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Globalisation, Education Governance and Citizenship Regimes: New Democratic Deficits and Social Injustices

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Introduction

In the past two decades, education systems around the globe have undergone dramatic changes. In large part this is because of changes within and between nation states as the stakes increase in the competitive race of the global economy (cf. Cerny, 1997; Held et al., 1999). It is also because there has been a reconceptualisation of the role of education across the developed and developing world, on the one hand to tie education more closely to the economy in order to drive economic growth, and on the other to develop the education sector in such a way that it directly generates income for institutions, national economies and for profit firms who are moving into particular sectors.

Throughout this period there have been major changes in the structures and systems of governance, with nation states ceding some of their powers of governing to new ‘scales’ of activity—by scale, here, I mean ‘regional’, ‘global’ and ‘local’ (Jessop, 2000). New and invigorated global and regional structures, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), European Community and Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) have emerged, all with important implications for education (Dale and Robertson, 2002; Robertson et al., 2002), while the decentralisation and dispersal of state’s functions to the community and private actors has considerably complicated the terrain of education provision, funding and its regulation (Dale, 1997). In sum, national/sub-national education systems—at all levels—from schools to higher education establishments, are being radically transformed.

These transformations in the governance of education, however, raise important questions about how education systems now mediate citizens’ claims-making and thus the terrain of social justice, particularly as education has been an important institution in balancing capitalism and democracy through redistribution and recognition politics (see Carnoy and Levin, 1985). Education has been a key institution for nation states in constructing citizens, not only in terms of identity but also as potential workers and members of the polity—often referred to as ‘nation building’. Education is an important political arena of struggle for members of a polity around who gets taught what, matters of access, and equal opportunity. It is also a central strategic platform for political actors, including political parties and the wider public – particularly because of its so-called ‘public good’ nature. Finally, education systems have been a core mechanism in generating legitimacy and societal cohesion for the state, in part through the knowledge that is transmitted, but also because of its capacity to propagate ideas like meritocracy and the values of market economies and societies.

If, however, national systems of education are being transformed as a result of processes of globalisation, the question we must ask ourselves here is: What form are these transformations taking? How do these alter the nature of national citizenship regimes? And, what are the implications of these shifts for citizens and claims-making in national territories, and for notions of rights, responsibilities, identities and social justice? In this chapter I want to address these questions, first by outlining what I mean by ‘citizenship’ and the idea of a ‘citizenship regime’. I will then develop four linked shifts that chart the nature of transformations taking place in education that directly and indirectly impinge on citizenship regimes. These shifts, I will argue, are reconstituting national citizenship regimes at a multiple set of scales and, as a result, the sites and parameters for claims-making and social justice. Specifically, I will suggest that as a result of neoliberal policies, programmes and practices at multiple scales—from the global to the local, there is a diminution, if not an absence, of possibilities for political claims by citizens, giving rise to a significant democratic deficit.
Defining citizenship and citizenship regimes

“In its narrowest definition, citizenship describes the legal relationship between the individual and the polity” (Sassen, 2005: 81). Until recently, the idea of citizenship was commonly associated with the Westphalian system of nation-states, with nationality a key component. This meant that citizenship and nationality tended to fuse. A citizen could normally only be a passport holder in one nation, while dual or multiple passports were firmly discouraged.

However, while related to each other, nationality and citizenship reflect different legal frameworks. While both identify the legal status of an individual in terms of state membership, until more recently, citizenship was largely confined to the national dimension (as in the right of access to state assistance, liability to conscription), while nationality referred to the international legal dimension of citizenship in the context of an interstate system (such as being a passport holder of a particular nation). In other words, being a passport holder might not qualify an individual for all of the rights that a citizen of that nation might have access to. An example here is in the UK, where a passport holder who had been absent from the UK for some time will have no recourse to public funds immediately on arrival back in the country. Alternatively, until recently, being a passport holder in New Zealand entitled the bearer of that passport to access public funds in Australia. We can see from these two brief examples that there is considerable variation across nation-state as to they way nationality and citizenship rights are defined. This is also the case across the various member states of Europe as to as to how citizenship is articulated, how non-citizens are defined, and what rights citizens might be entitled to.

We can see, then, that “citizenship is a social construction” (Jenson, 2000: 232). That is, how citizenship is understood and practiced varies with place and over time. Where these constructions develop some degree of stability and coherence and are the foundation for widely understood and endorsed claimmaking within a social formation, we can refer to these paradigmatic encodings as a citizenship regime. For Jenson, a citizenship regime can be seen as;

…the institutional arrangements, rules and understandings that guide and shape concurrent policy decisions and expenditures of states, problem definitions by states and citizens, and claims making by citizens. A citizenship regime encodes within it a paradigmatic representation of identities, of the ‘national’ as well as the ‘model citizen’, the ‘second class citizen’, and the non-citizen. It also encodes representations of the proper and legitimate social relations among and within these categories, as well as the borders of ‘public’ and ‘private’. It makes, in other words, a major contribution to the definition of politics which organizes the boundaries of political debate and problem recognition in each jurisdiction (op. Cit: 232-33).

Jenson (2001: 4-5) develops four elements of a citizenship regime, each one of which contributes to the setting of its boundaries. The first element concerns the expression of basic values about the responsibility mix; that is, defining the boundaries of state
responsibilities and differentiating them from those of markets, families and communities. Second, through the formal recognition of particular rights (civic, political, social and cultural; individual and collective), a citizenship regime establishes the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion of a political community. In doing so, it identifies those entitled to full citizenship status and those who, in effect, hold second-class status. Third, a citizenship regime prescribes the boundaries around democratic rules of the game for a polity. Included in these are rules around access to the state, the modes of participation in civic life and public debates, and the legitimacy of specific types of claims making. Fourth and finally, a citizenship regime contributes to the definition of nation, in both the narrow passport sense of nationality and the more complicated notion of national identity and its geography. It therefore establishes the boundaries of belonging. Changes in the wider society challenge and change the encodings of citizenship regimes. What we might also note here is that Jenson’s concept of citizenship regimes is implicitly assumed to be ‘national/nation’ – which takes me to the core of my argument. New dynamics and developments broadly referred to as processes of globalisation have challenged the primacy of the national scale and the supremacy of the nation state as sole actor in the governance of education and producer of knowledgeable citizens.

Enter globalisation

As John Urry notes, when the discourse of globalisation really took off “…exponential growth in the analyses of the global began to suggest that there was a putative global reconstruction of economic, political and cultural relationships” (Urry, 1998:2) with transformations in the nature of the state in turn transforming the parameters of citizenship (Held et al, 1999; Sorensen, 2004)

Processes of globalization have laid bare the embedded and socially constructed and produced nature of ‘citizenship’ and the ‘national state’ (Sassen, 2005: 80) as each has been challenged and transformed by internal and external pressures, processes, projects and practices. Key characteristics of this new regime include the liberalization of trade, the freer movement of finance capital around the globe, greater competition within the public and private spheres, increased levels of private sector activity in formerly state dominated monopolies, the privatization of risk, the withdrawal of the state from various spheres of citizenship entitlement, and the reformulation of state-citizen rights/responsibilities relation (Cerny, 1997; Sorensen, 2004, Sassen, 2005; Peck and Tickell. 2005). Politically, the development of new supra- and sub-regional spaces, projects and politics, such as the European Union (EU) or structures of global governance, have opened up opportunities for rights (political and human) to be negotiated at these different scales. For instance, some indigenous communities now directly target the UN or other international networks and forums in order to progress claims, while citizens in particular national polities have moved to variously use the legal and social structures of the United Nations (UN), the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the European Union, to advance claims around labour rights, human rights, or social welfare and legal protection.

Globalisation and the transformation of education

There are differing views as to how much education systems have changed as a result of processes of globalisation (cf. Hargreaves, 2001) and different accounts as to the form
that this is taking (e.g. extent of the globalisation of ideas like devolution, internationalisation and so on). There is nevertheless broad agreement that there have been significant changes in the rights/responsibilities mix, the borders around public and private and the nature of the boundaries around education—particularly its public good/public sector and service nature. However, surprisingly, there is very little attention paid to the way in which these processes are re/constituting citizens (though for interesting work that looks at the discursive and practical - see Pykett, 2006), citizenship and citizenship regimes, except in terms such as the creation of the entrepreneurial subject or rather descriptive and normative analyses of citizenship programmes and their politics which have re-emerged in the wake of concerns over social order (cf. Lockyer et al 2003). It seems to me that four interlinked processes are implicated here that are involved in reorganising the boundaries of political debate and problem recognition at the level of the national as well as new emerging scales of education activity; the global, the regional and the subnational.

Firstly, there has been a transformation in the mandate and governance of education systems (Dale, 1997). The new mandate for education has been significantly influenced by human capital theory and neoliberal ideas (economic competitivism, investing in knowledge producers, lifelong learning), while choice, diversity and markets have emerged as the dominant ideas to guide governance. This has resulted in more and more of the various activities that comprised the ‘education services sector’ being unbundled and outsourced, including inspection and audit, curriculum writing, research, management services, special education services and so on (Mahony, Hextall and Mentor 2004). In the UK these developments have been given considerable impetus with the introduction of the Public Finance Initiative (PFI) that prioritized the establishment of public-private partnerships as the means for delivering education services. Trends at the EU level suggest a similar pattern, as does the World Bank’s preferred solution to delivering the Millenium Development Goals for universal primary education and an expansion of the secondary sector. In sum, education is now becoming much more closely tied to the economy (World Bank, 2003), while citizens are being constituted by the state as economic actors and choosers.

Secondly, education is being constructed as a private good and a commodity. This process is taking place at all levels of education, from primary to higher. Universities (Marginson and Considine, 2000) and schools (Lewis, 2005) have gone global in search of opportunities for raising revenues and recruiting foreign fee-paying students, while new for-profit firms have moved into the sector (Sachman, forthcoming; Henschke, forthcoming).

A new language has emerged to talk about this development; the idea of importing and exporting education services, while education is increasingly presided over by Departments of Trade. Trade in services is now estimated to be one of the most dynamic growth sectors for the developed economies and a critical means for ensuring continued growth. Importantly for my argument here, industry analysts estimate that the education market is valued to be upward of US$2 trillion (Oxfam, 2002).

Spurring on this development is the World Trade Organisation, itself created in 1995, with the specific mandate to promote free trade, and to regulate global trade (Peet, 2003). The innovative feature of the World Trade Organisation’s mandate was that, for the first time, services—including education—were brought into the ambit of the global trading regime (Robertson et al, 2002). This move has been highly controversial, since services
like education continue to be regarded by the public as ‘public’ goods’.

A third development is the emergence of a new functional and scalar division in the labour of education (Dale, 2002; Robertson, 2002). In other words, education and its governance is being reallocated across scales, from the local to the global, now involving a new array of actors—public and private, including for profit actors. A series of examples can be instanced here: the Bologna Process within the European Union (see Dale, 2003); Singapore’s Global Schoolhouse that provides education services across the region— and which has assembled in Singapore a range of globally-competitive university departments (Olds and Thrift 2005); the rise of personalized learning in the UK which is intended to provide community-based learning rather than institutionally-based learning (Robertson 2005); Brand New Zealand which stamps a mark of quality on education providers who provide education services within the region (Lewis, 2005) and research on brains (see OECD website). The control of learners and definitions of what counts as valuable knowledge is also being distributed across scales, with systems of benchmarking and other forms of assessment, for instance, national league tables, EU benchmarking, global PISA scores. An array of old and newer actors are now present at all these scales engaged in promoting these developments (e.g. Microsoft, IBM, Cisco Systems, Sylvan Learning Systems) and who are keen to promote digital learning technologies and new virtual approaches to learning (Robertson, 2002).

Fourthly, there has been the pluralising of identity(s) in part because a reflection of the rise of identity politics, and in part because of the breakdown of older forms of hegemonic identity (around social class and nation – e.g. English working class). A new terrain of identity claims has opened up; for example in the UK, by the Welsh, Scottish and Irish as well as the various ethnic minority groups. New political projects, such as the creation of the European Union, are also being advanced by the newer structures of the EU (European Commission, Council and Parliament). In this latter case, education systems located at the national scale, as well as a parallel sector of education at the European scale, are explicitly charged with the creation the European citizen (Dale and Robertson, 2006). Identity claims are increasingly turning on cultural particularity rather than principles of universalism, as in the challenge by the French North African community that their young women should have the right to wear the ‘foulard’ (veil) in schools, or where particular groups have asserted the right to state funding to establish schools which protect and promote their cultural and political interests. The upshot, however of this process of pluralising is to privilege identity claims over redistribution claims (see Fraser, 2005)—a matter I will come back to when assessing the implications of these transformations for education and citizenship regimes.

**Education, national citizenship regimes and claimsmaking**

Globalisation and the transformation of education have had and continue to have important consequences for national citizenship regimes, claimsmaking and the possibilities for social justice. To begin, the combination of changes in governance, processes of rescaling (global, national, local) and commodification mean that citizenship regimes are being encoded at a multiplicity of scales and that is is no longer exclusively the provenance of the national state. This does not mean that that transformations being driven by processes of globalisation are exclusively taking place out there, which is what David Held is suggesting with the idea of global governance (2002) or Nancy Fraser’s press for new forms of global dialogue and ploitical representation (2005). Rather, I am
arguing that there have been significant transformations to education and the way in which it is encoded in each of the four elements of contemporary citizenship regimes as they operate within as well as beyond the boundaries of the nation state. As Jayasuryia convincing argues, “the changing architecture of power both globally and within the state serves to rupture and fragment the institutions and processes of governance; from this perspective, globalization is as much an internally as an externally driven process” (2001: 442).

As I have been suggesting, there has been a dispersal and dissolution of powers of governing into institutions in civil society as well as the economy within the boundaries of the nation state as a result of the move from government to governance, for instance, with public-private-partnerships, quangos, outsourcing and so on. However, there is also greater porosity in the boundaries around scales of governing and an emerging contestation over jurisdictions (for instance with the EC, the principle of subsidiarity, and its interventions into national education systems with the Bologna process).

Recall Jenson’s (2001) first element of a citizenship regime; that is, the nature of the boundaries around the responsibility mix between the state, market, community and family. As I have argued, a mix reflects a particular set of values about social and political life, and at present, this mix is shaped by neoliberal ideas as to the precise role of the state, market, community and family. Processes of globalisation have also significantly altered the sites and scales at which actors might be located, including whether some scales take precedence over others. This has resulted in new struggles over all four boundaries and the terms of political debate.

Two consequences have followed from this. One is that neoliberalism has dispersed greater power and responsibility to the market rather than the state in the coordination of public goods and services, signalling the dominance of economism. This results in “…a form of economic constitutionalism that gives a juridical cast to economic institutions, placing these institutions beyond politics” (Jayasuryia, 2001: 443). Jayasuryia argues not only is sovereignty transformed, but that the very nature of these governance changes results in a transition from political constitutionalism to a kind of economic constititutionalism (ibid: 443). Put another way, contracting out public education services to the private sector and community not only constructs them as economic relationships, thus depoliticising them, but they are legally protected ‘beyond’ politics. Mahony et al’s (2003) research on the way private contractors in the education sector in the UK claim commercial sensitivity thereby blocking public scrutiny is an example here.

Second, economic constitutionalism is not confined to the national level. GATS, by transforming education into a global service sector and industry and locating its governance in global regulations that first and foremost protect investors and profits rather than citizens and knowledge, also constitutionalises the economic over the political at the global scale. Similar processes have taken place at the regional scale, for instance with NAFTA and the FTAA. Not only is education and its transformation into a commodity removed and insulated from popular scrutiny or democratic accountability within the political realm, but the regulatory instruments, such as the dispute settlement processes, work in favour of particular agents and their projects (Gill, 2003: 132); the transnational for-profit firms, or the powerful countries or blocs such as the USA, EC and so on.

The transformation of education through commoditizing and rescaling has direct
implications for rights of citizenship. On the one hand, rights are constructed in consumer terms; as information in the marketplace to facilitate choices about which education provider to choose in the local, global or regional marketplace. The only ‘right’ that can be protected by nation states is the right to choose, not an equal ability to realise this choice (Ball, 2003). Paradoxically, while the right to (free primary) education is recognised in several international instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948) and to which all countries are signatories, there is no way to force a particular government to meet its commitments. However, if a company trading in education services were to lose right to trade in a particular country (e.g. because it was renationalised or because of a change in policy at the level of the nation state), the country where the company is based will have, according to the WTO rules, the right to compensation. These kinds of global initiatives have thus narrowed the the policy space for national states and their economies, in turn reducing the scope for national actors and nationally-located citizens to determine policies and programmes. It would seem that rules concerning free trade are much stronger in international law than rules concerning human rights (Fredrikssen, 2004: 422) or laws that might protect national sovereignty. Finally, how do transformations in education as a result of globalisation affect identity construction/production, particularly national identity? Again, the picture is complex because of processes of rescaling (with possibilities of mutiple identities – eg. Welsh, British, European), the acceleration of processes of migration and recruitment of talent, and new identity projects and curriculum initiatives that are being mobilised at a multiplicity of scales -supranational (EU - My Europe; Oxfam – global citizenship; Microsoft – global learner) national and sub-national. If we look take the EU and the idea of European citizenship as a specific case, two developments may well mediate this: cultural diversification as a result of the growing multi-ethnicity and multiculturalism of European societies; and the perceived democratic deficit of the institutions of EU. However, these are dynamic processes, and there is emerging evidence that the growing economic competition between regional blocks (between EU and the USA and Japan) and emerging nations (India, China) that is driving the integration of higher education across Europe (under the Bologna Process and also the Lisbon Agenda – see Corbett, 2005) and responses in other nations (e.g. Australia and Bologna, or Tuning America Latina) will have important consequences for forming identities. At the more global level, it is not yet clear the extent to which the acceleration of the globalisation of education under GATS (in particular through the expansion of e-learning and cross-border supply) will mediate ideas of citizenship and identity production. However, it is a matter of serious concern for nations like South Africa whose fledgling democracy is dependent upon using its systems of education to promote national interests and national identities. Despite this evident fluidity, and the potential for contradiction in identity projects, there is an evident convergence in the discourses and projects to construct the model citizen across these scales. The model (private) citizen is conceived of through the lens of neoliberalism and human capital theory; this citizen is responsible for their own welfare through workfare, their success through entrepreneurialism and competitivism, and their future through lifelong learning for the knowledge-based economy and society (Kuhn and Sutlana, 2006). However, this model is also being contested, not only at the global level (for instance over the GATS), but through new sites of innovation in education, such as Chavas’s reforms in Venezuela, Porto Alegre in Brazil, or indeed in sub-national regions, such as Wales in the UK who have tried to turn back some of the neoliberal reforms of Thatcher and Blair.
Neoliberal citizenship regimes and spaces of social justice

So far I have argued that four intertwined shifts have taken place since the early 1980s as a consequence of processes of globalisation that challenge the role of education systems in the re/production of post war national citizenship regimes. These were (i) shifts in the mandate and governance of education (ii) the growing commoditization of education; (iii) rescaling the labour of education; and (iv) the pluralising of identities. Taken together, these have disturbed the embedded and once tightly bound categories of the national state and notions of national citizenship in turn reconstituting citizenship and citizenship claims in new ways. However, what I have also argued is that though there is a pluralising of identities and processes of identity production, citizenship regimes have become dominated by neoliberal discourses and projects and that this has resulted in the constitutionalisation of the economic at multiple scales. This depoliticises education as an important site of power/knowledge and a resource that is mobilised by particular social classes. However, for the moment there are no adequate framings for claimsmaking at the global or supra-regional levels (aside from ideas like global cosmopolitanism, references to education as a human right, a weak if not unconstitutional mandate for education at scales like the EU). Nor are there sites of legally institutionalised power that might enable a system of multi-scalar claims—corresponding to the encoding of citizenship regimes across scales. For the moment, then, the current state of affairs is more likely to privilege transnational capital and other powerful political actors at the expense of citizens, or those citizens who are successfully ably to reconstitute themselves as entrepreneurial subjects. There has in response been a call for a reclaimed citizenship (Magahlaes and Stoer, 2006).

Sassen (2005) and others are confident there has been an opening up of citizenship and thus possibilities for claimsmaking through the unravelling of the nationality-citizenship relation. Indeed, Fraser (2005) has gone so far as to call for new transnational politics of representation, arguing that claimsmaking is still largely located in nation-states. However, given that there has been a redistribution of the labour of education across scales, moving claimsmaking upward to the transnational scale simply relocates the space for claimsmaking to the global. This would overlook the distribution and transformation of the elements of citizenship regimes across scales. What follows from this insight is the importance of interrogating more closely the politics of the reconstituted spaces for claimsmaking that are now emerging, for these seem to me to be rather limited in their possibilities for delivering social justice and democracy.

In conclusion I want to argue that what is important here is that we are able to reveal the way neo-liberal governance and processes of rescaling have enabled new boundaries to be drawn and new encodings to be constitutionalised that will depend on more than calls to action. It will require a new level of juridical literacy amongst sociologists of education (especially given complex legal architecture of global and regional agreements) as well as a more global outlook on questions of education and sites of knowledge production, distribution and consumption. Furthermore, in the development of a multi-scalar chain of spaces for claims-making that could be at the heart of this project, the ideological content and the mechanisms of governance must be shaped by dialogue and debate in order to generate a stronger sense of the conditions for realising social justice and a remix of the boundaries around state, market, family and individual in order to move it away from excessive economism and the poverty of neoliberalism. This would offer a far more
robust platform for citizenship and education equality and might provide both the content and the impetus for such a programme of education.

References


Jenson (2001: Urry,


