWE can seek to stimulate innovation in practice that can then be disseminated at national and regional levels.

A consideration of governance issues draws attention to an important distinction between more ‘top down’ forms of regionalism (such as NEPAD the CFA, SADC, ADEA and SACMEQ) and more ‘bottom up’ initiatives such as FAWE, the AUU and the IUCEA. Some of the civil society based initiatives such as FAWE and the AUU have developed mechanisms for influencing policy largely through their collaboration with other regional initiatives such as the AU and NEPAD. Questions remain as to whether any of the civil society initiatives have sufficient capacity to influence change and to provide in Mittleman’s (2000) terms examples of transformative regionalism\textsuperscript{36}. This also takes us back to the question raised in the introduction about the extent to which regionalism in Africa represents a genuinely ‘indigenous’ response to global challenges or is simply a vehicle for disseminating and implementing dominant global agendas. We will discuss this issue in more depth below.

10.5 Emerging themes and tensions in African education

A consideration of the above examples of the new regionalism in education and training draws attention to several themes and tensions that have emerged as a consequence of globalisation. The aim of this section is to consider these in relation to the broader literature. The main argument is that the initiatives between them exemplify a new, emerging view of the role of education in relation to globalisation for the African region, but that they also represent a series of new policy tensions related in part at least to the different models of regionalism.

10.5.1 New understanding of the role of education in development

NEPAD and the CFA are the only two of the above initiatives to explicitly refer to globalisation, although global challenges are implicit in the other initiatives. On the basis of the review of initiatives, a key challenge for policy makers is to raise awareness of globalisation at the regional and national levels. Nonetheless, what emerges from a close reading of NEPAD and the CFA in particular is a new understanding of education in the global era; an understanding that exemplifies broader discursive shifts discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 and that seeks to integrate human capital and human rights themes. The CFA document, for example, defines the role of education as follows:

> Education is a fundamental human right. It is a means to the fulfilment of an individual. It is the transfer of values from one generation to the next. It is also critical for economic growth and healthy populations. … The case for education is overwhelming – both in terms of fulfilling human security and as an investment with very high returns (CFA, 2005: 181).

\textsuperscript{34} The process allowed for Tony Blair and the other commissioners to interact directly with African leaders. There were 17 members of the Commission, all working in an independent capacity rather than formally representing national governments. Nine of the Commissioners were African and included leading government figures such as Benjamin Mokapa the President of Tanzania and Trevor Manuel, South Africa’s Minister of Finance as well as representatives form civil society and the private sector. The UK had three representatives besides the Prime Minister including the Minister for International Development, Hillary Benn, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, and the pop singer and activist, Bob Geldorf. They were joined by representatives from the US, China, France and Canada.

\textsuperscript{36} For example, gender issues are only partially reflected in emerging regional policy frameworks such as NEPAD and the CFA (see below). On the one hand this may be seen as indicative of a broader ‘gender blind’ approach to policy on the part of (largely male) policy makers. On the other hand, it may also indicate the difficulties faced by organisations such as FAWE in influencing these agendas. As we will argue below, a pertinent issue for donors and others interested in developing the gender dimension of policy and giving voice to civil society organisations would be how to boost the capacity of so-called ‘informal’ organisations such as FAWE to influence policy at all levels, put civil society coalitions in general.
In relation to human rights, access to education is seen not just as a matter of realising individual rights but as a means to develop greater awareness of rights and responsibilities in society more broadly. Through education’s role as a transmitter of cultural norms and values it can foster social cohesion and democracy, particularly in post-conflict societies (the GLI is a good example of this). In keeping with developments in human capital theory, the role of education is seen not only in terms of producing the skills required for economic production but also as a means to bring about improvements in the health and welfare of the population (see also Ilon, 1996; Wolfensohn, 1999; World Bank, 2001). These new enlarged understandings of human capital are evident in NEPAD and the CFA which conceptualise education at the most fundamental level as ‘investing in people’. In this respect, education is perceived by the all of the initiatives to have a critical role to play in relation to capacity strengthening. Higher education in particular is perceived to play a pivotal role in supporting good governance through providing leadership and citizenship skills and through the link between greater accountability and higher levels of education. Many of the initiatives highlight the role of higher education in promoting African self-sufficiency in key areas of scientific and technical expertise (see in particular NEPAD, the CFA, the AVU, SADC, the AUU and the IUCEA).

10.5.2 New directions in education access

All of the initiatives reaffirm the importance of meeting the education MDGs related to education access, and some explicitly point to Africa’s patchy performance in meeting the targets to date (see also Chapter 6). A fundamental concern for FAWE is with gender parity in access to education at all levels (see for example, FAWE 2000; 2003). Many of the initiatives also draw attention to the increasing demands on enrolment in secondary and tertiary education and the need to address these (the AVU was set up specifically to respond to these demands). The thrust of the initiatives is in line with the general shift from the Washington to the Post-Washington consensus discussed in Chapter four and with new evidence from rates of return analyses which suggests a higher rate of return than previously thought to secondary and tertiary levels (Knight and Sabot, 1989; Bennell, 1996; UNESCO, 2002). The CFA report, for example, defines basic education as encompassing a 9 year cycle of primary and lower secondary education37. The report also breaks with previous orthodoxy through emphasising the role of higher education in development. ADEA, NEPAD, FAWE and the CFA all address issues of access and quality in secondary education, whilst developing access in higher education is a key rationale for the AUU and IUCEA and a key theme underlying the SADC protocol. However, there is a tension between the emphasis on basic schooling in the MDGs, on the one hand, and the wider definition of basic education and demands for access to secondary and tertiary education, on the other. A recent synthesis report prepared for the Second African Union Meeting of Experts in Higher Education puts the issues succinctly:

On the one hand, basic education is seen, both under Education for All (EFA) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), as a key factor for the reduction of poverty and the enhancement of social equity. On the other hand, the World Bank's recognition of the critical role of higher education in building the knowledge economy and the renewed campaigns organized around the World Conference on Higher Education (WCHE) have elevated higher education as one of the prime agendas of development (AU, 2005).

10.5.3 Education quality

Many of the initiatives attach great importance to the quality of education. This is true, for example, of NEPAD and the CFA, both of who make several recommendations related to education quality38. ADEA has devoted its last two biennial conferences to themes related to quality and educational effectiveness (ADEA, 2003; 2006) whilst developing appropriate indicators and measurements of quality and building technical capacity in monitoring education quality is a key rationale for the establishment of SACMEQ. Among the drivers for the focus on quality are the additional pressures on the quality of education arising from increased pressure on enrolments at all levels. There is clearly a tension between improving access and improving the quality of education.

37 The CFA and NEPAD both reference the World Declaration on Education for All which includes in its definition ‘informal activities to teach basic skills to people of all ages’ – a reference to non-formal and adult education. As we discussed in Chapter 2, this represents a re-affirmation by African leaders of a definition of basic education that is in contrast to the view that dominated for much of the 1980s and 1990s.

38 Although NEPAD makes only one rather general reference to education quality the CFA develops this into a more specific recommendation that ‘African governments must invest in teacher training, retention of staff and professional development. Teacher-child ratios should be brought under 1:40 in basic education. Donors should commit to predictable long-term funding to enable this’ (CFA, 2005: 186). The report also suggests greater community involvement in education to improve accountability and raise quality, more relevant curricula and more active learning and problem-solving approaches to teaching and learning, greater investment in resources including Internet based resources, development of school infrastructure to make them more girl friendly; and, the development of regional networks of quality assurance. These recommendations are supported for the most part in the wider literature on education quality such as the recent Global Monitoring Report (UNESCO, 2005a) and the synthesis document prepared for the ADEA biennial meeting on quality (ADEA, 2003).
Both NEPAD and the CFA come out in favour of abolishing primary user fees as a means to dramatically increase enrolments although the CFA points to the dangers posed to education quality where fees have been abolished and access rapidly expanded in an unplanned way (see also Rose, 2003; UNESCO, 2005b). Although there is evidence from the wider literature that improvements in quality and relevance can ultimately have a beneficial impact on enrolments and on continuation rates in basic education (Bergmann, 1996; Lloyd et al, 2000; UNESCO, 2005b), a tension remains at the level of policy between investing in access to meet the MDGs and investing in quality improvements. Other drivers for a focus on quality include outdated and irrelevant curricula, and, most significantly of all, an under-qualified teaching and lecturing force which has also been depleted due to the impact of HIV/ AIDS (CFA, 2005; AU, 2005 for example). Issues of quality in higher education are further exacerbated by the brain drain (see Chapter 7) and a poor research infrastructure.

A key driver for improving quality that is alluded to, although never explicitly addressed, relates to the skills needs of a globalising economy. As the contributions to Green et al (2007) illustrate, the Asian countries that have successfully globalised have all invested in education quality including the quality of the teaching force, buildings and resources including ICTs and the curriculum, particularly in the teaching of literacy, numeracy, science and technology and moral education (See also Ashton and Green, 1996; Tikly et al, 2003; Green, 1999; Green et al, 2007).

10.5.4 The new meaning of relevance

Many of the initiatives call for a more relevant curriculum to meet Africa’s changing needs in the global world. The AU, NEPAD and the CFA cast the debate in terms of the perceived irrelevance of outmoded curricula, dating from the colonial era, for addressing contemporary problems and issues. These include the increasing relative levels of poverty on the sub-continent compared to other regions, the threat to security posed by the AIDS/ HIV pandemic and by conflict, and the need to develop appropriate skills for development and to promote growth in the global era. They also include the need to incorporate local cultures, histories and languages (see CFA, 2005: 187, for example). The emphasis on life skills and education’s role in fighting poverty and disease is shared in the wider literature. It is argued, for example, that access to basic education by children and adults can have an impact on poverty reduction because it can contribute to lower child mortality and female fertility rates, protect against HIV/AIDS, and promote environmental awareness (see DfID, 2000a; Wolfensohn, 2003).

In Chapter 2 we saw how globalisation has contributed to the informalisation of labour. In Africa, as Afenyadu et al (1999), Tikly et al (2003) and King and McGrath, (2002) point out, a very significant proportion of school leavers are likely to enter into the jua kali informal sector which is the mainstay of many local economies. In this respect, these authors ask whether some basic vocational skills ought to be included under the heading ‘basic education’. Similar arguments are advanced about access of children and adult learners to basic agricultural and other livelihood skills such as various kinds of crafts. Basic education provision has been correlated both with increased agricultural productivity (Appleton and Balihuta, 1996) and individual economic welfare (Hannum and Buchmann, 2005). Education is seen to have a critical role to play within local communities through providing access to information that can support the feasibility and diversity of sustainable livelihoods (Lawrence and Tate, 1997).

It is also argued, however, that long-term poverty eradication is dependent on achieving sustainable economic growth and that education has a crucial role to play in this through providing the necessary human capital (see for example, DfID 2000a). There is tension here in that many of the skills required to promote growth within a global knowledge-based economy are at a higher level than those that are considered necessary for fighting poverty and disease and supporting sustainable livelihoods. This tension is closely related to that mentioned earlier concerning access to different levels of education. For example, various studies have shown that the capacity to innovate and to build indigenous technological capabilities in production requires workers possessing skills at least to secondary level (Riddell, 1996; Lall and Wignaraja, 1997) and there has been an increasing recognition amongst donors and multilateral agencies including the World Bank (World Bank, 2005c) and UNESCO (2006) in recent years of the importance of secondary education as a complement to the existing priority on basic education. Similar arguments are advanced with respect to the role of higher education both by organisations such as the AUU and the AU and in the wider literature (Ntuli, 1998; Brock-Utne, 1996, for example). In this literature, higher education has a critical role to play in, for example, developing new biotechnologies to expand and develop the agricultural sector or affordable remedies for diseases such as malaria or HIV/AIDS. Further, if African economies wish to develop their tourism and other service sector industries, they require a range of higher level skills including business management, legal and accounting, ICT and other professional skills as recent research in

39 Kasozi, (2004: 190) points out that African Universities are spending very little on research and development, with few of them having articulated a development strategy linking the application of knowledge to economic growth and to the funding of research and development units of universities. Indicating the minimal maturity of the contribution of developing countries to knowledge ranking of published scientific papers during 1981 – 94 does not include a single developing country.

Tanzania and Rwanda has indicated (Tikly et al, 2003). The development of higher order professional and technical skills has a trickle down effect within the education system as the overall capacity for learning new skills (for example, to upgrade teachers’ knowledge in mathematics and science) is increased.

A further tension of relevance to debates about the privatisation of education (see below) is relevance for what? The AU argues that the privatisation of higher education, poses risks for what it describes as the …fulfillment of the broad mission of a university, spanning critical thinking, knowledge generation, innovation, production of different skills, "an enlightened citizenry", laying the foundation for democracy, nation building, and social cohesion, calls for a more comprehensive definition of relevance, a different pedagogic orientation, and new learning competencies. Academic programs should produce not just job seekers but also job creators, cultivate analytical skills necessary for independent thinking, cater to the needs of not just those enrolling fresh from secondary schools but also those that need lifelong learning. This requires not only redesigning the curriculum to meet the demands of the knowledge economy but also adoption of a different methodology as well as retraining of teachers (AU, 2005: viii).

This ‘classical’ view of the function of higher education also provides an interesting contrast to the more utilitarian and market oriented emphasis of the AVU which has prioritised programmes in the area of business administration and computer science during its pilot phase (Naidoo and Schutte, 1999).

10.5.5 Skills for development and lifelong learning

There is an acknowledgement in many of the initiatives that globalisation requires developing new kinds of skills to meet the knowledge demands of a global economy. This is reflected, for example, in calls for greater investment in secondary and higher education, research and development and for improvements in the quality of education. There is a tension, however, between this tacit acknowledgement and a more thoroughgoing response in the face of similar challenges elsewhere in the world.

As we saw in Chapter 7, for instance, the success of the Newly Industrialised Countries lay in the ability of states to put in place national innovation systems (see Green et al, 2007). We also charted the extent to which low and middle income countries, including most African countries, lag behind high-income countries. Following Fagerberg et al (2004), it was suggested that there is no unique way for African countries to successfully catch up; that all countries must find their own way based on an understanding of global and local realities and needs.

The form that knowledge societies take in the African context, however, needs to be tailored to African needs and does not, indeed should not, mirror that taken in highly industrialised countries. Recent research suggests, for example, that successful interventions for poverty reduction can only be implemented on the basis of an understanding of the foundations of the social change processes in specific African countries and that developing suitable responses to poverty at the local level involves a new approach to the generation and use of knowledge. This involves the establishment of systems that can learn from the context-specific lessons of past experiences; build up an understanding of how local realities interact with wider structures of power to shape development outcomes; and, learn how local cultures, beliefs and practices affect ongoing processes of improvement or impoverishment (ESRC, 2006: 12).

An important component of a knowledge society is a ‘skills development strategy’ that clearly links education and training and research, design and development to broader developmental goals (Kuruvilla et al, 2002; Ashton and Green, 1996; Green 1999, King and McGrath, 2002; Tikly et al, 2003). Such a strategy requires putting in place relevant inter-governmental structures to facilitate communication between stakeholders and developing a supportive regulatory and legal framework. A similarly co-ordinated approach is required to reverse the effects of the ‘brain drain’41. However, in many African countries, suitable frameworks do not exist and sectors often work in isolation from one another. This has implications for capacity building as we suggest below.

The concept of lifelong learning is often considered integral to that of knowledge societies, although the term has, in fact, a long pedigree on the African continent42. Initiatives such as NEPAD the CFA, the SADC protocol and

41 A cross-sectoral and strategic approach is also required to reverse the effects of the ‘brain drain’. The reasons and scope of the brain drain are themselves complex. The African Union has made an analysis of the causes of the brain drain in Africa and has made some recommendations to reverse it (AU, 2005: ix). People migrate for multiple reasons including financial reasons, political intolerance or because of feelings of isolation from a research community. According to the AU ‘It is likely then that finding ‘permanent’ solutions to the brain drain will be equally complex and will rely on the creation of a more conducive economic and political climate. Strategies to contain the outward migration of talent and in some cases even achieve reversal include: improving institutional autonomy and academic freedom, working conditions, salaries and benefits, opportunities for intellectual engagement and professional development; launching and/or strengthening joint degree programs; creating a conducive condition for permanent or temporary repatriation of members of the Diaspora; Use of ICT for tapping into the skills of members of the Diaspora. The long term solution, however, lies in ensuring rapid economic growth and improving the livelihood of people, creating a democratic society wherein individual liberties are guaranteed, and ensuring peace and stability’.

42 Julius Nyerere (1974), for example, developed a vision of lifelong learning for Africa linked to the philosophy of Ujamaa that pre-dated similar, western visions (see also Mulenga, 2001).
the AAU all refer to the idea, although they do not develop a clear picture of what it might look like in practice other than the implicit view that it is linked to non-formal, adult education. This once again highlights the tension between the rhetorical intent of many of the initiatives and the failure to translate these into practical solutions.

Turning to the wider literature, the World Bank argues that the concept of lifelong learning has relevance for regions, such as Africa. It is suggested that globalisation requires a new kind of worker who,

…will be able to engage in lifelong education, learn new things quickly, perform more non-routine tasks and more complex problem solving, take more decisions, understand more about what they are working on, require less supervision, assume more responsibility, and – as vital tools to those ends – have better reading, quantitative, reasoning, and expository skills (World Bank, 1999b).

According to Tikly et al (2003), however, this kind of analysis places too much emphasis on generic competences derived from experiences in high-income regions and does not take sufficient account of the quite different contexts and specific skills development needs facing Africa. Neither does the analysis take account of the specific needs of women or of other groups at risk of social exclusion from the globalisation process. Further, as we suggested in Chapter 7, definitions of lifelong education, such as the one above, tend to focus on the economic aspects of creating knowledge economies rather than, as we have suggested, knowledge societies (see Chapter 7. It does not take account, for instance, of the role of education in providing communities with access to knowledge about assets, entitlements and basic social services that can assist in creating sustainable livelihoods as well as the knowledge that might contribute to good governance and democratic processes.

10.5.6 Addressing the digital divide

In Chapter 7 we outlined current debates about the digital divide, lifelong learning and knowledge economies/societies. It is worth outlining what form these debates take in Africa. Firstly, in relation to the digital divide we argued that Africa significantly lags behind the rest of the world in terms of popular access to technology (UN, 2005b). NEPAD, in particular, makes proposals to address the digital divide that the CFA reiterates and there are several NEPAD initiatives in the area of ICTs as well as a range of similar initiatives in operation in African countries. As we saw in Chapter 7, there is a growing consensus about the potential benefits of ICT use in supporting a more student-centred, problem-based and collaborative approaches to teaching and learning and to assessment (Haddad and Draxler, 2002; Hawkins, 2002; World Bank, 2004b). However, to achieve these benefits and to transform learning, ICT use has to be integrated into national policy and into practice in schools. In this respect, according to UNESCO, most African countries are still at the ‘emerging’ stage of development (Farrell et al, 2003).

In this respect, there is a tension in some of the initiatives concerning the prioritisation and use of ICTs. On the one hand there is a realisation in NEPAD and the CFA, for example, of the need to promote older as well as newer

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43 The report looks at the skills development needs of Tanzania and Rwanda. Tanzania wishes to prioritise developing its niche agricultural markets and to develop its industrial base in order to pursue global economic integration. Rwanda on the other hand, wishes to prioritise the development of its service industries including tourism and the financial sector and its high technology industries. Each of these may require the development of generic skills but they also require attention to quite different, sector-specific skills and have implications for the form and content of lifelong education.

44 In a submission to the CFA, one NGO working with small businesses in Africa has urged the authors of the report to take account of the opportunities opened to disadvantaged people to successfully increase their incomes through the provision of fairer access to various other kinds of knowledge. These include knowledge linked to gains in productivity such as knowledge of higher value products, knowledge of value-adding processes and of markets. It also includes, however, knowledge about suitable training opportunities, administration and legal knowledge and the availability of enabling financial services such as loans, secure deposits, savings, leasing arrangements, mortgages and insurance.

45 In this regard, as Butcher (2001) has pointed out, of the 818 million people in Africa, 1 in 4 have a radio; 1 in 13 have a television; 1 in 35 have a mobile; 1 in 40 have a fixed line telephone; 1 in 130 have a personal computer; 1 in 160 use Internet; 1 in 400 have a pay TV.

46 This has been led by the e-Africa Commission which was established in 2001 and involves a public/private partnership called the Information Society Partnership for Africa’s Development (ISPAD). Some of the private interests on ISPAD include Microsoft, Hewlett Packard, Cisco systems, MTM and Oracle. The two major projects led by the Commission include one to develop ICT infrastructure and the NEPAD e-schools initiative. The Initiative aims to impart ICT skills to pupils in primary and secondary schools as well as harness ICT technology to improve, enrich and expand education in African countries. Two key documents have been produced to guide implementation, namely the NEPAD e-Schools Concept Framework which describes the major features, objectives and priority actions related to this initiative (e-Africa Commission 2004); and, the NEPAD e-Schools Implementation Structure which is an agreed framework to achieve the NEPAD e-schools initiative’s objectives (e-Africa Commission, 2004). Three recent examples besides the NEPAD e-school initiative include: Catalyzing Access to ICT in Africa (CATHA) (http://www.cathia.ws); Global E-school and Community Initiative (http://www.wsweb4.worldbank.org/disted); Leland Initiative- Africa Global Initiative(URL: http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/leland).

47 As such they are yet to apply new technologies to teaching and learning let alone to fully integrate them or, better still to transform the basis of teaching and learning.
technologies. This fits within the comprehensive definition of ICTs given by UNESCO, (2005c: 1)\textsuperscript{48}. The inclusion of analogue technologies, such as radio and TV, is important because these often prove the most effective for distance learning in Africa where a lack of infrastructure and human capacity hampers the use of digital technologies. Isaacs, for example argues that:

> It is necessary that other technologies and resources such as radio, television and print media should not come to be seen as less important than computers and the Internet. These media will continue to play a fundamental role in provision of educational resources to learners (in Butcher, 2001: 62).

More traditional technologies have an important role to play in supplementing teacher knowledge and providing increased opportunities for drill and practice within more traditional learning environments typical of many African schools. On the other hand, there is a clear emphasis in the AVU and the NEPAD e-school project, for instance, on moving as rapidly as possible to the use of digital technologies, despite the evidence that these are often expensive and difficult to sustain in Africa. Whilst digital technologies might transform education in the longer term, the danger is that an exclusive focus on newer ICTs is likely to disproportionately benefit elites who have access to them and have the effect of exacerbating the digital divide at least in the short term.

### 10.5.7 New directions in the governance of education in Africa

There is a tension in the regional initiatives between support for the privatisation and marketisation of education on the one hand and support for state provided and state-led education systems. This tension is growing in significance given the increasing internationalisation of education, particularly at the tertiary level. As we saw in Chapter 3, the privatisation and increasing marketisation of education has been a feature of education policy in low-income countries since the 1980s although the policies associated with this process have differed (Whitty et al, 1998; Bullock and Thomas, 1997). In most African countries, marketisation has involved encouraging the policy of charging user fees, a proliferation of private schools and universities and the development of a limited notion of ‘choice’ for some students in the urban areas\textsuperscript{49}.

The CFA initiative provides support for partnerships in the provision of education and training. It points out that ‘non-state actors, including faith-based organisations, civil society, the private sector and communities, have historically provided much education in Africa. Some of these it claims, are excellent, but others (often aiming at those who cannot afford the fees common in state schools) are without adequate state regulation and are of a low quality’ (CFA, 2005: 186). The CFA is supportive of public/private partnerships, particularly in relation to secondary and tertiary education provision. Such a view mirrors a similar emphasis on public/private partnerships in other regions including Europe, North America and South East Asia and finds support in the wider literature. Researchers associated with the World Bank, for example, have often favoured the development of private schools, colleges and universities because it is argued that government support for private institutions can provide a more cost-effective way of increasing educational provision (see for example Jimenez et al, 1991) (although the evidence is disputed and contradictory) (Kitaev, 1999). Encouraging the participation of multinational companies in skills training can also lead to potential benefits of technology transfer and this was a major element of the Singaporean skills formation model (Green, 1999).

The literature also identifies negative aspects of privatisation. As we saw in Chapter 3, there is a growing consensus implicit in the post-Washington consensus that the introduction of user fees had disastrous consequences for primary and secondary school enrollments during the 1980s and early 1990s in many countries. Private education has also been associated with growing educational inequality in countries such as Tanzania (Lassibille et al, 1998) and the quality of private schools compared to government schools in Africa has been extremely variable (Kitaev, 1999). The policy of encouraging private provision in secondary and tertiary education since the 1980s has led to only a modest increase in enrollments at these levels throughout sub-Saharan Africa (secondary school enrolment, for example has only slightly risen from 20.1% in 1991 to 24.3% in 2000) (UNESCO, 2002). This suggests that introducing elements of a market system is not in itself a sufficient condition for improving access or quality.

As we discussed in Chapter 7, the proposed marketisation of higher education through GATS has proved controversial in many low-income countries (see also Tikly, 2003b; see also Chapter 5 of Green et al, 2007). A negative view of the perceived impact of GATS is expressed in some of the regional initiatives. For example, the Association of African Universities (AAU) in collaboration with UNESCO and the South African Council on Higher Education (SACHE) organised a workshop under the theme: *The Implications of WTO/GATS for Higher Education* (SACHE, 2001: 62).

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\textsuperscript{48} The tools and processes to access, retrieve, store, organize, manipulate, produce, present and exchange information by electronic and other automated means. These include hardware, software and telecommunications in the form of personal computers, scanners, digital cameras, handhelds/PDAs, phones, faxes, modems, CD and DVD players and recorders, digitized video, radio and TV and programs like database systems and multimedia applications.

\textsuperscript{49} The degree of marketisation, however, for example with respect to the proliferation of private schools, has varied considerably across the continent (Bennell, 1997).
Education in Africa. One major outcome of the workshop was the unanimous adoption of the ‘Accra Declaration on GATS and the Internationalisation of Higher Education in Africa’. In this declaration participants recalled the significance of and responsibilities for higher education as acknowledged in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the World Declaration on Higher Education for the 21st Century (1998). The participants expressed concern about the commodification of education under GATS. They declared their support for an internationalisation process that is mutually beneficial, and called on African governments to exercise caution on further GATS commitments in higher education until a more informed position is arrived at on how tradable transnational education can best serve national and regional development priorities.

In the same vein, higher education institutions, expressed concern (AAU, 2004) that market forces alone are inadequate to ensure that cross-border education contributes to the public good. They observe that the scope, complexity and volume of cross-border activities are likely to make it difficult for countries to safeguard the broader cultural, social and economic contributions of higher education and research, especially in today’s global knowledge society. The implication of the encroachment by WTO and GATS for Tanzania’s higher education development is captured by Alphonse (1998: 6) who argues that through the GATS, powerful US and OECD transnational corporations (TNCs) sought to develop a ‘globalized ‘free market’ and ‘free trade’ through comprehensive liberalization of trade in services by the application of all GATTS (now WTO) principles’. The author cautions that, whereas these advances have partially been thwarted, “…it may just be a matter of time before the international services sector is fully GATTanized” (ibid.).

Ogot (in Some and Khaemba, 2004) observes that in discussing the internationalisation of higher education it is important to note the nature of the current global context in which we operate, where deep inequalities undergird many of the processes. A few countries dominate global scientific systems. These new technologies are primarily owned by multinational corporations and academic institutions in the major western industrialised countries, (along with Russia and Japan). Many African countries find themselves dependent on the major academic superpowers. Ogot (2004) further argues that, ‘the imperatives of the market are driving internationalisation trends worldwide. Universities and academic systems now seek to make themselves attractive to foreign students and to build links with universities in other countries to enhance their global reach’. This process is deemed to entail developing means to market higher education programmes effectively; to treat intellectual property as a commodity; and to adopt strategies of profit driven corporations. It has to be borne in mind that the international higher education market is not only very competitive, but also it is a full cost recovery market.

It is no wonder, in the light of the above analysis, that some high income countries such as, USA, Australia, Britain, France Ireland, Germany, Canada and New Zealand are perceived to be at a huge advantage in terms of benefiting from international educational markets. Significantly for Tanzania and other countries in Southern and Eastern Africa, however, South Africa as the regional hegemon has also begun to increase its provision of international higher education in the region. South Africa’s role is seen as an unintended consequence of initiatives such as the SADC protocol which have encouraged cross-border provision (see also Chisholm, 2005). The AVU, likewise, provides an interesting example of internationalisation in higher education. Although it is currently consulting partner countries on priorities for future programmes, it is clear that its existing programmes are intended to respond to market needs. It also serves to underscore the hegemony of certain education providers that programmes are marketed as being led by world-class academics from (generally) high-income countries.

10.5.8 African renaissance and the language question

Some of the initiatives refer to the role of education in transmitting African cultural values and languages. However, this theme remains relatively under-developed reflecting the dominance of issues relating to the role of education and training in supporting economic integration and development. This omission is reproduced both in global and national policy agendas. There is a tension, however, between the glib and superficial treatment of issues relating to ethnicity and language in education, on the one hand, and the importance of these issues in the processes of teaching and learning and in terms of understanding wider social processes and conflicts, on the other.

The CFA argues “…Education systems are often based on inherited curriculum content that is limited to conventional academic subjects…. Curricula should be designed with regional histories, cultures and languages in mind” (CFA, 2005: 187). Elsewhere in the report there is a suggestion that development must be African-led and informed by African values. A view of the ‘collectivism/communalism’ of African culture is counter-posed

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50 The workshop was held on April 27 – 29 2004, in Accra Ghana. It aimed, among other things, to fill the gap in public awareness of the issues of GATS and to facilitate proactive engagement as well as informed and consensus-based policy-making process both at the national and regional bodies. During the deliberations papers dealing with the opportunities and challenges emerging from GATS, regional co-operating quality assurance, research, advocacy and information dissemination were discussed.

51 The declaration noted the negative impacts of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs); the limited level of development of higher Education and its regulatory frameworks in Africa; The process of internationalization of education underway in Africa; and the full implications of GATS under such conditions.

52 To quote from the report: “Ask the big question ‘What is development for?’ and you get very different answers in different cultures. Many in the developed world see it as being about places like Africa ‘catching up’. Development is often described as
articulating and developing the concept in the form of a call to traced back to the writings of Marcus Garvey and luminaries such as Nkrumah, Nyrere, Kaunda, Senghor and Biko. More greater emphasis on increasing human dignity within a community. An understanding of the cultures of Africa shows that development means putting a about increasing choice for individuals. In Africa, by contrast, you might be told that it is something to do with well-being, happiness and membership of a community. An understanding of the cultures of Africa shows that development means putting a greater emphasis on increasing human dignity within a community.

With respect to the language question, the CFA (2005) report explains that the problem of identifying and implementing a suitable medium of instruction policy is intimately tied up with the way that colonial boundaries were drawn in the past. The GLI has specifically identified overcoming the deep ethnic divisions caused in part by the legacy of colonial language issue as fundamental to securing regional co-operation and peace. Most of the initiatives, including the CFA, the GLI, the AUU, the IUCEA, SADC, NEPAD and the AU, are committed to developing and promoting African languages but shy away from detailed policy recommendations about how this commitment can be realised in practice. ADEA (2006), however, does provide a summary of research and an overview of some of the key issues facing policy makers.

The complexities relating to choice of medium of instruction in the global era are rehearsed in the wider literature. A key tension is around whether African led development is best served by using indigenous or European languages as the medium of instruction (see Phillipson, 1999; Pennycook, 1995; Brocke-Utne, 2001; Rassool, 1999; Mazrui, 1999; Watson, 1999, Moodley, 2000; Brocke-Utne et al, 2004). Pragmatically, the use of a global language as a medium of instruction has advantages. English, for example, is recognised by many within Africa as a language that will grant access to power and prosperity. It is favoured by many parents, and is evidenced by the growth of English medium private schools. It is also cheaper to obtain suitable learning materials in English and is sometimes seen as a ‘neutral’ medium in a multilingual setting (ADEA, 2006: 1).

Mazrui (1999), however, also arguing from a functionalist perspective, points out that no country has successfully advanced scientifically without significantly developing indigenous language/s. He cites the examples of Japan and Korea in this respect. Furthermore, there are pedagogical and psychological benefits to learning in own language, especially in the early years. These advantages feed into more critical perspectives which see the spread of European languages as vehicles for western consumer culture and as an aspect of neo-colonialism.

Faced with these conflicting perspectives, African countries are increasingly adopting a phased bilingual or even trilingual approach, favouring indigenous languages in the early years and global languages such as English in the later years (Heugh, 2005). In some countries, such as South Africa, choice of languages for learning is left up to individual school communities within broad national guidelines. The problem is that the resources, training and political will required to support such a policy are often lacking (Brocke-Utne et al, 2004) and schools often revert to English as the ‘default’ medium. More recent perspectives, such as those of Rassool and Phillipson, however, view language rights in the era of globalisation as even more complex and contested than the above accounts. For Phillipson, the complexity is around the use and recognition of different dialects and forms of English, besides the standard English form. For Rassool it is about recognising language rights in trans-national settings, such as the language rights of refugees or migrants. Speakers of minority languages may be particularly disadvantaged by blanket language policies that promote either a global language or a local majority language (Brock-Utne et al, 2004; Trudell, 2005). They may perceive learning in these languages as a threat to their culture (Aikman, 1995) and certain ethnic groups, including pastoralists and nomads, find formal education alien and even hostile to their culture (e.g. Tshireletso, 1997; Dyer, 2001).

10.5.9 The gender debate and other forms of social exclusion

Many of the regional initiatives provide support for the Dakar framework and for the MDGs relating to gender parity (even though this is the first MDG to have been missed). This is particularly the case with FAWE. The participation of women and girls in education and training is understood partly as a question of recognising their equal rights. As noted, it is also perceived to have wider benefits to health and welfare including the fight against HIV/AIDS and greater control by women over their own fertility (see also DfID, 2000b; Hannum and Buchmann, 2005; Lloyd et al, 2000; Benefo, 2005). Citing recent research (Abu-Ghaida and Klasen, 2004), the CFA, for example, argues that ‘Countries which are not on track to meet the gender parity MDG target in education (and nearly half of those are in Africa) will have child mortality rates one and a half per cent worse than countries with

about increasing choice for individuals. In Africa, by contrast, you might be told that it is something to do with well-being, happiness and membership of a community. An understanding of the cultures of Africa shows that development means putting a greater emphasis on increasing human dignity within a community.

53 Its discursive origins lie in the concept of the African Renaissance which itself has its roots in pan-Africanism and can be traced back to the writings of Marcus Garvey and luminaries such as Nkrumah, Nyere, Kaunda, Senghor and Biko. More recently, Nelson Mandela’s (1994) speech to the OAU summit in Tunis referred to a vision of an African Renaissance following on the liberation of South Africa (Mandela cited in Cornwell, 1998). It is Thabo Mbeki, however, who is most credited with articulating and developing the concept in the form of a call to action for Africans at the turn of the new millennium.
better education systems, and they will also have two and a half per cent more underweight children’ (CFA, 2005: 181)\textsuperscript{54}. Educating women and girls can also contribute to their alleviation from poverty and can have wider economic benefits. Providing girls with one extra year of education has been estimated to boost their eventual wages by 10 to 20 per cent (Dollar and Gatti, 1999). It has a positive effect on overall labour supply through increasing the amount of time women work (UNESCO, 2003). Finally, educating mothers through adult literacy programmes has been linked with improving their children’s attendance and performance at school (UN Millennium Project 2005). In this respect it is alarming that in Africa girls can expect to stay in school for only six years compared to eight years for boys (UNESCO 2002). Poor educational outcomes and low participation rates become more pronounced at the secondary and tertiary levels and in vocational education. Given the stark nature of these statistics it is not surprising that the main focus of the MDGs has been on improving access for women and girls.

However, there is a tension between the emphasis on access in the MDGs and the need to address wider, related issues of quality and relevance. Girls and women are more likely to experience gendered abuse in African schools (FAWE, 2002,2003; Leach et al, 2003) and teenage girls may expose themselves to sexual risk in order to fund their education (Vavrus, 2003; Vavrus, 2005). An important consideration for teenage girls is the availability of appropriate sanitary facilities (UNESCO, 2005b). One of the working groups established by ADEA on female participation in education has concluded that girls face particular difficulties in accessing some areas of the curriculum, such as science and mathematics and technology education\textsuperscript{55} (see also Swainson, 1998). Some commentators have argued that the curriculum needs to pay greater heed to women’s strengths and custodial roles in African culture (Mazrui, 1999). A key issue is the lack of women in senior positions within institutions and at a national policy making level. For organisations such as FAWE, gender issues need to be tackled in a holistic way and must be mainstreamed into all areas of policy and practice (FAWE, 2002).

There is evidence that globalisation is creating the need for new skill training for women and girls that go beyond the emphasis on primary and secondary schooling and on literacy in the Dakar framework and in the MDGs. These needs have yet to find expression in regional initiatives. For example, women face a risk of being pushed out of traditional domains of production by the introduction of new technologies and land uses (Chinkin, 2002). At the same time, in some African countries, there has been an expansion of exports of fruit, flowers and vegetables and other kinds of agricultural produce, based largely on use of female labour and on the growth of employment opportunities within the clothes manufacturing industry. These pose risks for all workers, but particularly for women, of low pay and not having their rights recognised (Chinkin, 2002). Carr (2005) has argued that education and training can play a role in enabling women to understand the risks involved and to make better use of the opportunities available to link what they produce locally to global markets. There has also been a growth of opportunities for women within the labour intensive service sector, including the tourist industry, the information-based industries, banks and insurance companies at a number of different grades (DfID, 2000b; Joekes, 1995; Fontana et al, 1999). Women find it difficult to compete with men for these new jobs, however, because of lack of access to necessary skills training and the persistence of barriers based on discriminatory cultural norms and practices. Similar barriers exist to women’s’ participation in globalised manufacturing and high-end value-added production. It is the potential exclusion of women in Africa from these areas of emerging labour markets that present the biggest risk of keeping women in relative poverty (Keller-Herzog, 1998; DfID 2000b). Finally, women also carry the double burden of responsibility at work and at home and are particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in governments and donor expenditures on education and health (Mohan et al, 2000). Women need access to information about what services are available to them at a local level and about their rights.

There is, however, a further tension in the regional initiatives between recognising issues related to gender and other types of social exclusion. The CFA (2005) report, for example, draws attention to the needs of the rural poor, migrants and refugees and to the divisive role of ethnicity, tribalism, religion and regionalism. The CFA document refers in particular to the need for support for orphans and vulnerable children (OVC). The exclusion of these groups from education is supported in the general literature. For example, those living in remote rural areas are more likely to attend schools with poor infrastructure.\textsuperscript{56} The quality of education with respect to the practice and teaching of human rights is particularly important for refugees and those living in contexts of violence as we have seen in Chapter 9. Those with special education needs, including physical disabilities, are often excluded as already overstretched and under-resourced schools fail to meet their needs (UNESCO, 2005b). Children, who suffer abuse and neglect at home, may be especially vulnerable to bullying and abuse by teachers or fellow students at school (Leach et al, 2000). AIDS orphans are more likely to fall into this category as well as suffering, together with learners, who are HIV positive, the stigma attached to the disease. A death of a parent has been

\textsuperscript{54} Following in the same vein, the CFA recommends that ‘in their national plans African governments must identify measures to get girls as well as boys into school with proper allocation of resources. Donors should meet these additional costs’ (CFA, 2005: 185).

\textsuperscript{55} The working group involved co-operation between ADEA and FAWE. It integrated ongoing initiatives under the Female Education in Mathematics and Science in Africa (FEMSA) program led by the Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD) and disseminated its activities through a regional network of NGOs (see http://www.adeanet.org/workgroups/en_wgfp.html).

\textsuperscript{56} It is also difficult to attract and retain well-qualified teachers in these areas. Further, distance from the national or local administrative centre impedes supervision and monitoring, making remote schools relatively invisible to inspectors and managers responsible for holding teaching staff to account and distributing resources (Barrett, 2005).
related to a delay in starting primary education and lowered attendance of girls (Ainsworth et al, 2002). What emerges from the literature is an increasingly complex picture of how gender interacts with a range of other factors in complex ways to produce disadvantage and exclusion. Although this complexity is acknowledged by some initiatives such as FAWE and the CFA, it has yet to be translated at the level of education policy into coherent strategies for tackling multiple disadvantages.

10.5.10 Building leadership capacity for change

All of the initiatives recognise the importance of building capacity within the education sector and more broadly as a pre-requisite for development. Some make specific recommendations, many of which find support in the wider literature relating to ‘good governance’ (see for example, Cheru, 2002; Ashton and Green, 1996; Carnoy, 1999). These include putting into place better regulatory frameworks, a sharper delineation of responsibilities among different levels of government, ensuring decentralisation does not lead to inequitable distribution of resources, more efficient use of existing resources, improving management capacity, greater cross-sectoral co-ordination, more leadership and management training and ensuring gender equity. We have seen, then how initiatives at the regional level are specifically targeted at developing leadership capacity. However, there is also the recognition that implementing change requires going beyond developing the technical capacity of leaders to effect change. We have seen in relation to the earlier discussion on the post-colonial state, for example, that a key issue in the African context (and elsewhere) is creating greater accountability. For the CFA (2005), education has an important role to play in this regard because it is argued that a more educated citizenry is better able to make leaders accountable to them.

The emphasis in most of the initiatives is on developing leadership capacity in government, i.e. developing ‘top down’ leadership. Little, if any, attention is given to the need to develop leadership capacity outside of government within civil society. In this respect there is a tension between the commitment in NEPAD and the CFA for example, towards developing democratic institutions in Africa and including stakeholders from civil society in decision making, on the one hand, and providing training for civil society organisations in policy advocacy work, on the other. For some critics there is also a tension between developing effective and accountable indigenous leadership and the continued dominance of donor led agendas in determining policy. For some writers, such as Sogge (2002), the ‘good governance’ agenda in Africa is principally concerned with ensuring the efficiency with which African governments can implement externally determined policies and agendas. As we argued in Chapter 5 and 6, some critics have also suggested that the impact of Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes in the most indebted countries has been to continue to impose externally defined reform agendas, this time by linking reform to debt relief (see also Cheru 2002). Other critics have pointed out the salience of the ‘intellectual financial’ complex which is understood to define research agendas and funding priorities in relation to the interests and viewpoints of donors rather than those of recipients (Samoff, 1992; 1999).

10.5.11 Emerging approaches to education funding.

If the regional initiatives are to be ultimately successful then a key requirement is that they are adequately resourced. The recommendations of the CFA report concerning education funding provide a useful reference point because they are the most recent and comprehensive, and build on the proposals contained in other initiatives, such as NEPAD. The CFA recommends that ‘donors and African governments should meet their commitments to Education for All, ensuring that every child in Africa goes to school. Donors should provide an additional US$7 to 8 billion per year as African governments develop comprehensive national plans to deliver quality education’ (CFA, 2005: 184). This would, according to the report, be enough ‘to strengthen education systems comprehensively and enable all children to have a basic education with half progressing to secondary’ (ibid.). Part of this funding would go through the Fast Track Initiative (FTI) that would be extended to an increased number of sub-Saharan African countries. As we indicated in Chapter 6, there is a major tension between the goals of the MDGs and the FTI and the resources available to implement them. This tension is reproduced in relation to the CFA. Perhaps the largest risk facing the CFA initiative is that donors will fail to find funds to meet their commitments (Independent, 27/12/05).

There is also a tension between the form that donor support for education and training takes and the goal of developing indigenous leadership. As we indicated in Chapter 6, the advent of sector wide approaches to donor funding in education and training, Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes (PRSPs) and the more recent Fast Track Initiative to achieve the MDGs are intended to support the goals of African led development. As we also saw, however, some question whether these simply represent more subtle forms of control by donors over national policy agendas whilst others point out the limited success of these initiatives in meeting their objectives. These tensions appear in the CFA report.

Through emphasising the need for African governments to set their own priorities, the report presents expenditure on education as a ‘political’ as well as a ‘technical’ question. The report suggests that the additional donor funding called for will mean that overall government expenditure on education will reach 6% of GNP. A silence, however, is the relative priority that African governments should themselves give to education funding over other areas of
government expenditure. As we saw in Chapter 9, many governments continue to spend considerably more on areas such as supporting the military than they do on areas such as education and health.

10.7 Conclusion

By way of conclusion it is worth retuning to the central question that the chapter has sought to address, i.e. the extent to which a regional model of educational development provides a suitable basis for developing an indigenous, African response to the challenges posed by globalisation. The new regionalism in African education encompasses a hugely diverse range of initiatives representing different interests and objectives. Nonetheless, it has been argued that the regional level provides an increasingly valuable level for African governments and civil society organisations to affect change although the reasons for this may vary. In general it provides opportunities for locally and nationally-based interests to influence agendas at the supra-national level, and for the continent as a whole to articulate a common voice in dealings with the outside world. Regional initiatives can also assist processes of integration through harmonising education policy frameworks with regional development initiatives. The regional level provides a useful vantage point for identifying and tackling educational issues that are common to countries within a region or that have a trans-national character, undertaking capacity building initiatives and achieving economies of scale in some areas of educational provision and in research.

However, there are a number of barriers that currently limit the effectiveness of the regional level for realising educational objectives. Firstly, as we have argued, there is an inherent danger that regional initiatives cannot by their nature take account of the range of contexts within and between countries and at times provide too uniform and homogenous a view of educational challenges and possible solutions. Secondly, however effective the regions may be in advocating reform, initiatives come up against the reality that it is national governments rather than regions that have responsibility for implementing policy. Here initiatives come up against issues such as a lack of resources and capacity to implement change locally. Thirdly, regions, too, suffer from similar problems of a lack of capacity to influence change. The issue is particularly stark for civil society based organisations. Both of these factors militate to reproduce a top-down approach to regionalism in education and limit the possibilities to create more bottom-up approaches. Fourthly, many of the initiatives only touch the surface of the challenges facing African education. They do not go far enough and appear too slow to respond to the rapidly changing realities affecting the continent as a result of globalisation. We have seen this, for example, in relation to the need to develop national systems of innovation and to deal with the multi-dimensional nature of social exclusion. Fifthly, developing an indigenous response to global challenges runs up against the dominance of global agendas. Although many African countries have themselves signed up to these agendas, there are sometimes tensions between these and other priorities that African governments or civil society may have. This was illustrated, for example, in the tensions between implementing the MDGs on the one hand and prioritising other areas, such as education quality, and other levels and sectors of education besides primary schooling. We also witnessed this tension in relation to conflicting views about the impact of the GATS and the marketisation of education. The analysis suggests that although global agendas exert a powerful influence over low income regions such as Africa, the regions can themselves be seen as sites of debate and contestation over educational priorities linked to broader debates about the nature and direction of development. That is to say global educational agendas are mediated at the regional level. Finally, like examples of the new regionalism more broadly, regional initiatives in the area of education have tended to emphasize education’s role in relation to economic integration and development. Whilst this emphasis is important for tackling Africa’s problems, it has meant that issues of culture, language and identity that go to the heart of the African renaissance project have been more marginal in debates thus far.
PART III: CONCLUSIONS
Chapter 11: Synthetic Review

11.1 Introduction

Our historical and thematic review of the literature on ‘globalisation’, ‘education’ and ‘development’, and the relationship between them, suggests that they are complex, contingent and changing. Saying they are complex is not a new insight. The purpose of reminding ourselves of this is to underscore the importance of linking education to wider social and political processes if we are to generate relevant and robust problem diagnoses and policy solutions. Education does not operate as a separate system. In fact, it is charged with a highly contradictory mandate; of producing competitive workers for the economy, and socially competent and responsible citizens for the polity. Education also plays an important role in generating societal cohesion and regional and national identities. These contradictory mandates shape the terrain of education policymaking. Saying that the relationship between globalisation, education and development is contingent means emphasising the importance of agency; that the ideas that we have and the decisions that we take do make a difference. It is why education itself, as a site for the production of both ideas and capacities to generate change, matters. Education can make a difference, positively and negatively. The trick is getting things sufficiently right so that the positive side of the balance sheet registers far weightier than the negative side. It is also why informed policymaking matters. It is also clear that at its simplest and most concrete, ‘globalisation’ signals profound changes taking place in the wider society and global political economy. Globalisation thus changes the conditions for development.

Like Green et al (2007) we take a particular view of development-promoting globalisation, and that it must be more than economic growth that is at stake. Their articulation of ‘development promoting globalisation’ as ‘growth with equity and peace’ is particularly helpful as a lens through which to view and make judgements about the efficacy of policies and programmes in place that are intended to produce development. As always, this is a very difficult line to tread. Green et al (2007) show from their analysis of the various country studies that while it is possible to draw the conclusion that education has been a significant factor in the early stages of development, it is not the sole contributor to development or indeed to the overall reduction in poverty and inequality. Land reform, improvements in agriculture, the equalisation of outcomes in education and pro-active government policy have all played an important part in facilitating economic growth. Again, this is to underscore the importance of seeing education, not as a sole cause, or sole solution to problems of development, but one of a number of strategies that can, under the right circumstances, contribute to growth with equity and peace.

Whereas Green et al (2007) reviewed the evidence from the perspective of national actors or institutions, our review focuses on the global actors or institutions as they engage with the national and regional. In other words, we examine the policies and programmes of the actors (for example, the traditional international organisations, nation states, non-government organisations, multinational firms) involved in the global governance of education. Moreover, we have been particularly concerned with the structuring ideas, mechanisms and processes through which the global governance of education is mediated and produced.

The purposes of this final chapter, then, are, first, to set out a brief structured account of the differences that globalisation has brought about in the relationship between education and development, and second, to draw some implications of this analysis that may have relevance for policy makers. The account of the differences made by globalisation will be in stages; first, a review of historical relations between education and development, culminating in the era of globalisation; second, an analysis of the global governance of education, focussing on actors, ideas and processes; third, a brief review of some ‘new’ problems and challenges generated by globalisation in the area of education and development, and four, an outline of possible policy directions.

11.2 Locating globalisation historically

One starting point in our work was to locate globalisation historically. The reason for this was to understand globalisation as a structural transformation in the world order (see Held et al, 1999) whilst recognising and identifying the continuities and discontinuities with the past (see Mittelman, 2004). This has given us a way of identifying new tensions emerging as a result of processes associated with globalisation, in particular, movements across borders (of ideas, people, goods, services, aid).

Table 11.1 offers a highly stylised account of the major shifts in theory, policy and priorities of the international community in relation to education and development between 1945 and 2005. We have identified a transition from what we have called a ‘National Development’ era’ (1945-1979) to one that we have referred to as a ‘Neo-liberal Globalisation’ period (1980-2005).

We divided this latter period into three, comprising the Washington Consensus; the Post Washington Consensus and the period following the attacks of September 11th, 2001. We did not place a solid line between the Post Washington Consensus and the Post September 11th columns. In our view, this represents an addition in the form of the Post Washington Consensus policy repertoire rather than a break with it, at least to date. The new emphasis on security has had consequences for the distribution of aid by some donors as well as for the content of some aid programmes (see Chapter 5).
Table 11.1 Educational Policy from Washington to Post Washington and Beyond

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY THEMES</th>
<th>National Development Era</th>
<th>Neo-liberal Globalisation Era</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newly independent nation states, United Nations Institutions; the United States &amp; the USSR.</td>
<td>IMF/World Bank and other IFIs. OECD/DAC; US/USSR.</td>
<td>IMF/World Bank &amp; IFIs; G8 &amp; WEF, End of Cold War leads to US hegemony.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FINANCE</strong></td>
<td>Largely state funded. ODA focused on specific project funding, little bi-lateral/multi-lateral coordination. Legacy of colonial educational ties gives way to national development in Cold War context.</td>
<td>Fiscal austerity &amp; SAPs, User Fees, community financing, decentralisation, privatisation, ODA reductions as Cold War ends (early 1990s).</td>
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<tr>
<td>State &amp; bi-lateral/multi-lateral. Few ODA partnerships with NGOs. Little coordination between ODA agencies. Soviet alliances with certain LICs, US alliances with others. NAM coordination.</td>
<td>Top-Down, Donor Led; local participation often reduced to funding; Global recipe for education. Some bypassing of state to work with local government and NGOs.</td>
<td>Country Owned?, Poverty Reduction Strategies, Sector Wide Approaches, increased participation, more sensitive to local needs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong state led model of educational development.</td>
<td>Minimal State, preference for private sector and market like delivery. Decentralised processes.</td>
<td>Reshaped state role, state as catalyst &amp; strategic actor (NIEs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State education as nation building project. Strong focus on national economic &amp; social development objectives.</td>
<td>Narrow focus on fiscal austerity and economic role of education (human capital theory &amp; rates of return).</td>
<td>Wider understanding of education’s social function: citizenship and social capital. Increasing concern with conflict.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
The 10 points below characterise this particular globalisation phase (for a more thorough summary see the Executive Review) of education and development:

- human capital theories continue to permeate education development agendas;
- structural adjustment policies (free trade, markets, privatisation) have been augmented by policies to develop stronger institutions and to strengthen civil society;
- the traditional International Organisations have been joined by a new set of (international) actors; these include NGOs, for-profit firms, and other kinds of education providers. Together they play a prominent role in shaping the direction of education in national contexts;
- education as a human right as well as education for human capital is promoted as part of the Millennium Development Goals;
- education is conceptualised as a private good and as part of the services sector;
- the use of digital technologies in education is unevenly distributed and threatens to create new divides; between the north and the south, between elites and the working classes, between rural and urban;
- global benchmarks are being created to establish international standards and determine the quality of education outputs;
- citizenship education has become more pressing as a result of increased levels of migration and the breakdown of traditional communities;
- conflict reduces opportunities for education and therefore learning; and
- new security issues are impacting on the distribution of aid for development.

While not exhaustive, this list provides us with an insight into the characteristics of the new globally-structured agenda in education and raises important issues for the direction of development policy and programmes in the education sector.

11.3 New developments in the global governance of education

A number of new developments have occurred during this globalisation era that offer new challenges to the global governance of education. These are discussed below under new actors and ideas; security; mobility and migration, and trans-border supply of education.

11.3.1 New actors and ideas

There has been a thickening of multilateral interactions and interconnections in the global governance of education. There are more actors involved in making policy and in delivering programmes in the education sector, aside from the United Nations agencies, donor agencies like DFID, the OECD and more recently the WTO. It includes globalising organisations (such as universities), multi-national firms (such as Microsoft), non-government organisations (such as Oxfam), and regional actors (such as NEPAD, CARICOM, APEC and NAFTA). Nation states are also active on the global stage in promoting their own ‘national interests’, or the interests of particular fractions of capital, such as in the globalising services sector.

The dominant ideology associated with globalisation is neo-liberalism, and there is good evidence to suggest that neo-liberalism, with its commitment to opening up rather than closing off national economies has been a central dynamic in quickening the pace of globalisation.

So why has neo-liberalism proved so controversial as an idea in guiding development? Part of the answer lies in the fact that neo-liberal theories promote the market above the state as a means for coordinating development. They also prioritise the economic over the social and political as a means for generating economic growth. Human capital theories view investments in humans as a means to enhance capabilities (knowledge and skills), which will generate economic growth. However, as we have outlined in Chapters 2 and 9, and Green et al (2007) have indicated, neo-liberal theories have also presided over a period characterised by greater rather fewer inequalities (as measured by the GINI coefficient), rising rather than reducing poverty (particularly if India and China are excluded) and increased levels of social conflict. Added to this, all social relations are being reduced to market relations – for example in the inclusion of education as a services sector within the economy (see Chapter 8). However, as a set of ideas, neo-liberal globalisation is a diminishing and one-dimensional model of development (and therefore demeaning) rather than an enhancing and equity-oriented model. Neo-liberal globalisation also increases rather than decreases social inequalities (with particularly negative effects on women and girls, and indigenous populations); it also reduces knowledges to knowledge (reducing diversity and possibilities for creative innovation) while knowledge is reduced to a commodity (thus reducing its capacity to inform diverse innovations).

More recently development agendas have emphasised the importance of the social and the political (as in good governance, social capital, community development, citizenship – see Chapters 4, 6, 9). In part, the turn to good governance and social capital by the traditional International Organisations was a response to the critique of structural adjustment programmes. It was also recognition that the Asian development model represented a viable
alternative (see Green et al, 2007). Amartya Sen’s landmark work, stressing the importance of multiple human freedoms and capabilities, has likewise encouraged a broader perspective on the social as well as economic dimensions of development.

Two new major developments in actors and ideas have characterised global governance more generally in the new millennium and which have had effects on development. The first was the organised resistance to proposals for the extension of world trade, heralded by the ‘Battle in Seattle’ in 1999, but still active and effective up to the failure of the Doha round in mid-2006. This resistance was broadened into the World Social Forum that met for the first time in 2001, and has continued to spawn other organisations and actions around the world. Oxfam, for instance, has supported and promoted the idea of ‘fair’ rather than ‘free’ trade, and are opposed to including education in the GATS agreements.

The second development was, of course, the convulsions caused by the events of 11th September, 2001, which called forth major shifts of direction in the ideas and perceived purposes of global governance. The ‘security’ agenda both strengthened and challenged the ‘development’ agenda; it highlighted a new and more pressing ‘value’ of development, but also threatened to ‘distort’ it and to displace it as a recipient of funding and concern.

In a not unrelated move, the MDGs were introduced as a major new initiative that highlighted in manifold ways the relationship between development and education. They were characterised by their single, global focus with a single dominant purpose—the elimination of poverty.

11.3.2 Security

As we showed in Chapter 5, the growing politicisation of aid under the aegis of the ‘War on Terror’ may be leading towards a redefinition of what constitutes overseas development aid, with certain types of military assistance potentially being delivered under the rubric of humanitarian aid. We also noted the danger that the pledges of both national governments and the international community towards meeting the MDGs might be sacrificed for military and security concerns. Furthermore, we emphasised the need to ensure that the War on Terror does not repeat the follies of the Cold War period when aid, including aid to education, often had little to do with assisting the poorest nations and population groups and more to do with furthering the particular and contingent political objectives of the major powers. However, we also highlighted that there are very different conceptualisations of how growing insecurity might be addressed which range from increased offensive military action to ‘winning hearts and minds’ to large-scale humanitarian investment to address the material roots of political disquiet. All of these policy repertoires appear to be present in the current period but the balance between them may change. Centrally the chapter emphasised the direct and indirect ways that aid to education and international education policy appears to be becoming involved in the global war on terror and the potential implications of this.

11.3.3 Mobility and migration

One major, new and relevant consequence of globalisation is to be found in the changes in the patterns, purposes and participants in transnational mobility and migration. While there has always been movement of people across borders and continents, such movement has taken on new forms across the last two decades and presents novel challenges for education. One way in which this might be recognised is the inability of the powerful concept of the ‘New International Division of Labour’, which served very well during the latter decades of the last century, to capture the issues involved. On the one hand, it does not capture the complexity of the issues thrown up by an emerging global labour market; on the other it does not take into account the non-economic basis of much contemporary mobility of persons. One of the problems it raises is how far the challenges are to be seen as national, (and if so which ‘national’, sending or receiving), and how far they are to be seen as trans- or supra-national. The nature of these movements of persons is extremely diverse, in purpose, intensity and consequences. Among the forms it takes and the issues it raises we list the following:

- ‘brain mobility’ – this raises issues of the cost of, and public and private returns to, education (including remittances). What are the effects on both the overall economic, and the educational sectoral capacity of sending and receiving countries? What are the effects on educational priorities of sending and receiving countries?
- *internal migration* - this takes the form of rural to urban movements, but includes internally displaced people, temporary movements in search of seasonal work, and nomadic cultures. What kinds of curricular and mechanisms of delivery are more appropriate?
- *economic migration* - both ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’, and refugees – this raises the question of whose responsibility it is to ensure that children involved in such movements receive education as a human right when they are not citizens of the receiving (or possibly, any) country?

11.3.3 Cross border supply of education
As outlined in Chapter 8, there has been a rapid escalation in the cross border supply of education. Many leading developed countries now receive significant returns from ‘exporting’ education to countries where capacity is limited, or where there is sufficient demand (for example, for status, acquisition of English). The OECD argues that the cross border supply of education provides a real opportunity for low-income countries to boost capacity in their education sectors. In other words, the sector can be opened to a new range of education providers who are able to capitalise on new technologies, existing expertise in the exporting country, surplus capacity, and so on. While countries have most certainly used this approach to boost their stock of educated labour (e.g. China, Malaysia), there are particular dangers in this approach at present if it is tied too closely to the WTO processes. As the WTO processes stand at present, low-income countries are not able to use the WTO rounds to effectively promote their own interests in a fair and equitable way.

The terms of this agreement are largely being pushed by the developed, exporting countries with an interest in protecting their own investors. Low-income countries, on the other hand, have had limited input into these negotiations, yet they are committed to a programme of progressive liberalisation of education. In our view there are also major problems in locating education within the framework of global trade, largely as it narrows the space for policymaking not only in the short but longer term. Also, low-income countries may not always realise the full-import of committing their education sectors in this way.

11.4 Challenging development assumptions

This part of our conclusions is set at the level of the basic set of assumptions of the relationship between globalisation, development and education. It is based on the view that the failure of that relationship to deliver more of the good things it promised and aimed for, and fewer of the bad things, inheres in the nature of the fundamental approach that has dominated the field—in various forms, and not without challenge—for the past 50 years. It is clear that the shortcomings of that dominant approach are becoming recognised by many of its leading exponents, but in our view, the responses to this recognition add up to a modification, but not a transformation of its basic assumptions. We will consider the logic, the mechanisms and the processes of the dominant approach.

The logic of the dominant approach rests on two fundamental components; that economics can supply the answer to problems of development, because development is ultimately dependent on economic growth; and that all economies have the same basic elements, certainly to the point that they can all be treated alike. Recipes for development are essentially based on policies and actions, in all sectors of a society that produce the optimum level of economic growth. Until relatively recently (in fact, until the exposure of the disasters visited upon developing countries by the Washington Consensus), in essence, economic theory was ‘institution free’ (Rodrik 2003). The failure of the Washington Consensus, and the recognition that it was due, at least in part, to the basic assumptions mentioned above, led to a heightened focus on the importance of domestic political, as well as transnational economic, institutions.

So, in response to that set of failures, and further fuelled by the need to respond to the new priorities generated by 9/11, there has been a greater recognition, signalled most clearly in the idea of good governance, that institutions matter. This has been reflected in a range of statements and initiatives that emphasize the need for participation, partnership and democratisation. However, and this is a key part of our argument, the means through which this response has been conceived and implemented has represented continuity with, rather than a recognition of the need for a departure from, existing means of conceiving and delivering development assistance. Put very simply, the institutions perceived as necessary were largely modelled on their Western counterparts and the means of implementing them were essentially the same means as had been used in earlier phases of development; capacity was to be built, and institutions developed in a technocratic, top down, prescriptive way. The basic approach was added to, but not otherwise altered. There was little if any recognition that political processes and social policy may operate according to a different model and logic from that of economic processes.

These attempts to change the details of the dominant approach adhere strongly to its basic explanatory logic, which is a logic of rationality, or of consequences, which essentially suggests that the application of the same actions will have the same results in all cases. Its focus is outcomes, not processes. It tends to set time limits for the achievement of outcomes. Recognising the significance of social and political processes, and adding them into the actions required to bring about the desired changes does not involve any change in this logic.

What we suggest in place of this dominant approach is one that recognises the complexity of development, that economies are always embedded in social and political institutions, that different circumstances produce different outcomes from the same programme, and that the ‘real’ world of development operates according to a logic of local appropriateness rather than to a logic of universal consequence.

Mechanisms

The addition of political and social institutions to the development mix does nothing in itself to change the power relationship between donor and recipient, or the direction of that power. As the leading institutional theorist Douglass North put it, ‘institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient; rather they, or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to devise new rules’ (1990: 16). Though these refinements recognise the importance of political processes, this does not seem to be taken up in the mechanisms through which they are to be implemented. On the one hand, they assume that just
as there is one economy, there is also one state; in both cases these are institutions that developed in the West, and cannot be assumed to transplant easily, or at all. On the other hand, those mechanisms themselves can be seen as part of the dominant approach. They continue to operate through the mechanisms of sanctions and incentives, which have, in one form or another, dominated the development relationship. We see this, for instance, in the conceptions of negative and positive conditionality. The point here is that both mechanisms rest on a basic assumption of individual rational calculation that maintains power and authority in the same place, and limits opportunities for anything other than a calculative response. Similarly, if we take Powell and DiMaggio’s well-known typology of legitimations of organisational responses to changes in their environment, coercive, mimetic and normative, we can see that the legitimations called forth from developing countries for their development-led actions is either coercive—‘we had no choice but to do this’—or mimetic—‘we did it because it worked somewhere else’. The crucial thing about both these levels of response is that they tend strongly to close off the third alternative, respectively ‘learning’ as a mechanism, and the closely associated ‘normative’ legitimation, where the legitimation is based primarily on application of professional principles or a specialist cognitive base.

We want to emphasize here the massive importance for successful development of mechanisms and processes that enable or encourage learning and the development of professional principles and cognitive bases for action.

Processes

It is undoubtedly the case, as we pointed out in Chapter 6, that we are witnessing a new set of processes of development, in the form of the new meta-narrative and the new architecture of aid. However, in the opinion of many commentators, the main vehicle of this new set of processes, the PRSP, is already discredited, and we want to close this section by suggesting ways that the principles on which it was based, of ownership, partnership and participation, might be more effectively installed. It should be noted that these suggestions all assume ‘a logic of local appropriateness’ rather than universal rationality. As Rodrik has pointed out, in critiquing the dominant assumptions; ‘Local conditions matter not because economic principles change from place to place, but because those principles come institution free and filling them out requires local knowledge’ (Rodrik, 2003: 29). Hence the importance of an approach that problematises local contexts rather than making them subject to ceteris paribus clauses, that recognises the importance of process as well as outcome, and that maximises the opportunities for (mutual) learning in the development relationship.

If we are to move beyond the existing processes, it is necessary first to make them problematic rather than assuming that they have constant, or particular, meanings. In terms of ownership, one such attempt has been elaborated by Gibson (2005), that ownership can be viewed as incorporating the following processes:

- enunciating demand - participation in provision by articulating what asset, project, or program is needed and deciding how resources should be mobilised.
- making a tangible contribution - participation in production by making tangible contributions. Time, effort, and other resources contributed to production are a costly signal that beneficiaries expect to derive benefits from a project.
- obtaining benefits - participation in consumption of the benefits if the project is successful and a share of responsibility if the project fails.
- sharing responsibility for long-term continuation or non-continuation of a project - participation in decisions related to the alienation of the rights to a project (the decision to continue or not continue a project once it has been initiated) (Gibson, 2005: 16-17).

In terms of partnership, it is necessary to ask: does it involve the same partners, or new partners?; what is the basis of their partnership and how has it changed?; what benefits accrue to each party from the partnership?; are these benefits process or outcome benefits?; what is the scope of the partnership?—is it about ends or means—capacity or organisation?; what are the partners’ different interests? And how shared are the understandings of both ‘partnership’ and ‘this’ partnership?

In terms of participation, Eberlei (2001) has assembled the following list of forms of participation; these are (in rising order of significance): information sharing; consultation; collaboration; joint decision-making; empowerment; and control by stakeholders.

The point of this exercise of problematising in a rather simple way might be meant by the three key terms of the new aid processes is to provide a means of evaluating and comparing different combinations of the three terms—where the basis of the evaluation is how far they have moved towards the objective they aspire to attain, of ‘local’ ownership, ‘full’ participation by all parties and a locally focussed partnership.

Enabling learning

If there is one point that emerges from this review of the literature on globalisation, development and education, it is the potential benefits to be gained by all the parties to the relationship from enhancing their opportunities to learn from the processes they are engaged in. The closing off of such opportunities is the pragmatic basis of our
objection to the dominant approach to development. This should not, of course, be seen as a self-interested proposal from a bunch of people involved in ‘education’; the kind of learning we are concerned with here has little, except contingently, to do with what has traditionally gone on in schools—though it may come to be more prominent even there. Learning is seen as the opportunity to develop new capacities. It is central to work in the systems of innovation approach, and it is perhaps most strikingly seen in this text in the work of the Uruguayan economists, Rodrigo Arocena and Judith Sutz, and their conception of the ‘learning divide’. This is the gap they perceive between the countries of the North and those of the South not so much in access to, but in the opportunities to practice and work with those technologies to the point where new capacities can be developed. What this means for us is that policies, projects, programmes of development should always contain an explicit set of processes that provide opportunities for learning and hence for capacity building—for individuals, organisations and institutions—as well as a set of actions that will produce the desired set of outcomes. One specific set of initiatives that seems to us to fill this bill is that of mutual peer review. Particularly if allied to a regional system of innovation, this could from the basis for a different kind of development-education relationship. One initiative that comes close to this is the African Peer Review Mechanism (see Chapter 10). This has gotten off to a slow, and so far fairly unspectacular start, but it is in the essence of the process that its slowness and lack of spectacular achievements are to be expected, even welcomed.

11.5 Knowledge for development – concluding remarks

In concluding our review of the relationship between education, globalisation and development, we want to emphasize the value in, and importance of, reviewing what we know about the processes and relationships that might better inform policy and practice. At the same time we recognise the particular difficulties of working in the education area, largely because of the differing and in many cases contradictory mandates, for education – as an engine for economic growth, a tool for creating politically responsible citizens, and as a means for socialising individuals. The difficulties of providing even a basic education are compounded in low-income countries, such as sub-Saharan Africa. Despite these difficulties, education continues to be aspirational and inspirational; it can change lives and alter our views about who we are and how we might live. Yet it is denied many children and adults in the world, and even when they might access it, it is at times not of sufficient quality to make the difference that it should. This fact alone also reminds us that education is a means of producing both social justice and injustice. For all of these reasons it is important that we try to get it right, or recognise when we don’t so that we can try again. As is also argued in the complementary volume to this book (see Green et al 2007), if education can produce growth with equity and peace, then it is a goal worth striving for.
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